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RUSSIAN BATTLE CRUISER BORODINO

Guns: 9-14 in., 20-_-5.1 in. Torpedo tubes
Ahead: 3--14 in.
Broadside: 9-14 in.

Astern: 3-14 in.

RUSSIAN NAVY-BUILT AND BUILDING Dreadnoughts

7 Predreadnought battleships. Battle cruisers...

The known building program of dreadnoughts is as follows: Comp'd Displace

Speed in

Name. ment. Armament. Knots. 1914..Sevastopol 23,0261 1914. . Petropavlovsk 23,026 ! 12 12-inch.... 23.0 1914.. Poltava

2:3,026 1914..Gangoot 23,026 1914..Imp'sa Maria 22,435 1915. .Imp. Alex. III 22,435 12 12-inch.... 21.0 1915. . Ekaterina II., 22, 435)

Of these the last three are for the Black Sea fleet. It will be observed that the Russian dreadnoughts are turret ships of the Roanoke design, with four turrets instead of three-and three guns in each turret.

The program is as follows:

RUSSIAN BATTLE CRUISERS
Comp'd
Displace-

Speed in Name. ment. Armament. Knots. 1916..Navarin

32,000 1916.. Borodino 32,000 1916.. Ismail

32,000

12 14-inch.... 25.0 1916. .Kinburn...... 32,000)

In these Russian battle cruisers we find again the design of the Roanoke, with three guns in each turret instead of two.

Knowing the pressure that the war has brought upon Russia, it seems impossible that this building program of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers has been completed in any degree that would make the Russian Navy a factor in the balance of sea power at this time.

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2-12

3 12

2.12

- 42

GIULIO - CESARE.

ITALIAN DREADNOUGHT GIULIO CESARE Length, 575142 feet. Beam, 91% feet. Mean draught, 27% feet. Ahead: 5-12 in. Broadside: 13—12 in.

Astern: 5-12 in.

9

no

in

Russia, however, is well provided with destroyers, having an unusual number of these craft for a navy of its size.

The Italian Navy The corresponding strength of the Italian Navy is as follows: ITALIAN NAVY-BUILT AND BUILDING Dreadnoughts Predreadnought battleships..

The Italian Navy has battle cruisers. The latest construction in the known building program is as follows: Comp'd Displace

Speed Name. ment. Armament. Knots. 1913.. Giulio Cesare 22.022 13 12-inch.... 22.5 1914..C'ti di Cavour 22,022 13 12-inch.... 22.5 1915. . Andrea Doria. 22,564 1915. . Duilio

22,564

13 12-inch.... 22.5 1917..Carraciolo 30,000 1917. .Mar'o-Collona 30,000 1917..C'ro-Colombo. 30,000

8 15-inch..... 25.0 1917..F'co-Morosini. 30,000)

The Italian naval constructors have been very skillful—and the above is an advanced program calculated to make Italy, if not a great naval power, a valuable ally to any naval power. The turret plan shown above should be noted, as it provides an ingenious way of mounting thirteen heavy guns—and it is unique among the navies of the world.

But, again in the case of Italy, it must

be realized that the country has probably been too much occupied in other fields to carry out this ambitious naval program.

The Hungarian Navy Austria-Hungary's known strength in first essentials of sea power is given as follows: Dreadnoughts

8 Predreadnought battleships..

6 The Austro-Hungarian Navy has no battle cruisers. The recent known building program is as follows: AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY-BUILT AND

BUILDING Comp'd Displace

Speed in Name. ment. Armament. Knots. 1912.. Viribus Unitis 20,010 1913.. Tegetthoff.... 20,010 12 12-inch.... 21.0 1914. .Prinz Eugen. 20,010 1914.. Szent Istvan. 20,010 12 12-inch.... 21.0 (?)...One ship. (1)...One ship.

24,500 10 13.5-inch... 21.0 (?)...One ship. 24,500 (?)...One ship..... 24,500)

It is improbable that this program has been carried through to any degree. It is much more likely that with German assistance Austria-Hungary has been devoting her energies to submarines-and has thus become a factor in the war of destruction now being waged in the Mediterranean.

.... 24,500)

(1) Time due to be completed unknown.

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AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DREADNOUGHT VIRIBUS UNITIS

Length, 496 feet. Beam, 89 1% feet. Mean draught, 27 feet.
Ahead: 6-12 in.
Broadside: 12-12 in.

Astern: 6-12 in.

Reply to the United States A

or

USTRIA-HUNGARY'S new Ambas

sador to the United States, Count Tarnowski von Tarnow, successor

to Dr. Dumba, arrived in Washington almost simultaneously with the announcement of Germany's new policy of sinking all merchant ships without warning. Before accepting the credentials of Count Tarnowski, the United States Government decided that it must know the attitude of his Government on this vital subject. Accordingly on Feb. 18 a note was dispatched to Vienna asking for a definite and full statement as to the stand which the Dual Monarchy had assumed regarding submarine warfare, and inquiring whether the assurances given to . the United States at the time of the sinking of the Ancona and Persia were to be regarded as changed withdrawn. Frederic C. Penfield, American Ambassador at Vienna, handed this memorandum to Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, and the status of the new Ambassador remained one of suspense pending a reply.

Text of American Note The text of the United States Government's inquiry of Feb. 18, as reported through the European press, is as follows:

In Note 4,107 of Dec. 9, 1915, the American Government laid down the points of view whereby it was guided regarding the activity of submarines in naval warfare. These points of view were on an earlier occasion clearly expressed to the German Government, and the United States Government was of the opinion that the Austro-Hungarian Government was acquainted therewith. The AustroHungarian Government replied with Note 5,735 of Dec. 14, 1915, wherein it declared it had neither adequate knowledge of the exchange of ideas which had taken place between the United States and Germany nor was of the opinion that even complete knowledge would suffice for judgment in regard to the Ancona incident, as the questions arising from this incident bore a different character.

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry declared, in Note 5,949 of Dec. 21, 1915 : As regards the principle set up in the United States Government's very es

teemed note, that enemy private ships, provided they do not flee or offer resistance, should not be destroyed before the passengers are placed in safety, the Austro-Hungarian Government is in a position to assent in the main to this view of the Washington Cabinet.

Further, the Austro-Hungarian Government on the occasion of the sinking of the steamer Persia in January, 1916, declared that, although not informed regarding this incident, it would be guided by the principles whereto it agreed in the Ancona affair, should events prove that responsibility falls on AustriaHungary in this matter.

Simultaneously with the communication from the German Government on the 10th of January, 1916, the Austro-Hungarian Government declared that every merchant ship which for whatever purpose was armed with a gun forfeits by this circumstance alone the character of a peaceful vessel, and that in consideration of these circumstances the Austro-Hungarian naval forces had received orders to treat such vessels as warships.

In conformity with this declaration, ships whereon were American citizens were sunk in the Mediterranean, presumably by AustroHungarian submarines. Some of these ships, for example the English steamer Welsh Prince, were torpedoed without warning by a submarine under the Austro-Hungarian flag. The American Ambassador at Vienna requested information regarding these cases, but thus far has received no reply.

At the same time as the German declaration of Jan. 31, 1917, which described certain portions of the sea off the coasts of Entente countries as exposed to danger from submarines, the Austro-Hungarian Government made known that Austria-Hungary and her allies, as from Feb. 1, would prevent with all available means shipping within the defined barred area.

From the foregoing it can be concluded that the assurance, given on the occasion of the Ancona case and renewed on the occasion of the discussion of the Persia case, is in all material respects the same assurance contained in the note of the German Government of May 4, which reads: " In conformity with the general principles of international law concerning the holding up, search, and destruction of merchant ships, such ships will not be sunk either inside or outside that portion of the sea which has been declared a naval war zone without previous warning and without taking such means as are available for saving human lives, unless such ships flee or endeavor to offer resistance," and that this assurance ig more

less

or

altered by the declaration of the AustroHungarian Government of Feb. 16 and Jan. 31.

Since the United States Government is in doubt regarding the meaning to be attached to these declarations, especially the last, it desires to be finally and clearly informed of the standpoint which the Austro-Hungarian Government adopts in these circumstances and also whether the aggurance given in the Ancona and Persia cases is to be regarded as changed or withdrawn.

Text of Austrian Note The reply of Emperor Charles's Government to the foregoing memorandum was handed to Ambassador Penfield on March 6. It took the unsatisfactory position that neutrals at sea would enter the barred zone at their own risk, and that only neutrals on neutral ships had any right to freedom of the seas. At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government asserted that it adhered strictly to the assurances given at the time of the Ancona incident, though it had declared in the second Ancona note: “The Imperial and Royal Government can substantially concur in the principle that private ships, in so far as they do not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed before the persons on board have been brought into safety."

The full text of the Austro-Hungarian reply to the United States is as follows:

From the memorandum of Feb. 18 of thre American Ambassador, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister has concluded that the Washington Cabinet, in view of statements made on Feb. 10 of last year and on Jan. 31, 1917, by the Austro-Hungarian Government, is now in doubt regarding the attitude which Austria-Hungary will henceforth observe regarding the submarine war and as to whether the assurances given by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Washington Cabinet, in the course of negotiations about the Ancona and Persia papers, have not been nullified by the aforementioned statement. The AustroHungarian Government is ready to make a clear and definite statement so that these doubts may be solved.

The Austro-Hungarian Government may be allowed first of all to discuss briefly the methods employed by the Entente Powers in waging submarine war, because they are the starting point for the intensified submarine war begun by Austria-Hungary and her allies and also throw a bright light upon the attitude which the Austro-Hungarian Government has taken hitherto in regard to the questions which have arisen.

When Great Britain joined the war against the Central Powers only a few years had

elapsed since that memorable time when she, in union with other States, began to lay the foundation at The Hague for modern naval war law. Soon afterward the British Government had assembled in Holland representatives of the great powers in order to consolidate the further work of The Hague Conference, especially in the sense of a just arrangement between interested belligerents and neutrals. These efforts aimed at nothing less than the mutual establishment of principles of right which even in war times should embody the principles of freedom of the seas and the safeguarding of the interests of neutrals.

Neutrals were not to enjoy these benefits for long. Hardly had the United Kingdom decided to participate in the war when, almost at once, it began to break down the barriers which the principles of international law had erected. While the Central Powers, in the very beginning of the war, had declared that they would observe the Declaration of London, which also bore the signature of the British representative, Great Britain threw overboard some of its important provisions. In an endeavor to cut off the Central Powers from supplies from overseas she enlarged, step by step, the list of contraband until nothing was missing in the list of things which today men want for their subsistence.

Then Great Britain proclaimed what she called a blockade of the coasts of the North Sea, which form also an important commerce route for Austro-Hungarians, in order to prevent goods which were still missing in the list of contraband from entering Germany and in order to prevent all sea traffic by neutrals to those coasts as well as all exports through neutrals. That this blockade was in flagrant contradiction to the customary principles of the right of blockade, as established by international agreements, was explicitly declared by the President of the United States of America in words which will continue to live in the history of international law.

By the illegal prevention of reports from the Central Powers Great Britain aimed at paralyzing the countless factories and works which the industrial and highly developed peoples of Central Europe had created and, by forcing workmen to be idle, to incite them to rebellion.

When Austria-Hungary's southern neighbor joined the enemies of the Central Powers his first act was to declare as blockaded all coasts of the enemy, following, of course, tha example of his allies in ignoring all the legal rights in the creation of which Italy had taken an active part a short time before. Austria-Hungary did not neglect to inform neutral powers at once that the blockade was not legal.

Long-Suffering Central Powers For more than two years the Central Powers hesitated. Only then, and after long and careful consideration of pros and cons, did

they begin to return like for like and attacked the enemy on the sea. As the only ones of the belligerents who had done everything to secure the existing treaties which were to guarantee to neutrals the freedom of the seas, they felt with pained hearts the law of the hour which commanded them to violate this freedom. But they took this step to fulfill the paramount duty toward their peoples and from the conviction that it would help the principle of the freedom of the seas to be victorious. The proclamations which they issued last January are apparently directed only against the rights of neutrals. In reality they serve toward the restoration of these rights, which their enemies have incegsantly violated and which, 'if they were victors, they would destroy forever. Thus the submarines which are cruising around the English coast announce to peoples who need the sea-and what people does not want coasts?-that the day is not far off when the flags of all States, in the glory of their newly won freedom, can freely fly over the seas.

We cherish the hope that this announcement will find an echo everywhere where neutral peoples live, and that it will especially be understood by the great people of the United States, whose most illustrious representative has during the war defended with flaming words the freedom of the seas as the highway of all nations.

Working for "Freedom of the Seas " If the people and Government of the United States keep in mind that the blockade proclaimed by Great Britain is not only meant to wear down the Central Powers by starvation, but aims at subjecting the seas to her rule in order to establish in this manner her tyranny over all nations, while, on the other hand, the blockade of England and her allies only serves to make these powers incline toward peace with honor and a guarantee to all nations of the freedom of the sea traffic and sea commerce, and thereby a secured existence, then the question which of the two parties has the right on its side is already decided. Though the Central Powers have no desire in this war to beg for allies, they yet believe that they will be entitled to look to neutrals to appreciate their efforts to revise in the interest of all the principles of international law and equal rights of nations.

In replying now to the question put in the American note of Feb. 18, the Austro-Hungarian Government firstly remarks that in the exchange of notes referring to the cases of the Ancona and the Persia it restricted itself to defining its attitude to concrete questions which individually arose, without laying down its fundamental legal conception. But in its note of Oct. 19, 1915, referring to the Ancona case, it reserved to itself the right to bring up for discussion at a later date difficult international questions which arise in connection with submarine warfare. It now refers to this reservation, and now

briefly discusses the question of sinking enemy vessels, to which that note refers, it is guided by the desire to show the American Government that it now,

as heretofore, strictly adheres to the assurance already given, and endeavors by clearing up that important question arising from submarine warfare, because it touches the laws of humanity, to avoid misunderstandings between the monarchy and the American Union.

Above all, the Austro-Hungarian Government desires to emphasize that it is also its opinion that the thesis set up by the American Government, which also is represented in various learned records, that enemy merchantmen, apart from cases of attempted flight and resistance, must not be destroyed without precautions being taken for the safety of the persons aboard, forms, so to say, the kernel of the whole subject. Regarded from a higher standpoint, this thesis can, of course, be ranked in a further suggestive connection, and from that view its domain of application can be marked out more exactly.

"General Warning" Sufficient From the laws of humanity, which the Austro-Hungarian Government and the Washington Cabinet take in the same manner as judging the lines, the more general principle can be derived that when executing the right of destroying enemy merchantmen the loss of human life should as far as possible be avoided. To this principle the belligerent can only do justice by issuing warning before exercising the right. Therein he can choose the way which the aforementioned thesis of the American Government indicates, according to which the commander of the war vessel himself gives warning so that the crew and passengers may bring themselves into safety in the last moment, or the Government of a belligerent State can, if this is recognized as an inevitable necessity of war, issue warning of full effect also before the departure of the vessel which is to be sunk; or, finally, it can, if it establishes extensive measures against enemy sea trade, employ a general warning for all enemy vessels in question.

That the principle according to which care must be taken for the safety of the persons aboard undergoes exceptions the American Government itself recognized. But the Austro-Hungarian Government believes that destruction without warning is admissible not only when a vessel flees or offers resistance. It appears-to mention only one example, that the character of the vessel itself also must be taken into consideration. Merchantmen or other private vessels which carry a military garrison or arms aboard in order to. commit hostile acts of any kind may, according to valid right, be destroyed without hesitation.

Austrian Ships Sunk Without Notice The Austro-Hungarian Government need not call attention to the fact that the belligerent is released of all consideration for human life if his opponent sinks enemy mer

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