mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene. The Austrian Note It was at 6 P. M. on July 23 that the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade handed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the note embodying the demands of Austria, and insisting on a reply within forty-eight hours. The Serbian Government was charged with fomenting a revolutionary propaganda having for its object the detachment of part of the territories of AustriaHungary from the monarchy. It was asserted, though no proof was given, and dossier communicated, that the Serajevo assassinations were planned and the murderers equipped in Belgrade. The following demands were included in the note: The Royal Serbian Government will publish in the Journal Officiel of July 26, and as an army order, a condemnation of the antiAustrian propaganda and of all officers and officials who have taken part in it. The Royal Serbian Government will undertake besides: 1. To suppress all publications inciting to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the tendency of which is directed against that power's territorial integrity. 2. To dissolve immediately the Narodna Odbrana and all other societies or affiliations which foster an anti-Austrian propaganda. 3. To eliminate without delay from the Serbian schools any members of the staffs or vehicles of instruction with anti-Austrian tendencies. 4. To remove from the army and the civil service a number of officers and officials guilty of anti-Austrian propaganda, whose names will be communicated by the Austrian Government. 5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of agents appointed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the suppression of the subversive movement. 6. To institute a judicial inquiry with regard to the accomplices to the plot of June 28, residing in Serbian territory; AustroHungarian delegates to take part in this investigation. 7. To arrest at once Major Tankositch and Milan Ciganovitch, both of whom are implicated in the assassination. 8. To prevent the illicit trade in arms and explosives across the frontier, and to punish those who assisted the murderers to cross the frontier. 9. To furnish explanations regarding the hostile and unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian functionaries at home and abroad since the outrage of June 28. 10. To notify the Austro-Hungarian Government without delay that the measures enumerated above have been duly carried out. A reply is expected at the latest on Saturday, July 25, at 6 P. M. So secret had the contents of the note been kept from the representatives of the powers-except the German Ambassador Tschirschky, who was understood to have co-operated in drafting it—that when its contents were published on the 24th all of them were dumfounded. The French and British Ambassadors and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires held the view that the step taken by Austria-Hungary must be considered not as a note but as an ultimatum. They expressed indignation at its form, its contents, and the time limit, and they also declared it to be inacceptable. 66 It was not intended to be accepted, and all Vienna went wild with jubilation at the certainty of war, a short war and a merry one, or rather an 'execution,"* to be rushed to a termination before the powers of the Entente had time to decide on a course of action; for Austria-Hungary had been assured by Herr von Tschirschky that the conflict would be localized, that Germany would keep the ring and that Russia must remain passive. It was indeed a fact that neither Serbia nor Russia wanted war, and before the expiration of the time limit Serbia handed in a reply to the note, in which she exceeded all expectations in the direction of conciliation. The Serbian Government unreservedly accepted all the demands of Austria-Hungary, except Nos. 5 and 6, and promised to revise those articles of the Constitution (e. g., Article 22 on the liberty of the press) which stood in the way of these demands. With regard to Nos. 5 and 6, further explanations were requested; the participation in the inquiries and investigations of Austrian functionaries could only be accepted in so far as it should *On July 25, in a conversation with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, Herr von Jagow said that what Vienna intended against Serbia was not a war, but an "execution." conform with international equity and with the maintenance of friendly relations as between State and State. Furthermore, if the manner of carrying out the different clauses enumerated above were not entirely satisfactory to Austria-Hungary, the Serbian Government was ready to refer any point either to The Hague Tribunal or the powers who had taken a part in the settlement of March 21, 1909. Declaration of War A conciliatory answer was neither expected nor wanted, however; that very evening the reply was rejected and the Austrian Minister instructed to leave Belgrade; on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia. Within the next two days Austria awoke to the startling fact that Russia was beginning to move. In spite of the German Ambassador's assurances that the Czar would not and could not fight, he had decided to intervene! A bully likes a fight best when his opponent is much smaller than himself; at this appearance of a full-grown adversary Vienna pulled a very long face, and on July 21 the Ballplatz suddenly consented to eliminate from the ultimatum those demands which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Serbia, to discuss certain others, and, in short, to reopen the question. It was too late. Germany, having jockeyed Austria into a position from which there was no escape, declared war on Russia the next day. The "Punitive Expeditions When on the evening of July 25 the Crown Prince Alexander, acting as Prince Regent, signed the order for mobilization, Serbia was as entirely unprepared for war in every respect, save actual experience of warfare, as any country that has ever been summoned to take the field in self-defense. Little or none of the recent wastage had as yet been made good. The orders placed abroad for cannon, rifles, ammunition, clothing, and stores had not yet been carried out; heavy guns, automobiles, flying machines were lacking. During the campaign which followed, it fre quently happened that a regiment went into the firing line with one rifle for every two men, those who were unarmed taking both the place and the weapons of those who fell. The declaration of war on the 28th was followed by a desultory bombardment of the unfortified Serbian capital from batteries on the opposite shore and monitors on the river. This, however, was the only action taken during the first few days, and Austria's failure to strike while Belgrade lay defenseless and open to easy occupation is significant testimony to her alarm at the European situation and anxiety to compromise. It was impossible for the Serbian armies to line the Austro-Serbian frontier, which extends to 340 miles, especially as in Summer the Save and the Drina are easily forded at numerous points. Voyvoda (Field Marshal) Putnik therefore fell back upon the traditional lines of defense, and, while the Government withdrew from Belgrade to Nish, he grouped the main armies in the Shumadija on the line Palanka-Arandjelovats-Lazarevts, whence they could rapidly move either north or west. Strong detachments were posted at Valyevo and Uzhitse, and outposts stationed at every important point on the frontier, after which all the General Staff could do was to wait till the enemy's plan of invasion materialized. The First Invasion At the beginning of August, Belgrade, Semendria, and Gradishte were subjected to vigorous bombardment, and a number of attempts to cross the Danube were made and repulsed with heavy losses, one Austrian regiment having been practically wiped out. The Serbian staff knew, however, that several army corps were stationed in Bosnia, and refused to be misled by these feints on the Danube. Attempts followed to cross the Drina at Lubovia and Ratsha, and the Save at Shabats, and these were looked upon as more significant. Desultory fighting round places as far apart as Obrenovats and Vishegrad continued until Aug. 12, when the first penetration of Austrian troops into Serbia was signaled from Losnitsa. At that town and at Leshnitsa By The great bulk of the invaders had entered by the valley of the Jadar; the Third Serbian Army and part of the Second Army now advanced with all possible speed to meet them; meanwhile the remainder of the Second Army was ordered to block the advance from Shabats. The Austrian plan was obviously to isolate and overwhelm the Second and Third Serbian Armies in the wedge of land between the Save, the Drina, and the Jadar; this object once attained, the road to Valyevo and Kraguyevats lay open, and Serbia was at the mercy of the invader. On the 14th the Austrians were brought to a temporary halt by the Serbian detachments retreating from Losnitsa, who dug themselves in across the Jadar Valley at Jarebitsa, and gave the main armies time to hasten westward by forced marches; but the first real shock of battle came on the 16th when the Austrian column of almost 80,000 men, advancing from Leshnitsa to the north of the Tzer Mountains, was heavily defeated and routed at Belikamen, two regiments having been annihilated. Pursuing their advantage, the Serbians drove in a wedge between the Austrian forces advancing from Shabats and those operating south of the Tzer Mountains along the Jadar. From this moment the Shabats and the Jadar campaign became distinct operations. At the same time, south of the Tzer, a violent and indecisive action had taken place, and the Serbians were at length compelled to evacuate Jarebitsa on finding their left wing threatened by a force advancing, in hitherto unsuspected strength, from Krupani. The retirement was completed by the morning of the 17th. der, having thrown the Austrians back upon Shabats and brought up reinforcements south of the Tzer, deployed his army on a front of thirty-five miles, extending from Leshnitsa to the neighborhood of Lubovia. Inspired with memories of Kumanovo and Prilip, the Serbians gradually forced their way westward, along the Tzer and Iverak ranges, and down each bank of the Jadar, throwing the enemy back upon Leshnitsa and Losnitsa. Aug. 19 was the decisive day of the struggle; the Austrians gave way at every point; their retreat along the valleys was shelled by the Serbian guns advancing along the intervening heights, and gradually converted into a rout, in which rifle and bayonet completed the work of the guns. By the 23d the Serbian armies, after taking quantities of prisoners and artillery, had hurled what was left of the Austrians back across the Drina. Thus ended the five days' engagement which will be known as the battle of the Jadar. In the meantime strong Serbian forces had crossed the Dobrava Valley and advanced on Shabats, round which the Austrians had fortified a wide circle. Violent fighting took place on the 21st and 22d, on which day the Serbian troops worked their way round to the western approaches of the town. They tightened their cordon on the 23d, and during the night brought up siege artillery. When the bombardment had begun on the morning of the 24th, it was discovered that the Austrians had decamped, after murdering in cold. blood fifty-eight prisoners from the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Serbian Regiments, whose bodies were found piled up in three rows in a private house. By 4 P. M. the Serbians had reached the banks of the Save, and the first invasion of Serbia was at an end. The Austrians' explanation of their retreat, after the "successful accomplishment" of their incursion into the enemy's territory, on account of “ more important operations at other points," is still fresh in public memory. As a result of their attempt to execute" Serbia, the Austrians had lost On Aug. 18 the Crown Prince Alexan- 8,000 dead, 4,000 prisoners, and about |