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Astern: 4-12 in.

States Navy has been authorized. As this is for future years it has nothing to do with this article. But the program is here given because some of its features point out the real weakness of our navy-our weakness in auxiliaries of the battle fleet.

Auxiliaries of Battle Fleet

Our lack of battle cruisers does not now seem the fatal defect so often proclaimed in the first months of the war. Battle cruisers are not now considered equal to the task of standing up against battleships. The development of the submarine has lessened the raiding value of the battle cruiser, which was thought destined to be the knight errant of the seas. In consequence, the tactical use of battle cruisers, by such a navy as the

German or Japanese, against a navy without battle cruisers, seems restricted to the use of these ships as scout cruisers and screen.

Undoubtedly they would give great trouble to such a fleet as ours, but their limitations are now realized. As will be seen from the above table, unless there is some change, we are to build six battle cruisers in our three-year program. It is possible that we may be the last to build them.

The authorization of ten scout cruisers draws attention to the real weakness and greatest need of our navy. We have absolutely no scouts in the modern sense of the word-and from the great sums given by Congress to the navy a large number of these ships should be built as soon as possible.

In destroyers also we are below the needs of our fleet. We have sixty-three built and building. The tactics of the battle of Jutland and the development of the torpedo and submarine indicate an increased value for these craft. A great number should be built as soon as possible. Many are authorized in the future program-and these should be rushed to completion.

Fortunately, without any guiding wisdom of our own, the war has given our country great elements of preparedness. Where there were practically no high explosives available, we now have a great stock on hand. Many kinds of munitions of war are available for seizure in our emergency.

The same conditions have developed an efficient type of submarine that has been built and can be built-in great numbers in an unprecedentedly short time.. This is fortunate for our nation, as in our problem of defense submarines will be of great value. Our coasts are long, and the danger of raids by battle cruisers was very real before the war developed the submarine. Now only specially built monitors dare to stay near a coast long enough to attempt a serious bombardment.

Aircraft are now given a vogue, in spite of the fact that in the war very small tactical results have resulted from

the great sums expended on them. Outside of the limitations imposed on their use by the weather, the development of anti-aircraft guns compels them to fly at such great heights that their usefulness is diminished. It is obvious that we should have some of these craft of a reliable type-but there should not be a great deal of money and energy diverted to aircraft. Their usefulness at sea is greatly diminished, because they are unable to navigate. Out of sight of land, or out of sight of the mother ship, they are lost.

Armament

The details of the principal guns of the United States Navy were given in Part I. of this article. The twelve dreadnoughts completed of the battle fleet carry sixty-four 12-inch guns and sixtyfour 14-inch guns. The three ships of the Mississippi class will add thirty-six 14-inch guns to this total.

In addition to these, the two ships of the Michigan class, which are more powerful than many foreign dreadnoughts, carry sixteen 12-inch guns. Of the other predreadnought battleships six carry twenty-four 45-calibre 12-inch guns, and eight carry thirty-two 40-calibre 12-inch guns, which would make these ships factors in any battle of modern fleets. This cannot be said to the same extent of the predreadnought battleships of the other navies. Every gun in this list is available for a broadside because all our big guns are carried in turrets aligned over the keel.

The shortage of men is too much emphasized in current comment on our navy. It should be realized that we have a highly trained personnel, that even the second-line ships in reserve are in being with skeleton crews-and that we have unusually intelligent classes to draw upon for our war strength.

Great Britain's lesson in unpreparedness should be studied by our country. On land and sea it was not the lack of It was the men that was the trouble. lack of weapons for the men.

On land our energies should be concentrated on providing munitions and equipment-on the sea to provide ma

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FRENCH DREADNOUGHT NORMANDIE Length, 574 feet. Beam, 92 feet. Maximum draught, 28 feet. Ahead: 4-13.4 in. Broadside: 12-13.4 in.

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Astern: 4-13.4 in

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As will be seen from the plans of the Normandie given above, the French have

FRENCH NAVAL GUN IN USE ON THE

WESTERN FRONT

(Underwood & Underwood.)

built good battleships-and French ships have been of great use in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. But with the fearful drain of all the resources of France necessary to maintain her battle front, it is safe to say that not only has there been no completion of her naval building program, but that many of her ships are not now in active commission.

It is now known that equality in heavy artillery on the western front was only established by use of the French naval guns-many of them actually taken from French warships. Probably the French Navy was also drawn upon for men in this great emergency. Consequently the French Navy should be considered as a power in abeyance-not in proportion to its building program.

In auxiliaries of the battle fleet France is well equipped. Her submarines in particular are known to be very good, although, as has been the case with the British Navy, there has not been much chance to use them.

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The first two dreadnoughts have the ineffective arrangement of the turrets of the German Helgoland class, (Part I., Figure 2.) The four dreadnoughts of the Fu-So class are formidable battleships, but, as explained above, they have followed the design of the Arkansas, and are probably not as powerful as the battleships of the Pennsylvania design.

The Japanese predreadnought battleships are not as good as those of the United States Navy.

As a matter of course Japan, like the other nations at war, has given out no naval information since she entered the war. Undoubtedly there has been a great increase of the Japanese building program, but it is not probable that any new capital ships are ready for service. The Battle Cruisers

As in the case of the British Navy, it will be noted that the Japanese naval program did not include battle cruisers for completion later than 1915. Whether

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or not other ships of this class have been recently laid down is not known.

The four battle cruisers in the Japanese building program probably make up the most powerful squadron of their class afloat today, but it is also possible that the Japanese regret building these ships instead of battleships. Their fine armament is carried on hulls that cannot be trusted to resist a serious combat with battleships. Their tactical use would greatly embarrass such a battle fleet as our own, but they cannot any longer be considered a menace.

In all the auxiliaries of the battle fleet

Maximum draught, 29% feet. 8-14 in.

Astern: 4-14 in.

it may be assumed that the progressive Japanese are well equipped. In guns they have closely followed us-and it is probable that they are going to larger calibres, as is the United States Navy.

The Russian Navy

In the matter of sea power Russia has been at a disadvantage through being obliged to maintain two separate navies -the Baltic fleet and the Black Sea fleet. This unusual condition has come from closing the Dardanelles to Russian warships. Their strength in first essentials is as follows:

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