Elizabethport, N. J., and, on its arrival at Elizabethport was received by the vendee's agent and forwarded to him at Boston, and the vendor attempted to stop the iron at Boston, it was held that the transit ended on the delivery to the vendee's agent at Elizabethport. Brooke Iron Co. v. O'Brien, 135 Mass. 448. Right of Stoppage Defeated by Transfer of Bill of Lading. A vendor's right of stoppage in transitu is defeated by the transfer by the consignee of the bill of lading. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Heidenheimer, 82 Tex. 195; Sheppard v. Newhall, 54 Fed. Rep. 306. The right of stoppage in transitu is not affected by a transfer by the consignee of the bill of lading covering the goods, where such bill of lading is drawn to a third person or assigns, and not indorsed by such person. Sheppard v. Newhall, 54 Fed. Rep. 306. See Ocean Steamship Co. v. Ehrlich (Ga.), 14 S. E. Rep. 707. Four or five weeks after the arrival of goods at their destination, the consignee, who owed arrearages of charges upon other goods, verbally pledged the goods to the railroad company as security therefor. The goods at that time were in the company's warehouse, and under a stipulation of the bill of lading the company had a lien thereon for the arrearages. There was no change of possession, nor was there any new consideration for the agreement. Held, that no delivery had taken place which would defeat the seller's right of stoppage. Farrell v. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 102 N. Car. 390, 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 704. And where by statute actual receipt of the goods was necessary to put an end to the right of stoppage, it was hel that, although goods had reached their destination, and, by agreement between the railroad company and the consignee, had been set apart in the company's depot to be sold for the payment of arrearages of freight due the carrier, no delivery was effected by this agreement, and the right of stoppage still continued. Macon, etc. R. Co. v. Meador, 65 Ga. 705.

Goods Attached by Creditor.-An attachment or execution against the vendee does not preclude the exercise of the right of stoppage in transitu. Farrell v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 102 N. Car. 390, 3 L. R. A. 647, 9 S. E. Rep. 302. A creditor of the consignee, who has become insolvent, cannot pay the freight ostensibly as agent of the consignee, and have the goods removed to the consignee's store in order to be attached upon such creditor's debt. Harris v. Tenney (Tex.), 20 S. W. Rep. 82. See, also, Conture v. McKay, 6 Manitoba L. Rep. 273.

Goods Received by Mortgagees.-The right of stoppage in transitu is not lost where goods consigned are never received by the consignee, but are received by mortgagees who are in possession of his store when the goods arrive, although they have a mortgage cover. ing after acquired property and power to sell the goods under it, the mortgagees themselves becoming purchasers. Kingman v. Denison, 84 Mich. 608, 11 L. R. A. 347, 32 Cent. L. J. 362. D. M. MICKEY. Chicago, Ills.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

JUDGMENT AGAINST ONE TORT FEASOR NOT A BAR TO AN ACTION AGAINST THE OTHER.

In the case of Parmenter v. Barstow, 47 Atl. Rep. 1035 (1899), the plaintiff claimed damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant's servants in cutting stone on the sidewalk, a piece of which struck her in the eye. The defendants pleaded a former judgment against Chace, a joint tort-feasor

with the defendants, in the plaintiff's favor for the same cause of action which was claimed in this suit. The plaintiff demurred to this plea on the ground that the judgment against Chace did not bar a recov. ery in this action.

The demurrer was sustained by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The grounds upon which the court based its decision are best stated by Stiness, J.: "The only two American cases which directly hold in favor of the bar of the former judgment are Hunt v. Bates, 7 R. I. 217 (1862) and Wilkes v. Jackson, 2 Hen. & M. (Va.) 355 (1808). The rule in this country is that joint tort feasors may be sued separately. Hunt v. Bates, and, indeed, the English cases only bold the contrary in cases of trover and trespass. As to other torts there is a practical unanimity. Virginia stands alone in holding the judgment to be a bar in all cases. This it did in Wilkes v. Jackson, which was an assault case. That case has been recently reviewed and affirmed in Petticolas v. City of Richmond, 95 Va. 456, 28 S. E. Rep. 566 (1897), which was trespass on the case for negligence. The court rests wholly on the ground of the English cases and ac quiescence for nearly a century in Wilkes v. Jackson. The court further based its decision on the general rule and, sustaining the demurrer, concluded its opinion with the statement that a judgment against one joint tort-feasor did not bar an action against another joint tort-feasor.

The English rule, as laid down in one of the best and latest cases on the subject-Brensmead v. Harrison, L. R. C. P. 547 (1872)—is that a judgment in an action against one of several joint tort-feasors is a bar to an action against the others for the same cause, although such judgment remains unsatisfied. See also Adams v. Ham, 5 U. C. Q. B. 292 (1849), and Sloan v. Creasor, 26 U. C. Q. B. 127 (1863).

This is also stated in the text books to be the English rule to day. See Webb's Pollack on Torts, p. 231; Baylies' Addison on Torts (6th Ed.), p. 24; Cooley on Torts, *page 138; 2 Kent's Commentaries, 388, 389, and Underhill's Summary of the Law of Torts, p. 113, art. 35.

The American rule was first laid down by Chief Justice Kent. That rule, which, as stated by the eminent jurist, is generally followed in the United States, is that the party injured may bring separate suits against the wrongdoers and proceed to judg ment in each case; and that no bar arises as to any of them until satisfaction is received.

This is admitted to be the general rule in the United States, as in the text books above cited and the cases to be cited, except in Virginia, as pointed out by Justice Stiness above.

Golding v. Hall, Port. (Ala.) 169 (1839); Blann v. Cocheron, 20 Ala. 320 (1852); Morgan v. Chester, 4 Conn. 387 (1822), approved in Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447 (1863); Union, etc. Co. v. Sacklett, 19 Ill. App. 145 (1886); Fleming v. MacDonald, 50 Ind. 278 (1870); Turner v. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310 (1866); United Soc. v. Underwood, 11 Bush (Ky.), 265 (1875), 21 Am. Rep. 214; White v. Phillbrick, 5 Me. 147 (1827); Aldrich v. Parnell, 147 Mass. 409 (1888); Kenyon v. Woodruff, 33 Mich. 310 (1876); Page v. Freeman, 19 Mo. 421 (1854); Lord v. Tiffany, 98 N. Y. 412 (1885); White v. Lathrop, 2 Ohio St. 33 (1825); Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 103 (1841); Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 195 (1826); McGehee v. Shafer, 15 Tex. 198 (1855); Griffie v. McClung, 5 W. Va. 171 (1872).

In Tennessee it is agreed that a judgment against one joint wrongdoer is not of itself a bar to suits against

the others, but it is said that "the more reasonable doctrine on the other hand is, that as each of the wrongdoers is liable for his own act, separate actions may be brought at the same time or successfully, in each of which the plaintiff may proceed to judgment. But he can claim or enforce only one satisfaction." Christian v. Hoover, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 505 (1834).

The federal courts follow the general rule laid down by Chief Justice Kent. The first case on the point under discussion is Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 1 (1865), wherein it is held that such a judg ment (as the one spoken of in the case under discussion) against one joint tort feasor is no bar to an action against the other. "Nothing short of full satis faction," said Miller, J., "or that which the law must consider as such can make such judgment a bar." This case has been followed in Sessions v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 347 (1877), and Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U. S. 485, 489 (1884).

It is to be regretted that in Parmenter v. Barstow nothing was said as to the satisfaction of the prior judgment against Chace. In England satisfaction was held to be not necessary in a judgment in trover, because title was held to have passed by the mere ren. dering of such judgment. This rule was extended, but wrongfully, as Kent shows, to all cases of tort.

We are of opinion, then, that the present case goes too far in holding that a judgment against one of two joint tort feasors does not bar recovery in an action against the other. The court should have inserted in its opinion the saving proviso in Lovejoy v. Murray, namely, that such judgment is a bar only where full satisfaction has been recovered.-American Register.

Law

UNIFORM DIVORCE REGULATION. Certain public questions may be said to not unremotely resemble the poor in that they are with us always. Among these are the divorce, death penalty, trust question, and a few others that we might mention were time and space available. Some day, we suppose, a few years immediately preceding the millennium, one or more of them will be definitely and finally disposed of one way or the other. At the present time, however, we confess that there are very slight hopes excited. The press, public speakers and lecturers, the bench and the bar have talked, written and thought upon this subject until the only wonder is that they had not talked, written and thought themselves all out of all interest in the matter long ago. As a beautiful and monu mental relic of human inconsistency the present system of divorce laws is a shining success. In one State in the Union, the right to divorce for causes arising subsequent to marriage is not recognized at all; in another the legislature in their omnipotent wisdom have seen fit to provide (unless the statute has been changed very recently) that ten causes shall be suffi cient, and then, for fear that by any possibility, something might have been omitted, they add, "or for any other cause which to the court may seem fit and proper." We read some time ago that under this latter clause a divorce was sought because a wife had informed her husband that in her estimation he was pretty close to being a fool. We do not remember whether the court considered this of sufficient gravity to warrant judicial interference, and as it was in a newspaper article, take it with some degree of suspicion. At the same time, however, it illustrates the extreme laxity with which the marriage tie may be regarded in certain sections of the community.

It has been said that New York is the easiest State

in which to enter into marriage, while the hardest to get divorced in, and if an arrangement is ever to be reached for uniform legislation upon the present subject the State must relax something of its strictness. Personally, we are inclined to believe in a more liberal divorce law than that now ex. isting there. It has been said, and with some show of justice, that one more strict in its na ture than that generally in force throughout the United States will compel individuals to act carefully before they enter into marital engagements. While this may be true to a certain extent, yet some mistakes must inevitably occur, be the carefulness of both parties of the highest degree, and a more hideous injustice than keeping chained together two individuals who mutually detest each other can scarcely be imagined. It is a favorite remark of speakers upon the present subject that Roman degeneracy be gan with freedom of divorce, they being seemingly quite oblivious to the fact that the luxury introduced by Eastern conquest may perhaps be said to have been quite as influential a cause in the decline of the Empire.

This particular phase of the situation. however, belongs rather to the sociologist than to the legist. Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the lat ter and considering merely the means by which uniformity may be secured, it is not easy to see how the desired end can be accomplished unless by means of a commission to which each State shall appoint members, the result of whose deliberations will be em bodied in legislation. Frankly, however, we consider this eminently eutopian. That other remedy, a national law necessitating as it inevitably would, an amendment to the constitution, seems far too impracticable.

The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at their recent conference in Buffalo did, as a matter of fact, devote their entire attention to the present subject, and as a result of their deliberations presented the draft of an act to be recommended to all the States for adoption after being revised at the conference of next year.

The proposed law provides that no divorce shall be granted for any cause arising prior to the residence of either party in the State which was not ground for divorce in the State where the cause arose. It requires actual residence in the State for a year, with the intention of making it a permanent home, before the petitioner for a divorce can have any standing in court. When the cause for divorce arises outside of the State the petitioner must have been a resident of the State in good faith for two years before bringing suits. The defendant in the suit must be personally aerved, or if his or her whereabouts are unknown a reasonably diligent search must be continued for one year before notice by publication can be given. judgment may be granted solely upon default, nor solely upon admissions by the pleadings, nor except upon trial before the court in open session. Either party may marry again, but in cases where notice has been given by publication only and the defendant has not appeared, the decree shall not become operative until six months after the trial and decision.

The statute is an improvement upon existing conditions. Its undoubted effect would be, as one writer states, to check "migratory divorce" as well as fraud and collusion. It is certainly advisable to permit the remarriage of both parties in view of the extreme facility with which decrees to the contrary may now be evaded. Could the laws have only been made uniform with respect to the causes for divorce the

1. ADMINISTRATION-Presumption as to Collection of Assets. It being the duty of an administrator to promptly collect what was due his intestate, it will be presumed that he collected his intestate's share of an ancestor's estate, the money being on deposit in bank to the credit of the administrators of such estate, and therefore collectible.-BURBANK'S ADMX. V. DUNCAN, Ky., 53 8. W. Rep. 19.

2. BANKRUPTCY-Acts of Bankruptcy-Giving Preference.-Creditors filing a petition in involuntary bank. ruptcy against their debtor, alleging, as an act of bankruptcy, that he has transferred property with in. tent to give a preference, must assume the burden of proving the transfer of property, the debtor's intent to prefer a creditor, and his insolvency at the date of the transfer, except (as to the last requirement) when the respondent fails to produce his books and papers and submit to an examination, thereby incurring the obligation of proving his own solvency.-IN RE ROME PLANING MILL, U. S. D. C., N. D. (N. Y.), 96 Fed. Rep. 812.

3. BANKRUPTCY - Allowance of Claims Preferred Creditor.- Under Bankruptcy Act 1898, § 57g, providing that the claims of creditors of a bankrupt who have received preferences shall not be allowed unless they surrender their preferences, a creditor who has act. ually received a preference cannot have his claim allowed without surrendering the preference, notwithstanding the fact that he had no knowledge or cause to believe that, a preference was intended.-IN RE FT. WAYNE ELECTRIC CORP., U. 8. D. C., D. (Ind.), 96 Fed. Rep. 803.

4. BANKRUPTCY Commissions of Referee and Trustee-Dividend.-Under Bankruptcy Act 1898, §§ 40, 48, providing that referees and trustees in bankruptcy shall be entitled to receive commissions on "sums to be paid as dividends" by the estates administered by them, these officers are not entitled to commissions on disbursements made in payment of those creditors who are entitled, under the act, to priority of payment,

and to full satisfaction, before distribution to general creditors begins, the sums paid to these preferred creditors not being "dividends," within the meaning of the law.—IN HE FIELDING, U. S. D. C., W. D. (Mo.), 96 Fed. Rep. 860.

5. BANKRUPTCY Compositions - Construction of Statute. The provisions of the bankruptcy act prescribing the requisites of a composition with creditors are to be strictly construed as against those who seek by this means to deprive non-assenting creditors of their right to have the debtor's property administered upon and distributed in the ordinary course of bank. ruptcy proceedings.-IN RE RIDER, U. S. D. C., N. D. (N. Y.), 96 Fed. Rep. 808.

6. BANKRUPTCY-Examinations- Competency- Wife of Bankrupt.-Where the law of the State provides that a wife shall not be examined as a witness for or against her husband without his consent, nor as to any communication made to her by him during the mar riage relation, the wife of a bankrupt, under examination as a witness in the bankruptcy proceedings, cannot be required to disclose any communications made to her by her husband respecting his property or his income.-IN RE JEFFERSON, U. S. D. C., D. (Wash.), 96 Fed. Rep. 826.

7. BANKRUPTCY Exemptions - Homestead. - Under Bankruptcy Act 1898, § 70, providing that a trustee in bankruptcy shall be vested with the title of the bankrupt to his property, except as to "property which is exempt," land acquired by the bankrupt under the United States homestead law cannot be subjected, in the bankruptcy proceedings, to the payment of any debt contracted by him before the issuance of the patent for such land, it being exempt as to all such debts by the terms of the homestead act (Rev. St. § 2296).-IN RE DAUBNER, U. S. D. C., D. (Oreg.), 96 Fed. Rep. 805.

8. BANKRUPTCY-Exemptions-"Wearing Apparel."— Where the State statute (Rev. St. Tex. art. 2397) exempts from execution all "wearing apparel" of the debtor, a bankrupt is entitled to claim as exempt a diamond stud, worth $250, habitually worn by him, during several years past, in the front of his shirt, and for the purpose of fastening the shirt together, when there are no circumstances connected with its acquisition or use tending to show fraud or bad faith towards his creditors.-IN RE SMITH, U. S. D. C., W. D. (Tex.), 96 Fed. Rep. 832.

9. BANKRUPTCY Liens Unrecorded Mortgage. Where the law of the State provides that a mortgage of chattels shall not be valid, as against creditors of the mortgagor, if not recorded, or if it permits the mortgagor to retain, use and sell the property af fected, a mortgage which is open to these objections will not create a lien entitling the mortgagee to the possession of the property as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor, though it would have been good as against the bankrupt himself.-IN RE LEIGH, U. S. D. C., D. (Col.), 96 Fed. Rep. 806.

10. BANKRUPTCY- Proof of Claims - Review of Decision of Referee.-On the question of allowing or disallowing a claim offered for proof against the estate of a bankrupt, the referee in bankruptcy has a large measure of discretion; and his decision on a question of fact will not be reversed by the judge, unless manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.-IN RE KIDER, U. S. D. C., N. D. (N. Y.), 96 Fed. Rep. 811.

11. BANKRUPTCY Rights of Secured Creditors.-A trustee in bankruptcy is vested by law with title to all the assets of the bankrupt, including securities in the hands of a creditor as collateral; and such creditor has no right to hold the securities until paid the amount of his debt, nor to sell or cancel them, or realize on them by the aid of a court or otherwise, independently of the bankruptcy proceedings, but he must surrender them to the trustee, who has sole authority to reduce them to money, and the claim of the creditor to priority of payment out of the proceeds will be adjudged and administered in the bank

ruptcy court, which alone has jurisdiction of the mat. ter.-IN RE COBB, U. S. D. C., E. D. (N. C.), 96 Fed. Rep. 821.

12. BANKRUPTCY - Time for Appeal Rehearing.When the district court, in a controversy between a trustee in bankruptcy and a creditor of the estate, has rendered a decree on the merits adverse to the trustee, and the latter, without culpable neglect, has lost his right of appealing therefrom by the expiration of the time limited by Bankruptcy Act, § 25a, the district court may grant a rebearing, on his petition filed thereafter, for the purpose of reviving his right of ap. peal.-IN RE WRIGHT, U. s. D. C., D. (Mass.), 96 Fed. Rep. 820.

13. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS-Change of Beneficiary. -The rules of a beneficial association authorized a change of beneficiary on payment of a fee, filing an application with the local court, and surrendering the old certificate. The officers of such court were then required to certify and seal the application, and transmit it, with the old certificate, to the head office for approval. A member filled out an application for a change, paid the fee, and transmitted the application, without the old certificate, which was not then in his possession, to the local court, the officers of which properly authenticated the same, and it was received by the head office before the member's death. The original certificate was also subsequently sent to the head office, but was not received until after his death. Held a substantial compliance with the rules, and effectual to change the beneficiary.- McGOWAN V. SUPREME COURT OF INDEPENDENT ORDER OF FORESTERS, Wis., 80 N. W. Rep. 603.

14. BILLS AND NOTES-Consideration.-In an action brought against one of the makers of a joint and several promissory note, he may interpose, to defeat recovery pro tanto, the defense that there was a partial failure of consideration, arising out of a breach of a contract of warranty, entered into with all of said makers, as to a part of the property for which the note WAS given. NICHOLS & SHEPHERD Co. v. SODERQUIST, Minn., 80 N. W. Rep. 630.

15. BILLS AND NOTES-Genuineness of ¡SignaturesWarranty.-One who in consideration of the surrender of a note indorsed by him, delivers to another a note purporting to be made by a third person, impliedly warrants that the signature thereto is genuine, though he does not in fact know at the time that it is a forgery.-LOWRY V. STAPP, Tenn., 53 S. W. Rep. 194.

16. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION-Contract.- A contract evidenced by a certificate of shares in a building and loan association should be construed in connection with the by-laws and charter, and the articles of incorporation should be treated as a part of the contract, on the principle that a party becoming a member is chargeable with knowedge of its provisions. -MILLER V. EASTERN BUILDING & LOAN ASSN., Tenn., 53 S. W. Rep. 231.

17. CARRIERS-Freight Contracts. It being within the apparent power of the agent to contract for delivery of a car at a certain place within a specified time, his contract therefor is binding on the company, the shipper not knowing of the limitation of his power.-STONER V. CHICAGO, G. W. RY. Co., Iowa, 80 N. W. Rep. 560.

18. CARRIERS-Injuries to Passengers-Overcrowding Street Car.-The exposure of a passenger to danger which the exercise of reasonable foresight would have anticipated, and due care have avoided, is neg. ligence on the part of a carrier.-REEM V. ST. PAUL CITY RY. Co., Minn., 80 N. W. Rep. 639.

where, before the conductor took any steps to eject him he produced money and offered to pay, as the conductor has elected to treat him as a passenger.KANSAS CITY, P. & G. R. Co. v. HOLDEN, Ark., 53 8. W. Rep. 45.

20. CARRIERS-Passenger-Evidence.-Where one goes to a depot to take passage on the way car of a freight train, and, going to the place where passengers for that train are ordinarily received, enters the car, having a ticket, he becomes a passenger, and does not cease to be one where he leaves the car merely to avoid the collision of a train running into the rear of the car, and after getting out is injured by the col lision.-GRADERT V. CHICAGO & N. W. RY. Co., Iowa, 80 N. W. Rep. 559.

21. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Fraud.-A reservation in a chattel mortgage conveying goods to a trustee, to be sold for the benefit of mortgagor's creditors, that mortgagor might, by paying off debts and expenses, resume possession of goods unsold, does not invalidate the instrument, since the rights reserved are only such as the law gives.-PARLIN & OrendorFF Co. v. HANSON, Tex., 53 S. W. Rep. 62.

22. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Extra Compensation-Offcers.-Under Const. art. 2, § 25, providing that the legislature shall never grant extra compensation to a public officer after the service shall have been ren. dered, nor shall the compensation be increased ur diminished during his term of office, a resolution of the legislature granting extra pay to its officers and clerks is void, where no services in addition to their regular duties were rendered, and where such resolution was not passed until the term of service was nearly completed.-STATE V. CHEETHAM, Wash., 58 Pac. Rep. 771.

23. CONTRACr-Bond.-A bond given to secure the performance of certain work for a municipality, conditioned to secure the performance of the contract, is the equivalent of one conditioned to secure the performance of the work contracted for.-CITY OF FT. MADISON V. MOORE, Iowa, 80 N. W. Rep. 527.

24. CONTRACT-Subscriptions-Corporations.-A subscriber to a building contract, payment under which was to be due at a certain time after completion of the building, is not entitled to demand before suit. It is his duty to find the creditor, and pay him.-DAVIS & RANKIN BLDG. & MFG. Co. v. CAIGLE, Tenn., 53 S. W. Rep. 240.

25. CORPORATIONS-Purchase of Stock.-A corporation attempting to avoid its contract for purchase of its stock on the ground of ultra vires has the burden of showing that its articles of incorporation did not authorize it.-WEST V. AVERILL GROCERY CO., Iowa, 80 N. W. Rep. 555.

26. CORPORATIONS-Service of Process.-Where it appeared by uncontradicted affidavit that the person on whom process was served as "manager" of defendant corporation was in fact only a bookkeeper, and that the company had a vice-president and general manager, the service was not good, though the return stated that "the president and chief officers" were absent from the county, there being no designation of the officers who were thus absent.-BEATTYVILLE COAL Co. v. BAMBERGER, BLOOM & CO.'S ASSIGNEE, Ky., 53 8. W. Rep. 31. 27. CRIMINAL LAW-Bigamy-Marriage.-Since marriage is a civil contract, in the absence of a statute declaring that marriages contracted in any other mode than that prescribed shall be void, marriages proved by cohabitation, general reputation, etc., are valid; and hence requested instructions, in a prosecution for bigamy, requiring defendant's former marriage to have been in conformity with the ceremonies prescribed by statute, were properly refused.-WALDROP V. STATE, Tex., 53 S. W. Rep. 130.

28. CRIMINAL LAW-Forgery-Another Offense.-In a prosecution for knowingly passing as true a forged check, an instruction that, if there was any evidence tending to show that defendant passed another forged check about the same time as the one declared on, they could consider such evidence only as bearing on

his intent in passing the check referred to in the indictment, is not erroneous.-WOLF V. STATE, Tex., 53 S. W. Rep. 108.

29. CRIMINAL LAW-Forgery-Previous Acquittal.Under Pen. Code, art. 549a, making a "conviction" of forgery & bar to any other prosecution based on the same instrument, "acquittal" of a charge of forging a deed is no bar to a prosecution for uttering the same deed, where the indictment and plea in bar show distinct offenses, not susceptible of being proved as the same identical case.-PRESTON V. STATE, Tex., 53 S. W. Rep. 127.

30. CRIMINAL LAW-Former Conviction.-On an indictment for an affray in which a deadly weapon was used, where one of the accused pleads a former conviction of simple assault before a justice of the peace, and the evidence before the superior court, as before the justice, shows he used no deadly weapon and in. flicted no serious injury, though the other defendant did, the plea should be sustained, since the same will not interfere with the punishment of the other defend. ant.-STATE V. FAGG, N. Car., 34 S. E. Rep. 198.

31. CRIMINAL LAW-New Trial-Misconduct of Jury.Where, before a verdict had been reached, and while the jury were deliberating on the term of punishment, one of the jurors stated that accused was an ex-convict, and thereafter the jury agreed to a term of imprison. ment greater than the minimum authorized, such statement is ground for a new trial, though two of the jurors made affidavits that they were not influenced by it.-HARDIMAN V. STATE, Tex., 53 S. W. Rep. 131.

32. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-Limitation of Actions. -Shannon's Code, § 4025, provides that the right of action which a person who dies from the wrongful act of another would have had, had not death ensued, shall not abate by death, but shall pass to his widow, children, or personal representative. Section 4026 provides that the action may be brought by the deceased's personal representative, but, if he declines, it may be brought in his name by the widow and children without his consent. Section 4027 provides that the action may be brought by the widow in her own name, and, it there be no widow, by the children. Section 4029 provides that parties suing under sections 4025 and 4027 may recover for the deceased's suffering, loss of time, and necessary expenses, and also the consequent damage resulting to the parties suing. Code 1884, § 3469, provides that actions for injuries to the person shall be brought in one year after the cause accrues. Plaintiff, an infant, sued defendant for procuring the murder of her father and mother-the death of each being instantaneous with the fatal blow; the action being brought more than one year after the murder. Held, that the action was barred, since the limitations began to run from the time the injuries were inflicted, and as said sections create no new cause of action, but merely allow the survival of the actions of decedents. -WHALEY V. CATLETT, Tenn., 53 S. W. Rep. 131.

33. DEED-Evidence Delivery. The presumption that a deed is delivered on the date of execution is overcome, where the record clearly shows that deeds did not reach the grantees until after the date of grantor's death.-FURENES V. EIDE, Iowa, 80 N. W. Rep. 539.

34. DIVORCE- Grounds-Jurisdiction.-Under Code, § 3171, relating to divorces and giving jurisdiction there. of to the district court of the county in which either party resides, residence need not be for the length of time prescribed by Const. art. 2, § 1, to give the right to vote.-SYLVESTER V. SYLVESTER, Iowa, 80 N. W. Rep. 547.

35. EASEMENTS-Adverse Use of Passway.-The us explained use of a passway for more than fifteen years establishes the right to its use; the presumption being that the user was as a matter of right, and not permis. sive merely.-BROWNING V. Davis, Ky., 53 S. W. Rep.

9.

36. EQUITY Reformation of Release Laches. A court of equity will not refuse to reform a release in

aid of an action at law for a personal injury on the ground of laches in commencing the suit, where a reasonable excuse is shown, and it does not appear that the delay will result in the loss of material evidence to the defendant in the action.-WABASH RY. Co. v. LUMLEY, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 95 Fed. Rep. 773.

She

87. ESTOPPEL-Sale by Husband of Wife's Property.A wife bought a team and made all the payments personally except one small deferred payment, which she intrusted her husband to pay. She permitted him to use the team, the earnings to be paid to her. During her ownership the wagon was traded once and one of the horses twice, and she was present at two of the trades, paying boot money herself, and she authorized the third trade, which was made in her absence. spoke of the team as her own, and it was listed for taxation as her property. A year after the original purchase, the husband sold the team to defendants, and absconded. He told defendants that he owned the team and had made other similar statements, but his wife had no knowledge thereof. Held, that she did not allow her husband to appear as the true owner of the team, so as to estop her from denying his agency to sell the team, in view of the statutes enabling a wife to own separate property.- CAMPBELL V. FILLMORE, Colo., 58 Pac. Rep, 790.

38. EVIDENCE-Declarations.-In a suit by heirs to recover chattels alleged to have belonged to their deceased ancestor, the testimony of a third person that the ancestor had told him in his lifetime that he was controlling them as defendant's agent, and that they belonged to defendant, is admissible.-LEE V. JOHNSON, Tenn., 53 S. W. Rep. 183.

39.

EVIDENCE-Intent to Defraud Creditors.-It is the duty of the court to direct a verdict, where a contrary verdiet would have to be set aside as against the testimony. On an issue as to whether a transfer was intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, parties to the transfer may be asked if it was made with that intent.-BROWN V. POTTER, Colo., 58 Pac. Rep. 785.

40. EXECUTION SALE-Vacating - Property Sold.-A judgment creditor who purchased land on an execution in his favor is not entitled to have the satisfaction of the judgment set aside, and a new execution issued where, after the sale and issuance of a sheriff's deed, he discovered that the judgment debtor did not have as great an interest in the tract sold as he thought, and where he was induced to believe that the debtor had a greater interest than he really had, partly by the representation of the debtor, and party by his own and other people's investigation, and it is not shown that the debtor knew that his representations were false when made.-POPPLETON V. BRYAN, Oreg., 58 Pac. Rep. 767.

41. FEDERAL OFFENSE.-While the criminal offenses against the United States are wholly statutory, and the indictments therefor must find their warrant in the provision of some statute, the fact that an act of congress creating an offense-such as the defacement or removal of revenue stamps or marks or brands-delegates to an administrative department of the govern ment the duty of designing and preparing such stamps or prescribing such marks and brands, and making regulations governing their use, does not render their removal or defacement, when used in accordance with such regulations, any the less a statutory of fense.-WILKINE V. UNITED STATES, U. S. C. C. of App., Third Circuit, 96 Fed. Rep. 837.

42. FIXTURES-Removal by Tenant.-Fixtures for a storeroom, made in sections, so that they can be removed, not intended by a tenant who put them in to become part of the room, and fastened so that they can be readily removed, are trade fixtures.-ROTH V. COLLINS, Iowa, 80 N. W. Rep. 543.

43. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Husband's Use of Wife's Property.-Under the statute of frauds, an oral agree. ment by a husband with his wife that, if she would