that the calf which the plaintiff claims was infected was slaughtered at the defendant's plant in Fort Worth, and shipped to Galveston to be skinned, sold to butchers, and by them sold by retail to consumers. The defendant contends that it exercised ordinary and reasonable care, in that all cattle slaughtered in May, 1905, at its Fort Worth plant was inspected by men employed by them to purchase cattle, and especially that the United States Government inspectors inspected all cattle purchased and slaughtered at its plant in Fort Worth. The contention is that this evidence of inspection is such that it shows without conflict the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care, and therefore the absence of negligence. The evidence of inspection on the part of the defendant's agents is not urged as being in itself sufficient. J. E. McCarthy testified that he had been defendant's cattle buyer at Fort Worth for four years. "They are examined carefully. * * We aim to buy something that will make good veal or beef, and, if it looks at all doubtful, we buy subject to Government inspection. If the animal seems to have anything at all the matter with it, we buy it separate, and it is held separate and the Government man takes it, etc. If it is all right, it is passed, and, if not, it is tanked. When it is tanked, it is boiled up and goes into grease for fertilizing." His plan was not to reject cattle, although it might seem to be diseased, but he would let it take its chance to pass the Government inspectors.

*

The contention of the plaintiff is that the defendant has negligently failed to perform this duty, and the contention of the defendant is that the inspection by the Government was all that could be required, and that, under the circumstances, the master was not chargeable with the duty of making any inspection. It was not denied that the doctrine requiring inspection was applicable to the case, but the contention is that the inspection provided was sufficient, as matter of law, to relieve the defendant of the charge of negligence.

The object of the Federal statutes requiring inspection was to provide additional safeguards against the traffic in spoiled or diseased cattle and meats. They should not be so construed or applied as to deprive anyone injured or damaged by the negligence or wrongdoing of a dealer in or a vendor of cattle or meats any remedy which he had under laws existing when the statutes were enacted. We are not of opinion that the inspection by Government officials of a place, machinery, instrumentality, or material necessarily and as matter of law releases the master from his duty to make such examinations and inspections as are required of him by the rule which demands that he exercise ordinary and reasonable care for the safety of his servant. This duty of the master is absolute and inalienable. He can not transfer it to another so as to avoid responsibility. (4 Thompson on Negligence, section 3791.) It would seem to follow that the court, in the absence of a statute requiring that course, can not permit another to assume the responsibility for him. In McGregor v. Reid, 178 Ill. 464, 53 N. E. 323, 69 Am. St. Rep. 332, it was held that inspection of freight elevators by city officers and indemnity companies did not as matter of law relieve the owner of the elevators from liability for their defective condition. Commenting on the effect of the inspection of others than the proprietor himself, Labatt says: "It is difficult to admit that the fact of an appliance having been pronounced sound by an official inspector should be deemed to pre

clude the jury from considering whether his inspection was really an adequate one. Such an inference seems to be unwarrantable without assuming the possession by such inspectors of a much larger measure of skill and diligence than can be fairly credited to any class of employees."

And the learned author adds:

"Another objection to holding the master not liable as matter of law is that the doctrine of nondelegable duties is virtually ignored." (1 Labatt on Master and Servant, section 165. See also 3 Thompson on Negligence, section 3700.)

Granting the contention of the defendant that, to show the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care, it may avail itself of the inspection proved to have been made under the supervision of the Government, it must of necessity follow that the defendant is burdened with the deficiencies, if any are shown, of such inspection. The defendant can not ask more than that the case should be examined as if the Government inspectors were its own inspectors. It is clear that the master's entire duty is not performed when he employs competent and skillful inspectors. That is only the first step necessary to secure the reasonable safety of his servant. There must be a reasonably careful and skillful inspection. Although the master may have engaged competent and skillful inspectors, if a servant is injured in consequence of a defect which would have been discovered by a reasonably careful and skillful inspection, but was not discovered, the master will be liable.

Was there evidence in the case from which the jury might have concluded that no inspection of the calf in question was made; or, if made, that it was made unskillfully and negligently? Dr. W. A. Knight, a witness called for the defendant, testified that anthrax would not necessarily be discovered by an inspection of the animal on foot. It might escape detection if it had not "broken out," but that after the animal is slaughtered, and a post-mortem examination is made," the entire relations would be such that it could not possibly slip an inspector." The witness gives a full description of the effects of the disease in enlarging the organs of the animal and in causing "hemorrhagic spots. No one can read the description and fail to see that a reasonably careful inspection by a reasonably skillful inspector would easily discover the existence of disease.

INJUNCTION GROUNDS PROPERTY RIGHTS INTERFERENCE Sailors' Union of the Pacific v. Hammond Lumber Compony, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 156 Federal Reporter, page 450.In the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of California an injunction had been granted against the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, prohibiting interference with the business of the Hammond Lumber Company. The injunction was granted on representations of acts of violence committed by the union in futherance of its purpose to secure an increase in rate of wages followed by a strike. A strike committee had been organized, consisting of members of the

Sailors' Union of the Pacific, Pacific Coast Marine Firemen's Union, and the Marine Cooks' and Stewards' Association. This committee had the services of two launches which were used as picket boats, and the water front was also picketed by strikers. Threats of bodily injury, use of profane, insulting, and obscene language and the commission of brutal assaults upon crews, firemen, cooks, and stewards were alleged in the evidence and specific dates given. The union appealed, making various contentions as to the legality of form of the injunction and the power of the court to issue the same. The injunetion was sustained by the circuit court of appeals in an opinion which was delivered by Judge Gilbert, the principal parts of which are as follows:

It is urged that the injunction was violative of the rights of the appellants; that the defendant unions and their members had the right to endeavor to improve their condition and to organize for that purpose, and had the right to communicate their desires to others, whether they were in the employment of the appellee or not, and to explain the differences that existed between their former employers and themselves; and that, if it became necessary to employ launches to carry out these purposes, they had the legal right to do so, as the waters of the bay of San Francisco are free to all. Conceding that the appellants had all of these rights, the argument ignores the salient facts brought to the attention of the court by the bill and the affidavits. It was not to prevent the exercise of any of such rights that the injunction was sought or obtained. Its purpose was to prevent acts of lawlessness, of violence, of insult, and of intimidation. No one can read the affidavits without arriving at the conclusion that members of the unions went far beyond the peaceful communication of their rights, their attitude toward their former employers, their purpose of self-protection, and the objects of their combination. It may be true, in the present case, as in many others of a similar character, that the disorders of the strike were deprecated by the officers and leaders of the unions, but that fact does not relieve the appellants of responsibility, nor render the court powerless to deal with them in their collective capacity for the violent acts which in the present case are shown to have been committed, and which, according to the affidavits, were threatened to be continued.

It is contended that the court erred in issuing the injunction for the reason that the appellee had no property right in that in which the court protected it, and it is argued that, while the appellee had a property right in its vessels, it had none in the labor of its employees, as the latter could leave its employment as they saw fit. To Sustain that contention, Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Whalen, 149 U. S. 157, 13 Sup. Ct. 822, 37 L. Ed. 686, is cited. In that case the court held that the only ground on which, independently of an express statute, a court of equity could grant an injunction in a private action for nuisance, is special injury to property. The court said: "No employer has such a property in his workmen, or in their services, that he can, under the ordinary jurisdiction of a court of chancery, maintain a suit as for a nuisance, against the keeper of a house at which they voluntarily buy intoxicating liquors, and thereby get so drunk as to be unfit for work."

This language of the opinion is especially relied upon, but the distinction between that case and the case at bar is elsewhere clearly stated in the opinion, where the court pointed to the fact that the defendants had not conspired or intended to injure the plaintiff's property or business, or to prevent the plaintiff's workmen from performing their contracts of service. The bill in the case at bar alleges, and the affidavits prove, that the appellants had conspired to injure and destroy the appellee's business and to prevent its workmen from performing their contracts of service. The appellee's property is not only its vessels, but the business of carrying freight and passengers, without which the vessels would lose their value. The right to operate vessels, and to conduct business is as much property as are the vessels themselves. All the rights which are incident to the use, enjoyment, and disposition of tangible things are property. "Property is everything that has an exchangeable value." (Mr. Justice Swain, in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 127, 21 L. Ed. 394.) "Property may be destroyed, or its value may be annihilated. It is owned and kept for some useful purpose, and it has no value unless it can be used." (In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 105, 50 Am. Rep. €36.)

But it is said that the injunction goes further than the law permits, in that by its language it prohibits the appellants from doing that which they have the lawful right to do. By the order of the court. the appellants are enjoined "from in anywise interfering with the crews, foremen, cooks, stewards, seamen, or either of them or any of the servants or employees of the said steam schooners or steamship or either or any of them, without due process of law; * from in anywise interfering with the business of the said steam schooners and said steamship except by due process of law, with the business of complainant or orator of and concerning the said steam schooners and the said steamship; * * * and from in anywise conspiring, colluding or confederating together for the purpose of preventing the said steam schooners and steamship from receiving and discharging freight and passengers." It is said that under this injunction the appellants would be in contempt if they asked one of their relatives not to go as a passenger on one of the appellee's steamers, or if they made complaint of the violation of navigation laws of the appellee's vessels, or if they exercised their right to discriminate against the appellee by shipping cargo on other vessels than those of the appellee. The language of the injunction, however, is to be interpreted in the light of the allegations and prayer of the bill, and these may make an otherwise indefinite order sufficiently specific. (Hamilton v. State, 32 Md. 348.) It is the acts set forth in the bill that the appellants are enjoined from doing.

It is urged that there is no showing that the alleged damage is irreparable, but that, on the contrary, the showing is that, if the appellee was suffering any damage for which the appellants were liable, it was easy of estimation and could have been recovered in a single action against any of the appellants, who are abundantly able to respond in damages. It is true that the answer to the bill alleges that the appellants are not insolvent, and that they possess $150,000 in cash in bank. But it may be said, in general, that ground is presented for injunctive relief whenever there is actual and threatened

injury to property, coupled with facts bringing the case within one of the recognized grounds of equitable jurisdiction, and showing that there is no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law.

Said the court, in Walla Walla City e. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 77, 43 L. Ed. 341:

"The remedy at law, in order to exclude a concurrent remedy at equity, must be as complete as practical, and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity." One ground of equitable jurisdiction in cases of continuing trespass is the fact that the measure of damages is exceedingly difficult of ascertainment. In such a case the solvency or insolvency of the wrongdoer is an immaterial fact. (Kellogg v. King, 114, Cal. 378, 46 Pac. 166, 55 Am. St. Rep. 74.) And relief by injunction may be invoked as a remedy for the destruction of one's business, if in such a case no action at law would afford as complete, prompt, and efficient a remedy. (North v. Peters, 138 U. S. 271, 11 Sup. Ct. 346, 34 L. Ed. 936; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74, 18 L. Ed. 580.) is made sufficiently clear by the allegations of the bill and the facts proven that, notwithstanding that the appellants may possess $150,000, the remedy at law is not as complete, prompt, and adequate as the remedy in equity. The remedy at law would involve a multitude of suits and delay, pending which the injury to the appellee's business might proceed to ultimate destruction. The question of withholding or granting the injunction was one which rested in the sound discretion of the circuit court. We find no ground for saying that there was abuse of that discretion.

It

INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT-MALICIOUS PROCUREMENT OF DISCHARGE-DAMAGES-Gibson v. Fidelity and Casualty Company, Supreme Court of Illinois, 83 Northeastern Reporter, page 539.— This was an action by Jacob N. Gibson against the company named for damages for wrongfully procuring his discharge from employment. A judgment for $1,200 was given him in the circuit court of Cook County, which was affirmed by the appellate court and again by the supreme court. The defendants had asked the trial judge to direct a verdict of not guilty, and afterwards to give an instruction to the same effect, and it was the refusal to do this that was complained of in the appeals.

The position of the trial court was sustained for reasons that appear in the opinion of the court, which also states the facts. This was delivered by Judge Cartwright, and is as follows:

The plaintiff was a die maker in the employ of the Union Drop Forge Company, at $2.65 a day. He met with an injury to one eye on August 26, 1897, from which he was laid up about thirteen weeks. After recovering he returned to his work, and on August 2, 1899, he brought a suit against his employer, the Union Drop Forge Company, for damages on account of the injury. . On October 21, 1899, he was discharged by William G. Holbrook, the president and treasurer of the company. At the time he had been working for the company