« ПретходнаНастави »
This language of the opinion is especially relied upon, but the distinction between that case and the case at bar is elsewhere clearly stated in the opinion, where the court pointed to the fact that the defendants had not conspired or intended to injure the plaintiff's property or business, or to prevent the plaintiff's workmen from performing their contracts of service. The bill in the case at bar alleges, and the affidavits prove, that the appellants had conspired to injure and destroy the appellee's business and to prevent its workmen from performing their contracts of service. The appellee's property is not only its vessels, but the business of carrying freight and passengers, without which the vessels would lose their value. The right to operate vessels, and to conduct business is as much property as are the vessels themselves. All the rights which are incident to the use, enjoyment, and disposition of tangible things are property.
Property is everything that has an exchangeable value." (Mr. Justice Swain, in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 127, 21 L. Ed. 394.) “Property may be destroyed, or its value may be annihilated. It is owned and kept for some useful purpose, and it has no value unless it can be used.” (In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 105, 50 Am. Rep. €36.)
But it is said that the injunction goes further than the law permits, in that by its language it prohibits the appellants from doing that which they have the lawful right to do. By the order of the court the appellants are enjoined" from in anywise interfering with the crews, foremen, cooks, stewards, seamen, or either of them or any of the servants or employees of the said steam schooners or steamship or either or any of them, without due process of law;
from in anywise interfering with the business of the said steam schooners and said steamship except by due process of law, with the business of complainant or orator of and concerning the said steam schooners and the said steamship;
and from in anywise conspiring, colluding or confederating together for the purpose of preventing the said steam schooners and steamship from receiving and discharging freight and passengers.” It is said that under this injunction the appellants would be in contempt if they asked one of their relatives not to go as a passenger on one of the appellee's steamers, or if they made complaint of the violation of navigation laws of the appellee's vessels, or if they exercised their right to discriminate against the appellee by shipping cargo on other vessels than those of the appellee. The language of the injunction, however, is to be interpreted in the light of the allegations and prayer of the bill, and these may make an otherwise indefinite order sufficiently specific. (Hamilton v. State, 32 Md. 318.) It is the acts set forth in the bill that the appellants are enjoined from doing.
It is urged that there is no showing that the alleged damage is irreparable, but that, on the contrary, the showing is that, if the appellee was suffering any damage for which the appellants were liable, it was easy of estimation and could have been recovered in a single action against any of the appellants, who are abundantly able to respond in damages. It is true that the answer to the bill alleges that the appellants are not insolvent, and that they possess $150,000 in cash in bank. But it may be said, in general, that ground is presented for injunctive relief whenever there is actual and threatened
injury to property, coupled with facts bringing the case within one of the recognized grounds of equitable jurisdiction, and showing that there is no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law.
Said the court, in Walla Walla City r. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 77, 43 L. Ed. 311:
The remedy at law, in order to exclude a concurrent remedy at equity, must be as complete as practical, and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity."
One ground of equitable jurisdiction in cases of continuing trespass is the fact that the measure of damages is exceedingly difficult of ascertainment. In such a case the solvency or insolvency of the wrongdoer is an immaterial fact. (Kellogg v. King, 114, Cal. 378,
v 46 Pac. 166, 53 Am. St. Rep. 74.) And relief by injunction may be
55 invoked as a remedy for the destruction of one's business, if in such a case no action at law would afford as complete, prompt, and efficient a remedy. (North v. Peters, 138 U. S. 271, 11 Sup. Ct. 316, 34 L. Ed. 936; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74, 18 L. Ed. 580.) It is made sufficiently clear by the allegations of the bill and the facts proven that, notwithstanding that the appellants may possess $150,000, the remedy at law is not as complete, prompt, and adequate as the remedy. in equity. The remedy at law would involve a multitude of suits and delay, pending which the injury to the appellee's business might proceed to ultimate destruction. The question of withholding or granting the injunction was one which rested in the sourd discretion of the circuit court. We find no ground for saying that there was abuse of that discretion.
INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT-MALICIOUS PROCUREMENT OF DISCHARGE-DAMAGES-Gilson 2. Fidelity and ('asualty C'ompany, Supreme Court of Ilinois, 8.3 Vortheastern Reporter, page 5.39.This was an action by Jacob X. Gibson against the company named for damages for wrongfully procuring his discharge from employment. I judgment for $1.200 was given him in the circuit court of Cook County, which was aflirmed by the appellate court and again by the supreme court. The defendants had asked the trial judge to direct a verdict of not guilty, and afterwards to give an instruction to the same eifect, and it was the refusal to do this that was complained of in the appeals.
The position of the trial court was sustained for reasons that appear in the opinion of the court, which also states the facts. This was delivered by Julge ('artwright, and is as follows:
The plaintiff was a die maker in the employ of the Union Drop Forge Company, at $2.63 a day. He met with an injury to one eye on August 26, 1997, from which he was laid up about thirteen weeks. After recovering he returned to his work, and on August 2, 1899, he brought a suit against his emplover, the l'nion Drop Forge Company, for damages on account of the injury. . On Oetober 21, 1899, he was di-charged by William G. Holbrook, the president and treasurer of the company. At the time he had been working for the company about ten years; but his employment was at the will of the parties, and he had no contract for future employment. Ile was without employment until the first part of December, 1899, when he secured work elsewhere. In his suit he claimed $10,000 damages, and the Union Drop Forge Company was insured by the defendant against accidents and injuries of the character for which the suit was brought. By the policy of insurance the defendant had agreed to defend against such claims and would be liable to the amount of $5,000 in case of recovery. The controverted question of fact was whether the defendant caused the discharge of the plaintiff, and the only evidence tending in any manner to connect the defendant with the discharge, or to prove that it induced the l'nion Drop Forge ('ompany to discharge The plaintiff, consisted of testimony that John A. Post, the general manager of the defendant in Chicago, and Holbrook, made statements or admissions to that effect. The plaintiff belonged to a labor union, and he went with a committee of that union to see Ilolbrook. The plaintiff and two members of the committee testified that Holbrook said his company was satisfied with plaintiff's work, and would be willing to put him back at work, but could not do it; that his company had an agreement with the defendant, and if they would get a letter from Post he would reemploy plaintiff. They further testified that they then went to see Post, and Post said that they had caused the discharge and did not intend to let plaintiff work to earn money to fight them with, and that he did not propose to have plaintiff go to work there, or anywhere else, if he could prevent it. There was evidence for defendant, by Holbrook, that when his company was sued he called up Post, the manager of the defendant, and advised with him as to whether it would be necessary or advisable or expedient to keep the plaintiff in their employ under the circumstances; that Post said they could use their own judgment; and that it was on their own judgment and on their own motion that the discharge was made. The letters which passed between Holbrook and Post tended to substantiate that version of the affair, and, of course, it is conceded that the Union Drop Forge Company could discharge the plaintiff whenever it saw fit, because he had brought a suit against it, or for any other reason, or for no reason at all and througlı malice. If the Union Drop Forge Company discharged the plaintiff becanse he had brought the suit, or because it did not choose to pay him money with which he could carry on the suit, no cause of action would arise in his favor; but under the doctrines announced in the case of London Guarantee & Accident Co. . Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526, 99 Am. St. Rep. 15), there would be a cause of action against the defendant if it procured the discharge of the plaintiff with the motive of injuring him.
Post and another witness denied that there was any such admission made by Post as was testified to by plaintiff and the two members of the labor committee. Their evidence was that Post said it did not make any particular difference to the defendant whether the Union Drop Forge ('ompany reemployed plaintiff or not; that he made no statement or admission that he or the defendant had procured the discharge of plaintiff; and that the conversation consisted only of a discussion between him and the committee as to the propriety of an emplover keeping a laborer in his employ who had a suit pending against him which the employer believed to be without merit, and as to what course the members of the committee would themselves take under the same circumstances.
The court was not authorized, in passing on the motion to direct a verdiet and the instruction tendered with the motion, to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine on which side the preponderance was. Only the evidence favorable to plaintiff could be considered, and if such evidence, with all the reasonable inferences to be drawn there from, would be sufficient to sustain a judgment for the plaintiff, it was the duty of the court to deny the motion, refuse the instruction, and submit the question to the jury. The testimony above detailed, given by the plaintiff and the two members of the committee, of the alleged statements and admissions of Holbrook and Post, fairly tended to prove the cause of action alleged in the declaration, and therefore the court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict. The controverted question of fact as to whether the discharge of the plaintiff was caused by the wrongful act of the defendant has been settled by the judgment of the appellate court.
The next ground of complaint is that the attorney for the plaintiff, in his closing argument, made improper and prejudicial remarks to the jury for the purpose of inflaming their minds and biasing their judgment, and that on objection being made the court overruled the objection. In the course of his argument the attorney for plaintiff said that the defendant, in what it did, was trying to starve the plaintiff into a settlement of his suit against the Union Drop Forge Company. This argument was founded on the testimony for the plaintiff as to statements made by Post, and the attorney was contending that the motive of the defendant was an improper and malicious one. The argument did not exceed the proper and reasonable limits allowed in the discussion of evidence before a jury.
It is also argued that the evidence did not warrant an assessment of exemplary damages. There was no instruction given to the jury which authorized an assessment of exemplary damages, and the question of the amount of actual damage is one of fact, which we are not authorized to review. The evidence was that the plaintiff was only out of employment a very short time, and at the time of the trial was receiving much larger wages than when in the employ of the Union Drop Forge Company, and perhaps the verdict can only be accounted for by assuming that exemplary damages were included. If that is
there is evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, would justify exemplary damages.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS-CAPACITY-LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF INJUNCTION-APPEALS—.1. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical l'nion No. 16, Supreme Court of Illinois, 8.3 Vortheastern Reporter, page 9.12.—The firm named was a member of the Chicago Typothetæ, an unincorporated association of employing printers, and had procured an injunction against the defendants forbidding the picketing of their premises and otherwise interfering with their employees in the conduct of their business. From this injunction an appeal was taken and the proper bond filed, and the members of the union continued to perform acts of the same nature as those complained of. The plaintiffs then began proceedings to procure punishment of the offenders for contempt of court, and a fine of $1,000 was assessed against the union, which action was affirmed by the appellate court, and, on further appeal, by the supreme court, Judges Scott and Farmer dissenting.
Various points of interest were involved, as the status of the union as a party to an action, the power of the appellate court to punish during the pendency of an appeal and the matter of the collection of the fine. These were taken up in order by Judge Cartwright, who delivered the opinion of the court, and who spoke in part as follows:
The first point made by counsel for the appellant in his argument is that it is neither a natural nor an artificial person, and therefore it could not be made a defendant in this proceeding. The bill of complaint in the suit for an injunction in which the decree was entered alleged that appellant was a labor union organized and existing in the city of Chicago; that it had presented to appellees a contract to be executed by them in which appellant agreed to do certain things; that it had an executive committee, issued circulars, published a directory, exercised control over its members, furnished money to induce employees of appellees' to leave their service, and as an association interfered with their business, and did various acts charged in the bill. The appellant came into court and demurred to the bill and appealed from the decree to the appellate court, giving its bond, and not raising any question as to its legal capacity to be sued or as to its legal status. In this proceeding the appellant came into court and answered as an organization having a legal existence, with a constitution, by-laws, and officers, and doing business to carry out the objects of the organization. The time and place to raise the question by what name and in what manner the association, or the aggregation of individuals of which it was composed, might be made defendant in a suit in equity, was in the original suit. Whether it was no more than a mere partnership, with the rights and liabilities incident to that relation, or whether it had any definite legal status, was a question to be considered then. Joined with appellant were various officers in their capacity as representing appellant, and it does not appear that any objection was made that the association was not properly before the court. If it would not be regarded as a legal entity in the action at law, it does not follow that the decree was a nullity, or that the association could violate the injunction with impunity. It is wholly immaterial in this proceeding whether the decree was erroneous or not, and the association is amenable to the court and the law for any violation of it.
The important question in the case, and the one to which the argument is almost wholly devoted, relates to the jurisdiction of the superior court to entertain this proceeding and punish appellant for violating the injunction after an appeal had been taken from the decree. The law is that an appeal enjoining a defendant from doing an act does not suspend the operation of the injunction, stay it in