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any manner, or disturb its operative force. The appeal does not have the effect of dissolving or suspending the injunction and the defendant acquires no right to disregard it by the execution of an appeal bond. The doing of the act enjoined may be punished as a contempt notwithstanding the appeal, and the contempt is a contempt of the court which granted the injunction. The question being by what court the contempt can be punished, the natural answer would be by the court whose order is disobeyed, and whose dignity and authority are defied. And, indeed, it does not seem to be disputed that if the proceeding is in the name of the people, for the purpose of maintaining the dignity and authority of the court, an appeal would present no obstacle to it. Such a proceeding is wholly independent of the appeal or any question to be considered by the appellate tribunal, and we see no substantial distinction between a prosecution for contempt instituted for the purpose of punishing a person for disobeying an order of the court on the ground that its authority or dignity is in question and one which is instituted to enforce the authority of the court in the administration of justice between litigants. The question whether the injunction was properly awarded or whether the decree was erroneous is not involved in either. A defendant can not refuse to obey an injunction, however improvidently or erroneously granted, but he is bound, at his peril, to obey it while it remains in force.
To adopt a rule that the court granting an injunction must stand idly by and see it violated while an appeal is pending, and after the case is reinstated in that court may then proceed to punish, would be attended with evil consequences. All that it would be necessary for a defendant to do to secure immunity until the case should be reinstated in the court would be to pray an appeal and file a bond. If the court should be denied the right to compel obedience to the prohibition of the decree until the original case has completed its rounds through the courts the appellees might lose all the benefits of their litigation and have their business ruined, although the decree should finally be aflirmed. We are not prepared to adopt or declare such a doctrine.
By the final order of the superior court imposing the fine, appellant was ordered to pay the same to the clerk of the court, and it was further ordered that, if suel payment should not be made, execution should issue for the collection of the fine in the name of the people for the use of the appellees [ Barnes & Co.). The judgment was in proper form, and the court properly or lered execution in default of payment, but the execution should not be in the form directed. If The fine shall be paid to the clerk, an execution will not be necessary; but, if it becomes necessary to issue an execution, it will not be for the use of the appellees, and the order will be niodified by striking: out that feature. There is no statute in this State which authorizes the appropriation of a fine imposed for a contempt of court to the party injured by the act constituting the contempt or who prosecutes the proceeding for the contempt.
The form of the order for execution being modified, the record is free from error, and the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS-TRADE AGREEMENTS-POWER OF COMMITTEE TO CONTRACT_PAYMENT OF STRIKE BENEFITS—CONTROL OF FUNDS BY INJUNCTION.-A. R. Barnes & Co. ?. Berry, L'nited Stutes Circuit Court, Southern District of Ohio, ll'estern Division, 157 Federal Reporter, page 883.--This was an action brought by Barnes & Co., members of the United Typothetæ of America, against Berry and McMullen, officers of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of America, both voluntary associations, to determine the effect of an agreement alleged to exist between the two organizations, and to prevent its violation by the members of the union.
The agreement referred to was one that had been entered into for the purpose of establishing “ between the employing printers of the United States and their pressmen and feeders uniform shop practices and fair scales of wages, settlement of all questions arising between them, and the abolition of strikes, sympathetic or otherwise, lockouts and boycotts." Among its provisions was one that looked to the introduction of the eight-hour day on January 1, 1909.
This agreement had been entered into by committees representing the two bodies, and had been ratified by a special convention of the Typothetæ, but was repudiated by the union at its annual convention in 1907, and a referendum vote of its members determined on the inauguration of the eight-hour day on November 18, 1907. The committee of the union had been directed to renew a former agreement which provided for a nine-hour day, at the same time “to strive with all power possible to have some concessions made by the Typothetæ toward having the eight-hour day established within a reasonable time.” At the same meeting a special fund was arranged for, to be known as the “ Shorter workday fund."
Two questions were involved in the suit, first, as to whether the committee of the union had full and final authority to make the contract; and secondly, whether performance of such contract could be enforced indirectly by enjoining the officers of the union from paying strike benefits, and from doing anything in furtherance of strikes.
The decision of the court, which was delivered by Judge Thompson, was adverse to the contentions of the plaintiffs, Barnes & Co., on both questions, as appears from the following extracts from his opinion. Having discussed in some detail the efforts of the union to secure the adoption of the eight-hour day, Judge Thompson said:
The Typothetae had theretofore refused to consider the adoption of the weight-hour day," and the convention of the union had declared in favor of its adoption immediately after the expiration of the existing agreement, unless the two associations could agree upon some reasonable time thereafter, and the directors were instructed to obtain from the Typothetæ a declaration as to whether it would agree to the "eight-hour day;” that is, whether the Typothetæ would con
sider the demand for it, and at some time agree to it. The directors were not authorized in securing the renewal of the existing agreement to add new terms thereto; nor were they instructed to determine what would be a reasonable time after the expiration of the existing agreement within which to inaugurate the “ eight-hour day,” nor were they empowered to conclude a new agreement with the Typothetæ. If they succeeded in securing the consent of the Typothetæ to the renewal of the old agreement, with a declaration as to whether or not the “eight-hour day" would be agreed to, the instructions given them would be fulfilled, and their only remaining duty would be to report their action to the next convention. In their report it would have been proper to recommend what action, in their opinion, should be taken by the convention, giving their reasons therefor, but, under the instructions given them, final action could be taken only by the convention. The board of directors exceeded its authority in perinitting new matter to be added to the renewal agreement, and in assuming power to bind the union by the agreement entered into by them with the Typothetæ.
As to the second point the court spoke as follows:
If the board of directors were authorized to enter into the agreement on behalf of the union can performance thereof by the men of the union be enforced by injunction? The agreement is not a contract of employment between members of the Typothetæ and men of the union, but is a contract between the two associations for the purposes hereinbefore stated. We are not advised of the terms of the employment of union men by members of the Typothetæ, except as to hours of labor. So far as we are advised by the pleadings and the evidence, they might at any time, without breach of the contract of employment, withdraw from the service of the Typothetæ. It is not shown that they agreed to work for any definite time, nor is there any provision in the agreement between the two associations fixing the time of service, and if, therefore, they should, at any time, with or without cause, withdraw from the service of members of the Typothetæ, they would be within their rights. As heretofore stated, the agreement was repudiated by the union at the Brighton Beach convention, and thereafter the men of the union, by a referendum vote, declared in favor of the inauguration of the “ eight-hour day” on November 18, 1907, and its maintenance is now the established policy of the union, and the defendants, its officers, are charged with the duty of carrying it ont, and pending the strikes incident thereto may the men employed by the Typothetær be deprived of the advice and assistance of their officers and of strike benefits? The strike benefit fund is created by moneys deposited by the men with the general officers for the support of themselves and families in times of strikes, and the court has no more control of it than it would have over deposits made by them in the banks, and the attempt to enforce specific performance of the agreement by enjoining the officers from performing their functions can not be entertained. The court will not by indirect methods compel the men to continue in the service of the Typothetae and work nine hours a day. The agreement only requires that, if they work at all, they shall work nine hours a day. There is no agreement that they shall continue in the service of the Typothetæ until January 1, 1909.
The bill will be dismissed, at the complainants' costs.
LAWS OF VARIOUS STATES RELATING TO LABOR, ENACTED SINCE
JANUARY 1, 1904.
[The Tenth Special Report of this Bureau contains all laws of the various States and Territories and of the United States relating to labor, in force January 1, 1904. Later enactments are reproduced in successive issues of the Bulletin, beginning with Bulletin No. 57, the issue of March, 1905. A cumulative index of these later enactments is to be found on page 1037 et seq. of tbis issue.]
ACTS OF 1907.
CHAPTER 116.-Board of immigration-Contract laborers.
SECTION 3. The duties of said [immigration) commissioners shall be:
First. To contract with and appoint an agent or agents in Europe and else where and subject to the methods as their judgment may direct, invite and encourage immigration to this State. Also to contract, in the name of the State, with laborers in foreign countries for the purpose of bringing said laborers to this State for agricultural purposes.
SECTION 1. The commissioner of labor of the State of Minnesota is hereby directed to organize and establish in all cities in this State containing fifty thousand (50,000) inhabitants, or more, free public employment bureaus, for the purpose of receiving applications from persons seeking employment, and applications from employers desiring to employ labor. There shall be no fee or compensation charged or received, directly or indirectly, from persons applying for employment, or from those desiring to employ labor through said bureaus. There shall be appointed by the commissioner of labor, for such bureaus, one superintendent, who may be removed by the commissioner for good and sufficient cause, such appointment to be made immediately after this act becomes a law, and thereafter at the commencement of the biennial session of the legislature, the salary of such superintendent shall not exceed ($1,200) twelve hundred dollars per annum.
SEC. 2. The superintendent of such bureaus shall cause to be received and recorded in books to be kept for that purpose, the names of all persons applying for employment, as well as the name and address of all persons, firms or corporations applying to employ labor, designating opposite the name and address of each applicant the character of employment desired or offered. Such superintendent shall also perform such other duties in the collection of labor statistics, and in the keeping of books and accounts of such bureaus as the commissioner may direct or require, and shall report monthly all business transacted by such bureaus to the office of the commissioner of labor, at the State capitol.
Sec. 3. Every application for employment by employer or employee which is made to the free employment bureaus shall be void after thirty days from its receipt, unless the same be renewed by the applicant. When an applicant for labor has secured the same, he shall within ten days thereafter notify the superintendent of such bureaus upon a notification card provided for that purpose. If any such applicant neglects to notify such superintendent, he or they shall be barred from all future rights and privileges of such employment 46129_-Bull, 76-08-24
bureaus at the discretion of the commissioner of labor, to whom the superintendent shall report such neglect.
SEC. 4. There is hereby annually appropriated out of any money in the State treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.
Approved April 13, 1907.
CHAPTER 202.-Safety appliances on railroads.
SECTION 1. On and after the first day of July, nineteen hundred and eight, it shall be unlawful for any railway company or common carrier, in moving freight between points in the State, to haul or permit to be hauled, or used on its line, any car not equipped with couplers, coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.
SEC. 2. On and after the first day of July, nineteen hundred and eight, it shall be unlawful for any railway company or common carrier, in moving freight between points in the State, to use any car that is not provided with secure grab irons or hand holds in the ends and sides of each car for the greater security to men in coupling and uncoupling cars.
SEC. 3. Any railway company or common carrier violating any of the provisions of this act shall forfeit to the State one hundred dollars ($100) for each and every such violation.
Approved April 15, 1907.
CHAPTER 253.—Hours of labor of employees on railroads.
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any railroad company within the State of Minnesota, or any of its officers or agents, to require or permit any employee engaged in or connected with the movement of any rolling stock, engine or train, to remain on duty more than sixteen consecutive hours, or to require or permit any such employee who has been on duty sixteen consecutive hours to perform any further service without having had at least eight hours' rest, or to require or permit any such employee to be on duty at any time to exceed sixteen hours in ans consecutive twenty-four hours: Prorided, however, That this section shall not apply to work performed in the protection of life or property in cases of accident, wreck or other unavoidable casualty: And, provided further, That it shall not apply to the time necessary for trainmen to reach a resting place when an accident, wreck, washout, snow blockade or other unavoidable cause has delayed their train.
SEC. 2. Any officer of any railroad company in the State of Minnesota violating any of the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100), and not more than five hundred ($500) for each offense, or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than sixty days, or both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
It shall be the duty of the State railroad and warehouse commission, upon complaint properly filed with it alleging a violation of this act, to make a full investigation in relation thereto, and for such purpose it shall have the power to administer oaths, interrogate witnesses, take testimony and require the production of books and papers, and if such report shall show a violation of the provisions of this act the commission shall, through the attorney-general, begin the prosecution of all parties against whom evidence of violation of the provisions of this act is found; but this act shall not be construed to prevent ar other person from beginning prosecution for violation of the provisions hereof.
Approved April 19, 1907.
CHAITER 276.-Safety appliances on railroads. SECTION 1. Whenever in the judgment of the railroad and warehouse commission it is necessary for the public safety, said commission may require, at all railroad crossings, junctions and drawbridges in said State, the establishment of interlocking devices, or such other safety appliances as are necessary for the protection and safety of the traveling public.