substance the issue submitted, and that every intendment is to be indulged that the award is responsive to the submission. This is perfectly true, but it does not mean that the ordinary rules of construction may be set aside nor the plain import of language ignored, nor that the contract may be given an interpretation it will not bear, merely because in the judgment of the board it did not cover all that the parties should have included in it. Counsel also insist that the terms of the contract must be construed with reference to the circumstances and the spirit in which they were understood by the parties at the time when they were employed, and, for this purpose, the antecedent negotiations and respective claims of the parties may be looked to. The general rule in this regard is that if the language of a particular clause or feature of a contract is plain, explicit, and unambiguous, not involving an absurdity on its face, and not repugnant to the context, the meaning of that language can not be controverted or affected by evidence either of the surrounding circumstances or of the understanding of the parties. What the court is to ascertain is, not what the parties may have meant or intended, but what is the meaning of the words they have used. It is only when the language is susceptible of more than one construction that the intent may be inquired into. I am satisfied that the construction placed by the board on question D was unwarranted, and that its finding thereunder was outside the issues submitted by the parties. The facts therein found, not being within the issues, the finding must be held nugatory and not binding upon either party. 3. As to the motion for judgment on findings B and C, it is at least doubtful if, under this act, a judgment can be had on part of the award when a part is set aside; and it is likewise doubtful, independently of the act, whether under the general rules applicable to proceedings of this character the issues submitted here are not so interdependent and inseparably a part of one controversy that they must all stand or fall together. But, if I am correct in my reading of the act, the motion is premature, and those questions not now before the court. As we have seen above, the act provides that, where exceptions are filed to the award, it shall go into effect," and judgment be entered accordingly when such exceptions shall have been finally disposed of, either by said circuit court or on appeal there from." The same section further provides: "At the expiration of ten days from the decision of the circuit. court upon exceptions taken to said award, as aforesaid, judgment shall be entered in accordance with said decision, unless during said ten days either party shall appeal there from to the circuit court of appeals. ** The determination of said circuit court of appeals upon said questions shall be final, and being certified by the clerk thereof to said circuit court, judgment pursuant thereto shall thereupon be entered by said circuit court." From these provisions it would seem that it is not contemplated by the act, where exceptions are urged against the award, that judgment shall be entered by the circuit court until the expiration of ten days after the decision on the exceptions. If no appeal has then been taken from such decision, judgment shall be entered, either putting into effect or setting aside the award as the circumstances may warrant. If within the ten days, however, an appeal be taken, then the entry of judgment must await the determination of such appeal, when final judgment may be entered pursuant thereto. Very evidently the act does not warrant a piecemeal judgment such as contemplated by the motion; but one final judgment, which shall be determinative of the whole matter. Having in view the very commendable object aimed at by the act, I regret much the necessity of reaching a conclusion the result of which, if sustained, will be partially, if not entirely, to set at large the differences between the parties out of which the controversy arises. The evident purpose of the law was to afford a ready, summary, and speedy method of amicably adjusting labor disputes arising between the class of employers and employees to which it applies; and, the case being a pioneer thereunder, a more satisfactory result of its operation would have been desirable. There are certain features of the act, however, which, although doubtless intended to add to the simplicity of the procedure provided therein, are calculated to result, as in this case, in making cumbersome and burdensome its operation, and to largely negative and defeat the object of a speedy determination of a controversy. As noted above, the entire recordpapers, testimony, and exhibits-consisting in this case of something over 3,000 pages, is treated as a bill of exceptions for the purpose of review in this court. This would not be so objectionable in itself if there was any requirement at the hands of the excepting party of presenting a specification of the errors relied upon in some such form as would definitely point out the objections involved in the exceptions. In this instance, the exceptions filed were in the most general terms, with no attempt therein or in the brief of counsel to point out the particular page, or even the volume in which any obnoxious evidence or ruling was to be found. As a result, the evidence upon all the issues being intermingled, the court has been put to the necessity of searching through the entire record at the expense of much valuable time, and the great and unnecessary delay of its conclusion. This result could be avoided, either by providing, as in other instances, for a bill of exceptions presenting only the specific errors relied upon, or by a provision requiring the party excepting to the award to file such a specification of errors as would serve to point more particularly the rulings complained of. For the reasons above stated, the exceptions to finding A will be overruled, the exception to finding D will be sustained, and the motion for judgment will be denied. Let an order be entered to that effect. CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD-ADVANCES-PUNISHMENT FOR FAILURE TO REPAY-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-Vance v. State, Supreme Court of Georgia, 57 Southeastern Reporter, page 889.—A case was before the court of appeals involving the constitutionality of the act relating to the fraudulent procuring of advances, No. 345, Acts of 1903, which reads as follows: SECTION 1. From and after the passage of this act if any person contract with another to perform for him services of any kind intent to procure money, or other thing of value thereby, and not to perform the service contracted for, to the loss and damage of the hirer; or after having so contracted, shall procure from the hirer money or other thing of value, with intent not to perform such service, to the loss and damage of the hirer, he shall be deemed a common cheat and swindler, and upon conviction shall be punished as prescribed in section 1039 of the Code. SEC. 2. Satisfactory proof of the contract, the procuring thereon of money or other thing of value, the failure to perform the services so contracted for, or failure to return the money so advanced with interest thereon at the time said labor was to be performed, without good and sufficient cause and [with] loss or damage to the hirer, shall be deemed presumptive evidence of the intent referred to in the preceding section. A series of questions on the various points involved was submitted by the court of appeals to the supreme court of the State, which upheld the constitutionality of the act. From the opinion of the court, as given by Judge Lumpkin, the following is quoted: 1. Is the act of 1903 unconstitutional as being repugnant to and in contravention of clause 1, sec. 14, art. 8, of the Constitution of the United States (continued in Civ. Code 1895, sec. 6030), as to the provision therein contained that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws? The contention is that, in the class of contracts dealt with and contemplated by the act, the person or persons contracting to perform services are denied, as against the person or persons for whom such services are to be rendered, the equal protection of the laws, in that it subjects the former, under certain contingencies, to prosecution and punishment, and at the same time affords the latter absolute immunity from prosecution or punishment by reason of any infraction of said contractual obligations. If the act of 1903 sought to make it penal to violate a contract or fail to pay a debt, it would be patently unconstitutional. But this court has held that "such act does not violate the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt; the legislative purpose being, not to punish for a failure to comply with the obligation, but for the fraudulent intention with which the money or other thing of value is procured." (Lamar v. State, 120 Ga. 312, 47 S. E. 958; Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15 (4), 52 S. E. 74, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007; Townsend v. State, 124 Ga. 69, 52 S. E. 293.) This being true, it is apparent that the objection is without merit. In the nature of things the master does not ordinarily procure advances from his servant, or the employer from his employee. Legitimate classification is not unjust discrimination. There are a very large number of laws upon the statute books imposing penalties upon certain persons, without also providing for penalties as to others, though having some relation with them. The abandonment of a child by its father is a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code 1895, sec. 114.) But it is not declared criminal for a child to abandon its father. It is evident that the same duty does not rest upon both, and the two are not in the same situation. Enticing away apprentices is unlawful. (Pen. Code 1895, sec. 119.) But nothing is said as to putting any penalty on the employer. It is criminal for bank officers to purchase any bill, check, or other evidence of debt issued by the bank for less than its face *** * value; but the seller is not punished. (Pen. Code 1895, sec. 209.) These are only a few of the many instances which might be cited; but they will suffice to show that, where two persons deal with each other and the conduct of one requires safeguarding, criminal laws have been shaped for that purpose, and they have never been considered unconstitutional. 2. It is further urged that the equal protection of the law is denied, because the person contracted with, and for whom services are to be rendered, is permitted to testify to a state of facts declared to be sufficient to carry the presumption of fraudulent intent, whereas the accused is not permitted to testify, and has no opportunity or means equal to those afforded to the person contracted with of proving, that no fraudulent intent existed, and the act lays down no measure of proof by which such presumption may be overcome. Here, again, the error is made of treating the act as punishing a breach of contract, instead of a fraudulent transaction. To say that the equal protection of the law is denied, because a prosecutor can testify and the person accused of crime can not, would upset the practice in criminal procedure for centuries past. The privilege to the accused to testify as a witness is conferred by statute in some States. It is not a common-law right. In this State it does not exist generally, but only in certain cases. 3. The contention that no measure of proof is laid down by the act of the legislature by which such presumption may be overcome is without merit. The general law in regard to criminal procedure is to be considered in connection with this act. The presumption of sanity, of a continuance of a state of facts permanent in its nature when once shown to have existed, and other disputable presumptions, are declared by law. Upon the whole case, in a criminal prosecution, the State must show the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. But the act is not unconstitutional because on its face it does not declare the exact amount of proof which will overcome a disputable presumption raised by law from a given state of facts. 4. It is further contended that the act is violative of paragraph 1, see. 4, art. 1. of the State constitution (Civ. Code 1895, sec. 5732), and especially that portion thereof which declares that "laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State." It is argued that the act of 1903 does not have uniform operation, in that it singles out and deals with a given character of contracts, and prescribes with reference thereto "different rules, different condions, and different penalties from all other contracts of whatever nature," and because it imposes heavier burdens upon the person or persons who contract to perform services, while affording to the peron or persons for whom such services are to be performed immunity from prosecution and punishment, and also because it groups a class ervitizens who contract with reference to the performance of services, imposes on some of them certain conditions, prosecutions, and ments not inflicted upon others. Here, again, the error of ng the act as punishing for a violation of a contract appears. 4 is general and uniform, applying uniformly throughout the S to all persons falling within its terms. It is well settled that ...lo classification may be made, and if the law applies uniall within the class it is not unconstitutional. If this were not so, all the laws giving liens to laborers, material men, contractors, and others against the person with whom they contract, or for the improvement of whose property they furnish labor or materials, without providing a counter lien of some sort in favor of the other party to the contract, would be unconstitutional. We deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support of this well-settled proposition. 5. Again, it is urged that section 2 of the act is repugnant to paragraph 5 of section 1 of article 1 of the constitution of the State (Civ. Code 1895, sec. 5702), and particularly to that portion of the paragraph which provides that the accused shall have a public and speedy trial by an impartial jury, in that said act arbitrarily fixes the measure of evidence by which the jury may presume guilt, whereas the constitutional provision contemplates that the jury alone shall determine that question. This point is in effect controlled by the decision in Banks . State, 124 Ga. 15 (6), 52 S. E. 74, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007, where it was held that " a provision of the act of 1903 to the effect that proof of the contract of hiring, the procuring thereon of money or other thing of value, the failure to perform the service so contracted for or to return the money or other thing of value, the failure to perform the service so contracted for or to return the money so advanced, with interest thereon to the time the labor was to be performed, without good and sufficient cause, and loss or damage to the hirer, shall be presumptive evidence of a fraudulent intent in the procurement of the advances, is not an assumption of judicial functions by the legislature." If the act made the presumption of intent arising from proof of certain facts conclusive, rather than disputable, or if the inference was arbitrary and without reasonable connection with the premises on which it was predicated, a more serious question would arise. But such is not the case. The act is not unconstitutional on this ground. * * * 6. It is still further contended that the act, particularly the second section thereof, is repugnant to the provisions of paragraph 17, section 7, art. 3, of the constitution of the State (Civ. Code 1895, sec. 5779), wherein it is provided that "no law or section of the Code shall be amended or repealed by mere reference to its title, or to the number of the section of the Code, but the amending or repealing act shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made." It is said that the provisions of the act of 1903 are in direct conflict with section 1033 of the Penal Code of 1895, which provides that "on the trial of all criminal cases the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts, and shall give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty;" that the act necessarily works a repeal of this section as to the class of prosecutions within its purview; and that no reference is made to that section of the Code. The particular point of conflict between the section and the act urged is that the latter provides what evidence will raise a presumption of guilt, whereas under the provisions of the section of the Code the jury are the sole judges of the facts and of their probative value. What has been said in the preceding division of this opinion substantially decides this objection. The act of 1903 is not in conflict with and does not repeal the section of the Code quoted above. Upon the whole case that section is still the law, construed as it has heretofore been by this court. The two laws are to be construed in harmony. The establishment by |