gated, is the dereliction of the master. Nothing short of actual notice of the danger to the workman who is to encounter it, with such cautionary explanation as may enable him to avoid it, will satisfy the requirement of the law, and the default of the intermediary, whether he be the highest officer in control, or merely a fellowworkman of the one exposed to the danger, is the default of the mas

In such a case, all question as to whether the immediate cause of the injury was the negligence of a fellow-servant, is eliminated, and inquiry as to the extent of the control and authority committed by the master to the culpable agent, beside the issue, which is solely as to the character of the act or omission, and not the rank, of the offending servant.

INJUNCTIONS-PUBLICATIONS INCITING VIOLATIONS-National Telephone Company of West Virginia v. Kent, United States Circuit Court, Northern District of West Virginia, 156 Federal Reporter, page 173.—The telephone company above named had secured a preliminary injunction restraining Kent and other defendants, electrical workers and members of a labor union, from interfering with the conduct of its business. Subsequently an amended bill was filed, containing the complaints of injury and violence set forth in the original bill, and incorporating new matter relative to the action of one Hilton. editor and proprietor of a newspaper in the city of Wheeling, and the acts of certain persons, members of the Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly, and alleging that these parties had joined the con-piracy presented in the original bill, and asking an injunction against them also. A preliminary injunction was granted on this bill, to which the defendants named demurred.

On hearing before Judge Dayton, the demurrer was overruled. From his opinion the following is quoted as setting forth the grounds on which the injunction was continued:

It is alleged in the amended bill that these new defendants, Hilton, Hecker. Corcoran, and Wessel, the three last mentioned acting in their capacity as officers of the Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly, did subsequently to the granting of the preliminary injunction, granted upon the prayer of the original bill, join the conspiracy alleged in the original bill, and that they did. in pursuance of the said conspiracy, print and distribute a boycott circular, which appears among the exhibits to the amended bill, and that the defendant Hilton published in his paper certain matters intended to explain the carefully worded circular and to make the boycott inaugurated effective.

Counsel for the defendants, in the very able arguments presented, have very aptly said that this is an age of combinations. It is an age of combination--combination of capital and combinations of labor. These combinations, so long as they are kept within the bounds of the law, are certainly lawful, are in many instances beneficial to the persons interested, and may be, in some cases, of benefit to the general public; but when a combination of capital is made for unlawful pur

poses, or, being made for an avowed lawful purpose, seeks to accomplish its purpose by unlawful methods, it becomes the duty of the courts to restrain the unlawful practices and to punish the unlawful acts. Likewise, when a combination of labor is made for unlawful purposes, or, being made for an avowed lawful purpose, seeks to accomplish its purpose by unlawful methods, it becomes the duty of the courts to restrain the unlawful practices and to punish the unlawful acts. The law knows no distinction between the rich and the poor, recognizes no distinction between unlawful acts of combinations of capital and unlawful acts of combinations of labor. The same principles applying to one must apply to the other, and when a combination of laborers is organized for unlawful purposes, or, being organized for lawful purpose, employs unlawful methods, it will be suppressed by the courts, its unlawful acts restrained, and its crimes punished as promptly and as effectively as like combinations of capital are suppressed, restrained, and punished.

There is further involved here, after considering the rights of the complainant company and the rights of the defendants, the rights of those citizens who desire to exercise their God-given right to earn their bread by the sweat of their brow in the employment of this telephone company. It is charged that the defendants threatened, abused, pursued, and even assaulted these men, who were doing no wrong, but were merely exercising their right to work upon terms satisfactory to them; yet they were made to suffer the persecution of these defendants, and their rights, as it is charged, were denied them. There is to be considered also the rights of the general public. It appears from the bill that this company and another company are engaged in the interstate commerce of carrying messages between the States, and that the conspiracy and combination complained of sought to interfere with and tie up this interstate commerce. This being a public business by a "quasi" public corporation, the rights of the public are involved and are not to be interfered with by any unlawful methods.

It is urged by counsel for the defendants that the injunction interferes with the rights of the press. The injunction granted does not deprive the newspaper in question of any lawful right to publish the truth or express its opinions in a lawful manner, but no newspaper has the right to publish any matter intended to aid wrongdoers in accomplishing a wrongful purpose or doing unlawful things, or to aid unlawful combinations in making effective an unlawful conspiracy. Some newspapers, certainly the one involved in this case, have misconstrued the freedom of the press until they seem to interpret the right to be a license to publish what may please them, even though the publication should be an express violation of the law. There is no intention on the part of the court to interfere with the freedom of the press, but this court is not ready to accept the theory that the freedom of the press means a right to advocate crime or to encourage the violation of the law.

The laborers in the organization, appearing as defendants in this case, have the right to organize for lawful purposes and to proceed to accomplish their purposes by lawful methods; but when they resort to force, violence, and destruction of property, coercion of peaceable citizens, combinations, and conspiracies to injure property and interfere with business by threats, menaces, and boycotts, as has been

charged in this case, they lose the moral support of the public and bring upon themselves the condemnation and restraining as well as the punishing power of the court. They approve the application of these principles to combinations of capital, and they can not be heard to complain of the application of the same principles to their own combinations, when they step beyond the bounds of the law.

Applying these principles to this case, and considering the bill as being uncontradicted, I have no hesitation whatever in promptly overruling the demurrer, and an order to that effect may be now entered.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP-QUALIFICATIONS-PROTECTION BY UNION-Levin v. Cosgrove et al., Supreme Court of New Jersey, 67 Atlantic Reporter, page 1070.-Louis Levin applied for membership in a labor union of painters, decorators, and paperhangers, stating that accompanying his application was the required fee of twenty-five dollars. This fee was in fact paid in installments, and on his rejection on grounds of incompetency, he sued for the return of this fee. The district court of Elizabeth gave judgment against Levin, who appealed, securing a reversal of the ruling of the court below, and orders for a new trial. The following syllabus by the court sets forth with sufficient fullness both the facts involved and the conclusions of law in the case:

1. The constitution of the Brotherhood of Painters, providing that the initiation fee paid by an applicant for membership must accompany the application and be returned in case the applicant is rejected, with a proviso that, if the fee is paid in installments while the applicant is "working at the trade and receiving the protection of the brotherhood," such payments shall be forfeited to the brotherhood if the applicant has made any false statements or is unable to qualify as a member, and there being evidence tending to show a custom of the brotherhood not to permit its members to work with men who were not members.

Held, that evidence that an applicant, pending his application, worked at the trade together with members of the brotherhood, did not show that plaintiff was "receiving the protection of the brotherhood," within the meaning of the constitution.

2. Plaintiff's right to seek and gain employment in his lawful occupation was a right secured to him by the constitution of this State. The fact of the brotherhood, having no right to interfere with him, did not interfere, can not be construed as "protection" extended by the brotherhood to him; nor was it in a legal sense a benefit to him. 3. An applicant for membership in a trade union stated in his application that he was able to command the average wages in his locality. Held, not to amount to a representation with respect to an existing state of facts, except that it was equivalent to an assertion that he believed himself able to command the average wages; and that, in order to forfeit money paid by the applicant on the ground of the falsity of this statement, it was necessary to show that he did not reasonably believe that he was able to command the average wages.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS TRADE AGREEMENTS ENFORCEMENT STRIKES INJUNCTIONS-A. R. Barnes & Company v. Berry, United States Circuit Court, Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, 156 Federal Reporter, page 72.-A. R. Barnes & Co. and others, representing an employers' association known as the United Typothetæ of America, sued for an injunction against Berry and his codefendants, officers of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of America, to prevent the violation by the latter of a contract entered into by the two associations named in January, 1907. It appeared that agreements had been made for a number of years past, but that at the convention of the pressmen and assistants in 1907, considerable dissatisfaction was expressed with the failure to secure the recognition of the closed shop and the immediate adoption of the eight-hour day. These matters had been discussed by the committees of the respective bodies, but the only agreement reached was in the nature of a compromise which looked to the adoption of the eight-hour day in January, 1909, otherwise continuing the contract of previous years. Berry and his associates, elected to office subsequent to the making of this agreement, were alleged in the bill to have demanded an immediate modification in respect of the matter of the closed shop and the time of adopting the eight-hour day, and, in order to enforce the demand, to have incited strikes against members of the Typothetæ who would not accede to the modifications, and to have threatened to pursue the same policy in the future. Having stated these facts, Judge Thompson, speaking for the court, proceeded as follows:

The "closed shop" is contrary to public policy, and the demand for the immediate adoption of the "eight-hour day is violative of the contract. Now, this is the situation as I see it. This contract was made. The old officers were succeeded by new ones, who were dissatisfied with it. They insisted upon a modification of it which would recognize the "closed shop" and adopt at once the "eighthour day." The Typothetæ stood upon its contract rights and refused to make this concession, refused to change and modify the contract made, and it is alleged in the bill that in consequence thereof strikes have been declared against certain members of the Typothetæ in different parts of the country, and that strikes are threatened as against all members of the Typothetæ who may refuse to accede or consent to the modification of the contract as demanded. Practically the union is insisting upon a new contract.

The service of the employees, members of the union, is neither special, extraordinary, nor unique, in the sense that it could not otherwise be supplied, and that its loss would cause irreparable injury, and it is not sought to restrain them from quitting the service of their employers, but only that their officers, agents, and representatives be restrained from inciting them to strike, unless the contract be so modified as to make provision for the "eight-hour day" and "closed shop," and to make it effective at once. It is not a question, there

fore, of whether the men who work shall be enjoined from striking, but it is a question whether the officers, agents, and representatives of these men, who represent the organization and control it, shall be permitted to incite the men to strike, to induce them to strike, and thereby repudiate the contract which was made by them. through their agents at the January convention of 1907. The bill charges that the executive officers and directors have conspired to force the making of a new contract which will embody these two demands, and, in the event of the refusal of the Typothetæ to agree thereto, then to enforce these demands by strikes, and that they are using their position, power, and authority to control and induce the men to strike. That, in substance, is the allegation of the bill.

The court is not asked to make an order enjoining the men from striking, and, if it were asked, would refuse to grant it, because, as already stated, no case is made, nor can be made, in which the court would compel the men to labor. They can not be made slaves. They can not be compelled to work, and it is not sought by this bill to compel them to work; but it is sought to prevent the officers of the organization from using their power and influence to induce the men to strike in violation of their contract.

It is plain that these officers have great influence and power with the body of men composing this association, and if they exercise it unlawfully exercise it for the purpose of repudiating the contractthey may be restrained from exercising such power and influence, although the men themselves can not be restrained from striking, or from walking out, at any time, and refusing to work. In a word, the proposition dealt with is this: May the officers of this organization, in violation of this contract, induce, influence, incite, or coerce the men into resorting to a strike to compel a modification of the contract? Shall they be permitted to do that?

I am compelled to dispose of this case upon what appears in the bill and the accompanying affidavits. There is no answer, and no affidavits on behalf of the defendants, except the ones I have read. I am now disposing of the application practically upon what is shown by this bill. It is shown by the bill that, being advised of this contract, they advised the men to repudiate it, to demand that the "eight-hour day" be made operative at once, and also the "closed shop," and to enforce the demand they threatened strikes, and it is alleged that strikes have been entered upon in Chicago, and other places throughout the country, and that a strike will be instituted against every member of the Typothetæ unless it consents to this modification of the contract.

Now, so far as the men are concerned, if they take it into their own hands, they may walk out, but this court is asked to stay the hands e: the officers who manage and control this organization, who have Sewer to influence, to incite, to put on foot these strikes, who have all Spachinery in their hands, and who seek to use it to induce and these men to violate a contract that was fairly made.

of the opinion, therefore, that a case is made requiring that cers, named, be enjoined, in the respects prayed in the bill, ng their power, their control, and their influence to iner that purpose.