States to make so great a departure from its traditional policy? The wisdom of consistency lies in adherence to a principle so long as the conditions upon which it is based remain unchanged. But the conditions that affect the relations of America to Europe have changed greatly in the last hundred and twenty years. At that time it took about a month to cross the ocean to our shores. Ships were small and could carry few troops. Their guns had a short range. No country had what would now be called more than a very small army; and it was virtually impossible for any foreign nation to make more than a raid upon our territory before we could organize and equip a sufficient force to resist, however unprepared we might be at the outset. But now, by the improvements in machinery, the Atlantic has shrunk to a lake, and before long will shrink to, a river. Except for the protection of the navy, and perhaps in spite of it, a foreign nation could land on our coast an army of such a size, and armed with such weapons, that unless we maintain forces several times larger than at present, we should be quite unable to oppose an attack before we had suffered incalculable damage.

It is all very well to assert that we have no desire to quarrel with any one, or any one with us; but good intentions in the abstract, even if accompanied by long-suffering and a disposition to overlook affronts, will not always keep us out of strife. When a number of great nations are locked in a deathgrapple, they are a trifle careless of the rights of the bystander. Within fifteen years of "Washington's Farewell Address" we were drawn into the wars of Napoleon, and a sorry figure we made for the most part of the fighting on land. A hundred years later our relations with the rest of the world are far closer, our ability to maintain a complete isolation far less. Except by colossal self-deception we cannot believe that the convulsions of Europe do not affect us profoundly, that wars there need not disturb us, that we are not in danger of being drawn into them; or even that we may not some day find ourselves in the direct path of the storm. If our interest in the maintenance of peace is not quite so strong as that of some other nations, it is certainly strong enough to warrant our taking steps to preserve it, even to the point of joining a league to enforce it. The cost of the insurance is well worth the security to us.

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If mere material self-interest would indicate such a course, there are other reasons to confirm it. Civilization is to some common heritage which it is worth while for all nations to defend, and war is a scourge which all peoples should use every rational means to reduce. If the family of nations can by standing together make wars less frequent, it is clearly their duty to do so, and in such a body we do not want the place of our own country to be vacant.

To join such a league would mean, no doubt, a larger force of men trained for arms in this country, more munitions of war on hand, and better means of producing them rapidly; for although it may be assumed that the members of the league would never be actually called upon to carry out their promise to fight, they ought to have a potential force for the purpose. But in any case this country ought not to be so little prepared for an emergency as it is today; and it would require to be less fully armed if it joined a league pledged to protect its members against attack, than if it stood alone and unprotected. In fact the tendency of such a league, by procuring at least delay before the outbreak of hostilities, would be to lessen the need of preparation for immediate war, and thus it would have a more potent effect in reducing armaments than any formal treaties could have, whether made voluntarily or under compulsion.

The proposal for a league to enforce peace does not conflict with plans to go further, to enforce justice among nations by compelling compliance with the decisions of a tribunal by diplomatic, economic, or military pressure. Nor, on the other hand, does it imply any such action, or interfere with the independence or sovereignty of states except in this one respect, that it would prohibit any member, before submitting its claims to arbitration, from making war upon another on pain of finding itself at war with all the rest. The proposal is only a suggestion, defective probably, crude certainly; but if, in spite of that, it is the most promising plan for maintaining peace now brought forward, it merits sympathetic consideration both here and abroad.

PEACE LEAGUE INEFFECTIVE1

Clifton, Mass., June 9, 1915.

Dear Sir: I beg to express my thanks for the courtesy of the invitation to attend the conference of the League of Peace in Independence Hall under the presidency of the Hon. W. H. Taft. I feel myself, of course, in deepest sympathy with the spirit of justice and peacefulness which has suggested the foundation of such a league. Nevertheless, I beg to be excused from attendance, as I am convinced that this time of international excitement and prejudice is unfit for the crystallization of new forms for the common life of the nations.

I venture, however, to add that I feel in any case grave doubts of the value of any plans which aim to secure future peace by the traditional type of agreements and treaties. We live in the midst of a war in which one belligerent nation after another has felt obliged to disregard treaties and to interpret agreements in a one-sided way. Only yesterday Italy, without any reason of vital necessity, annulled an agreement and a treaty which had appeared the firmest in European politics, and which yet failed in the first hour of clashing interests. A psychologist has no right to expect that the national temper of the future will be different.

Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has sanctioned the idea, which is shared practically by all nations, that treaties are no longer binding when a situation has changed so that the fulfilment of the agreement would be against the vital interests of the nation. We have learned during the last ten months how easily such disburdening changes can be discovered as soon as the national passions are awakened.

The new plan depends upon only one new feature by which the mutual agreement is to be fortified against the demands of national excitement. The plan of the League of Peace promises the joint use of military forces in case that one nation is unwilling to yield. But the world witnesses today the clear proof that even the greatest combination of fighting forces may

1 Letter from Hugo Münsterberg to Augustus J. Cadwalader, Secretary of the National Provisional Committee for the League to Enforce Peace, expressing his disapproval of the objects of the league.

be unable to subdue by mere numbers a nation which is ready to make any sacrifice for its convictions. One hundred and fifty millions are attacked by eight hundred and fifty millions, by joint forces from five continents, which moreover are backed by the economic forces of the richest country in the world; and yet after ten months of fighting one million prisoners, but no other hostile soldiers, stand on German soil. After this practical example the plan merely to join the military forces will less than ever appear a convincing argument in an hour in which a nation feels its existence or its honor threatened. For a long time we heard the claim that the Socialists and the bankers would now make great wars impossible; both prophecies have failed. The threat that the warring nation will have to face the world in arms will be no less futile. But the failure in this case will be disastrous, as the terms of such an agreement would draw many nations into the whirlpool which would have no reason of their own for entering the war.

The interests of strong growing nations will lead in the future as in the past to conflicts in which both sides are morally in the right and in which one must yield. We have no right to hope that after this war the nations will be more willing to give up their chances in such conflicts without having appealed to force. On the contrary, the world has now become accustomed to war and will therefore more easily return to the trenches. The break between England and Russia and finally the threatening cloud of world conflict between Occident and Orient can already be seen on the horizon; the battles of today may be only the preamble. In such tremendous hours the new-fashioned agreements would be cobwebs which surely could not bind the arms of any energetic nation.

But, worst of all, they would not only be ineffective-they would awake a treacherous confidence. The nations would deceive themselves with a feeling of safety, while all true protection would be lacking. The first step forward toward our common goal must be to learn the two lessons of the war of today and to face them unflinchingly; mere agreements do not and cannot bind any nation on the globe in an hour of vital need, and the mere joining of forces widens and protracts a war, but does not hinder it. We must learn that success for peace endeavors can be secured only from efforts to avert war

which are fundamentally different from the old patterns of pledges and threats. These old means were negative; we need positive ones.

If a psychologist can contribute anything to the progress of mankind, he must, first of all, offer the advice not to rely on plans by which the attention is focused on the disasters which are to be avoided. Education by forbidding the wrong action instead of awaking the impulses toward the right one is as unpromising for peoples as it is for individuals. We must truly build up from within. But a time in which the war news of every hour appeals to sympathies and antipathies is hardly the time to begin this sacred work, which alone could bring us the blessed age of our vision, the United States of the World.