T tain amount of scholarship, but it is precisely what Unless Story could have written his Commentaries on the Constitution without much of the material he cites, as we said, he certainly could not have written it at the Law Institute Library. Story knew that the entire governmental superstructure of the United States was not new, but that it was reared on the colonial fabric, and that the revolution indicated a change, and not res nova. He, therefore, begins his work with an elaborate description of the jural condition of the original colonies, and he cites a great deal of material which is not inaccessible, and which determined effort ought long since to have gathered on the Institute shelves. Works which deal with the colonial laws of New York and with the laws of other colonies, a period almost twice as long as our present government has endured, are certainly not to be relegated to the anatomical museums; they belong, and properly belong, in a first-class American law library. Story evidently thought they belonged to a law book, or he would not have referred to them as he does in his great work. In the first book of his Commentaries on the Constitution this author makes a number of references to colonial authorities, none of which are in the Institute Library. We refer by name to "Chalmers' Annals; Douglass' British Settlements, Pownall's Colonies, where the rights and constitution of the Americans are discussed; Stoke's American Constitutions, with a variety of colonial precedents; Bacon's Laws of Maryland, printed at Annapolis in 1764; Charters of North American Provinces, London, 1766; Colony Laws of Connecticut; Plymouth Laws; Holmes' Annals; Proud's Pennslyvania; Dallas' Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Walsh's Appeal, Philadelphia, 1819, and Hazard's Collection of State Papers, Philadelphia, 1792-4. All these works are indispensable to lawyers dealing with colonial patents, boundary questions, or with issues involving the fundamental common-law rights of Americans. Besides those mentioned by Story, others occur to us as missing from the Institute, such as the Charters of the old English Colonies, London, 1850, a late book, but sure to become rare in course of time, and already desirable for a law library. Nor do we credit Mr. Wheaton, as does Mr. Winters, with the art of getting his facts from his head, and unless he possessed this art, as we said, he could not have written his great work in the precincts of the Law Institute Library. The reasons why he could not have written them may be briefly indicated: The most debatable question in all international law is the foundation on which the socalled law rests. Some theory on this subject is usually introductory to any systematic treatise on the Law of Nations, and Mr. Wheaton's treatment conforms to the ordinary rule. In his précis he refers to a number of works, few of which seem to be in the Institute Library, though of course the more noted are there. But the delicate threads of this author's thoughts could have not been fashioned at the Law Institute, as we said. Wheaton refers to Cicero's De Republica, Hobbe's DeCive; to Leibnitz' Jesuits De Legibus, Codex Juris Gentium, and to Marten's Nouveau Recueil. These famous works which certainly go to make up a complete law library are not in the New York Law Institute. We do not find there, indeed, Lord Liverpool's Discourse as to Neutral Nations, nor Schoell's Histoires des Traités de Paix, nor Arendt's Essai sur la Neutralité de la Belgique, yet in a few pages they are often cited in Wheaton's International Law. What Mr. Winter's theory as to Wheaton's work is, we do not know, but we do know that our statements as to Wheaton's inability to have worked as he did in the Institute Library was the fact, not fiction, nor careless editing on our part. It We repeat again what we also have said before, that the New York Law Institute Library, really admirable as it now is, cannot be made great or beyond criticism, by one collector or by two. needs the co-operation of many men of many minds, and it needs a scholarly atmosphere. It is no longer the little technical library in the Federal Court House in Chambers street. It has now over thirty thousand volumes, and is increasing rapidly in size, and is taking a place among the literary institutions of modern civilization. The question with us was, should it now change its motive and become something more than a mere workshop? Should it be artistic, elegant and complete, or wholly utilitarian? In short, should it be only a complete record of judicial utterances, no matter how crude or forlorn, or comprise also the science, the philosophy, and the genius upon which the fewer and best judicial utterances have been fashioned? Our judgment was that in this collection more attention had been paid to reports, to statutes, and to size, than to completing the collection in any one of the several higher walks of jural science, and we think so still, Mr. Winters to the contrary notwithstanding. In this statement we did not ignore the fact that the Institute Library had been originally collected as a mere help to practicing lawyers, but we had supposed that a division of labor, which always takes place as political societies become more complex, now made it expedient for the library to go out of the statistical line and into the systematization of statistics, in other words, into the science and phiBut here Mr. Winters' letter losophy of the law. seems to think that the Institute Library fulfills every rational requirement, and if his complacency in this respect is shared by the Institute, we can only regret that our hints have fallen on such stony ground, and are to bear no fruit. We should also while on this subject advert to the curious idiosyncrasy which regards an Ameri can law library as moderately complete in the philosophical department, although possessing no copy of such works as Plato's Laws. Aristotle's Politics, Hobbe's Leviathan and Bodin's Work on the Comwealth, translated into English in 1605, and most potent in its influence on English jurisprudence. No doubt the line of demarcation between strictly technical libraries and libraries of purely literary character is not a very wide or perceptible one, but it nevertheless exists, and it can be easily perceived by cultivation and attention. If it is imagined that it can be perceived in the dark or by any one in odd moments with casual attention, it is an error. For this reason great technical libraries are the result of the profoundest co-operative labor, and not of the accidental or casual attention of a few busy, bustling men, however able. With care the line of demarcation indicated may be detected, but it will require an examination of several cognate fields, bordering on the strictly jural relations. The science of politics and the science of law are regarded by scientists as cognate branches of sociology. Without some knowledge of the science of politics, the legal legislator may as easily go wrong as right-who then shall say that works on the science of politics are not part of a technical law library? If they are a part, why is not Freeman's Comparative Politics at the disposition of a reader in the Law Institute? Where are Vico's Scienza Nuova and a score of other great books on political science? Certainly next to this category belong such works as M'Lennen's Primitive Marriage, De Lavelye's Primitive Property, if not Sir A. Lyall's Aisiatic Studies. Let us suggest another line of thought! Did it ever occur to Mr. Winters, or to any of the library committee of the Law Institute, that the colonial reports of the British colonies offer us two strict analogies where the later English reports offer us one? As a Dutch colony originally, we of New York present many similarities in our legal development to Good Hope, and the other Dutch possessions which have drifted under English laws. In those colonies comes up the conflict between the Dutch and English laws which occasionally arises here. As a colony of England the law of New York, in the last century, would receive more valuable illustration from English colonies than from Great Britain. We do not however propose to tutor the faculty of the Law Institute Library, or to censure any one, for we are not a public censor morum, but it does seem to us that any helpful, honest suggestion from a law journal to a law institution should be welcomed rather than hastily and inconsiderately challenged. Mr. Winters is at liberty to impugn our statements if he wishes, but we beg to say to him for his future guidance that when we make plain statements of fact we are prepared to stand by them. In all that we have said we mean no reflections on the labors of Mr. Winters himself labors of great professional and technical value - but we do mean to say that were he a Scaliger, a Muratori, and a Savigny combined, he could not make a complete law library by himself. Having paid some attention to the subject under discussion, we can furnish a good many more suggestions to the improvement of the Law Institute Library, as well as to that of our other law libraries, although we do not for an instant suppose that the evidently satisfied temper of the Institute faculty in particular will suffer it to deviate from a mechanical policy, adopted, as Mr. Winters states, some twentyfive years back. In conclusion we desire to say that our statements in regard to the library in question were facts, and not, as Mr. Winters thinks, errors. When we make errors them, but when we do not, we do not care to be we are glad to correct hastily impugned. EXTRADITION-HAM V. STATE, 4 TEX. APP. 645. THIS HIS case came before the Court of Appeals of Texas in 1878. Ham was extradited from Missouri to Texas, on the basis of an indictment found against him by the grand jury of Limestone county in Texas, charging him "with the crime of forging a deed to land in Texas." Being brought into the State, and lodged in the jail of Travis county, he was charged by another indictment, preferred by the grand jury of that county, with the crime of uttering a forged instrument. for which he was extradited, and though, as charged, For the latter offense, though not the one committed prior to his extradition, he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to punishment. A motion for a new trial was made, and this motion being overruled by the court below, an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals of Texas. One of the legal points-the only one that we propose to consider -on which the appeal was based, raised the question whether it was lawful to try the defendant on a charge for which he was not extradited, and alleged to have been committed at a date anterior to the inception of the extradition proceedings." The counsel of Ham maintained that this was not lawful, and hence that the trial court was without jurisdiction. The substance of what Judge White, in stating the opinion of the court, said on this point, is epitomized in the following language-found in the syllabus of the case "Under the provision of the United States Constitution respecting the rendition of fugitives from justice, and the laws regulating the same, a citizen of another State, extradited therefrom to this State, may be here tried for a different offense than that alleged against him in the requisition on which he was extradited to this State. The doctrines of international extradition in this respect, whether based on comity or on treaty stipulations, have no application to extradition cases arising between the different States of the American Union under their common Constitution, whose imperative mandate on this subject is founded on the mutual trust and confidence of the States, and guarded by the guaranty that each State shall secure to the citizens of her sister States the privileges and immunities she concedes to her own." The actual ruling of the court in this case, being that of the highest court of Texas, settles the law for the courts of that State in respect to this particular question, and also furnishes an authority to be considered by the courts of other States. The correct ness of the ruling, and of the reasoning in support of it, is open to inquiry; and such an inquiry it is proposed to make in the present article, and in the following order: party is charged with crime, in the way prescribed, is made a sufficient presumption of guilt to justify his arrest and surrender. The procedure, in international extradition, as provided for by law and by treaty, is somewhat but not wholly different. The party must, by complaint on oath, be charged with some one or more of the crimes specified in the proper treaty; and when this is done, authority is given for his arrest and au examination of the charge. This examination is not a trial with a view to his punishment, if found guilty, but simply a process to ascertain whether the evidence is "sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention." Rev. Stat., § 5270. 1. After referring to the American and British doctrine that there can be no international extradition, except as provided by treaty stipulation, Judge White proceeds to say, that "without any treaty stipulation to that effect, it may now be considered as a well established doctrine of international extradition that good faith and comity require of the nation to which the fugitive is surrendered that he be tried alone upon the specific offense for which he was surrendered, and that he cannot be held to answer for another and different offense." We have here, in respect to interna tional extradition, even without a treaty stipulation to that effect, the admission of the principle for which the British government contended in the correspondence with regard to Winslow, which was placed in the English Extradition Act of 1870, which has been uni-had there been committed." The evidence must be formly asserted by the text-writers on extradition, which is now sustained by the preponderance of judicial authority in this country, and which the counsel of Ham claimed to be applicable to a case of interState extradition. 2. Judge White, while admitting this principle when the extradition is international, denies its applicability to a case of inter-State extradition, stating as follows the first of his reasous for the denial: "The relations between the States, as created by the general government, under their status and intercourse were different in most material respects, civilly and politically, from that subsisting between separate and independent nations. And this difference is especially apparent in the difference, heretofore alluded to, existing as to the modes of procedure in extradition matters." What the actual difference is between the States of the Union, and independent nations, considered relatively to their status and intercourse with each other, Judge White does not explain, with the single exception of that which exists "as to the modes of procedure in extradition matters." This he presents by a lengthy quotation from the deliverance of Chief Justice Savage, in the Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 212. The quotation however has no reference to the point that was before the Court of Appeals of Texas. Clark made no such claim as that set up in behalf of Ham. He simply offered to show by his own affidavit that the charge against him was not true; and in reply Chief Justice Savage said, that the actual truth of the charge was not the question to be decided. Whatever might be requisite in the way of proof if the case were one of international extradition, the only question before the court was whether Clark was "properly charged with the guilt." If he was, that was "sufficient" in inter-State extradition; and hence his offer to show by his own affidavit that the charge was false was not admissible. All that was said in the passage quoted relates to this single point. The Constitution, in a case of inter-State extradition, requires that the party should be charged with some specific crime; and as an indictment or an affi davit is the usual American mode of charging a crime, and sufficient evidence of its commission to justify, in the case of an indictment, the arrest and commitment of the accused party for trial, and in the case of an affidavit, the arrest and examination of this party, with a view to his commitment if the evidence be found sufficient, Congress saw fit to adopt this mode of pro cedure in charging a crime for the purpose of arresting and delivering an alleged fugitive from justice to the State demanding him for trial, leaving that State, after getting possession of the fugitive, to determine the question of his actual guilt. The fact that the The general treaty rule, as to the sufficiency of evidence, is that it must be such "as according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense sufficient to secure precisely the same legal result that in inter-State extradition is secured by the charge of crime in the way specified. In both cases there must be a sufficient prima facie showing of crime to justify the apprehension and commitment of the accused party for trial; and in neither case is it necessary to prove the actual guilt of this party. In re Farez, î Blatchf. 345, 358. Now it is undoubtedly true, that in the two forms of extradition, there is some difference in the procedure; but this difference is not one that in either form has any relation to the question whether the party, if delivered up, may or may not be tried for a crime different from the one for which he was demanded and on the charge of which he was surrendered. There is manifestly nothing in it to indicate, or even suggest, that he cannot be so tried when the extradition is international, or that he may be, when it is inter-State. Whatever may be the truth on this subject must depend on other considerations than such as grow out of a difference of procedure in the two forms of extradition, especially when we remember that in both forms there must be a sufficient showing of crime to justify the apprehension and commitment of the accused party for trial. The simple charge of crime by indictment or affidavit does this in the one case; and the charge of crime, by complaint on oath, supplemented by an examination at which the proper evidence appears, does this in the other. The result reached in both cases is the same, and this is a sufficient showing of crime to justify the apprehension and detention of the party for trial. We fail to see what logical connection the difference of procedure in the two cases has with the question to which Judge White was speaking. 3. The next point relating to extradition, found in the deliverance of Judge White, cannot be better summarized than in the following words of the sylla bus: "The doctrines of international extradition in this respect, whether based on comity or on treaty stipulations, have no application to extradition cases arising between the different States of the American Union under their common Constitution, whose imperative mandate on this subject is founded on the mutual trust and confidence of the States, and guarded by the guaranty that each State shall secure to the citizens of her sister States the privileges and immunities she concedes to her own." Here are two reasons for the opinion expressed; and the first of these reasons is "founded on the mutual trust and confidence of the States" in each other as members of "the American Union under their common Constitution," which do not exist to the same extent in the intercourse of nations with each other. Heuce as to the question whether a party, demanded by one State and delivered to another on the charge of a specific offense, could be tried for another and different offense, no "prohibition" of such trial was interposed. The whole matter was, or the score of "good faith and comity," left "entirely to the discre. tion of the State which had the right to demand him for any crime which he committed." The general terms in which this reasoning appears make it difficult to see what it proves, or that it proves any thing. The meaning of the Constitution, either in its express words, or by just and fair implication, is not to be settled by judicial fancy-work. The rhetorical phrases," their common Constitution," ". our common country," "the mutual trust and confidence of the States," "implicit faith and confidence," and the like, which figure in this part of the deliverance, do not furnish rules for interpreting the Constitution of the United States. They are entirely outside of the extradition provision of this instrument, and supply no foundation on which, in the disposal of a judicial case, to base a legal doctrine under it. The provision means just what it expressly says, and which it fairly implies; and this meaning is to be ascertained by a careful examination of the words used, rather than by general statements about the "American Union," "our common country," and "the mutual trust and confidence of the States." Such statements are too indefinite and elastic to determine any question of law. The other reason is drawn from the guaranty of the Constitution that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." The difficulty with this reason is that it has no application to the question that Judge White was considering. It is well settled that this provision is limited to what are called fundamental rights, and that in respect to these rights, it means that each of the States shall secure to the citizens of other States, when within its jurisdiction, the same privileges and immunities that it secures to its own citizens, and in this respect, and to this extent, treat them as if they were citizens of that State. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 371, and Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. Now plainly the question whether a party, extradited from one State to another, can in the latter State and in consistency with the extradition provision of the Constitution, be tried for a different offense than the one for which he was extradited, does not come within the limits of the guaranty cited by Judge White. The right of exemption from such trial, if it exists at all, is not a fundamental right, and is not derived from State citizenship. The question to be determined, is not whether an extradited party, if tried for a crime other than that for which he was extradited, must in the process of such trial, enjoy the privileges and im. munities conceded by the State to its own citizens when trying them on criminal charges, but whether he can be so tried at all; and to this question the guaranty referred to has no application. Moreover it may be, and generally is, the fact that the party demanded is a citizen of the State from which he fled, and which in the event of his delivery will try him for an offense against its laws. Such a case clearly would not come within the meaning of the guaranty. The provision establishes no rule as to the manner in which a State shall deal with its own citizens; and hence if the extradited party be a citizen of the State that tries him, the guaranty will have nothing to do with the case. It can, at the very utmost, operate only on the supposition, generally not true, that this party is a citizen of some other State than the one that tries him on a criminal charge. There is really no argumentative force in either of the special reasons, assigned by Judge White, to show that the admitted doctrine in respect to the crime for which the party may be tried, when the extradition is international, does not apply when it is inter-State. The first reason is too general and indefinite to prove any thing; and the second has no application to the question that was under discussion. 4. Judge White completes his deliverance on this branch of the case before the court, by citing the decision of Judge Nixon in the Matter of Noyes, 17 Alb. L. J. 407, in support of his view. The reasoning of Judge Nixon, into which we cannot here inquire, was very different from that of Judge White; and yet he came to the same conclusion. The case was therefore pertinent to the purpose for which it was cited, as an authority. 5. The two States that are concerned with a particular case of extradition-the one in demanding a fugitive criminal, and the other in acting upon the demand-are the only parties to the transaction in either form, or at any stage. The Supreme Court of the United States in Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 374, said, with reference to this point, that "the duty enjoined is several and not joint, and every governor acts separately and independently for himself." Referring to the extradition of McGuire from the State of Maine, while he was under recognizance in the State of Connecticut to appear before a court of that State and answer to a criminal charge there pending against him, the court further said: "We cannot hold that Connecticut was in any sense a party or consenting to what was done in New York." The extradition of McGuire was between New York and Maine; and with it Connecticut, though a member of the "American Union, and with the other States living under a common Constitution," had nothing to do, and the same was true of every other State of the Union. The fact that the States, directly concerned in the matter, were members of the "American Union," and for certain purposes relating to that Union, were confederated together under a "common Constitution," and for like purposes and to the same extent, were confederated with all the other States of the Union, did not, according to the Supreme Court of the United States, in any sense, make the other States parties to an extradition between New York and Maine. The matter concerned these States, and these only, and that too, as completely as if they had been independent and sovereign nations; and no other States had any power to exercise in regard to it, or any duty to perform, or held any relation whatever to it. 6. The particular States involved in a case of extradition as the exclusive parties thereto, are not municipalities created by the general government, or dependent upon it for their existence, but self-governing States exercising powers not derived from the general government, or even from the Constitution of the United States, and having defined territories within which these powers are operative upon the inhabitants thereof; and as such, and such only, they act, whether in demanding or surrendering fugitive criminals. They exercise, through their respective chief magistrates, the powers of State sovereignty. Their relation to each other in this respect, and for this purpose, is precisely like that of two nations in similar circumstances, with the single exception that a provision of the Constitution, and not that of a treaty, and a law of Congress for carrying the constitutional provision into effect, supply the rule of their action. They are as independent and sovereign in their action under this rule, as are two nations acting under the provisions of an extradition treaty. The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, was that there is no process of Federal coercion by which a State governor can, upon the demand of another State governor, be compelled to make the delivery of a fugitive criminal. The same doctrine was stated by the court in Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 370. The court said in this case: "In such cases the governor acts in his official character, and represents the sovereignty of the State in giving efficacy to the Constitution of the United States and the law of Congress. If he refuse, there is no means of compulsion." If this be so, then no nation can be more sovereign and independent, when acting under an extradition treaty, than is a State when acting under the extradition provision of the Constitution and the law of Congress for its execution. The demanding State, through its chief executive magistrate, determines for itself whether it will make a demand, just as a sovereign nation determines for itself the same question; and so the State to which the demand is addressed determines for itself, through a similar magistrate, whether it will comply therewith, just as a nation determines the same question. There is no power anywhere to revise and reverse these determinations. They are analogous, and in both cases the determinations of soyereignty. 7. The relations of the States to each other, as established by the Constitution of the United States, are not such as to create any essential difference between international and inter-State extradition. Messrs. Justices Field, Clifford and Miller, referring in their dissenting opinion in Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 356, 377, to the case of McGuire, which was a case of interState extradition, said: "The case is not essentially different from the surrender of a fugitive from justice under a treaty." It is extradition in both cases; in both, for a crime; in both, the removal of the accused party from one jurisdiction to another, with a view to his trial and punishment in the latter; in both, upon the specific charge of crime, and for nothing else; in the one case, under a treaty, and in the other under a constitutional provision. The two extraditions, in their great principles and ends, are essentially similar, and do not so differ as to exclude the application of these principles from either. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Matter of Frank Cannon, 47 Mich. 481, referred to Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush, 697, and to the fact that it was claimed in the argument that the case of Hawes, decided under an extradition treaty with a foreign nation, could have "no bearing on extradition between States," and then proceeded to say: "We do not perceive any ground for the distinction. The duties of one State to another are measured by law, and not by their mere good pleasure, and so are the rights of citizens. The disregard of domestic duties and of foreign duties should not be considered as different in quality, and where both depend on law it is impossible to find good reason for holding either class of obligations as undeserving of obedience." The court regarded the doctrine stated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the case of Hawes as equally applicable to a case of inter-State extradition. Judge Cooley, referring to the case of Hawes, says in regard to inter-State extradition: "It should be held, as it recently has been in Kentucky, that the fugitive surrendered on one charge is exempt from trial upon any other." Princeton Review for January, 1879, p. 176. This is the doctrine declared by the Kentucky Court of Appeals under the tenth article of the treaty of 1842 with Great Britain; and the view of Judge Cooley is that the doctrine is equally applicable to a case of extradition between States under the Constitution of the United States. Judge Daniels, in Lagrave v. Case, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 333, said: "In principle there is no practical difference between the case of a fugitive brought from a neighboring State under the Constitution and laws of the United States and one brought from a foreign country under the provisions of treaties. In each the right of freedom to return is precisely the same: and their implied guaranty of that right under the law is no greater in one case than in the other." It is true that the relation of the States of the "American Union" to each other are not in all respects like those of separate and independent nations to each other; and yet the Constitution, which is the exponent of their State relations, furnishes no reason why the principle, which in the absence of treaty stipulations otherwise providing limits the use of the custody gained by international extradition to the specific purpose for which the extradition was asked and granted, should not equally apply to inter-State extradition. Extradition, in both cases, is essentially the same thing. The two States concerned in the one case are acting in their separate, independent and sovereign capacity as States, just as if they were nations, acting under the obligations of a treaty; and no other States are parties to the action, or have any thing to do with it, any more than if those two States were foreign nations. The Constitution of the United States does not so consolidate or blend the several States together by their confederate relations to each other, or to the United States, as to destroy their distinct and separate autonomy, or make extradition between them essentially different in the powers exercised, the procedure adopted, or the ends to be attained from extradition between nations. Judge White, on this point, was, as we must think, mistaken in premise from which he reasoned, and hence incorrect in his conclusion. He assumed, without any explanation of the assumption, and equally without proof, that the relations of the States of the Union to each other, and those of nations to each other, so differ that the doctrine as to the crime for which it is permissible to try an extradited party, admitted by him when the extradition is international, has no application when it is inter-State. This we regard as a false assumption. 8. The Constitution contains only one provision in relation to the extradition of fugitive criminals, and this declares that "a person charged in any State with treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." There is here no declaration, that in express words, either affirmatively or negatively, determines the question whether the fugitive criminal, being delivered up by one State to another on the charge of a specific crime, may or may not by the latter State be tried for another and wholly different crime. Such a trial is not expressly permitted or prohibited. Is this question then answered by a just and fair implication from the words used? Such we think to be the fact; and if so, this is as decisive as if the idea were in express words. The vital point sought to be gained by extradition is to get the party back into the State from which he fled, that he might be there tried for the crime charged against him, and if convicted, punished for the same. This can be done only by the consent and action of the State to which he has fled, and in which he is found. This consent, with the necessary co-operative action, as provided for by the Constitution and the law, is to be given in the presence of certain specified facts as conditions precedent, one of which is the charge of a specific crime against the party demanded. The de |