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teristics of the knowledge that a practical man has of respondent, v. City of Brooklyn, appellant; James the needs of the profession. It is well printed.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

Fitzpatrick, administrator, etc., appellant, v. N. Y., N. Haven & H. R. R. Co., respondent.-Judgment of General Term recovered, judgment of Special Term affirmed, except as to the women's hospital and as to that reversed and the provision declared to be void,

HE following decisions were handed down Tues- with costs to all parties to be paid out of the fundTHE day, March 3, 1885:

Teunis P. Osterhoudt, tax payer, etc, respondent, v. John Rigney and others, appellants. Judgment affirmed. The cases of Osterhoudt v. Butler and others; Same v. Trodden and others; Same v. Murphy and others; Same v. Brackett and others; Same v. Hyland and others, are governed by the decision in this case and should also be affirmed, but with but one bill of costs in this court in the six cases. Judgment reversed, new trial granted, without costs to either party in this court-Teunis P. Osterhoudt and others, respondents, v. Board of Supervisors of Ulster county, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs-Samuel F. Edwards, appellant, v. New York & Harlem R. Co., respondent; Jonathan E. Robinson and another, executors, etc., respondent, v. Eph A. Smith and others, impleaded, etc., appellants; Margt. Barry,respondent, v. Patrick Lambert, executor, etc., appellant; John A. Lambert, executor, etc., respondent, v. Horace Craft and another, executors, etc., appellants; Angeline M. Snook, administratrix, etc., respondent, v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., appellant; Joseph M. Pray and another, executors, appellants, v. Joseph Hegeman, executor, respondent; Frank Wilson, executor, respondent, v. Henry R. Reynolds and another, appellants; James C. De Bevoise, administrator, respondent, v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., appellant; Mary E. Bacon, administratrix, respondent, v. Horace B. Claflin and others, appellants; Mary Hughes, administratrix, respondent, v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., ap pellants; Lewis A. Burgess, administrator, respondent, v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., appellant; James McKeen, executor, appellants, v. James D. Fish and another, receivers, respondents; Henry Moyer, administrator, respondent, v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., appellant; Catherine McDonald, executrix, respondent, v. Frederick Lester, appellant; Hiram L. Doolittle, executor, etc., respondent, v. Timothy Hoyle and others, appellants; Edward Ellsworth, executor, respondent, v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., appellant; Constance D. Price, respondent, v. Walter J. Price and others, executors, appellants; Wm. W. Thomas and another, administrators, respondents, v. Utica & Black R. R. Co., appellants; Frances E. Castle and others, respondents, v. Harvey A. Koch, sheriff, etc., appellant; John Drabriskie, administrator, respondent, v. Long Island R. Co., appellant; Margaret Moore, executrix, appellant, v. City of Albany, respondent; Edward B. Lord, administrator, respondent, v. Wm. Tiffany and another, appellant; Wm. A. Poucher, administrator, appellant, v. Robert C. Scott, etc, respondent; Jacob Werle, administrator, respondent, v. Long Island R. Co.; Richard P. Bisden, respondent, v. Lutgarda Augarica De La Rua, executrix, appellant. Judgment affirmed, costs to be paid by appellant In re Petition of Mary J. Lyman to revoke probate of will of Lewis S. Phillips, appellant, v. Mary B. Phillips, executor, respondent.—Order of General Term reversed and judgment at Circuit affirmed-Mary Powers and another, administrators, respondents, v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., appellants.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event George C. Hemingway, administrator, respondent, v. Jacob S. Poucher, impleaded, etc., appellant; Jeremiah Eighmie, respondent, v. Edgar D. Taylor, administrator, appellant; Willard Parker, Jr., and others, executors, appellants, v. Albro B. Stroud and others, executors, respondents; James Murphy, Jr., administrator,

Asa L. Shipman, executor, respondent, v. Isabella G. Rollins and others, aqpellants.-Order of General Term reversed and proceedings and order of the commissioners affirmed with costs-People ex rel. John J. McCarthy, respondent, v. Board of Police Commis sioners, appellant.-Order affirmed with costs-Adelaide R. Kenny, respondent, v. Edwin A. Weed, appellant; Kate T. Ryckman, respondent, v. Gerritt W. Ryckman, appellant.-Appeal dismissed with costsJennie Roat, appellant, v. J. R. Van Duzer and others, respondents (two cases); Jacob S. Freedman, assignee, respondent, v. Isaac Burman and others, appellants.

-Orders of General Term affirming the order of the Special Term confirming the report of the commissioners, and adjudging that the respondent is entitled to costs, etc., are affirmed, and the appeal from the order denying the motion to remit the case to the commissioners is dismissed, with costs to the respondent of one appeal-In re Application of the Cortland and Homer Railroad to cross, etc.-Order affirmed without costs of appeal, and remittitur heretofore sent down requested to be returned-Benj. Wright, receiver, respondent, v. Mary A. Nostrand, impleaded, appellant.-Judgment of General Term reversed and decree of surrogate affirmed, with costs-In re Estate of Andrew Hood, deceased.-Judgment of General Term approving decree of surrogate affirmed with costs of this appeal to the respondent to be paid out of the estate, but without costs to any other party-In re Final Settlement of Joseph H. Mahan, executor.—— Motion for reargument denied, with costs-People v. Gold Stock Tel. Co.; Same v. Western Union Tel. Co.

-Motion for reargument denied, with $10 costsJohn P. Higgins, appellant, v. Thomas J. Crichton, respondent.

NOTES.

WO new law journals have come to us. The Kan

Tas Law Journal, published at Topeka, is a small

octavo of sixteen pages, weekly, and is devoted to the legal affairs of that State. The Columbia Jurist is published-we do not know how often-by the Columbia Law School students, and is filled with weighty matter. The proof-reading is not faultless. For example, we cannot believe that Prof. Dwight ever spoke of a "bee-tail estate." That would be a very difficult estate to hold. We wish both these new journals all the success they deserve.There is a dreadful report about our President-elect. He is said to have been "busy with Marble all day." This is worse than Vinnie Ream's efforts. Represeutative Reed, of Maine, is quoted by the San Francisco Chronicle as saying: "I was admitted to the bar in California, and Judge Wallace examined me. I'll take my oath nobody was ever admitted to the bar with as simple an examina. tion. When I went up for examination the great question of the hour was the legal-tender act. Everybody was discussing its constitutionality. Some said it was constitutional, others said it was unconstitutional. The first question Judge Wallace asked me was, 'Is the legal-tender act constitutional or unconstitutional?' I didn't hesitate a moment. I said simply, 'It is constitutional.' 'You can pass,' said Judge Wallace. 'We always pass a man who can settle great constitutional questions off-hand.'"'

The Albany Law Journal.

TTHERE

ALBANY, MARCH 14, 1885.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HERE is a bill pending before the Legislature of this State which proposes to amend the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to defendants who set up the plea of insanity, and among other things provides that when a person is tried on the charge of murder, and he interposes the plea of insanity as his defense, and is acquitted on this ground, the jury shall so state in their verdict of acquittal, and that the court shall then order such person to be committed to a State lunatic asylum during his natural life, with the provision however that the governor may order the discharge of the person so committed whenever he shall be satisfied that it may be done with safety to others. The present provision is that the court, upon such acquittal, “must, if they deem his discharge dangerous to the public peace or safety, order him to be committed to the State lunatic asylum until he becomes sane." The proposed amendment would be a theoretical improvement, but we doubt whether it amounts to a substantial improvement. These "emotional criminals are always cured the moment they have killed their victim. Like Cole, who killed Hiscox, they are sane the instant before and sane the instant after, and insane only at the instant of the killing. What a farce it would have been to put Cole in the insane asylum; or Sickles, who was no more morally irresponsible at the moment he slew Key, than he was afterward, when he forgave his wife like a christian, and served his country like a patriot. The result of this bill would be simply to go through the form, for in nine cases out of ten the defendant must be discharged as soon as committed. The only effective measure practicable would be to make confinement in the insane asylum imperative for a given length of time, with the privilege of discharge after that. A still more effective measure would be to punish adultery and seduction and the like as crimes, capitally, if need be, and then if the offended man took the law into his own hands, to punish him as a criminal, or to shut him up as an insane person for life, without privilege of discharge- estop him by his plea. We have no sympathy with this emotional insanity plea. If a man's wife or sister is seduced, and existence is intolerable to him until he has hunted down and killed the seducer without giving him any warning or any chance for his life, why then let him not sneak away under the pretext of insanity, but let him walk up and take his hanging like a man, and be done with the existence which is hateful to him; or if he thinks he was crazy, let him face the consequences of such a plea. the seducer is so dangerous to society as to deserve the killing, the avenger is so dangerous as to deVOL. 31 No. 11.

If

These

serve the mild restraint of a lunatic asylum. acquittals after all embody the most effective argument against jury trial. When we read the history of such trials, we feel for once an approach to sympathy with those who say, with Bumble, slightly modified, "the jury is an ass." This emotional plea is a disgrace to our jurisprudence and our advocates. It deifies our profession at its most ignoble and human nature at its most lawless point. The scenes on these trials are disgusting. Women are always fainting away; the insane culprit is pale with suspense; the clerk is so agitated that he cannot ask the jury if they have agreed; the jury are always breaking down in tears; everybody is embracing and hand-shaking; the court-room is always bursting into a tornado" "of applause; and then they all go out and "paint the town red." A perusal of Mr. Donovan's "Modern Jury Trials and Advocates" will show that we do not exaggerate. Mr. Donovan truthfully says: "Fifty years ago the plea of emotional insanity was unknown; now it is a sheet anchor to the rich and influential." A sentence more damning of our profession was never written. In the present state of the law there is hardly any necessity for putting in the plea at all, and so counsel thought in Sickles' case, where they boldly justified the deed as an act of revenge, although they did throw out the "sheet-anchor" to windward. We repeat, we do not see that this bill will make much practical difference in the adminis

tration of our laws.

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A letter from the Honorable Charles Reemelin, in the Cincinnati Weekly Law Bulletin for March 2d last, contains some curious comments on codification. The author's proposal seems to be that the general government should codify the State constitutions. Some day, no doubt, even State constitutions will be so numerous and complex that reduction in some shape will be necessary for this species of legislation as for all others. But we are at a loss to understand how the Federal government can assist in the work, and in fact what affair it would be of theirs. Federalism is a beautiful product of human ingenuity, but a confusion of Federal functions may assist neither the cause of codification nor the cause of good government.

The Virginia Law Journal has recently made several excellent suggestions for the improvement of law-reporting. In the current number it says: "Can nothing be done to shorten the titles of cases cited in judicial opinions, and in printed arguments of counsel? Here is a not inconsiderable source of waste and annoyance which might be remedied to some extent. Take for example a late case from the United States Supreme Court, which has been 'dragging its slow length along' through the legal journals under the style of Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad v. Duane O. Ross,' and will soon wriggle itself entirely across the page of many a reported case. Now, what is the

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use of all this name? Why would not 'Railroad v. Ross' answer every possible purpose? There is no use for a title to the case except for identification and reference, and it does not matter in the least about the full name of the unfortunate engineer, nor the full legal designation of the road on which he was injured. And again, when Dick, Tom and Harry sue Harry, Tom and Dick, what is the use in reporting or citing the case as Dick, et als. v. Harry, et als.?' Yet this is the constant habit of reporters, judges and counsel; and if one of the parties on either side happens to be a party in a representative capacity, the case will almost certainly appear and reappear as Dick, Adm'r, etc., et als. v. Harry, Trustee, etc., et als.' Why not make it a uniform rule to drop all titles and descriptions, and report and cite every case by the name of one plaintiff and one defendant? Corporation cases, particularly those of banks and railroads, often furnish long and exasperating titles, which ought to be reduced in every case to 'Bank v. -.' and

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v. Railroad,' and vice versa.” We assent to most of this. It is however convenient sometimes to have the corporate title expressed in full, or so nearly so as to distinguish the party from other corporations. For example, there are a great many cases of "Railroad v. Smith," and the like. But all christened names, and descriptions, and "ex rels.," and the like, are vexatiously superfluous. In the American Reports we have always used the shortest form, and so they do in the American Decisions.

In the case of Groth v. Washburn, 34 Hun, 509, the following are the "catch-lines" preceding the head-note: "Statute of limitation an action by a husband to recover damages for injury sustained by his wife is governed by the six years' limitation Code of Civil Procedure, section 382." And the following is the head-note: "An action by a husband to recover damages sustained in consequence of injuries inflicted upon his wife by the defendant's negligence, where such damages consist in the loss of the services of the wife, and in moneys expended for necessary medical aid and attendance upon her during her illness, and in employing other persons to render the services which she had theretofore performed, is an action to recover damages for an injury to property, and not for a personal injury, and it may therefore be brought within six years from the time it arises, as provided in section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure." Now one or the other is superfluous. The "catch-line" should be: "Statute of limitation-action by husband for injury to wife." The head-note then would be quite right. Perhaps we have said it before, but we will run the risk of repetition, and say that this sort of reporting reminds us of the ministers who read the hymns all through before the choirs sing them. Mr. Hun's reports are so admirable in other respects that we would fain have him recognize the proper office of the "catch-line."

There is one species of Anglo-mania that ought to be encouraged in this country, and that is the imitation of the English dealing with criminals and their administration of criminal law. As we learn from the London Law Times, at the recent Lewes Assizes Lord Coleridge made some observations as to the general diminution in crime in England and Wales, as shown not merely at these assizes, but by the returns for the last ten or twelve years throughout the country. "When I recollect," said his lordship, "what assizes were when I was a young man, and observe that notwithstanding the more frequent gaol deliveries, the actual number of persons in the prisons of England has for the last ten or twelve years steadily declined, it is a matter on which we may heartily congratulate ourselves. We must not make too much of it, as it may have arisen from a concurrence of causes which may not be permanent; but for the present, at all events, it is satisfactory to find that upon returns which cannot deceive, and which include the whole of the prisoners in England and Wales, there has been a steady diminution in crime for the last ten or twelve years." Mr. Justice Denman also, at Derby, said that judges in many parts of the country had noticed that crime was diminishing in England. So far as the Midland Circuit was concerned, he was happy to give the strongest confirmation to that view. If he might judge from what had happened in every one of the counties in which he had been holding assizes during the last month or so, it was certainly the case that the fewness and mildness of offenses, as compared with other occasions within his memory, gave every reason for congratulation.

IN

NOTES OF CASES.

N Homer v. Harvey, Supreme Court of New Mexico, 19 Rep. 247, it was held that a railway conductor who rents a room in a hotel at the terminus of his route, at a specified rate per month, which he uses for sleeping and other purposes when there, is not a guest of the hotel. The court said: "The liability of innkeepers is strict, and justly so; but it is a liability limited to their relation to travellers or wayfaring men. The law of civilized countries benignantly protects men away from home, and from those resources with which the denizen or citizen can guard himself from wrong, and protect his property from loss or injury. When the traveller comes to an inn and is accepted, he instantly becomes a guest. The innkeeper, when he accepts him and his goods, becomes his insurer, and the innkeeper must answer in damages for the loss or injury of all goods, money and baggage of his guest brought within his inn and delivered into his charge and custody, according to the usage of travellers and innkeepers; but he must be a guest, and before he can be a guest he must be a traveller. When he ceases to be a traveller, or a transient or wayfaring man,

and takes up a permanent abode even in an inn, he ceases to be an object of the law's especial solicitude, and he is no longer a guest but a boarder, no longer a traveller but a citizen. In considering the liabilities of innkeepers in this connection, the words traveller and guest are always used correlatively. At common law the innkeeper was compelled to furnish lodging and entertainment for travellers and passengers, and he was bound to protect the property they brought with them when delivered into his care, and was liable if it was lost or injured. The length of time a man is at an inn makes no difference, so he retains his character as a traveller. Officers of the army and navy, and sailors and soldiers, are to be considered prima facie travellers and wayfarers, and it was upon this distinction that the case of Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1; S. C., 46 Am. Rep. 112, was decided. But are the employees of railroads, engaged in running trains, to be so considered? An engineer or conductor who follows his employment and runs his regular trips, stopping over at each end of his route, either at his own house or at a hotel, is neither a traveller, a wayfaring man, nor a transient person. He is a citizen of the community at both ends of his route. The fact that he works upon a train which runs thirty miles an hour does not make him a traveller any more than if he worked in the company's shops. If he goes to a hotel and rents a room by the month he is no more a guest in the legal sense which fixes the liabilities of innkeepers, than if he was a mechanic in the shops or a permanent citizen of the place. If Horner was not a traveller he could not be a guest, and if he was not a guest he could not maintain this action." See note, 46 Am. Rep. 119.

In Cole v. Western Union Tel. Co., Minnesota Supreme Court, Feb. 14, 1885, 22 N. W. Rep. 385, the printed blank forms in common use by a telegraph company contained the following condition: "No claim for damages shall be valid unless presented in writing within thirty days after sending the message;" and beneath the blank space for message and place of signature was printed in large type: "Read the notice and agreement at the top." Held, that one who filled up and signed a message upon such blank form was presumed to have had notice of such condition, and was bound by it as a part of his contract with the company. Held also that the same was a reasonable stipulation, and not contrary to public policy. The court said: "Under the circumstances of the case, as they appear, he must be presumed to have had notice of its terms and conditions. Wolf v. Telegraph Co., 62 Penn. St. 87; S. C., 1 Am. Rep. 387; Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 171; S. C., 10 Am. Rep. 575. It follows therefore that the terms embraced in the printed form became part of the contract between the plaintiff and the company, and are binding on him in so far as they are reasonable regulations. Telegraph Co., 18 Hun, 159; Young v.

Schwartz v.

Telegraph Co., 65 N. Y. 167; Grinnell v. Telegraph Co., 113 Mass. 299; S. C., 18 Am. Rep. 485; Heimann v. Telegraph Co., 57 Wis. 566. It cannot be contended that a regulation requiring the sender of a message to present his claim for damages in writing promptly to the company is an unreasonable one. Considering the character of its business such regulations would be necessary for its own protection, and to enable it seasonably to ascertain the facts in the case, and to secure or preserve the proper evidence. It is not a regulation intended to shield the company from the consequences of a neglect of duty on its part, but prescribing a duty to be performed by the plaintiff before he should be entitled to maintain his action. Wolf v. Telegraph Co., supra.

A similar rule is well established in insurance cases. Young v. Telegraph Co., 34 N. Y. Super. Ct. 392. No reason is apparent why thirty days is not a reasonable limit to fix in such cases, and no suggestion is made that the plaintiff did not have ample opportunity within that time to present his claim. Heimann v. Telegraph Co., supra. It is however expressly admitted that he did not comply with such condition, and no claim was made till suit brought, more than sixty days after the dispatch was sent. He was not therefore entitled to recover."

In Fisher v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., 34 Hun, 434, it was held that although a railroad corporation cannot, without the consent of the Legisture, lease its road to an individual, yet it may lease its road to another railroad corporation, and when it has done so, and the lessee has taken possession of the road, and is operating and managing it thereunder, the lessor is not liable to a passenger thereon for injuries sustained by him by reason of the negligent and wrongful acts of the lessee's servants. The court said: "It has been urged that the Metropolitan Railway Company had no legal authority to execute and deliver this lease of its railway to the Manhattan Railway Company, and Abbott v. Johnstown, etc., Railroad Co., 80 N. Y. 27, is relied upon in support of this position. But in that case the lease was made to an individual, and it was therefore held to be inoperative, and that the company still remained liable to persons injured in the course of its management, notwithstanding the lease. But by chapter 218, of the Laws of 1839, it was made lawful for any railroad corporation to contract with any other railroad corporation for the use of their respective roads, and thereafter use the same in such manner as may be prescribed in such contract. This act did not authorize the leasing by a railroad company of its road to an individual, but it has been held to authorize such a lease from one railroad company to another. That subject was considered in Woodruff v. Erie Railway Co., 25 Hun, 246, where this distinction was maintained, and it was there held incidentally that the Legislature had authorized the leasing of a railroad by one railroad company to another. This case,

it is true, was afterward reversed, but the reversal did not draw in question the correctness of this construction of the statute. But on the contrary, it was again repeated and approved by the court. Woodruff v. Erie Railway Co., 93 N. Y. 609. Under this authority it is regarded as having been conclusively settled by the laws of this State, that one railroad company may lease its road, as this railroad was leased, to another. And where such a lease has been executed and delivered, and the lessee has taken possession of the leasehold property, and afterward operates it as its sole proprietor, as it well might do under the terms of this lease, there the lessor cannot be held liable to persons having causes of action of this description. To render the corporation liable the law requires that the relation of principal and agent, or master and servant, shall appear to exist between the person whose wrongful act is complained of and the corporation proceeded against. A party injured by the misconduct of another is limited in his right to redress to the pers on or persons causing the injury, unless the fact can be established that these persons maintained the relation of servants or agents to another party or corporation. Milligan v. Wedge, 12 Ad. & E. 737; Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 Mees. & W. 710. The persons whose acts were relied upon as wrongful in support of the action did not maintain this relation of servants or agents to the Metropolitan Elevated Railway Company. And for that reason this company was not responsible for the consequences of what they omitted to do for the plaintiff. The case of Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445, is in no way inconsistent with this conclusion. For it appeared there that the persons in charge of and operating the railroad were still, as a matter of fact, in part at least, in the service of the company. They were its servants to that extent, and it was liable for the consequences of their failure to perform their duties. And what was said in the course of the opinion is to to be regarded as subordinate to this state of facts." See Singleton v. Southwestern Railroad, 70 Ga. 464; S. C., 48 Am. Rep. 574, and note, 580.

H

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COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES.

OUSEHOLD EFFECTS.— A carriage is within the phrase, "household effects," in the Federal statute as to customs duties. The court said: A carriage is peculiarly a family or household article. It contributes in a large degree to the health, convenience, comfort and welfare of the householder or of the family. The statute is not limited to articles of household furniture, or to things whose place is necessarily within the four walls of a house. Clause 2 above uses the words 'personal and household effects.' This serves to show that by the use of the words 'household effects' alone in clause 1, in the same section of the statute, something is intended different from 'personal effects,' and that those words embrace articles which the

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words 'personal effects' do not cover." Arthur v. Morgan, United States Supreme Court, Oct., 1884. SUPPLYING HEAT.-A corporation chartered "for the manufacture and supply of gas, or the supply of light and heat to the public by any other means," is not authorized to supply natural gas. Emerson v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 1885, 15 Pitts. Leg. Journ. 273. The court said: "Regarded in this manner, we feel obliged to hold that whether the article furnished be gas or light or heat, it must be the result of a manufacturing process. That is, if gas is furnished, it must be manufactured; if light or heat is furnished, it also must be manufactured. Nor is this inconsistent with the language of the section which speaks of the 'supply of light or heat by any other means.' For neither light nor heat can he produced by any human agency except by some species of manufacture. If either is the result of the mere combustion of natural substances, that very combustion is a method of manufacture. In the nature of the case the material for combustion, and the gases which support it, must be furnished in large quantities, their union effected, and an economical and safe means of transportation of the product provided. It is well known that heat is furnished by means of steam and hot water in pipes, or by currents of heated air produced by direct radiation from heated metallic surfaces. This brings us to the decision of the question whether the act of 1874 authorizes the creation of corporations for the supply of natural gas. The furnishing of natural gas is not the furnishing of heat. Natural gas is not heat. It is a fuel, a substance which may be converted into heat by combustion with atmospheric air. When the gas is delivered to the consumer it is still gas only. It is not heat. If the consumer does not produce combustion, no heat is obtained, and if he does produce it, the act of doing so is his act, not that of the company which furnishes the gas. In any point of view therefore it must be said that a company which furnishes natural gas is not necessarily furnishing heat. It would scarcely be contended that companies could be chartered under this section of the act of 1874, for supplying coal, wood, oil, peat or other substance whose combustion produces heat, yet they all belong alike in the category of fuels. The fuels must be destroyed in order that their calorific qualities may be developed, but when they are furnished in their original, natural state it cannot be said that they have been delivered in their developed form. They are still subject to any use to which the consumer may choose to apply them. If he does not choose to convert them into heat no heat is obtained, and it certainly cannot be said that the company has furnished any heat to the consumer. But if he does so convert them it is equally true that the heat thus obtained is not received from the company.'

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BODY OF WATER.-A river is a body of water." Berlin Mills Co. v. Wentworth's Location, 60 N. H. 156.

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