* * to his conviction. It is impossible that the judge can know any thing about that. The privilege would be worthless if the witness were required to point out how his answer would tend to criminate him. * * * The rule is of considerable antiquity, and I am not aware that any great practical inconvenience has been found to result from it. I think you must contend here that the witness' answer could not possibly place him in jeopardy, before you can say that the judge was wrong in refusing to compel him to give it. * I think the judge is bound by the witness' oath, otherwise you might exhaust all possibilities consistent with a man's innocence, and so convict him of murder." And Jervis, C. J., added: "We must allow the witness to judge for himself, or he would be made to criminate himself entirely. There is no doubt at times great difficulty in applying the rule, but it is impossible to help that." In Osborn v. London Dock Co. (4), where it was argued that the judge ought to decide whether the witness' reasons were sufficient for refusing to answer, Alderson, B., answered: "On the other hand there is great difficulty in saying where the limit is to be | drawn; for if the court were to decide improperly that a question may be put, irreparable injustice might be done to the witness. Suppose, for instance, a witness were asked whether he was in the company of two other persons at a particular place at a certain hour. That seems a very innocent question, and yet the answer might lead to the conviction of the witness for some very serious crime. The witness may know the effect of the question, and upon that ground he may refuse to answer it, although the court may be totally ignorant of its effect." (B.) 1. In a proceeding to wind up a company a witness is asked whether he has bought or sold, or had in his possession, any of the shares of the company. He declines to answer on the ground that the company is illegal, and the issue of the scrip illegal, thereby subjecting him to a penalty. It is for the judge to decide this, and if he decides that such transactions are not illegal, the witness must answer (5). 2. In England it is provided by the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act (elections), that a person giving full answers to all questions as to corrupt practices committed by him shall be freed from subsequent punishment or penalty (6). A witness who has been examined in such an inquiry, and has obtained from the tribunal a certificate of indemnity under the statute, is examined in a prosecution for bribery growing out of the same election. He is asked, "did you at such a time receive a sum of money from the respondent?" He declines to answer on the ground that his answer would criminate him. If in the opinion of the judge the cer tificate is a full protection to him, the witness will be compelled to answer (7). 3. A witness is asked whether he knew of any one, other than himself, being engaged in gambling at a certain place at a certain time. The witness refuses to answer because it will criminate him. The judge may compel an answer (8). 4. A witness says: "I decline to answer that question, because it may show that five years ago I exercised an office without first taking the oaths.” The judge decides, as a matter of law, that a subsequent act has repealed penalties of this kind. He will therefore compel an answer (9). In case 1 it was said: "The first point raises the question whether the witness is to determine the law as to his liability to any penalty. I do not doubt the accuracy of the observation in the case cited, that in a great number of instances the witness himself must be the only person to determine that point, but certainly where all the facts relating to it are brought before the attention of the court, then I am of opinion that it is for the court to determine it, because it is a mere question of law, and such is the case upon the present occasion. I therefore proceed to examine the law of the case, and to inquire whether the witness incurs any liability sufficient to justify him in his refusal to answer the question." And after examining the law the court held that there was no illegality about the transaction. The witness therefore was required to answer, and the ruling was affirmed on appeal. In case 3 it was said: "In relation to the privilege of witnesses, it is necessary to avoid these two extremes: 1. That of permitting the witness to protect himself by his privilege by refusing to answer questions which cannot, from the nature of the answers sought, criminate him. 2. That of compelling him to answer, when from the nature of the question, the answer would inevitably criminate him. In the first the court must be judge, and compel the answer. In the second the witness is sole judge, and may answer or refuse, as he sees proper. When it is evident to the mind of the court that the answer cannot accuse the witness, the court should require him to respond to the interrogatory. * In this case it was evident from the scope of the question that an answer could not possibly infringe upon this right, and yet the witness makes himself the judge, and refuses to answer." * * JOHN D. LAWSON. VOID GRANTS OF LAND HELD ADVERSELY. THE system of practice inaugurated by the Code is, in its spirit, opposed to every thing in the nature of legal fiction. Common sense and ordinary language, as opposed to technicality and circumlocution, lie at the basis of the system and give it vitality and (7) Ex parte Fernandez, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 4 (1861). (8) Richman v. State, 2 G. Greene, 533 (1850). (9) King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 330 (1851). consistency. The administration of justice is no longer to be hedged about with mysterious and vapory legal terms. It is to find the fulfillment of its mission less in the theoretical than in the real status of the parties. The veil of the temple of justice has been rent in twain, and the language of the layman instead of the mysterious circumlocution of the priest is to be heard at the altar. The practice of law, as respects the litigation of cases in our courts, has been made a practical matter. It is not so much a problem in algebra, with many and complex signs and symbols, which confuse the uninitiated, as an example in simple arithmetic, the statement of which the merest tyro may comprehend. Among other provisions of the Code, framed in this spirit, is that contained in section 449, which provides that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Speaking generally, there would seem to be but little occasion for any judicial interpretation or construction of this provision, and whatever questious respecting its scope and meaning may have been raised, have long since been placed at rest. But connected with this provision and section 1501 we find a clause which has more than once involved courts and litigants in doubt and obscurity. By this clause it is provided that an action may be maintained by a grantee of land in the name of the grantor * * when the conveyance under which he holds is void because the property conveyed was held adversely to the grantor. By the provisions of the Revised Statutes (2 Rev. Stat. 1120) "every grant of land shall be absolutely void if at the time of the delivery thereof such lands shall be in the actual possession of a person claiming under a title adverse to that of the grantor.” Here then is discovered a class of cases wherein the real party in interest, namely, the grantee of such "void" graut may not sue in his own name. That he is the real party in interest is unquestioned, for although the grant is declared to be void, it is 80 only sub modo and as between the grantee and third parties. As between him and the grantor the transfer is perfectly legitimate. So that the sense of the Code provision to which I have referred would be something like this: A. has executed and delivered to D. a conveyance of certain real property. But at the time of the conveyance this property was in the actual possession of C., who claimed to hold it adversely. B. is the real party in interest in any litigation to recover the possession from C. But as the statute makes the grant void as respects C., the only party who can prosecute the action is A. But as between A. and B. the latter has a valid conveyance, the Code permits him to use A.'s name iu the action brought to recover possession. This looks a little like circumlocution to the lay understanding. But is is clear that if B. were to be permitted to sue in his own name, the statute making void such grants would be rendered ineffective. The question which I wish to present at this juncture is this: Must the grantee of real property in all cases use the name of his grantor in actions to recover the same as against one holding adversely at the time of the grant? Having in view the phraseology of the Code, and giving it a literal construction, the answer would appear to be in the affirmative. But the courts, drawing inspiration from the spirit which animates our modern system, and at the same time bearing in mind the reason of the rule which avoids such grants, have held that these statutes, clear and unambiguous, as they appear to be, are nevertheless subject to certain exceptions. Naturally enough, the pleader, not having these exceptions before him, would be governed by the plain terms of the Code provision, and when a case was pre sented to him, would content himself with ascertaining as a fact whether at the time of the grant to his client, the property sought to be recovered was held adversely. He would thereupon institute proceedings in the name of the grantor of his client, and not until he was met at the trial by a more learned and philosophic opponent, would he discover that in addition to the single preliminary query which he propounded at the outset, there were two other elements in the case which he had quite overlooked. They may be started as queries, thus: First. Did the grantee derive title direct from the grantor, or indirectly through judicial proceedings? Second. Was the adverse holding under a claim of title, or was it a mere adverse possession? In short, if either of these elements were involved in the case, then the grantee, and not the grantor, would be the proper party plaintiff, since the courts have held that the statute which declares void all grants of land held adversely does not contemplate cases where the transfer is made by operation of law, and not by the direct act of the grantor, nor cases where the dispute is not concerning the title, but the right of possession growing out of disputed boundaries. In the first class of cases the statute originated in the ancient doctrine of champerty. Its purpose was to prevent a sale of disputed rights, which was contrary to public policy. Says Hawkins: "It seemeth to be a high offense at common law to buy or sell a doubtful title to lands known to be disputed, to the intent that the buyer may carry on the suit which the seller doth not think it worth his while to do. And it seemeth not to be material whether the title so sold be a good or bad one, or whether the seller were in possession or not, unless his possession were uncontested." 1 Hawk. P. C. (Curw. ed.) 470. And Bishop, under the head of "Champerty " (2 Cr. Law, § 137), says: "This is one of the sources of the rule that a convey. ance of land held by another adversely to the grantor is void." The foundation of the rule and of the statute having thus been made clear, it did not take the courts a great while to see that when a man's property was taken from him by judicial decree or by operation of law, and transferred to another-even though at the time held adversely-the transfer did not come within the mischief contemplated by the enactment, and in accordance with a familiar legal maxim, the reason of the rule having ceased, the rule no longer applied. The first case in which this doctrine was clearly stated was Tuttle v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 224, in which Chancellor Walworth uses this language: "I am satisfied that the statute against buying and selling pretended titles cannot apply to judicial sales. It is merely an affirmance of the common law, and that has never contemplated preventing change of title by operation of law or by sale by a proper officer under a bona fide decree. It does not come within the mischiefs intended to be guarded against by the statute." In Hoyt v. Thompson, 1 Seld. 345, Ruggles, C. J., said: "A change of property by operation of law or sale by a proper officer under a bona fide judgment does not come within the mischief of the statute." And in the same case Paige, J., added: "The principles of the common law and statutes do not apply to judicial sales or sales made under a decree, etc." The same principle was enunciated in 14 N. Y. 289; and Stevens v. Hauser, 39 id. 302. In the second class of cases the authorities simply adopt a sensible construction of the literal words of the statute. It is not every grant of land held adversely which is void, but only such grants as are held by adverse title. There must be not only a claim of possession, but it must be founded on a title adverse. Consequently when two parties claim under the same description or under the same grant, but there is a question of boundary, the case is not within the statute. A fortiori, must this be so where the claimant has mere naked possession without any title what ever. As was said by the court in Allen v. Welch, 18 Hun, 226: "It would be unreasonable to say that if one of two adjoining neighbors entered on and took possession of a strip between two disputed boundaries, the other could not make a valid sale of his land until the end of a litigation and the removal of the intruder." In that case each party admitted that the other was owner up to the line, wherever the line might be, and the judgment of the court was that for this reason the doctrine and statute of champerty did not apply. ED. J. MAXWELL. YONKERS, N. Y. CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER--CO-DEFENDANT MAY TESTIFY. MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT. STATE V. BARROWS.* On the separate trial of one of two persons jointly indicted for murder, the other defendant, even while the indictment is still pending against himself on a plea of not guilty, may with his own consent be called as a witness and allowed to testify against his co-defendant. ON exceptions. Indictment against Oscar E. Blaney and Mary E. Barrows for the murder of Thomas Barrows at Kittery, on the 14th of November, 1883. The respondents severally pleaded not guilty. On motion of Mary E. Barrows a separate trial was granted her and she was first put on trial. The opinion states the question presented by the exceptions. Henry B. Cleaves, attorney general, and Frank M. Higgins, for State. Ira T. Drew, William Emery, and John B. Donovan, for defendant. PETERS, C. J. Mary E. Barrows and Oscar E. Blaney were jointly indicted for murder. She was separately tried. Blaney, without any further disposition of the indictment as to him than his plea of not guilty, was called as a witness against her. The bill of exceptions presents the question, whether if two are indicted jointly, and one pleads not guilty, his testimony, if he consents to be a witness, is admissible for the State on the separate trial of the other defend ant. In this State it is a question to be decided upon the principles of the common law as amended or modified by statutory provisions. As a question simply at common-law, although there is a contradiction in the cases, the preponderance of authority seems to favor the admission of a co-defend ant, not on trial as a witness, if called by the prosecution. There is very much less authority allowing him to be sworn as a witness for the defense. Whether the distinction be a sensible one or not, it has prevailed extensively. There are really but a few adjudged cases upon the point whether such testimony is admissible for the State, for the reason, probably, that a prosecuting attorney can avoid the question by omitting to indict one party, or by obtaining separate indictments. The defendant having no such election, the cases affecting the testimony in his behalf are more numerous. *S. C., 76 Me. 401. Most of the authors on evidence evidently adopt the view that the testimony is admissible when offered by the State. Although but little authority is adduced to support their statements, and the doctrine is not very clearly or positively stated in some instances, still such a general concurrence of favorable expression has much weight upon the question. It goes far to show the common opinion and practice. Hawkins P. C., book 2, ch. 46, § 90; 1 Hale P. C. 305; 2 Starkie Ev. 11; Roscoe Crim. Ev. (9th ed.) 130, 140; 2 Russell Crimes, 957. Mr. Wharton says: "An accomplice is a competent witness for the prosecution, although his expectation of pardon depends upon the defendant's conviction, and although he is a co-defendant, provided in the latter case his trial is served from that of the defendant against whom he is offered." Whart. Cr. Ev. (8th ed.), § 439. Mr. Greenleaf states the same rule. He says: "The usual course is, to leave out of the indictment those who are to be called as witnesses; but it makes no difference as to the admissibility of an accomplice, whether he is indicted or not, if he has not been put on his trial at the same time with his companions in guilt." 1 Greenl. Ev., § 379. The counsel for the defendant places especial reliance on Mr. Bishop as an opposing authority. That learned commentator evidently attaches more weight to that side of the question than other writers do. 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. (3d ed.), §§ 1020, 1166. But Mr. Bishop states that all the cases are not in accord with his text, and also says, in a note to the section cited supra, that the late English doctrine seems to differ from the rule recognized by him. We find it to be so. Late English cases are quite emphatic to that effect. Queen v. Thompson, L. R., 1 C. C. 378; Queen v. Winsor, L. R., 1 Q. B. 390; Queen v. Payne, L. R., 1 C. C. 349; Queen v. Deeley, 11 Cox. C. C. 607. The defendant's counsel however in their able and exhaustive brief contend that the late English cases are based upon acts of Parliament in amendment of the common law. It cannot be so, for Chief Justice Cockburn in Queen v. Payne, supra, declares the rule to be according to the law "as it has existed from the earliest times," and other judges gave their opinion that the new enactments were not intended to apply to criminal cases. See cases, supra. The question before us does not appear in any reported case in this State. State v. Jones, 51 Me. 125, approaching the question nearer than any other case, merely decides that when two are indicted, and one pleads guilty, his testimony is admissible for the other defendant. Kent, J., says in the opinion: "It seems to be settled that he cannot be thus called whilst the charge in the indictment is pending and undisposed of against him. And this whether he is to be tried separately or jointly." That is, the defendant cannot be called by the co-defendant. The latter remarks are a correct statement of the law of New York, and New York cases are cited in support of it. See 17 Alb. L. J. 421. In 1876 however the privilege of calling a codefendant to testify, before that time possessed by the prosecution only, was extended by a legislative enactment to all parties. 18 Alb. L. J. 160. The case of Lindsay v. People, 63 N. Y. 143, relied upon by the defendant's counsel, upon a correct understanding of it, does not contradict previous decisions in that State. The argument against the admission of such evidence does not strike us with much force. It is almost universally admitted that an accomplice separately indicted may be a witness for the State, and any distinction arising between trials on a joint indictment and trials on separate indictments is not readily appreciated. The crime is supposed to be jointly committed in either case. If there are separate indictments, the fact of joint criminality is not withheld from the jury. It is not improper to aver it by way of recital or description. The interest and motives of the witness must be the same whether he is to be afterward tried under the same or another indictment. As said by Beasley, J., in a convincing argument of the question in State v. Brien, 3 Vroom, 414: "The only reason for the rejection of such a witness is, that his own accusation of crime is written on the same piece of paper with a charge against the culprit whose trial is in progress." The reason at first given for not allowing a party to testify was his interest. The old common law shuddered at the idea of any person testifying who had the least interest. But that reason failed sometimes. In many civil cases a party had no interest. Then it was decided that public policy or expediency prevented the reception of the testimony. A party to the record was not permitted to testify, whether interested or not. If only a nominal plaintiff, he could not testify either for the plaintiff or defendant. Kennedy v. Niles 14 Me. 54. Without much reasoning upon the subject, the law pronounced against it. The rule was general. But as stringent as the rule was, it did not apply to from the dock to the witness stand, but a companion in guilt, included in the same indictment not on trial, be excluded therefrom. Exceptions were taken to some portions of the charge of the judge to the jury. No argument has been submitted in their support. They are clearly untenable, and require of us only a passing word. Exceptions overruled. Walton, Virgin, Libbey, Emery and Haskell, JJ., concurred. MARRIAGE-HUSBAND AND WIFE - PARTNER- CITY COURT OF BROOKLYN, GENERAL TERM, 1885. NOEL V. KINNEY. A married woman is not authorized to form and carry on a business partnership with her husband, and she is not liable on a note given in the course of the business thereof. indictments to its full extent. The parallel between ACTION on a firm note. The opinion states the civil and criminal cases was not kept up. If a man was indicted and pleaded guilty, he could testify for his co-defendant. State v. Jones, supra. If however he was sued for the same cause, and became defaulted, he could not testify for his co-defendant. Gilmore v. Bowden, 12 Me. 412. Courts seemed inclined not to regard a co-defendant in a criminal case as a party, unless "a party to the issue on trial." That distinction is taken in the English cases before cited. To be incompetent to testify, the defendants must be in charge of the same jury. Mr. Starkie struck the same key, who declared that "an indictment against several is several as to each." It is plainly seen that there is much authority and reason for regarding an indictment of two or more persons as in effect a joint and several indictment; joint when the accused are tried jointly; and several when tried separately. But as before intimated, we are not to look upon the question before us as exclusively one at common law. Our statutory enactments bear upon it. They have weakened if not abrogated the argument of public policy. It was no doubt the design of the Legislature that the objection to the competency of parties as witnesses should be removed in both civil and criminal cases. In civil cases the door is opened wide. In criminal cases the provision is this: "In all criminal trials the accused shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness. * * *The husband or wife of the accused is a competent witness." R. S., ch. 134, § 19. While this enactment does not cover the present question with literal exactness, it approaches it, affects and influences it, and requires us to examine the matter in the light of the legislative policy declared by it. If both defendants were on trial at the same time, either could testify. Com. v. Brown, 130 Mass. 279. If the argument for the defendant is sound, then the common-law rule has become reversed. Defendants can testify against each other when tried together, and cannot so testify when tried apart. We do not assent to such a propo sition. The admission of the evidence did no injustice. It bore less heavily upon the defendant than it would have if the witness had not been himself indicted. As Lord Hale says, the indictment against him "doth much weaken and disparage his testimony." It would present a singular inconsistency in criminal procedure, if even one's wife may be compelled to testify against him, and a co-defendant on trial may be called point. N. P. O'Brien, for plaintiff. G. Storm Carpenter, for defendant. REYNOLDS, C. J. The respondent and her husband are sued as partners upon a note signed by her hus band in the firm name of J. P. Kinney & Co. As the complaint is now framed, the action is not upon the consideration for which the note was given, nor are any facts alleged for the purpose of charging the defendant as a married woman, but the claim rests simply upon the written instrument, and the case therefore presents the question whether a married woman may carry on business as a partner with her husband. As this question has been ruled both ways, and able and exhaustive opinions have been given, it will only be necessary for us to give a general statement of our reasons for the conclusion at which we have arrived. It must be conceded that at common law the unity of husband and wife was such as to preclude the existence of a business co-partnership between them; and such is still thrule unless it has been changed by some statute. The only statutes claimed to have effected such a result are the married woman's act of 1848, as amended by chapter 375 of the Laws of 1849, and the act of 1860 as amended by that of 1862. The idea of a co-partnership involves the holding of property in common, and the transaction of business together by the partners. First as to property. The provisions pertinent to the question are section 3 of the act of 1848 as amended, and section 1 of the act of 1860. The note in suit was made before the passage of the act of 1884. 66 By these statutes any married female may take by inheritance, or by gift, graut, devise or bequest from any person other than her husband and hold to her sole and separate use, and convey and devise real and personal property, and any interest or estate therein, and the rents, issues or profits thereof, in the same manner and with like effect as if she were unmarried, and the same shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband nor be liable for his debts" (1848). "The property both real and personal which any married woman now owns as her sole and separate property; that which comes to her by descent, devise, bequest, gift or grant; that which she acquires by her trade, business, labor or services carried on or performed on her sole or separate account" shall remain her sole and separate property, not subject to the con trol of her husband or liable for his debts; except in one case, not material to be considered here (1860). We cannot carry her powers or liabilities beyond these statutes. The essential ideas of co-partnership property seem to be carefully excluded so far as her husband is concerned as to him, her property must be sole and separate and held to her sole and separate use, not subject to his control or disposal or liable for his debts. But the interest of one partner is not sole or separate from the others, nor held to the separate use of such partner, nor free from the control or disposal of the other or from liability for his debts. In Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, the court says the statutes have not gone so far as to destroy the common-law unity of husband and wife, and make them substantially separate persons for all purposes. Judge Earl says: "So the common-law incidents of marriage are only swept away by express enactments. The ability of the wife to make contracts is limited. Her general engagements are absolutely void, and she can bind herself by contract only as she is expressly authorized to do by the statute." And in that case it was held that under a conveyance to a husband and wife jointly, they take not as tenants in common, or as joint tenants, but as tenants by the entirety. This is not the way partners take or bold. Second, as to the carrying on of business. "A married woman may bargain, sell, assign, and transfer her separate personal property, and carry on any trade or business, and perform any labor or services, on her sole and separate account, and the earnings of any married woman from her trade, business, labor, or services shall be her sole and separate property, and may be used or invested by her in her own name.' Laws of 1860, ch. 90, § 2. This is the enabling statute from which the married woman derives whatever power she has to carry on a trade or business. Where is the provision which authorized her to enter into co-partnership with her husband? She may sell her "separate personal property," not the partnership property, as she might have occasion to, from day to day in the course of trade. She may carry ou trade or busines or perform labor or services on her sole or separate account; not on joint account with her husband partner. Judge Brown in the case of Graff v. Kinney (Kings Co. Special Term), suggests that the words "sole and separate relate to "labor or services" and not to "trade or business." I think this is a mistake. The second section should be construed in connection with the first of the same act. The first declares that what she acquires by her trade or business carried on, on her separate account, shall be her sole and separate property. This plainly refers to the following section which goes on to authorize her to carry on trade or business. One section was plainly intended to be as broad as the other. The first meant to give her as her separate property all her acquisitions from the business authorized by the second, and yet the first only operates upon what she gains in business conducted on her sole and separate account. Besides it is only upon this construction that the latter part of section 2 can be made harmonious with the former part of the section or with section 1. Trade, business, labor, and services are there all joined together without a repetition of the qualifying words, and it is declared that her earnings from all these sources shall be her sole and separate property, meaning, I think, in the language of section 1, "trade, business, labor, or services carried on or performed on her sole and separate account." Any other construction makes confusion in the act. In Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17, Judge Earl says (commenting on the acts of 1848, 1849 and 1860): "The statutes referred to touch a married woman in her relations to her husband only so far as they relate to her separate property and business, and the labor she may perform on her sole and separate account.' It may be as contended by Judge Brown in the case referred to, that a married woman can carry on a partnership with a person other than her husband, but if she can do so with him, the words "sole and separate" in the statutes we have been considering, seem to have little or no use. Some of the views above expressed, and others equally conclusive, are so fully and forcibly presented by Judge Westbrook in Fairlee v. Bloomingdale, 14 Abb. N. C. 341; 29 Alb. L. J. 285, that a further discussion would seem to be out of place. Exceptions overruled and judgment for defendant, Frederica M. Kinney, with costs. NEGLIGENCE-DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION- ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL, JULY 12, 1884. BRUNSDEN V. HUMPHREY.* Plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages for injury done Held, that the damage to the cab and the personal injury con- THE plaintiff was a cab-driver, and while he was driv ing his cab a two-horse van driven by the defendant's servant came into collision with the cab, and the plaintiff was thrown from the box. The plaintiff sued the defendant in the Whitechapel County Court to recover the amount of the damage done to the cab. The defendant paid the amount claimed, and costs, into court. Afterward the plaintiff discovered that he had sustained more serious personal injury owing to the collision than he had at first been aware of, and he wrote to the defendant asking for compensation; his request was refused, and he thereupon commenced the present action in the High Court to recover damages for the personal injury which he had suffered by being thrown from the box of the cab in the collision. At the trial before Grove, J., the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for 3501. damages. A rule was afterward obtained calling on the plaintiff to show cause why there should not be a new trial or judgment entered for the defendant, on the ground of misdirection in not holding that the proceedings in the County Court were a bar to the present action. On the 5th of July, 1883, the Divisional Court (Pollock, B., and Lopes, J.,) made the rule absolute to render judgment for the defendant,and from this decision the plaintiff now appealed. Waddy, Q. C., and Crispe, for plaintiff. Murphy, Q. C., and Hannen, for defendant. BRETT, M. R. It was argued on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff could not succeed in the second action because he had already recovered damages in respect of the collision, and no person can sue twice *S. C., 51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 529. |