ity given by the deed, advertised the property for sale. The grantors thereupon instituted a suit in equity in one of the courts of West Virginia to enjoin the sale, making the trustee, the Missouri corporation, and the person who held its assets defendants. Upon the joint petition of that corporation and the defendant holding its assets the cause was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States, and was there finally determined. Held, that since the trustee was an indispensable party his citizenship was material in determining the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court; and as that was not averred, and did not otherwise affirmatively appear to be such as gave the right of removal, the decree must be reversed and the cause remanded to the State court. As the trustee and the complainants are on opposite sides of the real controversy in relation to the sale of the property, and since it does not appear affirmatively that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction by reason of the citizenship of the parties, the decree must be reversed, with directions-unless such jurisdiction upon the return of the cause shall be made to appear-to remand the suit to the State court. Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172; Gardner v. Brown, 21 id. 36; Ribon v. Railroad Co., 16 id. 446; Knapp v. Railroad, 20 id. 117; Grace v. American Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 278; Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 id. 381, 382; American Bible Soc. v. Price, 110 id. 61; Barney v. Latham, 103 id. 205; Blake v. McKim, id. 336. Thayer v. Life Association of America. Opinion by Harlan, J. [Decided Jan. 5, 1885.]

CONTRACT-CARRYING MAIL-ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM AGAINST GOVERNMENT-REV. STATS., §§ 3477, 3737.The St. Paul & Duluth Railroad Company, upon succeeding through a foreclosure of mortgage to the Lake Superior & Mississippi River Railroad Company, did not thereby acquire any claim the latter might have had as to such reduction of compensation for carrying the United States mail as was made by the postal department either before or after the succession of title; the contract with the United States government having been made by the Lake Superior & Mississippi River Railroad Company, and there being no descriptive words in the instrument of mortgage transferring the rights of the latter company under that contract to the mortgagees. In Erwin v. U. S., 97 U. S. 392, it was held that an assignment by operation of law to an assignee in bankruptcy was not within the prohibition of the statute; and in Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, a voluntary assignment by an insolvent debtor, for the benefit of creditors, was held valid to pass the title to a claim against the United States. But in our opinion the present case is not within the principle of these exceptions, but falls within the purview of the prohibition. It is a voluntary transfer by way of mortgage for the security of a debt, and finally completed and made absolute by a judicial sale. If the statute does not apply to such cases, it would be difficult to draw a line of exclusion which leaves any place for the operation of the prohibition. So the transfer, by the same proceeding, of the contract itself, so as to entitle the assignee to perform the service and claim the compensation stipulated for, is forbidden by section 3737, Rev. Stat. That section is as follows: "Sec. 3737. No contract or order, or any interest therein, shall be transferred by the party to whom such contract or order is given to any other party, and any such transfer shall cause the annulment of the contract or order transferred, so far as the United States are concerned." The explicit provisions of this statute do not require any comment. No explanation could make it plainer. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. v. United States. Opinion by Matthews, J.

[Decided Jan. 5, 1885.]

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

PARTNERSHIP-POWER OF PARTNER TO DISSOLVEFUTURE LIABILITY-NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION.-Every partner has an indefeasible right to dissolve the partnership, even when the partners have covenanted that the partnership shall last for a fixed period, as to all future contracts, by publishing his own volition to that effect; and after such publication the other members of the firm have no capacity to bind him by any contract, although they may have a right to damages against him for his breach of the agreement. The power given by one partner to another to make joint contracts for them both is not only a revocable power, but a man can do no act to divest himself of the capacity to revoke it. Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 513, 538. To the same effect are Mason v. Connell, 1 Whart. 381, and Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Penn. St. 155. All that can be required in any case is that such notice of dissolution be given as is likely to make the fact generally known locally; and when that is done, the party giving the notice has performed his duty, and any one contemplating for the first time to open dealings with the partnership must at his peril ascertain the facts. That publication in a newspaper is sufficient is not disputed by the defense, provided it appears on its face to be authoritative. Ketcham v. Clark, 6 Johus. 144; S. C., 5 Am. Dec. 197; Graves v. Merry, 6 Cow. 701; S. C., 16 Am. Dec. 471; National Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill, 572; Nott v. Douming, 6 La. 680; S. C., 26 Am. Dec. 491: Watkinson v. Bank of Pennsylvania, 4Whart. 482; S. C., 34 Am. Dec. 521; Rose v. Coffield, 53 Md. 18; S. C., 36 Am. Rep. 389. But in this case it is said the notice did not appear to be authoritative; it appeared as a local editorial item, and such items are often baseless, and may in any particular case have no better foundation than rumor, or even suspicion. They do not bear upon their face the verity which a notice signed by the party would import. One who derives knowledge of the fact from public uotoriety is sufficiently notified (Bernard v. Torrance, 5 Gill & J. 383; Halliday v. McDougal, 20 Wend. 81), and probably in many small communities a fact would sooner be made notorious by a notice in the local column of the county or village paper than in any other way. In a large city it might be otherwise. But all that can be required in any case is that such notice be given as is likely to make the fact generally known locally. Vernon v. Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. 183, 193; Lovejoy v.Spafford, 93 U. S. 430. Solomon v. Hollander. Opinion by Cooley, C. J.

[Decided Nov. 19, 1884.]

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-HORSE FRIGHTENED BY BOULDER IN STREET-STATUTORY LIABILITY.-A city is not liable under the statute for damages caused by the running away of a horse frightened by a large boulder which has been taken from the bed of a street and left for four or five days on one side thereof until it could be removed by a private party, to whom it had been given for building purposes. The statutory remedy is confined to cases where the want of repair is the immediate cause of the injury; and allowing things which are no part of a highway to stand in it temporarily, cannot be treated as putting out of repair, which must relate to the way itself, and not to things disconnected from it. This construction of the statute is the natural and correct one. The statute does not seem to be aimed at indirect and remote mischiefs, but to those which follow from direct injury caused by the want of repair. A similar question has come up in Massachusetts several times as to the law relating to injuries from things which did not obstruct passage, and it was held that where the damage was consequential, not on the effect of a want of repair,

but upon fright caused to a horse which ran away aud damaged the vehicle or persons he was drawing, or other analogous cases, it did not come within the rule, and the municipality was not liable. Cook v. Montague, 115 Mass. 571; Bemis v. Arlington, 114 id. 507; Cook v. Charlestown, 98 id. 80; Kingsbury v. Dedham, 13 Allen, 186; Keith v. Easton, 2 id. 552. The road itself was not out of repair. It was in good order and passable. If the stone had any thing to do with the action of the horse and damage to the buggy, it was by frightening the animal, and not by hurting or impeding him. But if it is admitted, and the court below allowed the jury so to assume, that a city is liable for leaving or allowing in its streets that which is dangerous by reason of its tendency to frighten the passing teams, the question arises how far this record presents such a case. It will not do to apply any far-fetched and unreasonable rule in such cases. It was held in the case of Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212, that a steam engine which, according to every-day experience is always a cause of terror to horses unused to meeting it in a highway, was nevertheless not, in law or in fact, an unlawful article to propel or draw there. And a similar rule was applied in Gilbert v. Flint & P. M. Ry. Co., 51 Mich. 488; S. C., 47 Am. Rep. 592. It is customary in all towns to allow ditches to be dug and building materials of all kinds and colors to be piled up and kept for considerable periods in the body of the street. In many, if not in most places, the right to do this can only be had by license from the corporation, and it cannot be claimed that such a license can be granted to do a wrong or create a nuisance. Such stones as that described are often used for building purposes, and left in the street like other building materials, and sometimes broken up for use or sawed for use. It does not seem reasonable to hold that such things can be allowed to await the convenience of a person who wishes to use them near by, and yet not to await removal somewhere else. If this stone had been hauled to the place it occupied in order to be used for building purposes, and left there for a considerable time, no one would think of regarding it as an actionable grievance. The use of streets for such purposes is too common to justify the owners of horses to assume it will not be allowed, and they should be prepared to guard against their animals' freaks and fears of such ordinary appearances. The stone, as is not disputed, was lawfully put there in the first place, in the course of street repairs. If it was the duty of the city to see that it was not left there indefinitely, it was equally its right to sell or give it away, and having done so, it could take no steps to interfere unless, at the worst, the purchaser or donee delayed so long as to make it unreasonable to wait longer for him. It could not be responsible for any delay which was not unreasonable. Agnew v. Corunna. Opinion by Campbell, J. [Decided Jan. 7, 1885.]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

ACCEPTANCE.

-

CONTRACT-"TO SATISFACTION The defense shows that in August, 1880, the plaintiff agreed to furnish the defendant "a cord-binder" in 1881, "guaranteed to work satisfactorily." The agreement was executory, and hence when the cord-binder was furnished defendant had the right before finally accepting it to make a trial of it, reasonable as respects both time and manner, and a right to reject it if it did not work satisfactorily, that is to say, satisfactorily to him. 2 Add. Cont. 942; Anson Cont. 285; Poll. Cont. 466; Doane v. Dunham, 65 Ill. 512; Leake Cont. 284. In case upon reasonable trial it did not work satisfactorily, it was not necessary for defendant to return it

to plaintiff in the absence of an express agreement to that effect. It was sufficient for him within a reasonable time to notify plaintiff in substance that it did not work satisfactorily, and that he declined to accept it. Gibson v. Vail, 53 Vt. 476; Doane v. Dunham, supra; Starr v. Torry, 22 N. J. L. 190; Smalley v. Hendrickson, 29 id. 371; Lucy v. Mouflet, 5 Hurl. & N. 229; Grimoldby v. Wells, L. R., 10 C. P. 391; 12 Eng. Rep. 451; 2 Benj. Sales (4th Am. ed. Corbin's), §§ 978, 1348; Leake Cont. 409, 827. McCormick, etc., Co. v. Chesbrown. Opinion by Berry, J. [See 33 Am. Rep. 351; 25 Eng. Rep. 569.] [Decided Dec. 22, 1884.]

INSOLVENCY

MORTGAGE -FUTURE ADVANCES PREFERENCE—FRAUD.—(1) A mortgage may properly be made to secure future advances. Madigan v. Mead, 31 Minn. 94; Brown v. Kiefer, 71 N. Y. 610; Ackermau v. Hunsicker, 85 id. 43; Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74; Jones v. Guaranty & Indemnity Co., 101 U. S. 622; Jones Ch. Mortg., §§ 94-97. It follows that a mortgage is not fraudulent per se, or as a matter of law, as respects the mortgagor's creditors, because given in whole or in part to secure such advances. (2) Our insolvent law (ch. 148, L. 1881) does not have the effect to render mortgages fraudulent or void as respects the mortgagor's creditors, on the ground that they are preferential, except in proceedings under it. Outside of such proceedings the preferences are not per se, or as a matter of law objectionable. Smith v. Deidrick, 30 Minn. 60. (3) The fact that a mortgage is given to secure a larger sum than is actually due from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, or that its condition failed to describe the real character of the indebtedness or liability intended to be secured, does not necessarily render the mortgage fraudulent as respects the mortgagor's creditors. The question still is, was it made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud the mortgagor's creditors? Minor v. Sheehan, 30 Minn. 419, and cases cited; Jones Ch. Mortg., § 96. Berry v. O'Counor. Opinion by Berry, J. [Decided Dec. 22, 1884.]

JUDGMENT-ENTRY ON ORDER OF JUDGE AFTER EXPIRATION OF TERM-IRREGULAR.-Where the judge of a municipal court, upon the expiration of his term of office, vacated and ceased to occupy the same, but thereafter reduced to writing and filed a decision and order for judgment in a case previously tried and submitted, held, that such decision and order were unauthorized, and a judgment entered thereon may be set aside on motion. It is not enough that he had arrived at a conclusion before his term expired; it was necessary that his decision be reduced to writing and filed; until then it was subject to revision, and could not be considered as determining the case. Kissam v. Hamilton, 20 How. Pr. 376; Ayrault v. Sackett, 17 id. 461; Putnam v. Crombie, 34 Barb. 232. In Carli v. Rhener, 27 Minn. 292, the judge filed his decision in writing the same hour, but after his successor qualified, and in ignorance of the latter fact, and while he was still in possession of the office and performing its duties. He had not yet surrendered or vacated it. And he was held to be an officer de facto, and his acts valid. That case is clearly distinguishable from this, and the same remark applies to the case of State v. Brown, 12 Minn. 545 (Gil. 448). We think the motion to set aside the

judgment was the proper remedy, and should be granted. Grant v. Vandercook, 57 Barb. 175. Cain v. Libby. Opinion by Vanderburgh, J. [Decided Dec. 2, 1884.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -INCORPORATION OF VILLAGES DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.-Chapter 73, General Laws, 1883, provides for the incorporation of villages upon petition to the judge of the Dis

trict Court; that upon a hearing of such petition the court may proceed to hear proof for or against the incorporation, and take such evidence as it shall deem necessary; and that if the court after such hearing is satisfied" that the lands embraced in such petition, or any part thereof, ought to be included in said proposed village, and that the interests of the inhabitants will be promoted thereby, it shall make an order declaring that such territory, the boundaries of which shall be therein set forth by metes and bounds, and which may be diminished or enlarged by such court from the boundaries specified in the application, as justice may require, shall be an incorporated village. Held, that this act is unconstitutional, for the reason that it assumes to delegate legislative powers to the District Court, a tribunal not authorized under the Constitution to exercise such powers. The granting of all charters of incorporation involves the exercise of legislative functions. The proposition (says Dillon) which lies at the foundation of the laws of corporations of the country is that they all, public or private, exist and can exist only by virtue of express legislative enactment creating or authorizing the creation of the corporate body. All municipal corporations are mere auxiliaries to the State government in the busi. ness of municipal rule. The act of deciding when and under what circumstances the public interests require the creation of these auxiliaries or aids to the State government is one of the highest and most important legislative powers and duties. By section 1, article 4, the Constitution of the State, the legislative department of the government is made to cons st of a Senate and House of Representatives. In them all legislative power is exclusively vested. One of the settled maxims of constitutional law is that legislative powers cannot be delegated. Where the Constitution has located the law-making power it must remain. The department to whose judgment and wisdom it has been intrusted cannot abdicate this power and relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon whom it shall be devolved. Cooley Const. Law, 139. As said by this court in State v. Young, 29 Minn. 551; S. C., 9 N. W. Rep. 737, it is a principle not questioned that except when authorized by the Constitution, as in respect to municipal corporations, the Legislature cannot delegate legislative power. The power of local legislation commonly bestowed on municipal corporations does not trench upon the maxim, since this is authorized, impliedly at least, by the Constitution itself; and the maxim itself is to be understood in the light of an immemorial practice which has always recognized the policy and propriety of vesting in such corporations these powers. As before remarked, municipal corporations are created for this purpose, as aid to the State government in the business of municipal rule. Cooley Const. Law, 140. Had the Legislature, by the act in question, fixed and specified all the conditions and facts upon which the incorporation of certain territory should depend, we do not question their right to refer to some tribunal or body the question of ascertaining and determining the existence of these facts and conditions. Neither do we decide that they might not delegate certain legislative powers regarding the organization and incorporation of villages to some appropriate municipal body which might constitutionally exercise local legislative powers. The delegation of certain powers of local legislation to municipal bodies, for reasons already suggested, is permissible. Boards of county commissioners are already, under certain limitations, invested with somewhat similar powers in the organization and change of boundaries of towns and school districts. But the present act assumes to delegate these legislative powers to the District Court, a tribunal not authorized to exercise

them, its jurisdiction under the Constitution being purely judicial. Cases may be found where it has been held that powers similar to those conferred by this act were properly delegated to certain so-called courts, but we think it will be found in almost every instance that these courts were not exclusively judicial, but also quasi municipal bodies invested with certain powers of local legislation. Such are the County Courts in some States, which take the place of our boards of county commissioners in the municipal government of the county. As bearing upon the question here considered, see City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152; Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451. State v. Simon. Opinion by Mitchell, J. [Decided Dec. 18, 1884.]

CRIMINAL LAW.

CONSPIRACY TO ROB-MURDER-ALL GUILTY.-If several are associated together to commit a robbery, and one of them, while all are engaged in the common design, intentionally kills the person they are attempting to rob, in furtherance of the common purpose, all are equally guilty, though the others had not previously consented to the killing, where such killing was done in the execution of the common purpose, and was a natural and probable result of the attempt to rob. People v. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477; United States v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624; People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572; State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; Stipp v. State, 11 Ind. 62; 1 Bish. Crim. Law (7th ed.), § 636; 2 Whart. Crim. Law (7th ed.), § 998. So if those inside the house while attempting to consummate the robbery, and in furtherance of such conspiracy purposely kill the person they are attempting to rob, while he is resisting such attempt, and such killing is the natural and probable consequence of the common purpose, the person outside, who is aiding and assisting, is equally guilty as the one striking the fatal blow, though he did not previous to such attempt agree to or assent to such killing. Sup. Ct. Ohio, Jan., 1884. Stephens v. State. Opinion by Johnson, C. J. [42 Ohio St. 150; See 28 Eng. Rep. 64.]

LARCENY-RECENT POSSESSION-INTENT.-The recent possession by the defendant of the stolen property, his conduct at the pawnbroker's shop, the nature of the account given by him of the manner in which he had acquired it, the conflict between his statement and his evidence in that regard, constituted sufficient proof that the defendant stole the watch. State v. Hogard, 12 Minn. 293 (Gil. 191); 2 Russ. Cr. 337, 338; Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177; Com. v. McGorty, 114 Mass. 299; Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647. The fact that the larceny was committed within the house during the night; that the defendant was not an inmate of the house, and up to the hour of the closing of the house for the night was not in it, render possible no other conclusion from the premise that he committed the larceny than that he also entered the house. The felonious intent with which the entrance was effected was properly inferred from the fact of the larceny committed. Roscoe Crim. Ev. 369; 2 Archb. Crim. Pr. & Pl. (Pomeroy's ed.) 1107. Sup. Ct. Minn., Dec., 1884. State v. Johnson. Opinion by Dickinson, J. [21 N. W. Rep. 843. See 30 Alb. L. J. 318.-ED.]

INDICTMENT-REFERRING TO THIRD PERSON AS UN

KNOWN-BRIBERY-EVIDENCE-At common law, in cases where an indictment referred to third parties as persons to the grand jury unknown, if upon the trial it was made to appear that the grand jury did know the names of the persons referred to, the accused would

have to be acquitted on the ground of a variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proofs. But it was not necessary for the State to prove the truth of the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon the contrary, quite a different rule is to be applied, and the burden is on the defendant to show that the grand jury at the particular time of finding the indictment knew the names of the parties described as unknown. Com. v. Gallagher, 126 Mass. 54; Com. v. Hill, 11 Cush. 137; Com. v. Tompson, 2 id. 551; Rex v. Bush, Russ. & R. Cr. Cas. 372; Whart. Crim. Ev., § 97. The doctrine contended for by plaintiff in error can be found in Stone v. State, 30 Ind. 115; but Wharton, in his work on Precedents of Indictments and Pleas, vol. 1, p. 18, refers to this decision as pushing the doctrine to a "questionable extreme;" and such is evidently the case. Under the allegations of the indictment, and the circumstances of the case as shown by the testimony, it was held competent for the State to prove other acts of bribery than those alleged in the indictment, for the purpose of corroborating the principal witness upon material facts involved in the original contract of bribery, and also for the purpose of showing the system, plan and design of the parties involved in the transaction alleged in the indictment. State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202; Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111; Kramer v. Com., 87 Penn. St. 299; Rex v. Hough, Russ. & R. Cr. Cas. 120; Rex v. Ball, id. 132; Com. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472; Reg. v. Francis, 12 Cox Crim. Cas. 612; Regina v. Garner, 4 Fost. & F. 346; Whart. Crim. Ev., § 38 et seq. Sup. Ct. Neb., Nov. 18, 1884. Guthrie v. State. Opinion by Reese, J. [21 N. W. Rep. 455.]

FINANCIAL LAW.

BANK AND BANKING-DEPOSIT OF NOTE FOR COLLECTION-SALE.—(1) Leaving a note at a bank for collec

tion does not authorize the bank to sell it. And if the bank does sell it without authority, and satisfies the payee, the purchaser cannot afterward collect it as against a surety of the maker. And if the purchaser has left the payee to suppose that the note was regularly taken up, the latter cannot after the maker's death, and on being made a party to a suit upon the note against the surety, be required to elect between affirming the sale and rescinding it and restoring the money which he has received in payment of it. (2) The maker of a note that has been sold to satisfy the payee will continue liable upon it if he consents to do so; but his consent will not bind his surety. (3) Whether one who in good faith has purchased a note that has been sold without authority has not a remedy against the vendor, quiere. Sup. Ct. Mich. Fuller v. Bennett. Opinion by Cooley, C. J. [21 N. W. Rep. 433.]

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE-AUTHORITY OF ADJUSTER-WAIVER OF FORFEITURE. However well the duties and powers of an insurance adjuster may be known in the community, the law makes no presumption with reference to them, and they must be proven in every case where the rights of the parties depend upon the question whether his acts were done with authority. Where there is no evidence of the authority of an adjuster to waive proofs of loss, it is error to instruct the jury that a waiver might be inferred from certain acts done by him. Where the assured asserts a claim for loss under his policy, and the insurer is informed of facts out of which a forfeiture it is claimed grew, but with knowledge of the circumstances, continues to treat the contract as binding, and induces the assured to act in that belief, the insurer may be held to have waived the for

feiture. See Titus v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 410; Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234; Webster v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 67; Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Germania Ins. Co., 40 id. 453; Cannon v. Home Ins. Co., 53 id. 585. It is claimed however by defendant that a different rule is established by this court in Fitch patrick v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 53 Iowa, 335. It is held in that case that the insurer did not waive the forfeiture of the policy by requiring proofs of loss after being orally informed of the fact which created the forfeiture. The ground on which the hold ing is put is that as the policy itself provided that the information should be communicated by the proofs of loss, and as the oral information was not full, the insurer had the right to demand that full information be communicated to it in the manner provided in the contract before it determined the question of its liability; and as the proofs were demanded to enable it to determine that question, it did not waive the forfeiture by demanding them. The distinction between the two cases is very apparent. Sup. Ct. Iowa, Dec., 1884. Hollis v. State Ins. Co. Opinion by Reed, J. [21 N. W. Rep. 774.]

CORRESPONDENCE.

LAW REPORTS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The publication of legal reports, authorized and as private enterprises, constitutes the only perpetual mo

tion. It does not slacken, falter, or wear out. If sufficient cases are not at hand to make a volume every month, what is called "annotation" is resorted to, viz., dozens of pages of solid names of cases which more or less cover certain of the ground of the text. We have railway reports, corporation reports, teleeverybody who can use a pair of shears can make them graph reports, and there is no reason why since -we should not have sugar-refinery cases, horse cases, cow cases, mad-dog cases, snake-bite cases, etc.? Is enjoy this sort of thing, and in the end the people pay, there no relief? Since nobody but the law booksellers cannot the State interfere? Why cannot a law be devised authorizing the reporter to abridge decisions something like this:

the novel point proceeded as follows," etc." Why should we be compelled to pay for a million decisions to the effect that contributory negligence is a defense to an action for ordinary negligence, or any other proposition of horn-book law?

In old times the lawyer who was buying books was only losing the use of his money, plus ordinary wear and tear. Now he is buying the costliest class of books published, with the certainty of their being superseded by new editions not only, but by private series and voluminous " reports," within a year or so. I do not remember the proceeds of the late Charles O'Conor's library, but it was a case in point. The amount realized was probably not one-tenth of the disbursement made. The result is that nobody but

the law bookseller is benefited.

The ALBANY LAW JOURNAL will earn the gratitude of lawyers not only, but of clients who in the end pay the lawyers, by not only calling attention to the matter, but keeping it up, inviting suggestions, discussing it, and lending its facilities to working our relief. BARRISTER.

NEW YORK, April 23, 1885.

P. S. What is the meaning of the word "reports?" It has an official sound. What right has any bookseller to get up a collection of cases by hack work and call them "reports," anyhow? The bar itself could stop this thing by simply refusing to purchase.