This recommendation in relation to our elec- tion to members of Congress, and to exclude them generally from executive appointments; and especially from appointments conferred by the President for whom they voted. The evil is the same whether the member votes in the House of Representatives when the election goes to that body, or votes and manages in a Congress caucus, or in a nominating convention. The act in either case opens the door to corrupt practices; and should be prevented by legal, or constitutional enactments, if it cannot be restrained by the feelings of decorum, or repressed by public opinion. On this point the message thus recom tion system has not yet been carried into effect, "While members of Congress can be constitutionally appointed to offices of trust and profit, it will be the practice, even under the most conscientious adherence to duty, to select them for such stations as they are believed to be better qualified to fill than other citizens; but the purity of our government would doubtless be promoted by their exclusion from all appointtion they may have been officially concerned. The ments in the gift of the President in whose elecnature of the judicial office, and the necessity of securing in the cabinet and in diplomatic stations of the highest rank, the best talents and political experience, should, perhaps, except these from the exclusion. which it was said: sponsible and nearly self-constituted bodies-in which the selection becomes the result of a jugOn the subject of a navy, the message congle, conducted by a few adroit managers, who tained sentiments worthy of the democracy in its baffle the nomination until they are able to early day, and when General Jackson was a govern it, and to substitute their own will for member of the United States Senate. The rethat of the people. Perhaps another example is publican party had a POLICY then in respect to not upon earth of a free people voluntarily relin- a navy: it was, a navy for DEFENCE, instead of quishing the elective franchise, in a case so great CONQUEST; and limited to the protection of our as that of electing their own chief magistrate, coasts and commerce. That policy was imand becoming the passive followers of an irrepressively set forth in the celebrated instructions sponsible body-juggled, and baffled, and govern- to the Virginia senators in the year 1800, in ed by a few dextrous contrivers, always looking to their own interest in the game which they play in putting down and putting up men. Certainly the convention system, now more unfair and irresponsible than the exploded congress caucus system, must eventually share the same fate, and be consigned to oblivion and disgrace. In the meantime the friends of popular election should press the constitutional amendment which would give the Presidential election to the people, and discard the use of an intermediate body which disregards the public will and reduces the people to the condition of political automatons. Closely allied to this proposed reform was another recommended by the President in rela "With respect to the navy, it may be proper to remind you that whatever may be the proposed object of its establishment, or whatever may be the prospect of temporary advantages resulting therefrom, it is demonstrated by the experience of all nations, who have ventured far into naval policy, that such prospect is ultimately delusive; and that a navy has ever in practice been known more as an instrument of power, a source of expense, and an occasion of collisions and wars with other nations, than as an instrument of defence, of economy, or of protection to commerce." These were the doctrines of the republican party, in the early stage of our government-in the great days of Jefferson and his compeers. We had a policy then-the result of thought, of judgment, and of experience: a navy for defence, and not for conquest: and, consequently, confinable to a limited number of ships, adequate to their defensive object-instead of thousands, aiming at the dominion of the seas. That policy was overthrown by the success of our naval combats during the war; and the idea of a great navy became popular, without any definite view of its cost and consequences. Admiration for good fighting did it, without having the same effect on the military policy. Our army fought well also, and excited admiration; but without the case with many of our finest vessels; which, though unfinished, will now require immense in which they were, when committed to their sums of money to be restored to the condition proper element. On this subject there can be but little doubt that our best policy would be, to discontinue the building of ships of the first and second class, and look rather to the possession of ample materials, prepared for the emergencies of war, than to the number of vessels which we can float in a season of peace, as the index of our naval power." President who saw what he described-many of This was written twenty years ago, and by a our finest ships going to decay before they were finished-demanding repairs before they had sailed-and costing millions for which there was no return. We have been going on at the same ing millions; but little to show for forty years rate ever since-building, and rotting, and sinkof ship-carpentry; and that little nothing to do but to cruise where there is nothing to catch, and to carry out ministers to foreign courts who are not quite equal to the Franklins, Adamses and Jeffersons-the Pinckneys, Rufus Kings, and Marshalls-the Clays, Gallatins and Bayards-that went out in common merchant vessels. Mr. Jefferson told me that this would be the case twenty-five years ago when naval glory overturned national policy, and when a navy board was created to facilitate ship-construction. subverting the policy which interdicted standing armies in time of peace. The army was cut down in peace: the navy was building up in peace. In this condition President Jackson found the two branches of the service-the army reduced by two successive reductions from a large body to a very small one-6000 men-and although illustrated with military glory yet refusing to recommend an army increase: the navy, from a small one during the war, becoming large during the peace-gradual increase the lawship-building the active process, and rotting down the active effect; and thus we have been going on for near forty years. Correspondent to his army policy was that of President Jackson in relation to the navy; he proposed a pause in the process of ship-building and ship-But this is a subject which will require a chapter rotting. He recommended a total cessation of the further building of vessels of the first and second class-ships of the line, and frigateswith a collection of materials for future use and the limitation of our naval policy to the object of commercial protection. He did not even include coast defence, his experience having shown him that the men on shore could defend the land. In a word, he recommended a naval policy; and that was the same which the republicans of 1798 had adopted, and which Virginia made obligatory upon her senators in 1800; and which, under the blaze of shining victories, had yielded to the blind, and aimless, and endless operation of building and rotting peaceful ships of war. He said: of its own, and is only incidentally mentioned now to remark that we have no policy with respect to a navy, and ought to have one-that there is no middle point between defence and but wars with the world,—and the debt, taxes, conquest—and no sequence to a conquering navy pension list, and pauper list of Great Britain. The inutility of a Bank of the United States as a furnisher of a sound and uniform currency, and of questionable origin under our constitution, was thus stated: "The charter of the Bank of the United States expires in 1836, and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils. resulting from precipitancy in a measure involving such important principles, and such deep pecuniary interests, I "In time of peace, we have need of no more feel that I cannot, in justice to the parties inter ships of war than are requisite to the protection ested, too soon present it to the deliberate conof our commerce. Those not wanted for this sideration of the legislature and the people. object must lay in the harbors, where, without Both the constitutionality and the expediency of proper covering, they rapidly decay; and, even the law creating this bank, are well quesunder the best precautions for their preserva- tioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens; tion, must soon become useless. Such is already and it must be admitted by all, that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and of politics and tariffs-and the duty of retrenchsound currency." ment by discontinuing and abolishing all useless offices. In a word, it was a message of the old republican school, in which President Jackson had been bred; and from which he had never departed; and which encouraged the young disciples of democracy, and consoled the old surviving fathers of that school. CHAPTER XLII. THE RECOVERY OF THE DIRECT TRADE WITH THE recovery of this trade had been a large object with the American government from the time of its establishment. As British colonies we enjoyed it before the Revolution; as revolted colonies we lost it; and as an independent nation we sought to obtain it again. The position of these islands, so near to our ports and shores This is the clause which party spirit, and bank tactics, perverted at the time (and which has gone into history), into an attack upon the bank—a war upon the bank-with a bad motive attributed for a war so wanton. At the same time nothing could be more fair, and just, and more in consonance with the constitution which requires the President to make the legislative recommendations which he believes to be proper. It was notice to all concerned-the bank on one side, and the people on the other-that there would be questions, and of high importconstitutionality and expediency-if the present corporators, at the expiration of their charter, should apply for a renewal of their privileges. It was an intimation against the institution, not against its administrators, to whom a compliment was paid in another part of the same message, in ascribing to the help of their "judicious arrangement" the averting of the mercantile pressure which might otherwise have resulted from the sudden withdrawal of the twelve and a half millions which had just been taken from the bank and the character of the exports they received applied to the payment of the public debt. But of from us, being almost entirely the product of this hereafter. The receipts and expenditures were our farms and forests, and their large amount, stated, respectively, for the preceding year, and always considerable, and of late some four milestimated for the current year, the former at a lions of dollars per annum-the tropical profraction over twenty-four and a half millions—ductions which we received in return, and the the latter a fraction over twenty-six millions-- large employment it gave to our navigation— with large balances in the treasury, exhibiting all combined to give a cherished value to this the constant financial paradox, so difficult to be branch of foreign trade, and to stimulate our understood, of permanent annual balances with government to the greatest exertions to obtain an even, or even deficient revenue. The passage and secure its enjoyment; and with the advanof the message is in these words: tage of being carried on by our own vessels. But these were objects not easily attainable, and never accomplished until the administration of President Jackson. All powers are jealous of alien intercourse with their colonies, and have a natural desire to retain colonial trade in their own hands, both for commercial and political reasons; and have a perfect right to do so if they please. Partial and conditional admission to trade with their colonics, or total exclusion from them, is in the discretion of the mother country; and any participation in their trade Other recommendations contained the sound by virtue of treaty stipulations or legislative democratic doctrines-speedy and entire extinc-enactment, is the result of concession-generaltion of the public debt-reduction of custom-ly founded in a sense of self-interest, or at best house duties-equal and fair incidental protec- in a calculation of mutual advantage. No less tion to the great national interests (agriculture, than six negotiations (besides several attempts manufactures and commerce)-the disconnection at "concerted legislation") had been carried on "The balance in the treasury on the 1st of January, 1829, was five millions nine hundred and seventy-two thousand four hundred and thirty-five dollars and eighty-one cents. The receipts of the current year are estimated at twenty-four millions, six hundred and two thousand, two hundred and thirty dollars, and the expenditures for the same time at twenty-six millions one hundred and sixty-four thousand five hundred and ninety-five dollars; leaving a balance in the treasury on the 1st of January next, of four millions four hundred and ten thousand and seventy dollars, eighty-one cents." between the United States and Great Britain on "If to the actual footing of our commerce and navigation in the British European dominions could be added the privilege of carrying directly from the United States to the British West Indies in our own bottoms generally, or of certain of Parliament, 28, Geo. III., chap. 6, may be carried thither in British bottoms, and of bringing them thence directly to the United States in American bottoms, this would afford an acceptable basis of treaty for a term not exceeding fifteen years.” this subject; and all, until the second year of General Jackson's administration, resulting in nothing more than limited concessions for a year, or for short terms; and sometimes cou-specified burthens, the articles which by the Act pled with conditions which nullified the privilege. It was a primary object of concern with General Washington's administration; and a knowledge of the action then had upon it elucidates both the value of the trade, the difficulty of getting admission to its participation, and the right of Great Britain to admit or deny its enjoyment to others. General Washington had practical knowledge on the subject. He had seen it enjoyed, and lost-enjoyed as British subjects, lost as revolted colonies and independent states and knew its value, both from the use and the loss, and was most anxious to recover it. It was almost the first thing, in our foreign relations, to which he put his hand on becoming President; and literally did he put his hand to it. For as early as the 14th of October, 1789—just six months after his inauguration-in a letter of unofficial instructions to Mr. Gouverneur Morris, then in Europe, written with his own hand (requesting him to sound the British government on the subject of a commercial treaty with the United States), a point that he made was to ascertain their views in relation to allowing us the "privilege” of this trade. Privilege was his word, and the instruction ran thus: "Let it be strongly impressed on your mind that the privilege of carrying our productions in our own vessels to their islands, and bringing, in return, the productions of those islands to our ports and markets, is regarded here as of the highest importance," &c. It was a prominent point in our very first negotiation with Great Britain in 1794; and the instructions to Mr. Jay, in May of that year, shows that admission to the trade was then only asked as a privilege, as in the year '89, and upon terms of limitation and condition. This is so material to the right understanding of this question, and to the future history of the case, and especially of a debate and vote in the Senate, of which President Jackson's instructions through Mr. Van Buren on the same subject was made the occasion, that I think it right to give the instructions of President Washington to Mr. Jay in his own words. They were these : An article was inserted in the treaty in conformity to these principles-our carrying vessels limited in point of burthen to seventy tons and under; the privilege limited in point of duration to the continuance of the then existing war between Great Britain and the French Republic, and to two years after its termination; and restricted in the return cargo both as to the nature of the articles and the port of their destination. These were hard terms, and precarious and the article containing them was "suspended " by the Senate in the act of ratification, in the hope to obtain better; and are only quoted here in order to show that this direct trade to the British West Indies was, from the beginning of our federal government, only sought as a privilege, to be obtained under restrictions and limitations, and subordinately to British policy and legislation. This was the end of the first negotiation; five others were had in the ensuing certed legislation "—all ending either abortively thirty years, besides repeated attempts at " or in temporary and unsatisfactory arrangements. con The most important of these attempts was in the years 1822 and 1823: and as it forms an es sential item in the history of this case, and shows, besides, the good policy of letting "well-enough" alone, and the great mischief of inserting an apparently harmless word in a bill of which no one sees the drift but those in the secret, I will here give its particulars, adopting for that purpose the language of serator Samuel Smith, of Maryland,-the best qualified of all our statesmen to speak on the subject, he having the practical knowledge of a merchant in addition to experience as a legislator. His statement is this: "During the session of 1822, Congress was infor the opening of the colonial ports to the comformed that an act was pending in Parliament merce of the United States. In consequence, an act was passed authorizing the President (then Mr. Monroe), in case the act of Parliament was Gallatin was instructed to waive temporarily satisfactory to him, to open the ports of the the demand of right, and accept the privilege United States to British vessels by his procla- offered by the act of 1825. But in the mean mation. The act of Parliament was deemed satisfactory, and a proclamation was accordingly time the year allowed in the act for its acceptissued, and the trade commenced. Unfortunate-ance had expired, and Mr. Gallatin was told ly for our commerce, and I think contrary to that his offer was too late! To that answer the justice, a treasury circular issued, directing the British ministry adhered; and, from the month collectors to charge British vessels entering our ports with the alien tonnage and discriminating duties. This order was remonstrated against by the British minister (I think Mr. Vaughan). The trade, however, went on uninterrupted. Congress met, and a bill was drafted in 1823 by Mr. Adams, then Secretary of State, and passed both Houses, with little, if any, debate. I voted for it, believing that it met, in a spirit of reciprocity, the British act of Parliament. This bill, however, contained one little word, "elsewhere," which completely defeated all our expectations. It was noticed by no one. The senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) may have understood its effect. If he did so understand it, he was silent. The effect of that word "elsewhere" was to assume the pretensions alluded to in the instructions to Mr. McLane. (Pretension to a "right" in the trade.) The result was, that the British government shut their colonial ports immediately, and thenceforward. This act of 1822 gave us a monopoly (virtually) of the West India trade. It admitted, free of duty, a variety of articles, such as Indian corn, meal, oats, peas, and beans. The British government thought we entertained a belief that they could not do without our produce, and by their acts of the 27th June and 5th July, 1825, they opened their ports to all the world, on terms far less advantageous to the United States, than those of the act of 1822." of July, 1826, the direct trade to the British West Indies was lost to our citizens, leaving them no mode of getting any share in that trade, either in sending out our productions or receiving theirs, but through the expensive, tedious, and troublesome process of a circuitous voyage and the intervention of a foreign vessel. The shock and dissatisfaction in the United States were extreme at this unexpected bereavement; and that dissatisfaction entered largely into the political feelings of the day, and became a point of attack on Mr. Adams's administration, and an element in the presidential canvass which ended in his defeat. In giving an account of this untoward event to his government, Mr. Gallatin gave an account of his final interview with Mr. Huskisson, from which it appeared that the claim of "right" on the part of the United States, on which Mr. Gal latin had been instructed to "insist," was "temporarily waived;" but without effect. Irritation, on account of old scores, as expressed by Mr Gallatin-or resentment at our pertinacious persistence to secure a "right" where the rest of the world accepted a “privilege,” as intimated by Mr. Huskisson-mixed itself with the refusal; and the British government adhered to its absolute right to regulate the foreign trade of its colonies, and to treat us as it did the rest of the world. The following are passages from Mr. Gallatin's dispatch, from London, September 11, 1827: "Mr. Huskisson said it was the intention of Such is the important statement of General Smith. Mr. Webster was present at the time, and said nothing. Both these acts were clear rights on the part of Great Britain, and that of 1825 contained a limitation upon the time within which each nation was to accept the privilege it offered, or lose the trade for ever. This legislative privilege was accepted by all nations which had any thing to send to the British West Indies, except the United States. Mr. Adams did not accept the proffered privilege-undertook to negotiate for better terms-failed in the attemptand lost all. Mr. Clay was Secretary of State, Mr. Gallatin the United States Minister in London, and the instructions to him were, to insist upon it as a "right" that our produce should be admitted on the same terms on which produce from the British possessions were admitted.tual convenience, the intercourse might not be This was the "elsewhere," &c. The British government refused to negotiate; and then Mr. the British government to consider the intercourse of the British colonies as being exclusively under its control, and any relaxation from the colonial system as an indulgence, to be granted on such terms as might suit the policy of Great Britain at the time it was granted. I said every question of right had, on this occasion, been waived on the part of the United States, the only object of the present inquiry being to ascertain whether, as a matter of mu opened in a manner satisfactory to both countries. He (Mr. H.) said that it had appeared as if America had entertained the opinion that the |