Opinion of the Court. 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 544; S. C. 3 Car. & Kirw. 193; Commonwealth v. Gould, 12 Gray, 171." Tested by these rulings, plaintiff in error's original sentence was not void but voidable, and if the sentence had been complied with he could not have been punished again for the same offense. Commonwealth v. Loud, 3 Met. 328. But as the original sentence was set aside at his own instance, he could not allege that he had been in legal jeopardy by reason thereof. In Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, Lange had been found guilty of an offense which was punishable by imprisonment or fine, but the Circuit Court sentenced him to imprisonment and fine. He paid the fine, and thereafter the Circuit Court vacated the former judgment, and sentenced him again to imprisonment only. It was held that it was a fundamental principle that no man could be twice punished by judicial judgments for the same offense, and that when a judgment had been executed by full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law, the court could not change the judgment so as to impose another. The present case does not fall within that decision, for here an erroneous judgment was vacated on the application of the accused; the original sentence had not been fully satisfied; and the second sentence was rendered in pursuance of the applicable statute. We repeat that this is not a case in which the court undertook to impose in invitum a second or additional sentence for the same offense, or to substitute one sentence for another. On the contrary, plaintiff in error availed himself of his right to have the first sentence annulled so that another sentence might be rendered. And as the decision which he sought and obtained involved the determination that he had been improperly sentenced under chapter 504 of the Statutes of 1895, providing for so-called indeterminate sentences, but should have been sentenced under antecedent statutes, which differed from that, it followed that the second sentence must be a new sentence to the extent of those differences, and might turn out to be for a longer period of imprisonment. Chapter 504 of the Statutes of 1895 provided for the establishment by the court of a maximum and minimum term of Opinion of the Court. imprisonment, and for a permit to the convict to be at liberty after the expiration of the minimum term, some changes being made in this regard by chapter 371 of the Statutes of 1898. Section 20 of chapter 222 of the Public Statutes, in force when the offences charged were committed, provided for certain deductions to be made for good behavior. These and other statutes bearing on the subject are fully set forth and examined in Murphy v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 264. And it is insisted that, under the present sentence, even if the prisoner received the maximum deduction, he cannot be released as soon as he might have been released under the original sentence, and that moreover he cannot receive as large deductions under this sentence as he might have received if it had been pronounced in the first instance. But we agree with the Supreme Judicial Court in the opinion that even if this were so, it would make no difference in principle so far as the validity of the second sentence was concerned. In Jacquins' Case, 9 Cush. 279, the Supreme Judicial Court, in lieu of the prior sentences, sentenced the defendant to certain years of imprisonment, "the term to be computed from the time when the first sentence commenced its operation." In the case at bar, the accused was originally sentenced to imprisonment for the term of not less than ten nor more than fifteen years. This being set aside, and the Superior Court, being manifestly of opinion that imprisonment for twelve years and six months was the punishment demanded under the circumstances, deducted from twelve years and six months, two years, seven months and nine days, which he had already served, and sentenced him to nine years, ten months and twenty-one days. As the original sentence had been vacated on the application of the accused it is clear that if the second sentence were productive of any injustice the remedy was to be obtained in another quarter and did not rest with the court. The Superior Court, being obliged to render a specific sentence, deducted the time Murphy had served notwithstanding the case really occupied the same posture as if he had sued out his writ of error on the day he was first sentenced, and the mere fact that by reason of his delay in doing so he had served a VOL. CLXXVII-11 Opinion of the Court. portion of the erroneous sentence could not entitle him to assert that he was being twice punished. Perhaps the court was the more moved to do this because six months after Murphy had been sent to the state prison the Supreme Judicial Court indicated in Commonwealth v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, that the indeterminate sentence act might be applicable to convictions for offences committed prior to its passage, although the question was not definitely presented and disposed of, and then to the contrary, until raised on Murphy's writ of error. 172 Mass. 264. But, however that may be, the plea of former jeopardy or of former conviction cannot be maintained because of service of part of a sentence, reversed or vacated on the prisoner's own application. And so as to the infliction of one day's solitary confinement. The Massachusetts statutes provide that where the punishment of imprisonment in the state prison is awarded, solitary confinement not exceeding twenty days at a time shall form part thereof. This requirement was complied with here by the infliction of one day. This was part of the sentence, but not in itself a distinct and separate punishment, and when the sentence was vacated the second sentence necessarily contained some solitary confinement as part of the imprisonment. Apparently this might have been dispensed with by the consent of the convict, but this he refused to give. In People ex rel. Trezza v. Brush, 128 N. Y. 529, 536, Trezza had been sentenced to death, and prosecuted an appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, pending which he was taken to the state prison and detained in close confinement. He applied for the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he had been once punished, which was denied. The Court of Appeals held that by the statute an appeal from a conviction in a capital case stayed the judgment of death only, and not that part of the judgment which provided for the custody of the defendant between his removal to the state prison and his execution; and Andrews, J., speaking for the court, said: "It not in frequently happens that the execution of a sentence to imprisonment continues, notwithstanding an appeal. The convict, if he obtains a reversal of the judgment, and is again convicted on a second trial, may be sentenced to a new term of imprisonment, Opinion of the Court. and the court is not bound to regulate the second sentence in view of the fact that the convict has already suffered imprisonment under the first sentence. The resentence in the present case was rendered necessary by reason of the fact that Trezza, by his own act in his own interest, had by his appeal prevented the execution of the death penalty at the time fixed by the first sentence." Trezza also applied to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York for a writ of habeas corpus, which the court refused to grant, and its order was affirmed by this court on appeal. 142 U. S. 160. In McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155, McElvaine had been sentenced to death, and the judgment was reversed and a new trial granted. He was again convicted and sentenced, and the judgment affirmed on appeal. 125 N. Y. 596. McElvaine presented his petition for habeas corpus to the Circuit Court, which was denied, and the case brought to this court. The order was affirmed, and we said, among other things, that "so far as the confinement had taken place under the first sentence and warrant, that resulted from the voluntary act of the petitioner in prosecuting an appeal." In Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, it was reiterated that "the State has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualifications that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights, or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution." We find no such denial or conflict in this case. As we have said, plaintiff in error must be deemed to have sought a correction of the original erroneous judgment, and held to abide the consequences. He seems to have then supposed that it might be decided that the prior statutes were repealed by the act of 1895, and that as he could not be sentenced under that act, he might be discharged altogether. In this it turned out that he was mistaken, as the Supreme Judicial Court adjudged that the prior statutes were still in force so far as he was concerned, and we concur with that court in holding that his present contention is equally unavailing to effect his release. Judgment affirmed, Opinion of the Court. PETIT v. MINNESOTA. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA. No. 194. Argued March 16, 1900.- Decided April 9, 1900. Section 6513 of the General Statutes of Minnesota for 1894 provides that "All labor on Sunday is prohibited, excepting the works of necessity or charity. In works of necessity or charity is included whatever is needful during the day for the good order, health or comfort of the community; Provided, however, That keeping open a barber shop on Sunday for the purpose of cutting hair and shaving beards, shall not be deemed a work of necessity or charity." Held that the legislature did not exceed the limits of its legislative police power in declaring that, as a matter of law, keeping barber shops open on Sunday is not a work of necessity or charity, while, as to all other kinds of labor, they have left that question to be determined as one of fact. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Joseph W. Molineaux for plaintiff in error. Mr. Albert E. Clarke filed a brief for same. Mr. W. B. Douglas for defendant in error. Mr. C. W. Somerby was on his brief. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court. Petit was tried and convicted of keeping open a barber shop on Sunday for the purpose of cutting hair and shaving beards, contrary to section 6513 of the General Statutes of Minnesota for 1894, and the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. 74 Minn. 376. This writ of error was then allowed. Section 6513 reads as follows: "All labor on Sunday is prohibited, excepting the works of necessity or charity. In works of necessity or charity is included whatever is needful during the day for good order, health or comfort of the community: Provided, however, That keeping open a barber shop on Sunday |