Decisions announced without Opinions.

Mr.

CLAIMANT. Second Circuit. Denied April 16, 1900. Henry Galbraith Ward for petitioner. Mr. Samuel Park opposing.

No. 595. CLEWS v. JAMIESON. Seventh Circuit. Granted April 16, 1900. Mr. Henry D. Estabrook for petitioners. Mr. Samuel P. McConnell, Mr. Horace K. Tenney, Mr. John H. Hamline and Mr. Frank H. Scott opposing.

No. 598. WAITE v. CITY OF SANTA CRUZ. Ninth Circuit. Granted April 23, 1900. Mr. John F. Dillon, Mr. Harry Hubbard and Mr. John M. Dillon for petitioner. Mr. James G. Maguire, Mr. John Garber and Mr. Carl E. Lindsay opposing.

No. 602. LOEB v. TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA TOWNSHIP, OHIO. Sixth Circuit. Denied April 23, 1900. Mr. J. W. Warrington for petitioner. Mr. Simeon M. Johnson opposing.

No. 605. LAKE STREET ELEVATED RAILROAD COMPANY V. ZIEGLER. Seventh Circuit. Denied April 23, 1900. Mr. Henry S. Robbins for petitioner. Mr. John J. Herrick opposing.

No. 606. SPRING VALLEY COAL COMPANY v. PATTING. Seventh Circuit. Denied April 23, 1900. Mr. Henry S. Robbins for petitioner. No one opposing.

No. 607. COLES v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF THE PORt of SAN FRANCISCO. Ninth Circuit. Denied April 23, 1900. Mr. Calderon Carlisle and Mr. Sidney V. Smith for petitioner. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Solicitor General opposing.

INDEX.

ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.
1. The amount of the estate, as a whole, was the matter in dispute below,

and it amounted to sufficient to give this court jurisdiction. Overby

v. Gordon, 214.
2. The sovereignty of the State of Georgia, and the jurisdiction of its courts

at the time of the grant of letters of administration on the estate of
Haralson did not extend to or embrace the assets of the decedent sit-
uated within the territorial jurisdiction of the District of Columbia;
and while the De Kalb county court possessed the power to determine
the question of the domicil of the decedent for the purpose of con-
clusively adjudicating the validity within the State of Georgia of a
grant of letters of administration, it did not possess the power to con-
lusively bind all the world as to the fact of il, by a mere finding

of such fact in a proceeding in rem. Ib.
3. Pending proceedings for the appointment of an administrator in the Dis-

trict of Columbia, the personal assets of the deceased there situated
were delivered up to the administrator appointed by the Georgia court.
The trial court declined to rule that their delivery operated to protect
those who made it as against an administrator appointed within the

District. Held that this was a proper ruling. Ib.
4. The act of Congress of February 28, 1887, c. 281, has no relation to a

case of this kind. 16.

ADMIRALTY.
1. In January, 1897, the navigation of the Mississippi River below New

Orleans was governed by the rules and regulations of 1864, (Rev. Stat.
sec. 4233) and also by the supervising inspectors' rules for Atlantic and

Pacific inland waters. The Albert Dumois, 240.
2. A steamer ascending the Mississippi within 500 feet from the eastern

bank, made both colored lights of a descending steamer, approaching
her “end on, or nearly end on." She blew her a signal of two whistles
and starboarded her wheel. Held: That she was in fault for so doing,
and that this was the primary cause for the collision which followed.
Held also: That the fact the descending steamer seemed to be nearer
the eastern bank and that her lights were confused with the lights of
other vessels moored to that bank, was not a “special circumstance
within the meaning of Rule 24, rendering a departure from Rule 18

necessary to avoid immediate danger," since if there were any danger
at all, it was not an immediate one, or one which could not have been

provided against by easing the engines and slackening speed. Ib.
3. Exceptions to general rules of navigation are adınitted with reluctance

on the part of courts, and only when an adherence to such rules must

almost necessarily result in a collision. Ib.
4. The descending steamer, running at a speed of twenty miles an hour,

made the white and red lights of the Dumois, the ascending steamer,
upon her port bow, and blew her a signal of one whistle to which the
Dumois responded with a signal of two whistles, starboarded her helm,
shut in her red and exhibited her green light. Helu : That the descend-
ing steamer, the Argo, in view of her great speed, should at once upon
observing the faulty movement of the Dumois, have stopped and re-
versed, and that her failure to do so was a fault contributing to the

collision; and that the damages should be divided. Ib.
5. While a steamer may be so built as to attain the utmost possible speed,

she ought also to be provided with such means of stopping or changing
her course as are commensurate with her great speed, and the very
fact of her being so fast and apparently uncontrollable is additional

reason for greater caution in her navigation. Ib.
6. The nineteenth rule, which declares that the vessel which has the other

on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other,
does not absolve the preferred vessel from the duty of stopping and
reversing, in case of a faulty movement on the part of the other

vessel. 16.
7. The representatives of two passengers on the descending steamer who

lost their lives, filed a libel against the owner of the ascending steamer
for damages, and recovered. Ield: That as both vessels were in fault,
one half of such damages should be deducted from the amount recovered
from the Dumois, notwithstanding that the local law gave no lien or

privilege upon the vessel itself. Ib.
8. The limited liability act applies to cases of personal injury and death,

as well as to those of loss of, or injury to, property. Ib.
9. The Carlos F. Roses, a Spanish vessel, owned at Barcelona, Spain, sailed

from that port for Montevideo, Uraguay, with a cargo which was dis-
charged there, and a cargo of jerked beef and garlic taken on board
for Havana, for which she sailed March 16, 1898. On May 17, while
proceeding to Havana, she was captured by a vessel of the United
States and sent to Key West, where she was libelled. A British com-
pany doing business in London, laid claim to the cargo on the ground
that they had advanced money for its purchase to a citizen of Monte-
video, and had received bills of lading covering the shipment. The ves-
sel was condemned as enemy's property, but the proceeds of the cargo,
which had been ordered to be sold as perishable property, was ordered
to be paid to the claimants. Helu, (1) That as the vessel was an enemy
vessel, the presumption was that the cargo was enemy's property, and
this could only be overcome by clear and positive evidence to the con-
trary; (2) that on the face of the papers given in evidence, it must
be presumed that when these goods were delivered to the vessel, they

became the property of the consignors named in the invoices; (3) that
the British company got the legal title to the goods and the right of
possession only if such were the intention of the parties, and that that
intention was open to explanation, although the person holding the
papers might have innocently paid value for them; (4) that in prize
courts it is necessary for the claimants to show the absence of anything
to impeach the transaction, and at least to disclose fully all the sur-
rounding circumstances, and that the claimants had failed to do so;
(5) that the right of capture acts on the proprietary interest of the
thing captured at the time of the capture, and is not affected by the
secret liens or private engagements of the parties; (6) that in this case
the belligerent right overrides the neutral claim, which must be re-
garded merely as a debt, and the assignment as a cover to an enemy
interest. The Carlos F. Roses, 655.

AGENT AND PRINCIPAL.
See INSURANCE.

BANKRUPTCY.

A representation as to a fact, made knowingly, falsely and fraudulently,
for the purpose of obtaining money from another, and by means of
which such money is obtained, creates a debt by means of a fraud in-
volving moral turpitude and intentional wrong, and such debt is not
discharged by a discharge in bankruptcy. Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 177.

CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.

1. Decree below affirmed on the authority of the cases named in the opin-
ion of the court. Chrystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. Los Ange-
les, 169.

2. Dismissed on the authorities cited. Phinney v. Sheppard, 170.

3. Dismissed on the authority of Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 183, and
other cases cited in the opinion of the court. Henkel v. Cincinnati, 170.
4. The judgment below is affirmed for the reason given in Ohio Oil Com-
Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana,

pany v. Indiana, No. 1, 177 U. S. 190.
No. 2, 212.

5. The same disposition and for the same reason is made of Ohio Oil Com-
pany v. Indiana, No. 3, 213.

6. The matter embraced in the questions submitted to this court has been
considered, and was passed on in the opinion in American Express Co.
v. Michigan, 177 U. S. 404, which is followed in this case. Crawford v.

Hubbell, 419.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7;

CONTRACT, 3;

JURISDICITON, A, 7, 10;

JURISDICTION, B, 2, 5;
MEXICAN GRANT, 1;

NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY, 2.

CERTIORARI.

See HABEAS CORPUS.