irregular, its meaning was plain, and seemingly, it was by the v. Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. Sinclair v. Mayor of Fall River, 198 The attempt to adjourn having thus been disposed of, the election was valid. It was agreed to, not only by a majority of the members present, but by a majority of the members of the whole common council. Even if there had been irregularities in the election itself, unless they were such as to defeat or render doubtful the expression of the will of the voters, the court would desire to give effect to the action of the majority. Attorney General v. Campbell, 191 Mass. 497, 502. Blackmer v. Hildreth, 181 Mass. 29, 32. Commonwealth v. Smith, 132 Mass. 289, 296. People v. Wood, 148 N. Y. 142. As the respondent Aylward was legally elected, the right of the petitioner, who was holding over after the expiration of his term of office until his successor should be chosen, was thereby terminated. Petition dismissed. T b. ADMINISTRATIVE. ELLIOTT v. CHICAGO. 50 1868. 48 Ill. 293. BREESE, J. This was an application by A. H. Heald, city collector of the city of Chicago, to the Superior Court, for judgment against certain lots in that city, assessed for certain improvements on Michigan avenue. The appellant, Elliott, appeared, and made objections to the entry of any judgment against the property assessed in his name, on the grounds 1st, That no notice, as required by law, was given of the application for judgment. 2d. The commissioners willfully and fraudulently failed and refused to assess real estate, knowing the same to be specially benefited by the proposed improvement. 3d. Because all the material requirements of the city charter, as to the passing of the ordinance for (the improvement) and as to the acts of the commissioners of the Board of Public Works, and of the Common Council and officers of the city, have not been complied with. 4th. No notice, as required by law, was given of the meeting of the commissioners for the purpose of making the assessment; and 5th, no notice, as required by law, was given of the filing of the assessment roll with the city clerk, or the commissioners' intended confirmation thereof. These objections were overruled, and judgment entered for the amount assessed, with one per cent per month since September 6, 1867, and costs, and an order entered that sufficient of the property assessed be sold to satisfy the judgment. To reverse this judgment, Elliot appeals to this court. In support of the second objection, appellant called several witnesses, who all concurred in testifying that other property on Michigan avenue, not assessed, was benefited by this proposed improvement, as thereby the value of the property was enhanced. Had these witnesses occupied the position of the Board of Public Works, they, doubtless, acting on their own judgments and official oaths, might have assessed the property not included in the assessment by the commissioners. The commissioners were acting under oath, and were to be controlled by the judgment of none others but their own, and on their oaths have made their return _that_the_lots assessed were specially benefited by the proposed improvement, and their judgment must stand, unless impeached for fraud, not the slightest proof of which is exhibited in this case. As matter of necessity, their judgments must control, else there could be no such improvements. If a board of public works, selected, as must be supposed, for their good judgment, integrity and general capacity, should, under their official oaths, declare by their report that certain property is specially benefited by a proposed improvement, can it be that their judgment shall be overthrown by the testimony of others no more intelligent and no more honest than they? The judgment of men greatly differs in almost every case demanding its exercise, and in cases like this, it must be shown it was unfairly or fraudulently exercised, to authorize a court to nullify it. Their judgment must be conclusive in the absence of all fraud. City of Chicago v. Burtice, 24 Ill. 489. The other objections have no foundation. All the material requirements of the law have been substantially complied with, and all the proceedings, from their inception to the final judgment, have been regular, and in accordance with the charter. Perceiving no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. GRAVES, J. TAPPAN v. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1. 1880. 44 Mich. 500. August 31, 1878, the defendant's trustees entered into a written contract with Tappan to hire him to teach defendant's school for the term of forty weeks beginning on the first day of the school year, September 2d, at $50 per month and board himself. The school was organized as a graded one in 1873 and so remained. He began teaching under the contract on the second of September and 1 Part of the opinion is omitted.-ED. continued two days. He was then dismissed by defendant's trustees, but no cause was expressed. September 24, 1879, he brought this action for damages. The circuit judge heard the case upon the facts and refused to allow a recovery. It is said that the trustees who contracted with Tappan were not empowered to hire for any time beyond the current school year to expire on the arrival of the annual meeting, September 2d, and that the contract so made on the 31st of August was not binding on the district after September first. In the case of graded schools the trustees are not annually renewed. The Legislature has seen fit to give the board more permanence. Onethird only or two out of six go out yearly. A purpose to secure an administration for these branches more stable and efficient in the interest of education than is very common under the general law, is plain enough, and there is no implication of a design that the power of the board should be so fettered that no teaching to commence on the first day of the school year could be lawfully contracted for until the annual meeting on that day should be closed. On the contrary, it may be fairly argued that the Legislature contemplated that these schools would generally open on the beginning of the school year, and that the teachers would have to be contracted with in season therefor, and that some time would be necessary to enable the trustees to perform with due care the important duty of selecting and hiring. It is scarcely necessary to enlarge upon the question. The contract appears to have been within the power of the trustees, and the record discloses nothing to impeach it. Neither the trustees nor the voters at the annual meeting had power to impair its obligation. Whether they resolved or not that none but female teachers should be employed is not important. PEOPLE EX REL. ALLEN v. WELLES. 1895. 14 N. Y. Misc. 226. OSBORNE, J. This is a proceeding by certiorari to review the action of the respondent, as commissioner of police and excise, in dismissing the relator from the police force. By the charter of the city of Brooklyn (Chap. 583, Laws of 1888. tit. 11, § 9) the commissioner of police and excise was authorized “to make such rules, regulations and orders for the government of the police force as he may deem proper," and he was also authorized (§ 15), on conviction for violation of rules, etc., to punish by dismissal from the force. It appears from the return to the writ that, on or about October 23, 1893, Hon. Henry I. Hayden, the then commissioner, caused to be adopted, issued and published certain rules and regulations for the government of the police force, and these rules have never been repealed. One of such rules (Rule 12, § 5) required each patrolman to remain on his post until the time assigned for the expiration of his tour of duty," except in certain specified cases not relating to the matters in issue here. Another of said rules (Rule 25, § 5) forbade any member of the force becoming intoxicated, and further provided, in addition to being suspended and reported, that, in case he became violent, disorderly, or unable to take care of himself, he should be detained as a prisoner and taken before a magistrate at the next sitting of the court." On December 18, 1893, the relator was appointed a patrolman of the police force, and at about that time a copy of the said rules and regulations was furnished him. On or about February 1, 1894, the respondent was duly appointed commissioner of police and excise, in place of Mr. Hayden, whose term of office had expired. On January 24, 1895, charges were preferred by the captain of his precinct, against the relator, for a violation of both of the abovementioned rules, and he was also taken before Police Justice Haggarty on a charge of intoxication. The relator appeared in person and by counsel before the commissioner in answer to said charges; a trial was had, witnesses examined on both sides, and, after deliberation, the commissioner adjudged the relator to be guilty of both of the charges preferred against him, and dismissed him from the police force. The relator now seeks, by writ of certiorari, to review this determination of the commissioner and to have it reversed. The learned counsel for the relator urges that, as the present police commissioner had never adopted as his own and promulgated the rules and regulations issued by his predecessor, there were no rules of the department in existence under which the relator could be disciplined by the present commissioner. This contention cannot be sustained. The police department is a continuous body, and, while the executive head thereof may be changed from time to time, such change never contemplated the readoption of all previous rules and regulations in order to make them binding on the force; those rules and regulations stood, not as the act or declaration of an individual, but of the official head of the department, and they continued to be binding on the police force till altered or repealed by the proper authority.1 1 The remainder of the opinion is omitted. Ed. MOTION for leave to file a petition in error to the District Court of Noble county. The original action was brought by the plaintiffs against Bethel Bates, Andrew J. Moore, Josephus Groves, E. H. Craft, and I. Q. Morris, in the Court of Common Pleas of Noble county. The following are the facts, so far as they are material to be noticed: On the 13th day of October, 1870, the defendants were members of the board of education of Seneca township, in said county, and on that day they entered into an agreement in writing with one J. S. Wachob, of which the following is a copy: "Mr. J. S. Wachob is hereby requested to forward to Herman Suabidissen, township clerk, the following list of articles, viz: Seven excelsior globes, seven inches in diameter, mounted as per cut herewith, provided a majority of the members of the board of education of Seneca township, Noble county, Ohio, sign this order; and we hereby agree to pay for the same on or before the first day of September, 1871, with interest, at the price hereto annexed. "The township clerk is hereby directed to issue an order on the firtive mee township in the payment for the same in favor of said Wachob, pay able as above specified, and he is meeting of said board within further requested to call a special with each other that we will ratify this contract. 66 BETHEL BATES, 1 Fortune meiling "I. Q. MORRIS. "October 13, 1870." Then followed a long list of school apparatus with prices annexed, the price annexed to the globes contracted for being $15 each. The globes were delivered to the township clerk, who drew an order on the treasurer of the township, as directed, for $105, in favor of Wachob, payable September 1, 1871. This order and Wachob's interest in the above-recited agreement were assigned by him to the plaintiff, after which the board of education, acting in its corporate capacity, repudiated the contract, and the treasurer refused to pay the order; whereupon the plaintiff brought his action against the members of the board signing the contract to recover upon their alleged individual promise to pay for the globes.. The defendants demurred to a petition stating the foregoing facts, upon the ground that the facts stated were ti |