Yet lacking sensibility) the man Who needlessly sets foot upon a worm.' Read Rab and his Friends; such poems as The Halo, by W. C. Gannett, and selections from the biographies of men, like Sir Walter Scott, fond of dogs and horses. See Miss Cobbe on the Education of the Emotions in the Fortnightly Review, xliii. p. 223. Lessons on Manners, by Edith Wiggin, is a good handbook for the teacher. As for kindness in charitable works: "That is no true alms which the hand can hold; He gives only the worthless gold Who gives from a sense of duty; The hand cannot clasp the whole of his alms." CHAPTER VII. THE GREAT WORDS OF MORALITY. In our previous chapters we have studied the meaning of "law" in general, and of the "moral law" in particular. "Duty," "ought," "justice," and "kindness" we have also explained. But there are numerous other words used very commonly in speaking of human actions, such as "right" and "wrong," "conscience," “virtue,” and “vice," which we have not yet considered. In every art and in every science a clear understanding of the exact meanings of the words we use is important. But nowhere is it of more consequence than when we are speaking or writing about the moral character of actions. Indeed, in discussing matters of conduct the decision as to their rightness or wrongness often turns upon the definition we give of "right" and "wrong" in general. In this book we are trying to keep clear of controversies as to the ultimate nature of vice and virtue, of the morally good and the morally bad, and to remain upon the ground of practical ethics where there is a general agreement among men. In such a spirit, avoiding refinements and subtleties, let us look at some of the words which mankind commonly use in regard to morals. In the first place, however, what do we mean precisely by "moral" or "ethical"? The two words have the same signification, the first coming from the Latin language, and the second from the Greek; both mean "pertaining to the habits, manners, or customs of men.” Of course, not all possible actions of human beings are called "moral." We eat and sleep and do many other things which all other animals do as a part of their animal existence. These are not immoral but unmoral acts: there is no propriety in applying the words "right" and "wrong" to them. We read and study, again; we employ our minds in many ways, and we do not think of vice or virtue as fit words to use about what we are doing. There is thus a great deal of human life which lies outside of the world of moral distinctions: our instinctive animal existence, the natural play of the mind, and numerous powers of conscious thought and action have standards other than those of morals. We may not judge a book, a picture, or a building by morals alone. Only a part of all the manners and customs of men do we properly call moral or immoral. This part, evidently, takes in those actions which most directly affect the welfare of other persons. Man in society is the subject of moral or ethical science, and our actions show themselves to be moral or immoral according as they tend, immediately or ultimately, to the welfare or to the injury of other human beings. Eating my breakfast is not a moral act in itself; but if I give another person poisoned food for his breakfast, it is a highly immoral deed that I do. If any act of mine is plainly confined in its consequences to myself, then its moral quality is not immediately obvious. If every human being were out of all relations to every other, there could be no such science or art as morals or ethics, for "duties to self," as they are sometimes called, would not, alone, constitute such a science. But there is a law, as we have seen, governing all the many actual relations of men to one another, and because we are social beings and live our lives mainly together, this law, the law of morality, is of the very first importance to us. Duty, "the ought," as we have explained, is the obedience we 66 Owe to this law. But there is a very common phrase, "rights and duties." This combination indicates the social nature of morals. Our duties are what we owe to others; our rights are what others owe to us. Their rights are our duties; their duties are our rights. "Right" (which comes from the same root as rectus, straight) means, first of all, "in accordance with rule or law." Righteousness, or rightness, is equivalent to rectitude, which means going straight by the rule or measure. This rule has come to be for all mankind the rule in particular derived from the moral law right means, therefore, doing the things which the moral law, of truthfulness or kindness for instance, prescribes to be done. If we can find this law and merely understand it as we should any other law of nature, we are intellectually right, i. e., correct in our thought; if we act as it commands, we are morally right, so far as our action is concerned; if we obey it in a spirit of gladness, as the inspiring law of our human life, then we are right, all through, mind and hand and heart and will then we are completely moral beings. "Right" has in it the notion of straightness, straightforwardness, directness. A "right line" is the straight line between any two points. Right conduct is conduct tending directly to social welfare, the good of all embracing the good of each. But when one's action is bent or swayed out of this straight line, when it tends. to some other mark than the good of all, it is "wrong," i. e., it is wrung out of conformity with the rule or law. Now the great occasion or cause of wrong-doing in the world is, as we have seen, that we are apt to think only of ourselves when we act. Our own welfare very often so takes the first place in our thoughts and feelings that we care little, or not at all, what the consequences of our deeds may be to other persons. There are, in truth, many matters in which we must think about our own comfort and convenience as the impor tant matter, since self-help is the best kind of help; and if the thing we desire is good for us, it may be entirely right that we should endeavor to obtain it. But when a benefit of any kind is one that may be shared, or that must be shared, in order that no one shall suffer because another gets more than his portion, then pure selfhood becomes selfishness, and is wrong. For example, a farmer works hard to make money from his land: he labors on his own place, and has his own interest, not his neighbor's, in view, as he buys and sells according to the usual laws of trade. This is right: there is no selfishness about caring for one's self in this way. But the farmer is bound to provide for his wife and children, to see that they have enough to eat, that they are well clothed, that the children go to school, that the hired men receive fair wages and are punctually paid, and that all the benefits of his prosperity, such as it is, are divided among those who have a just and natural claim upon him. But while the farmer is making money, he may compel his family to fare poorly and dress meanly; he may keep his children at work when they should have the opportunity to go to school; he may "beat down" the pay of his workmen and delay the payment. In all these ways, not to speak of other matters, he may disregard the fact that we are partners with one another. Instead of going straight to the mark of the plain and simple duty before him, he may force and complicate things into a state of wrongness by his selfishness. The crooked line is the proper emblem of the conduct that obeys no law; the straight line, of the conduct that is true to the direction which the law commands. Vice, a common word in speaking of bad conduct, means, first of all, a defect: it refers to a deficiency in the exercise of that power of self-control of which we have before spoken as the root of morality in the private person. One man does not exert himself as he |