law may severely punish; if he snatches it from my hand, or takes me by the throat and rifles it from my pocket, he is a robber, and may be punished with still greater severity; if he persuades me to part with it by promise of a material equivalent, and does not make good his promise according to specifications, he has obtained it "under false pretences,” and may be dealt with, but not so severely as the technical thief or robber; if he persuades me to part with it by offering or promising that which he knows to be valueless, or of less value than the price I pay, he is a swindler, and may or may not be punished, according to circum stances. But there are plenty of ways in which he may wrongfully take it from me with absolute impunity, so far as human laws are concerned. He may do it without my knowledge, as by charging unreasonable profits; or with my consent obtained through my folly, ignorance, or weakness (which is morally the same as no consent), as by selling me some worthless or worse than worthless nostrum, or by inducing me to invest in some enterprise which he knows to be hopeless. In either case he is as truly a thief as the poor, unskilled wretch who knows not how to steal according to statute. Again, he may do it with my full knowledge and in contemptuous defiance of my indignation and powerless attempts at selfprotection, as many a millionaire, trust company, or other monopoly has done and is doing to-day. How does he or they differ in reality from the strong, bold, insolent robber who seizes his victim by the throat and rifles his pocket? Joseph Cracklin. Are millionaires, trust companies, and monopolies always robbers ? Dr. Dix. Your question is not a call for information, but an implication against my fairness and candor. You know very well that they are not always robbers, that some of the noblest men the world has ever seen have been men of great wealth honestly obtained. You know, furthermore, that combinations of men for greater efficiency in business do not necessarily involve dishonesty in dealing, that such combinations may be, and often are, of the greatest benefit not only to the individuals composing them but to the general public also. Thomas Dunn. It is true, however, is it not, that such combinations, especially when they amount to monopolies, offer very strong temptations to dishonesty? Dr. Dix. Great power is always a great temptation, whether it be physical, moral, political, or financial. But virtue may be strong enough to withstand even that temptation. Of actual monopolies, as they are frequently secured and managed, I have no defence to make. Too often their prime object is fraud. Secured by the ruthless crowding-out of weaker rivals, one by one at first, and finally by hundreds or by thousands at a time, and when secured carried on by the wholesale legalized plundering of society, what name can be properly applied to thein but that of gigantic robbers? If, however, men were as mighty in virtue as they are in intellect, even monopolies might be as powerful agents for good as they are for evil. Henry Phillips. How would that be possible? Dr. Dix. There is nothing necessarily dishonest or cruel in organization. On the contrary, when its purposes are right and just it is most beneficent in its effects. If all the charitable people, for example, in our State should unite into one body and carry out their schemes of benevolence under one well-managed system, their power for good would be immensely increased. That would be nothing more or less than a monopoly of practical beneficence. So if all the competent workers at the various guilds should be allowed by their stronger representatives respectively to organize for the more efficient and economical carrying on of their business, there might be a grand system of monopolies that would be of incalculable benefit both to the workers themselves and to society in general. Thomas Dunn. Always supposing the controlling powers were honest and public-spirited. I suppose the civil codes of an age afford us a pretty fair means of judging of the average standard of morality of that age. Dr. Dix. It is often said that the rulers elected by a people fairly represent their average morality. As to the laws which those rulers enact, they more generally represent the average standard aimed at as attainable than that actually attained. How far short of the standard of the moral law that is, we have already illustrated to some extent. And yet the conduct of many so-called respectable men shows plainly that the civil law is their highest standard. In all their dealings their aim seems to be to keep just within its requirements. So long as they do this they defiantly challenge criticism of their conduct, though they may rob the widow and the fatherless with relentless cruelty. Julia Taylor. However great future improvements may be, I don't see how it can ever be possible for the two standards to be the same. Dr. Dix. If the day ever comes when they are the same, it will certainly not be by the enforcement of such civil penalties as are now in vogue. When the civil law requires, as the moral law has always required, that the rich shall not grind the faces of the poor in any way whatsoever, that the intelligent and the educated shall not use their intelligence and education to oppress the ignorant and the simple, it will be obeyed not through dread of fines or imprisonments, but through the fear of overwhelming public obloquy, a far more terrible penalty to many persons than either fine or imprisonment. Susan Perkins. If the time you speak of ever comes, there will be no need of the civil law; the moral law will be all-sufficient. Dr. Dix. Not quite all-sufficient, Miss Perkins. The prevention of crime is not the only function of the civil law. The simplest form of society - even of those whose intentions were morally unexceptionable — could scarcely hold together without laws governing their intercourse in many ways upon which the moral law has no bearing. Such laws are the only ones in which multitudes to-day are personally interested so far as their own conduct is concerned. Did you ever think how small a proportion of the crowds that walk the streets of a city have any personal relations with the bluecoated guardians of its peace, -ever notice, in fact, whether they are on their beats or not? Helen Mar. I was struck by your mention of the abuse of intellectual as well as physical power. A strong-armed ruffian that overpowers his victim and robs him of his purse is looked upon and punished as one of the worst of criminals, but the strong-brained ruffian that overpowers his victims by the thousands, perhaps, and robs them of purse, house, and land together by his superior intellectual power is looked upon, as you have said, only as a great financier. I do not see why one is not in reality a criminal as well as the other, and as much greater a criminal as his robbery is greater. Dr. Dix. So the moral law regards him; so in fact he is. XXVIII. A BLACK LIST. Dr. Dix. You may mention this morning some of the common ways in which the law of honesty as respects the right of property is violated. Archibald Watson. Shall we include those we have already talked about? Dr. Dix. Yes. Archibald Watson. Well, then, there is plain out-andout stealing, such as is recognized and punished by the law. James Murphy. And robbery. Frank Williams. And obtaining goods under false pretences. Henry Jones. Forgery. Lucy Snow. Counterfeiting. Charles Fox. Overcharging for goods or services. Jane Simpson. Is it necessarily dishonest to fail in business? Dr. Dix. No more than in any other department of human effort, no more than it is dishonest to fail in art, or authorship, or oratory. Jonathan Tower. But does n't a man who pays only twenty-five cents to a man to whom he owes a dollar cheat him out of seventy-five cents? Dr. Dix. Whether you can properly call it cheating or not depends entirely on the circumstances. Men in the business world sustain a very close relation to one another: the misfortune, folly, inefficiency, or guilt of one necessarily involves others in difficulties for which |