members of the United States Tariff Commission should be appointed from definitely outlined regions so that at all times the entire United States will have a representation on the Tariff Commission. It is confessed that at the present time the membership of the Tariff Commission is fairly well distributed geographically. At times in the past, however, the membership of the Tariff Commission have been too largely representative of one or two particular sections of our country.

The principle is becoming more and more widely established, of providing regional representation on Government commissions. The American Farm Bureau Federation is gratified that this condition exists so far as is now the case, and is on record in favor of all Federal commissions being composed of regional representatives. There is no new principle in this suggestion. In fact the courts of the United States, excepting the Supreme Court, and the members of the lower House of Congress, as well as courts within our States have their judges either elected or appointed by regions or districts, with the understanding either expressed or defined that such judges must be residents of the regions served. If it is alleged that the principle of regional representation on the Tariff Commission, or any other Federal commission at Washington, is a dangerous one, citation only need be made to the method above-described, by which judges are apportioned all over our country.

The principal benefit of the plan of regional representation is to assure a national point of view rather than a sectional one on a Federal commission. Different sections of the country have different problems. and different conditions, and quite often varying points of view. It is to be expected that a representative of a given section would be more familiar with such conditions than those residing outside of that section. Applying this thought to the Tariff Commission, one could expect a commission made up of regional representatives to give us in every determination a national point of view with the needs and requirements of every region constituting component parts of the national solution." There is perhaps no economic measure of a national character which affects more nearly all sections of the country, and all classes of population, than the tariff act. Its effects, either direct or indirect, and its ramifications affect the welfare of all groups. The commission, therefore, if composed of men acquainted with local conditions in their respective regions, as well as in a general way with national conditions, will give us a sounder and more satisfactory administration of tariff adjustment, other things being equal. It is suggested, therefore, that a plan of regional representation be instituted gradually as new appointments are made to the commission. As above noted, this will be one method to secure an abeyance of the partisanship which is now expected of commissioners, and to promote the growth of the quasi-judicial functions which the commission properly should follow. As a tentative suggestion the following districts are submitted as a basis for the selection of subsequent commissioners, so that eventually each of these districts will be represented by one member on the Tariff Commission:

District No. 1: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island.

District No. 2: New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland. District No. 3: Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama. Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee.

District No. 4: Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin.

District No. 5: Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado.

District No. 6: Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona. District No. 7: Washington, Oregon, Idaho, California, Utah, Nevada, Hawaii, Alaska.

As a further procedure in removing the Tariff Commission from the aspect of partisanship characterized by it in the past, it is suggested that the President of the United States be not required to act upon the information which the Tariff Commission acquires, but that the Tariff Commission itself be authorized to act as the agent of Congress in putting into force and effect the adjustment of rates which it finds advisable, without referring the matter to the President. With the Tariff Commission as it is now created on the bipartisan basis, and with the President of the United States elected on a partisan platform of principles, it seems ridiculous to expect the tariff matters to be approached from a nonpartisan point of view. In fact the present set-up invites a continuation of friction, hesitation, delay, and interminable discussions, such as have been prevalent in the past. Some have criticized the Tariff Commission for all of these disadvantageous features just mentioned, and have urgently recommended its abolishment.

Again, the American Farm Bureau Federation begs leave to differ from those who, failing to see the causes of situations which have arisen, seek to strike at a worthy enterprise, the Tariff Commission, at the same time failing in any effort to correct the disadvantages under which the Tariff Commission has worked down to date. To refer the findings of the Tariff Commission to the President, in addition to keeping tariff matters on a partisan basis, promotes still further delay in arriving at Executive decisions upon tariff rates. It is a logical thing to ask how can a President of the United States with all the multitudinous duties which he has to perform be expected to decide upon the advisability or nonadvisability of changing tariff rates when it has taken the entire Tariff Commission, and all of its force of assistants, months, and sometimes years, to assemble the data to lay upon the President's desk? Generally, it is expected that the President will act promptly when the Tariff Commission has presented its research findings to him. Usually the result is that the President takes his deliberate time in issuing or failing to issue his Executive order. All of this promotes delay and throws into more disrepute the really meritorious features of the elastic provision and the work incident thereto which has been performed by the Tariff Commission.

Under section 315, as it is now constituted, the Tariff Commission has no authority to make any change whatever in any duty. Its functions are purely those of research and fact finding. The authority to raise or lower rates under this section is delegated to the President as the agent of Congress, but before he can make any change in the rate the law requires an investigation by the Tariff Commission.

It is interesting to study some of the steps which must be taken in this laborious process even while confessing that the process, though it is laborious, is an improvement over the former situation where there was no way of securing rate adjustment except by congressional action.

First of all the Tariff Commission must conduct an investigation. This investigation may be begun on the volition of the commission, or by petition of interested parties. If a petition, or petitions, has been filed relative to any commodity, the Tariff Commission makes a preliminary investigation to see if the causes set out by the petitioners are well founded. If the commission decides to go further with the case after this preliminary investigation has been concluded, it sends its investigators into various portions of the United States, where the commodity being investigated is produced, and also into foreign nations particularly that one which is the most severe competitor, for the purpose of acquiring cost of production figures. This undertaking of acquiring cost of production estimates both at home and abroad takes months to consummate and costs a great deal of money. Worst of all, however, as previously described in this brief, it stirs up friction with foreign governments to have our investigators "snooping around" in what foreigners consider to be none of our business. When the commission has finally completed its investigation, it issues a preliminary report thereof for the benefit of all concerned, and announces public hearings where all interested parties may appear before the commission. After this public hearing is held another delay is met in the necessary time which the commission must use in digesting whatever new information has been brought to its attention at the public hearings. Finally, though, the commission has summarized all of its own data and that which has been brought to it by interested parties, and has submitted its report to the President. This report is not a recommendation in any sense of the word, but is merely a document which conveys to the President the facts in the case. Then the President must of course, have some time to consider these facts that he may properly discharge his responsibilities as outlined by the law which creates him the agent of Congress in such matters.

Obviously the President with all of his other duties can not give much detailed consideration to the cases which the Tariff Commission places on his desk. But finally the President comes to a point of decision and issues an Executive order that the rate be increased or decreased as the facts warrants, setting the amount of increase or decrease and the time of its operation. If the President, however, is not convinced of the necessity to act, after studying the data placed before him by the Tariff Commission, he can withhold his Executive order and thereby promote further delay and throw into the discard all the work which has been done upon that particular case by the Tariff Commission.

To remove all of this intricate machinery of tariff procedure, it is recommended that the Tariff Commission itself be not only the fact-finding research body, but the executive hand of the Government as well, to act as the agent of Congress for tariff rate-making purposes. This does not mean that one whit of the constitutional power now lodged in the House of Representatives by constitutional author

ity shall be taken therefrom. It merely means that Congress will delegate an agent, the Tariff Commission, to do what Congress itself can not well do as economic currents shift; that is, revise rates carefully and scientifically.

This recommendation that the Tariff Commission, instead of the President, be authorized to act for tariff rate-making purposes does not mean either that Congress will not retain to itself the powers both of reviewing and of recalling the acts of its agent, the Tariff Commission, and whenever it so desires entirely revise the tariff act and the regulations and administrative provisions by which its agent may proceed. Congress already has done similar things in regard to other Federal bodies. For instance, the Interstate Commerce Commission has been authorized by Congress to act as the agent of the Government in the making of freight and passenger rates. Congress still has the power of defining the functions of its agent, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and of completely overthrowing what this agent does if the public welfare so demands; but Congress has not the facilities to go into the intricacies, day after day, of freight and passenger rate making; therefore, an agent must do this work for Congress. Likewise an agent of Congress, the Tariff Commission, should be authorized to perform the constant task of readjusting tariff rates as conditions change.

It may be asserted by some that to lodge in the Tariff Commission the authority of an agent of Congress to increase or decrease tariff rates is not advisable, since there would be no court of review to which appeal could be taken by any interested party. It is known, of course, that a freight or passenger rate promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission is subject to appeal to the proper court. In the case, however, of the Tariff Commission we have a slightly different setup than in the Interstate Commerce Commission. Tariff matters should not be viewed exactly as freight and passenger rates, in that tariff rates are means for raising Federal revenue, and a function. of Government authorized by Congress to act as its agent should be final in its authority, except that appeal may be taken to the Congress itself by an interested party, to have the rate, which the Tariff Commission has changed, reconsidered by the ordaining body—that is, Congresswhich authorized the Tariff Commission to act. So it seems to follow that those who argue against having the Tariff Commission act in tariff rate making, on account of there being no court of review or appeal, forget that Congress itself constitutes such a court of review or appeal. Bills may be introduced at any time when Congress is in session to rectify any act which it is alleged by any person the Tariff Commission has performed disadvantageously to him. In other words, the legal status with the Tariff Commission acting as the agent of Congress, and with the President removed from acting as such agent, would be, as it is now, under section 315. There is no court of review or appeal from the action of the President except to appeal to Congress itself. If it is illegal or unconstitutional to have the Tariff Commission itself act as the agent of Congress, under the allegation that there is no court of review or appeal, then likewise it must be illegal or unconstitutional for the President to act in like capacity. This question has been settled, though, by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, referred to earlier in this brief. The decision of the Supreme Court briefly stated was that the elastic provision in authorizing the President to act as an agent of Congress is constitutional. The presumption, if not absolute conclusion, would be that any other agent which Congress might choose to act for itself, for instance, the Tariff Commission, would be likewise acting upon constitutional grounds.

Among those features of section 315 which need clarification other than the ones already discussed is one which is very prominent. The elastic section makes use of the expression "like or similar articles," but fails to define what this expression means. To the average person, the intent of these words is reasonably plain, but in actual practice before the Tariff Commission the phrase "like or similar articles" has been used as a pretext by importers to block action on the assertion that the imported article was not "like or similar" to any domestic article, and, therefore, could not become operative under the scope of section 315. For example, in the cherry case the importers sought to show that the cherries imported from Italy were not "like or similar" to the domestic Royal Anne cherry, even though the cherries were of the same variety. The importers alleged that the imported article was not "like or similar" due to the fact that most of the foreign grown cherries were of very small size, whereas the domestic Royal Anne cherries were of a much larger size. Evidence was submitted to the commission, however, which showed that the domestic cherry industry had been unable to compete successfully with the Italian cherry in the eastern markets and had been virtually driven out of such market by this competition. Consequently it was necessary for the domestic industry to adjust

The

itself by catering to a quality market for very large and fine grade cherries. sale for the smaller type of domestic cherries was confined largely to the regions west of the Mississippi River due to the destructive competition of Italian cherries, secured partially on account of cheap ocean rates to our eastern seaboard. It was further shown by competent evidence that the domestic industry, by changing its cultural practices, could produce a very much larger quantity of the smaller size cherries, under economic conditions, but foreign competition had prevented it.

This was nothing more nor less than a quarrel over the interpretation of what constitutes "like or similar articles."

A similar attempt was made in the Swiss cheese case to show that the imported cheese was not competitive with domestic cheese because of its alleged superior quality.

In the canned tomato case, importers likewise sought to show that Italian canned tomatoes were not "like or similar” to domestic canned tomatoes and, therefore, not competitive. Competent witnesses testified before the Tariff Commission relative to the very close similarity existing between the Italian canned tomatoes and the California solid-pack tomatoes. This testimony was corroborated by the display of samples of both products in the presence of the Tariff Commission.

Even in the case of such a commonly known product as corn a similar question was raised as to whether corn of the flint variety imported from Argentina is "like or similar" and competitive with domestic corn of the dent variety. In this case it was shown that both types of corn are used for the same purposes and are competitive in our markets.

Obviously if the expression "like or similar" is not defined in the law, the line of opposition described above can be carried to the extreme so that it would be necessary to demonstrate even that two commodities are of exactly the same grade, the same condition, used for all of the same purposes, and other ridiculous conditions, in order to demonstrate their likeness and similarity. Fortunately the President and the Tariff Commission have thus far interpreted this provision more from the common-sense point of view than from that of technicalities alone. Nevertheless, in view of the difficulties which domestic producers have encountered in overcoming the techincal objections advanced by importers to defeat adequate protection as intended by this study, it is recommended that a definition of the term "like or similar" be inserted in the act, as follows:

"For the purpose of this section an imported article shall be construed to be 'like or similar' to articles wholly or in part the growth or product of the United States whenever these articles are regarded in the usual trade channels as like or similar articles in the commonly accepted meaning of these terms, or whenever these articles are used for the same purpose; but differences in grade or quality of the imported article and the domestic article shall not be construed to prevent their comparison as 'like or similar' articles for the purpose of this section, provided due consideration is taken of differences in grade or quality, as these may be reflected in costs of production and prices."

With the clarifications of the flexible provisions which have been described in this brief incorporated in the forthcoming tariff act, it will be possible for the Tariff Commission to proceed with much more expedition in disposing of cases than has been possible down to date. In fact under this recommended scheme of amendments to the flexible provision it should be expected that the Tariff Commission could complete every investigation within one year unless some unusual circumstances required more time. In this event the commission could give notice, together with its reasons for consuming more time than 12 months upon any particular case. The commission also by the adoption of the examiners' system could further expedite its actions so that subordinate officials would do much of the work which is now done by the commissioners themselves. This would leave the Tariff Commission free to formulate policies and make decisions, after information had been analyzed at public hearings and elsewhere by employees selected as is usual for such work under the so-called examiner system. Perhaps an incident in permitting the Tariff Commission to speed up its work would be to give specific authority that will permit the commission to use information which has been obtained from other agencies than from its own investigators. Of course, it must be stated that the commission has made use of a great deal of information which has been available from sources other than its own investigations, but this has been done with hesitancy since the present elastic section gives the commission no specific authority to use such other data and information.

After all of the above suggestions and recommendations of the American Farm Bureau Federation relative to section 315 have been considered by the Ways and Means Committee, and the subcommittee to be placed in charge of the administrative provisions, it will be seen that a virtual rewriting of section 315 is required. The major factor, however, of this section is that elasticity or flexibility must be secured in our tariff laws. If in the first effort to secure this flexibility it has developed that the language and provisions of the section are not correct, it remains only to revise the language and provisions so that the flexibility originally desired, and stil an object to be accomplished, may be secured. No specific measure has ever been introduced for the consideration of Congress which includes the many suggestions already touched upon in this brief relative to section 315, as fully as does H. R. 15654 by Congressman Manlove. A study of the language in this bill is recommended to the Ways and Means Committee if this committee feels that the suggestions made by the American Farm Bureau Federation relative to section 315 should be carried out. The Manlove bill, however, does not subordinate costs of production estimates as is herewith being recommended by the American Farm Bureau Federation. So in a study of the Manlove bill it should be approached with the thought in mind that its sections shall be a guide in rewriting the elastic section with the qualification, however, that costs of production shall be made secondary, if not quite inconsequential, in determining whether or not a domestic industry is being injured, or that competition exists between domestic and foreign producers.

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In concluding this portion of the brief on the administrative provisions, therefore, it is not asked that section 315 be repealed; it is asked that the section be perfected. In fact the last thing that the American Farm Bureau Federation would recommend in connection with this section is that it be repealed. efforts should be made to clarify it and to perfect its working machinery. Turning now to a brief consideration of section 301, the Philippine Islands, requires that reference be made to the brief of the American Farm Bureau Federation presented on Schedule V, sugar, molasses, and manufactures of, on January 22, 1929. In that brief it was indicated very strongly that so far as sugars and molasses were concerned, the Philippine Islands, Porto Rico, and Cuba should be viewed exactly as all other parts of the world are viewed in tariff matters namely, that tariff rates to be written in the forthcoming tariff act should be applicable to these islands exactly as they are applicable to the rest of the world. It is desired now to broaden this statement of principle relative to our colonies and to Cuba so that all commodities coming from the Philippines or Porto Rico, as well as from Cuba, shall be on the same basis as if they came from a foreign country.

It is merely a gesture to adopt a tariff law giving agriculture seemingly high rates of protection and then to let various agricultural commodities come in duty free from our so-called colonies. In fact if we are to be a nation that promotes colonization with the freedom of trade between colonies and the mother country which could be expected, and which ordinarily as history records it has been proven to exist, then continental American agriculture had as well consider that tariff laws in its behalf are not even gestures unless they be of the hypocritical sort.

The Philippine Islands send us great quantities of sugar and vegetable oils. Others of our colonies send us quantities of agricultural products. Truly it must be stated that a nation wants colonies ordinarily for two purposes, first, to supply the mother country with cheap food; and second, to add a market for manufactured products. History has always demonstrated this to be so, and it will again be true if America continues a nation of colonization.

When reference is made to colonies in the briefs of the American Farm Bureau Federation, it is understood that Hawaii and Alaska are not included in this term. Those regions have definitely gone forward in the line of absorption into our national life, are component parts of our fiscal system, participate in Federal aid on various projects, and are qualifying in the usual American sense as territories eventually, one may presume to become States. In the case of others of our colonies, these steps of assimilation have not been taken. In fact the set-up of government, particularly in the Philippines and Porto Rico, is such that those islands evidently from the beginning of our contact with them during the SpanishAmerican War did not expect to become responsible parts of our Government but merely to secure the benefits to themselves of a governmental contact with our Nation. The fiscal systems of those islands are not parts of our fiscal system; they have functions of government which from the beginning of our contact with them indicate eventually a separation of the islands from the Government of the United States.