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newing fcenes fo very much to the honour of reasonable beings, may never be taken from the princes and potentates of the earth. I thus endeavour, dear Bethel, by entering into the interefts of those I am with, to call off my thoughts from my own, or I should find this very long pace of time, in which I have failed to receive letters from England, almoit infupportable.

At the very moment I com lain, I

fee my fervant Warham approaching the house-I fly, impatiently, to receive news of Geraldine, of you, of all i love; and hope to have a long, a very long letter to write, in answer, to-morrow, to thofe I expect from you-We go back to Montfleuri the next day, this will therefore be the laft pacquet you will receive from hence. LIONEL DESMOND.

An Account of the great Virtues of RHUBARB, combined with CREAM of TARTAR,

[From Sir William Fordyce's Method of Cultivating and Curing that Plant in this Country.]

F this Cream of Tartar, let half an ounce be diffolved in a quart of boiling water; of which let the patient drink one half every twentyfour hours, giving, in a cup-full of it, ten grains of powder of the fame rhubarb, twice or thrice within that fpace of time.

Mix a quarter of an ounce of rhubarb in powder with three quarters of an ounce of the cream of tartar, into the form of a linctus, with oxymel of fquills. A tea spoonful of this, taken twice or thrice a day, is one of the beft medicines for a dropfy hitherto known.

Add fixty grains of our rhubarb to as much of the falt of tartar, boil them for a quarter of an hour in fix ounces of water in a tin faucepan,

ftrain it through blotting paper; and you have what one of the belt writers on the Materia Medica calls Anima Rhabarbari. One tea spoonful of this given once a day to a child of a year old, twice a day to one of twentyfour months old, and three times a day to one a year older, is one of the beft compofitions as yet known for ftrengthening the stomach aud bowels of little children, and preventing the big bellies, rickety joints and limbs, incident to their age.

Put half an ounce of the fibrous roots of our rhubarb, with two drachms of this fame falt of tartar, into a bottle of brandy, or as much anifeed water ; and you have an excellent tincture and domeftic medicine for the wind cholic.

OBSERVATIONS, on the Importance of GIBRALTAR: From HERIOT's. Hiftorical Sketch of that Fortress.

THE very name of Gibraltar re-mercial advantages. It is reckoned

Briton the fpark of military ardour. It is justly confidered as the brighteft jewel of the British crown; which no boon, however fplendid and valuable, could induce the nation ingloriously to barter. The poffeffion of this fortrefs yields indeed in Great Britain, not only fignal political, but great com

ranean ocean, and confequently of
fingular benefit in carrying on the
trade of the Levant. In its remain-
ing fubject to the British empire,
therefore, not only the British nation,
but every northern maritime power
of Europe, is greatly interefted; for
under the batteries of the garrifon the

* Wolfgangii Wedelii Amoenitates Materia Medica
6

veffels

veffels of all nations find at all times a fafe and ready afylum, either in their ingrefs to, or egrefs from the Mediterranean fea.

Were this fortrefs fubject to Spain, there can be no doubt but the cafe would be very different. The impofition of heavy duties at the port of Gibraltar would have a fatally reftrictive operation upon the trade of the Mediterranean; and every mari

time nation would be, with respect to that trade, at all times in the power of Spain. To the poffeffion of Gibraltar there are therefore attached great commercial benefits, as well as military fplendour; the united confiderations of which muft at all times ftimulate the nation to preferve it as one of the most valuable appendages to the British empire.

ADVICES from the EAST INDIES.

THE Vetal frigate having arrived from the Eaft Indies, the dispatches which The brought were published in the London Gazette Extraordinary of July 2. The first is a letter from the prefidency of Fort St. George, dated Feb. 21, 1792, the contents of which are repeated in the letter we fhall give presently from earl Cornwallis to the faid prefidency, dated Feb. 8. -But, previous to this letter, his lordfhip had addreffed one to the prefidency, dated Feb. 3, in which he informs them of the letter he had received from Tippoo Sultan, and of his anfwer thereunto. "Tippoo," his lordfhip writes, "likewife addreffed letters to the Peshwa [the fovereign of one of the Mahratta states] and to Hurry Punt [general of one of the Mahratta armies] of a fimilar tenour to that which he wrote to me; except that in the conclufion of his letter to Hurry Punt he fays, that the difference refpecting the capitulation of Coimbatoor might be adjusted at the same time with the terms of general peace: but Hurry Punt and Azeem ul Omrah [prime minister of the Nizam, or fovereign of the Deccan] concurred, with great earnestness, in opinion with me, that juftice, as well as a due regard to the honour of the confederates, required that atonement for a flagrant breach of faith fhould be infifted upon previous to all negotiation."

• Had I looked upon it," proceeds his lordship, "to be confiftent with my duty to the Public, to allow myself to act merely from confiderations of the general perfidy of Tippoo's character, and the infulting effrontery with which he has denied a fact fo recent and notorious as the capitulation of Coimbatoor, I fhould, perhaps, have been induced to have adopted the draft of the letter that Azeem ul Omrah propofed, and warmly urged me to write, which, on account of his violation

of the capitulation of Coimbatoor, difclaimed and prohibited all further correfpondence between us. But feeling, as I do, how important it is to the interefts of our country to obtain a fafe and honourable peace with as little loss of time as poffible, I judged it much more expedient to leave the door open to Tippoo for negociation, by putting it in his power to fay, that he had been misinformed refpecting the transaction at Coimbatoor.'

Here earl Cornwallis fubjoins the following letter, received Jan. 24, from Tippoo, with his answer to it of the 31ft.

From TIPPOO SULTAN.

YOUR lordihip's letter arrived; and I have understood the contents; and, with a view to the quiet of mankind, your lordfhip writes, that in effecting the affairs of peace between the four powers, your lordhip, of yourself, is not neglectful; but that the garrifon of Coimbatoor, who furrendered on capitulation, and are in confinement, must be released; that after their arrival the vakeels of the three fircars fhall affemble at a certain place, and fuch negociation as may be necessary shall then be commenced. I have understood this. The particulars of the fort of Coimbatoor are thefe: I fent Meer Kummer ul Dien to take the fort; he arrived there, and furrounded it. When affiftance made its appearance from toward Paligautcherry, Kummur ul Dien, marching from Coimbatoor, attacked the force, defeated it, and then returned to the fort and took the people that were in it prifoners. If engagements had taken place to release them, how was it poffible to act contrary thereto? Some one has reported that falfely to your lordship. Some time ago, when the troops of the Ahmedy firkar befieged Daraporam, the garrifon furrendered on capitulation, and were immediately furnish

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ed with an escort, and fent to your lordfhip's army. God forbid! it is not the practice of any state to confine those whofe release may have been ftipulated by agreement. If, with a view to the quiet of mankind, it is your lordship's pleasure to eftablish a peace between the four ftates, the confidential agents shall be sent to you from the Ahmedy firkar, that the negociation for peace may be entered into with your lordship, with the pefhwa, or with Nizam Ally Khan, that through your lordfhip's means the peace and quiet of mankind may be effected.'

To TIPPO0 SULTAN.

I HAVE received your letter, in which you fay that I have been misinformed; and that no capitulation was made at Coimbatoor, which furprifes me very much.

"The manner in which lieut. Chalmers has been treated has put it out of his power to communicate to me the particulars of the tranfactions at Coimbatoor; but I have, by other means, received information, which I believe to be authentic and correct, that a capitulation was made fimilar to that which took place at Daraporam; and that the articles were figned by lieut. Chalmers and Kummer ul Dien Khan, by which it was agreed, that lieut. Chalmers and his garrifon fhould march out with their private property unmolested, and be immediately escorted to Paligautcherry, to proceed thence to the coaft; but that they were not to ferve against you, or your allies, during the war; and that all the guns, ammunition and ftores, and public property, should be delivered to Kummer ul Dien Khan.

'I was further informed, that when the garrifon marched out of the fort, they were, instead of being escorted immediately, according to agreement, to Palagautcherry, detained in the pettah of Co. imbatoor; and, after much correspondence had paffed between you and Kummer ul Dien Khan, they were, at the end of thirteen days, fent prifoners to Seringa. patam by your orders.

If any particulars relating to this bufinefs have been mifreprefented to you or to me, the truth can only be rendered clear and apparent by yourself.

You may, if you think proper, not only communicate again upon the fubject with Kummer ul Dien Khan, but you may alfo hear the ftate of the cafe from lieut. Chalmers, who is in your poffeffion; and it is equally in your power to remove the impreffions that I have received, by

fending lieut. Chalmers and lieut. Nah, or one of them, to me, to declare the truth, if it be different from what I have heard; by doing of which your affairs cannot fuftain the leaft injury, as I fhall engage, that the perfons who may be fent to me for that purpose fhall not serve against you during the present war.

I have ever been ready to endeavour, in concert with the company's allies, to terminate this conteft by open and fair negotiation; but a meeting of deputies could anfwer no useful purpose, unless all parties fhall be equally well-difpofed; and it is impoffible that I can have confidence in your fincerity, while I remain in the belief that you have recently violated a capitulation, and that you refufe to give the redrefs which I have a juft right to demand.'

A letter from Tippoo, to the fame effect as the former, here follows, addressed to Hurry Punt, with that general's anfwer. After this is the following letter to lord Cornwallis, received January 23, from captain Little, commander of the Bombay detachment, that accompanies the army of Purferam Bhow, the other Mahratta general:

My lord,

"Your lordship will have been acquainted, by a letter of the 28th inft. to colonel Rofs, of the intention of an attack the next day on the enemy, posted in the thick country to the S. W. We accordingly marched on the 29th at day-break, and, making a circuit of about ten miles round Semoga, encamped near the river Toom to the S. W. of the fort. About noon we marched again, leaving, by the Bhow's defire, eight companies of fepoys for the camp guards, with two guns; and, about three miles in advance, joined Appa Saheb, the Bhow's eldest fon, with a very large body of cavalry, within about a mile of the enemy, whom we found very ftrongly fituated. In front a deep ravine, full of high bamboos, planted extremely thick, flanked on the right by the river Toom, and on the left by a very thick jungle, which extended to the hills. In this ravine the enemy were pofted, fniping, and beyond the ravine was a plain, in which was a large body, both horfe and foot. The ftrength of the enemy could not be judged of, for the ground was fo clofe, that very few could be seen. I ordered two companies to endeavour to make an impreffion to the right, and two more companies, all of the eighth battalion, on

the

the same service, to the left. The latter met with a gully near the river, which greatly obftructed and delayed them; on which I fent on that fervice lieut. Doolan, with a grenadier company and two battalion companies of the eighth; lieutenant Betriene, with the other grenadier company, was fent to the fupport of the attack on the right; both of thefe officers were very foon wounded, and obliged to retire. Lieutenant Moore was then fent, with the grenadier companies of the ninth, to the left. He also was wounded, after having advanced a confiderable way into the plain. Six companies of the 11th were likewife employed. The extreme thickness of the jungle, while it afforded the enemy the advantage of a deliberate aim at our European officers, broke our troops, and, when they penetrated through it in fmall numbers to the plain, they were two or three times driven back, the enemy being there in great force, and perfectly fresh, while a few of the Mahratta in fantry, puthing forward irregularly whenever the enemy appeared to be broke, fell back on our fepoys as foon as they began to rally, and contributed greatly to put them in confufion. A corps of about 300, compofed chiefly of Chriftians (natives) were drawn up in our rear; and, on my pointing out where thay might be of fervice, they expreffed their readiness to go wherever I might wish, but that they had not a fingle cartridge, in which state they had come into the field. It was not till after a conteft of two hours, that an effectual impreffion was made on the enemy. Three of their guns foon fell into our hands. They were encamped part on the plain within the ravine, and part in another plain, a little way beyond it. Many of the tents were standing, and a good deal of ammunition and baggage left on the ground. From the nature of the ground, the route they had taken was not exactly known, and it required fome time to collect the troops to purfue them. As foon as the route was afcertained, I purfued them with the troops which captain Riddell had collected. They attempted to carry off with them their guns and tumbrils, firing occafionally, and beating their drums, in hopes of making their people ftand, particularly at the gateway of a final village, about three miles within the jungle, but without effect, The road was ftrewed with arms, cattle, and baggage, and fome killed and wounded. Fatigue, and the allurements of plunder, diminished our numbers every

minute; but the pursuit was continued till fun-fet, previous to which we came up with and paffed feven guns, which the enemy had been obliged to abandon. I hoped to have come to a plain, where we might all have ftaid the night, and covered the guns, &c. but finding none, and learning from the prifoners that the enemy had relinquished all their guns, I rode back myself to give fuch orders as might appear neceffary in other quarters, defiring captain Riddell to follow me flowly, and collect all the troops he could. When I firft paffed the guns, the bullocks were yoked to them; and I had hoped that the Mahrattas might have carried them toward the entrance of the jungle; but be fore my return the plunderers had cut away the bullocks. I then fent orders to captain Riddell to ftay with the guns all night, informing him that I would reinforce him. I met captain Thompson of the artillery near the enemy's encamp ment, and defired him to proceed to reinforce captain Riddell, with all the men of the 9th and 11th battalions that he could collect, which he executed with that alacrity which he fhews on all occafions when the public fervice requires it. The 8th battalions remained on the enemy's ground all night, and the 9th and 11th with captain Riddell, three miles within the jungle, with directions to ftay till the guns were carried off, which was done in the course of the next forenoon. From the impedi ments on the road, they did not reach the gateway, where the guns had been left, till ten o'clock at night. The Mahratta cavalry had fcarce an opportunity of acting in the courfe of the day. The next morning they proceeded through the jungle, five cofs from its entrance, to a village called Munduggoody, in which they found a great quantity of baggage. The ground was fo favourable for the enemy, that not many of them were killed by our fire. Several, however, loft their lives in attempting to cross the river, and not more than 300 horfe are faid to have paffed the village. The infantry having been completely routed and dispersed, a commandant and bucfhy were taken, who say, that they had left their entrenched encampment near Simoga about four days, not deem ing it a tenable poft, nor having fufficient fupplies; and that they had determined to defend themfelves in their new fituation. That the force was feven cumhoons, confifting of at least 7000 infantry and 800 cavalry, under the command of the nabob Ruzza Saheb or Ally Ruzza, a relation of Tippoo's,

G 2

Tippoo's, though, indeed, the general report is, that including the artillery, they were 10,000 ftrong. That the morning of the action a few elephants, with a great deal of baggage, had been fent off to the fouth-westward. I have the gratification to acquaint your lordship, that I had every reafon to be highly fatisfied with the conduct of the detachment. A return of the killed and wounded is enclosed. The fervice has fuftained a very fevere lofs, and myself an able support and worthy friend, in captain Hugh Rofs, major of brigade. The Bhow proceeded to the fcene of action the afternoon of the 29th. On the return of the detachment to camp the evening of the 30th, I received a meffage from the Bhow, that he wished to pay me a vifit of congratulation, which I begged might be deferred till the next morning, when he came; and, after condolence on the death of captain Rofs, expreffed himself much fatisfied with the conduct of the detachment, and the fuccefs of the day; and fignified, that if there were any of the guns that I should wish to keep with the detachment, they were entirely at my fervice. He acquainted me, that four o'clock this morning, being a lucky hour, he propofed commencing his operations against Simoga.

About 300 horfes have fallen into the hands of the Mahratta, with 600 of the a tillery bullocks, the finest I ever faw. The guns prove to be as follows:

2. fix and half pounders, brafs, very long,

country.

2 three and half ditto, iron. 1 four and half ditto, brafs, country. 2 ditto, ditto, ditto, Portuguefe. 1 three and half ditto, ditto, Portuguese. I two and half ditto, iron. 1 about a four pounder, brass.

There are, befides, three very fine tumbrils, and fome more tumbrils and carts were plundered in the jungle, and left there.

Intelligence has just been received of the enemy having got to Coolydroog, about thirteen miles from Bednore, with 400 horse, thirteen elephants, and about 1500 foot.

On the 28th inftant, I was honoured with your lordship's duplicate letter of the 6th, enclofing one for the Bhow, which was immediately prefented to him, but to which I have not yet been able to procure an answer. I have the honour to be, &c,

(Signed) JOHN LITTLE. Camp on the Toom or Toonge, about 4 miles S. W. of Simoga, Dec. 31, 1791.

This is fucceeded by lord Cornwallis' letter to the prefidency of fort St. George, mentioned above.

Camp near Seringapatam, Feb. 8, 1792. SIR,

ON the 5th inftant I encamped about feven miles to the northward of Seringapatam, from whence I faw that Tippoo had, according to my information, taken a pofition on the north bank of the river, with its front and flanks covered by a bound hedge, and a number of ravines, fwamps and water-courfes, and likewife fortified by a chain of strong redoubts full of cannon, as well as by the artillery of the fort, and of the works on the island.

It would have coft us a great many men to have attacked the camp in the day, and, perhaps, the fuccefs might not have been quite certain: I determined, therefore, to make the attempt in the night, and for this purpose I marched on the 6th, as foon after fun-fet as the troops could be formed in three divifions. The right divifion, commanded by general Medows, and the centre divifion, under my immediate direction, were deftined for the attack of the enemy's camp, and the divifion on the left, confifting of four battalions, under lieut.-col. Maxwell, was ordered to attack the works that the enemy were conftructing on the heights above the Karrigat pagoda.

The officers commanding the leading directed, after driving the enemy from their corps in the right and center divifions were camp, to endeavour to pursue them through the river, and establish themselves on the col. Maxwell to attempt to pafs the river, ifland; and it was recommended to lieut.if, after having poffeffed himself of the heights, he faw that our attack on the camp was fuccefsful.

The left and centre divifions were fo fortunate as to accomplish completely the objects propofed. Lieut.-col. Maxwell gained the heights, and afterward paffed the river, and the first five corps of the centre divifion croffed over to the island, leaving me in poffeffion of the camp, which was ftanding, and of all the artillery of the enemy's right wing.

The divifion of the right, by fome of thofe accidents to which all operations in the night must be liable, approached much too near to a very strong detached work, which it was not my intention to affault that night, and which must have fallen into our hands without giving us any trouble, if we fucceeded in forcing the enemy's camp.

The

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