south of the meander line that was made by accretion and reliction since the patent to lots 1, 2 and 3. The admissions of the defendant show that if he lost the land described in the deed on foreclosure, he would also lose the land he conveyed by accretion while he owned it, and such admissions also show the meander line to be at a point described in two of the deeds. By failing to deny, the answer admits the allegations in the complaint that the lands conveyed to plaintiffs are bounded on the south by the meander line of the lake, and that such southern boundary line of lots 1, 2 and 3 to the meander line are coterminous. After a careful examination of the evidence, and the admissions in the pleadings, we find the principal facts, as heretofore stated, to be substantially correct. We also find the testimony, so far as relevant was properly admitted, and that the material findings are established by the evidence. The plaintiffs are shown to be the owners of the patented land to the meander line, as established by the government survey. This ownership carried with it the right of possession to all lands that were formed by accretion or reliction below such lands to the water's edge. The government reserves no rights to accretion lands, or lands in the waters of the lake. When the appellant conveyed the land owned by him adjoining the lake, he conveyed his right to such lands that had or would attach to it by accretion or reliction as an incident to his riparian ownership. The reason given for the rule is that the riparian owner is likely to lose soil by the encroachment of the water, he should also have the benefit of such as would be gained from the same source. So far as we are able to discover it is held by all authorities that the water's edge and not the meander line is the real boundary of the land thus located and conveyed by patent from the government along the shores of meandering lakes; and the owner of such land so bounded has a right to follow the water as it recedes, and is entitled to all the land which might be added thereto by recession or accretion. No authorities have been cited by the appellants, nor have we been able to find any which changes this rule in cases of this character. We refrain from further discussion of the question because the general principles governing such cases, with reference to riparian rights, were fully discussed and decided by this court in Poynter v. Chipman, 8 Utah, 442, and Knudsen v. Omanson, 10 Utah, 120. See, also, as sustaining the position taken, Mitchell v. Small, 140 U. S. 412; Lamprey v. State, 18 L. R. A. 670; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 381; Jeffries v. East O. L. Co., 134 U. S. 196. We find no reversible error in the record. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, with costs, but the findings and decree should be modified in accordance with this opinion. BARTCH, C. J., concurs. BASKIN, J. dissenting: It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff's title to a large portion of the accretion claimed was added to land conveyed to them in 1898 by deeds describing the same by courses and distances from a fixed point, and that said accretion had been added to the land so described long before the same was conveyed to the plaintiffs. Consequently no title to the accretion, outside of the exterior boundaries of such land, passed to the plaintiffs under their deeds. Besides none of said land in the calls of these deeds was bounded by the lake, nor was the lake mentioned therein. Therefore the plaintiffs acquired title only to the land embraced within the metes and bounds of said deeds. I cannot, therefore, concur in the decision and judgment rendered by my associates. STATE OF UTAH, RESPONDENT v. CHRISTOPHER HILBERG, APPELLANT. INFORMATION Information Offense How Charged Under Secs. 4730 and 4732 R. S. 1898. Under Secs. 4730 and 4732 R. S. 1898, the information in a crim- Criminal Procedure-Specific Offense Charged-Evidence of Other A general rule in criminal cases, subject however to exceptions, ating the testimony relating thereto; but where the offense consists of illicit intercourse between the sexes, evidence of previous acts or improper familiarity between the parties, occurring prior to the offense alleged is admissible as explaining the acts, and as having a tendency to render it more probable that the act charged was committed, though evidence of such acts would be inadmissible as independent testimony. Several Offenses Proven-Election--By Operation of Law-Evidence of Subsequent Offenses-Inadmissible. In a prosecution under the statute for unlawfully and carnally knowing a female over the age of 13 years and under the age of 18 years, where but a single offense is charged, and on the trial six different offenses are proven, four of them prior to the offense charged, and the prosecution fails to elect on which offense to stand, the law makes the election and chooses the first offense of which evidence is offered to secure a conviction, and no subsequent election could be made; nor could the prosecution prove any other act of the kind as a substantial offense upon which a conviction could be had. It could, however, prove intimacy and improper relations of the parties prior to the offense elected, but not afterwards, and if evidence of such subsequent acts is admitted it is error, for which a new trial will be granted. Impeachment-Inquiry Confined to General Reputation. In impeaching the character of a witness the inquiry must be confined to the general reputation in the locality referred to.1 Chastity-Not An Issue-In Prosecution for Intercourse With Female Under Age of Consent - General Reputation for Chastity, Truth and Veracity. Where the crime charged is sexual intercourse with a prosecutrix under the age of consent, the intercourse constituted the offense whether she consented or not, and her good or bad character for chastity, as affecting the crime charged, was not in issue, but her general reputation for truth and veracity was. 1State v. Marks, 16 Utah, 204. When Participant in Crime Not an Accomplice-Corroboration. Where a statute, fixing the age of consent, makes the male participant, in a violation of it, the only guilty party, the female, although consenting, is not liable to indictment for the offense charged; she is therefore not an accomplice and her evidence does not need corroboration, under Sec. 4862, R. S. 1898. Consent Under Sec. 4221, R. S. 1898. Sexual intercourse constitutes the offense named in Sec. 4221, R. S. 1898, even if the prosecutrix consented to the act. In prosecutions under Sec. 4221, great care should be exercised in eliciting the truth from the witness, so that innocent parties may not be punished. Evidence Of Subsequent Acts-When Admissible in Criminal Prosecutions. Per BARTCH, C. J., dissenting. Where there is a continuation of the relation of intimacy and illicit intercourse between the parties to the offense, evidence of improper familiarity and adulterous acts both before and after the charged is admissible. (Decided May 3, 1900). Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake county; HON. A. G. NORRELL, Judge. Appellant was convicted under section 4221 R. S. 1898, which provides "any person who shall carnally know any female over the age of 13 years and under the age of 18 years, shall be guilty of felony." From the judgment, and sentence of conviction, defendant appeals. Reversed. Daniel Harrington, Esq., and Alviras E. Snow Esq., for appellant. "Where a specific offense is charged, the indictment cannot be sustained by proof of the second offense, even on the same day. This results from the general principle, |