expressed terms, or by intendment, show that the legislature intended to revive causes of action which had before the passage of that act become barred. We are clearly of the opinion, first, that it was not the intention of the legislature to revive causes of action on claims which had previously become stale and against which the statute had fully run; and, second, that when appellant's right of action on the note in question became barred, under the previous statute, the respondent acquired a vested right in this state, to plead that statute as a defense and bar to the action. Among the numerous authorities which sustain the latter view, are the following: Board of Education v. Blodgett, 40 N. E. 1025; McCracken County v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344; 1 Wood on Lim., Sec. 11, p. 36, et seq.; Buswell on Lim., Sec. 14; Bishop on Contracts (ed. of 1887), Sec. 1410; Bishop on Stat. Crimes, Sec. 265; Sutherland on Stat. Const., Sec. 480. It is ordered that the judgment of the court below be affirmed, and that the appellant pay the costs. BARTCH, C. J., and MINER, J., concur. 22 311 28 428 STANDARD STEAM LAUNDRY, APPELLANT v. C. ACTION TO REDEEM FROM MORTGAGE SALE-UNDER SECTION 3267, SUBSEQUENT CONTRACT Under Sec. 3267, R. S., Action to Redeem from Mortgage Sale Although a judgment debtor, or his successor in interest, may Conditional Sale of Personalty-Valid in Utah. A conditional sale of personal property, it being stipulated in good faith that the title is not to pass until full payment of the purchase price by the vendee, is valid and binds the vendee, his creditors and vendees.1 'Lippincott v. Rich, 19 Utah, 140; Hirsch v. Steele, 10 Utah, 19; Russell v. Harkness, 4 Utah, 197; Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663. 28 429 Assignment by Vendor--Of his Claim for Lien on Personalty. A vendor of personal property may assign his claim to such property sold conditionally, and his assignee acquires the same rights therein as the vendor had, and the vendor loses all interest in the property. Subsequent Contract-Taken by Vendor in Conditional Sale-Additional Security--Not Waiver of Lien. The taking, by a vendor in a conditional sale, of a subsequent contract from the vendees and another, which contract amounts simply to additional security, is not a waiver of the rights of the vendor under the contract of sale and does not destroy those rights or the vendor's lien. (Decided July 21, 1900.) Appeal from the Third District Court Salt Lake County. Hon. Ogden Hiles, Judge. Action for accounting. Defendant filed an answer admitting, denying and setting up a counterclaim and prayed for an accounting, and that he be decreed a lien upon the property of plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a replication denying affirmative matter in the answer and pleading payment. From a decree allowing the defendant a lien and giving the plaintiff the right to redeem the property on payment of the amount of the lien plaintiff appealed. Affirmed. N. V. Jones, Esq., for appellant. The contention of appellant is: That this is a special proceeding under the statute (sections 3260 to 3267 and 3503) to redeem plaintiff's real estate from mortgage sale, and that the rights conferred and the duties imposed are limited by the statute and the only conditions or burdens applicable in the case. Sharp v. Miller, 47 Cal. 82; Warren v. Fish, 7 Minn. 432; Park v. Hush, 29 Minn. 434. The following authorities hold that the introduction of new parties, new terms or alteration made in a contract, operates as a rescission of the old contract, thereby extinguishing the original contract. And it does not matter whether the new contract is performed or not: Anson on Contracts, 11, Am. Ed., pages 341 to 346, and cases cited; Parsons on Contracts, Vol. 1, page 231, Sixth Ed.; Morris v. Harvey, 75 Va. 726; Livingston v. Radcliff, 6 Barb. 201; Millard v. Thorne, 56 N. Y. 402. The following authorities hold that by taking other securities than the obligation of the vendee, for the purchase price, the vendor thereby waives his right to a lien. Jones on liens, Sec. 1086; Detrich v. Folk, 40 Ohio St. 635; Hazeltine v. Moore, 21 Hun., N. Y. 355; Richards v. McPherson, 74 Ind. 158; Mattix v. Weand, 19 Ind. 151; Jones on Liens, Sec. 1089, Vol. 11. Messrs. King, Burton & King. The doctrine is now well settled in this and nearly every state and territory where the subject has been considered, that a conditional sale of personal property by which the title is not to pass until full payment by the conditional vendee is good against him and his creditors and vendees. Russell v. Harkness, 4 Utah, 197; Same, 118 U. S. 663; Hirsch & Co. v. Steele, 10 Utah, 19; Rodgers v. Backman, 109 Cal. 552; American and English Encl. Law, Vol. 6, page 485. STATEMENT OF FACTS. The plaintiff filed a complaint for a general accounting and equitable relief asking that the defendant be compelled to account for certain rents, issues and profits of certain real and personal property employed in conducting a laundry business, and that the amount found due be credited as redemption money to be paid to redeem the real estate from foreclosure sale under a mortgage. In the answer certain things of the complaint were admitted, others denied, and a counterclaim set up, in which it was averred that the defendant by purchase and assignment, was the owner and holder of certain notes executed and delivered to the Troy Laundry Machinery Co. Limited, by O. A. and E. T. Wooley for the purchase price of the laundry machinery described in the complaint; that the notes provided that the title to the machinery was not to pass until they were paid in full; that to prevent the taking of the laundry machinery the defendant was compelled to purchase them and pay the balance due on them, neither the plaintiff nor the makers having paid them; and that he also paid certain taxes and expenditures for repairs on the property. The prayer was that an accounting be had, and that the defendant be decreed a lien on the machinery for the amount paid by him on the notes and on the real estate for the taxas and expenditures paid by him, and that in case the court decreed a redemption of the real estate, the plaintiff be ordered to pay the several sums covered by such lien, in addition to the amount paid by the defendant for the real property under the foreclosure sale. 66 The plaintiff in its replication denied these averments of the answer, alleged that the notes were paid under a certain agreement of defendant, and concluded, as follows: Wherefore, plaintiff prays, that it be decreed to be the owner of the property specified in paragraph nine of plaintiff's complaint, free from all incumbrances and liens held by defendant, of whatever nature, that the plaintiff have and recover from the defendant, the rents, issues and profits received for the reasonable use and occupation of |