the latter's authority when the instructions are unknown to the shipper; nor by a local custom of which the shipper has no knowledge. The public cannot take notice of the limitations upon the agent's power, unless they are conveyed to it in such a manner as to authorize the inference that the shippers are apprised of such limitations.3 § 173. As has been said, carrier's agents are not only authorized to receive goods upon a contract for transportation simply, but it is within the scope of their authority to make special contracts modifying the ordinary relations between the shipper and the carrier. Thus, express companies' and railroad companies' agents may contract to "collect on delivery," or to deliver in covered cars." § 174. A contract for the immediate delivery of goods made by a station agent binds the company, although the agent had no control over the locomotive power of the road. The sending forward of instructions was held to be within the general scope of the forwarder's business and it was to be presumed that his clerk had authority to make the contract. If an agreement to transport goods in a certain time is within a reasonable time, then it is within the scope of the employment of the carrier's agent to make it and binding on the carrier, but a mere statement by such agent of the ordinary time of carriage, if honestly made, is not sufficient to show a time contract.8 Nor is the mere promise of an agent, without additional consideration, to forward freight then en route by an earlier train. than was usual, binding upon the carrier." § 175. An agreement made by the ticket and passenger agent of a railroad to watch for the arrival of goods at one point and carry them to another, is not within the sphere of the agent's 1 Walker v. Skipwith, Meigs (Tenn.), 502. 2 Hutchins v. Ladd, 16 Mich. 493. Pruitt v. H. & St. Jo. R. R. Co., 62 Mo. 527. 4 Am. Exp. Co. v. Lesem, 39 Ill. 312; Nimter v. Pacific R. R. Co., 41 Mo. 503. 5 G. T. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 5 Duval (Canada), 204. 6 Deming v. G. T. R. R. Co., 48 N. H. 455. Hutchings v. Ladd, 16 Mich. 493. 8 Strohn v. D. & M. R. R. Co., 23 Wis. 126. 9 Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wallace (U. S. S. C.), 176. employment, inasmuch as a common carrier by rail is not bound by law to watch for the arrival of goods at the depots or wharves of other carriers and transport them to its own depots.1 A mere station agent has no authority to contract for the carriage of goods beyond the line of the carrier,2 nor from a station not on the regular route. The governing officers alone have power to make such a contract. An agent may not contract to receive payment for transportation on a credit to be given by the shipper on a demand against third persons. In such a case, where the agent makes a contract upon terms which he knows he has no authority to agree to, he makes himself personally responsible." Taylor v. Chicago, N. W. Ry. Co., 74 Ill. 86. 2 Burroughs v. N. & W. R. R. Co., 100 Mass. 26. 9 Irwin v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 59 N. Y. (S. C.) 473. Wart v. A. & S. R. R. Co., 5 Lansing (N. Y.), 475. 5 Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend. (N.Y.) 315. 118 CHAPTER XII. BILL OF LADING EXECUTED BY THE MASTER OF A VESSEL. Authority of the master to sign bills of | Master has no authority to sign bills lading, § 176. for goods not received, § 180. Contract must be within the scope of Effect of custom on this rule, § 181. the master's authority, § 177. Authority of ship broker to sign bills, Secret instructions to the master do not § 182. bind the shipper, § 178. Master cannot sign bills for lower rate of freight than the ship-owner contracted for, § 179. Personal liability of the master under the bill of lading, § 183. § 176. It is presumed from the nature of his employment that the master of a vessel which is employed as a common carrier is authorized to make contracts for the carriage of freight.' The terms of a bill of lading, therefore, signed by the master, constitute the engagement or contract of the owner," wholly irrespective of the question whether the master is the agent of the general or of the special owner. It is not necessary that the bill should be signed in the name of the owners for, while it is the general rule that to make the principal personally liable on a written contract made by his agent it should be executed in his own name and appear to be his own contract, a bill of lading signed by the master in his own name in the usual course of the employment of the ship will bind the owner. When he signs as master of the vessel he is regarded as signing as the agent of the owners. It is not necessary that he should write himself down as "master" if in fact he fills that position, or if he is described in the body of the contract as the master. 1 Bell v. Wood, 1 Dana (Ky.), 146; Moseley v. Lord, 2 Conn. 389. Ferguson v. Cappeau, 6 Harris & Johnson (Md.), 394. 3 Schr. Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 Howard, 182. 4 McTyer v. Steele, 26 Ala. 487. 337. 6 Fox v. Holt, 36 Conn. 558. § 177. The contract must, however, be executed in the usual course of business and it must be within the scope of the master's authority. The mere fact that a man is master of a vessel does not give him authority to take freight and sign bills of lading. Every vessel is not a common carrier and to bind the owners by a contract of affreightment the vessel must be engaged in the freighting business. The master, therefore, of a vessel which had been sent by the owner to carry a cargo on the latter's own account, cannot bind the owner by a bill of lading. The authority of the master can be either express or implied from custom and the usual course of business, or from subsequent assent. The shipper has the right to infer that one occupying the position of master of a vessel engaged as a common carrier has the power to contract for the carriage of goods, in the absence of information to the contrary. The receipt of compensation for carriage on previous occasions for goods similarly shipped is strong evidence of the authority of the master to act as the carrier's agent.? § 178. Any secret instructions by the owner of which the shipper has no notice, inconsistent with the authority with which the master appears to be clothed, will not affect third persons but the authority of the master is limited by the custom of the carrier where that custom is known to the shipper and the master cannot make the owner liable for the loss of money carried contrary to the custom and without the consent of the owner. Where, however, a custom exists to carry a particular article (as money) a receipt by the master binds the owners and the latter are liable for the money if lost." § 179. The master of a ship has no authority to sign bills of lading for a lower rate of freight than the owner has contracted for, nor has he power under his general authority to draw bills of lading making the freight payable to any other than the Nichols v. De Wolf, 1 R. I. 277. 2 Witbeck v. Schuyler, 44 Barbour (N. Y.), 469. 3 Schooner Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 Howard, 182; Allen v. Sewall, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 327. 4 Chouteau v. St. Anthony, 11 Mo. 226. 5 Hosea v. McCrory, 12 Ala. 349; Garey v. Meagher, 33 ib. 630. 6 Pickernell v. Janberry, 3 F. & F. (C. P. Eng.) 217. owner, as for example, to the agents of the charterers who have advanced money to the master for the ship's use.1 180. The master of a ship is estopped as against a consignee who is not a party to the contract and as against a consignee of the bill of lading (when either has taken it for a valuable consideration upon the faith of the acknowledged agreements which it contains) to deny the truth of the statements to which he has given credit by his signature, so far as these statements relate to matters which are or ought to be within his knowledge. When he is acting within the limits of his authority the owners are estopped in like manner with him, but the master of a ship has no authority to sign a bill of lading for goods not actually put on board. Such an act would be a fraud on his part. Therefore the owner of a ship is not responsible to parties taking or dealing with or making advances on the faith of an instrument which is untruthful in this particular. When a captain has signed bills of lading for a cargo that is actually on board his vessel his power is exhausted, he is functus officio and he has no right or power, by signing other bills for the same quantity of goods (no more being put on board) even though he suppose the first bills destroyed, to charge the owners.3 § 181. Where by a custom bills of lading were, signed by a master before the goods were received by the ship, it was held that the bills must be considered as conditional and only binding in the event of the goods being really delivered to the boat subsequently. Where the bill of lading is signed by the Reynolds v. Jex, 7 B. & S. 86; 34 L. J. Q. B. 251. v. 2 Grant v. Norway, 10 C. B. 665; Meyer v. Dresser, 16 C. B. N. S. 657; Zipsy v. Hill, Foster & Finlason, 573; Hubbersty v. Ward, 8 Exch. 330; 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 551; Coleman Riches, 16 C. B. 104; Schooner Freeman, 18 How. 187; Friedlander v. Texas, etc., R. R. Co., 130 U. S. 424; Bark Edwin, 1 Sprague, 477; The Loon, 7 Blatchford (C. C.), 244; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Wilkins, 44 Md. 11; Sears v. Wingate, 3 Allen (85 Mass.), 103; Fellows v. Hubbersty v. Ward, 8 Exch. 330; L. J. Exch. 113; Tindal v. Taylor, 4 El. & Bl. 219. 22 Fearn v. Richardson, 12 La. Ann. Rep. 752. |