of God," "the public enemy," "perils of the sea," and "dangers of navigation," nor will the fact that the taking was against the will and without the default of the carrier serve to exonerate him if protected only by the foregoing exceptions. In Howland v. Greenway' the master appears to have consulted the Brazilian consul at New York, before setting sail for Rio de Janeiro, as to the Brazilian customs laws, and acting upon the information thus given him to have neglected to enter upon his manifest certain goods, which were accordingly seized and confiscated. The bill of lading contained the clause “perils of the sea," and the fact that the master acted in good faith and without design to defraud was not questioned. The carrier was nevertheless held liable. § 306. Embargo, blockade and neutrality edicts and laws may come within the exception under consideration. The restraint contemplated by the phrase, however, must be actual and operative and not merely expected or contingent. Said Lord ELLENBOROUGH, in Atkinson v. Ritchie :5 "Such a state of circumstances must be shown as that the contract is no longer capable of being performed without a criminal compromise of public duty." So where an English vessel left St. Petersburg upon a general rumor of a hostile embargo being laid on British ships by the Russian government, it was held that this did not. justify a breach of contract by the master, though he acted in good faith and under a reasonable and well-grounded apprehension. The mere information by a belligerent to a neutral vessel of a blockade is said in a Massachusetts case not to be a restraint, and in Evans v. Hutton, where the action was as 8 proper delay or deviation is under 6 Atkinson v. Ritchie, ib. 7 Richardson v. Maine, etc., Ins. Co., 6 Mass. 102. 8 4 M. & G. 954. sumpsit upon the undertaking to carry goods in defendant's ship to Canton, and the plea set up that one Elliot being superintendent of the trade of Her Majesty's subjects to and from China, and one Smith then being captain of Her Majesty's ship The Volage, did, for divers good, sufficient and lawful reasons and not for any wrongful, negligent, unlawful or improper act or behavior on the part of the defendants, forcibly interrupt the said ship from further proceeding on its said voyage to Canton and did prohibit, prevent and discharge the said ship from proceeding to Canton, etc. It was held on special demurrer that this plea was bad for not sufficiently disclosing that Captains Elliot and Smith, as chief superintendent and commander of the naval forces in the China Seas respectively, had authority to act in the manner alleged. § 307. In Geipel v. Smith' it was shown that by charter-party it was agreed that defendant's vessel should load with coals and should then proceed to Hamburg and there deliver the same, restraint of princes and of rulers being, inter alia, excepted. The pleas set up that, before there had been any breach of the charter-party, a war had broken out between France and Germany and that the port of Hamburg was blockaded by a French fleet; that the Queen of England had enjoined a strict neutrality on the part of her subjects; that the performance of the charter-party became thus illegal, and that the defendants, as they lawfully might, refused to carry out the same. The court held that the pleas disclosed substantially a good defence, for that the charter-party, being for one single adventure to commence at once and the contract being still executory, the defendants were justified in throwing up the contract and refusing to load the ship when the further performance of the contract within a reasonable time was prevented by an excepted clause, to wit, the blockade which was a "restraint of princes." 308. A series of early cases decides that the exception restraint of princes or rulers in a charter-party does not operate for the benefit of any one but the owners of the ship, uuless it be expressly stipulated that the benefit of the exception shall be mutual, and if a merchant hire a ship to go to a foreign 1 L. R. 7 Q. B. 404. port and covenant there to furnish a cargo, an embargo or prohibition on the part of the foreign government forbidding the export of the intended cargo does not dissolve the contract so far as the shipper's liability under it is concerned.1 § 309. In the case of The Bohemia2 there was in the bill of lading an exception for damage or decay caused by delay from "restraint of princes, rulers, or people." The steamer was delayed at quarantine for fourteen days and the potatoes which she had on board were spoiled by the delay. The court held that the ship was not liable for the damage. § 310. The meaning of the phrase "restraint of people" differs in no material way from that of "restraint of princes." The word "people" in this sense means the supreme power of the country, whatever it may be. Hence where a mob or a multitude of people seize a vessel and compel the master to sell the cargo, this, though an act of piracy, does not come within the exception under consideration.3 1 Sjoerds v. Luscombe, 16 East, 201; Blight v. Page, note to 3 B. & P. 295; Touteng v. Hubbard, 3 B. & P. 293; Bruce v. Nicolopulo, 24 L. J. Ex. 321. Mr. Leggett gives the converse of this proposition in these words: "If the government of the country to which a ship and cargo belong should prohibit the exportation or importation of the particular commodities that 234 compose the cargo, or by the terms of the contract are destined to compose it, performance being thus rendered illegal by an authority to which both parties owe allegiance, damages for non-performance cannot be claimed by either." Leggett on Bills of Lading, p. 171. 2 38 Fed. Rep. 756. 783. Nesbitt v. Lushington, 4 T. R. CHAPTER XXII. EXCEPTIONS CONTINUED 66 RIOTS, STRIKES, AND STOP PAGES OF LABOR”—"RISK OF BOATS"—"AT SHIP'S RISK"-"ROBBERS AND THIEVES"-"RUST"-" SWEAT." "Riots, strikes and stoppages of la- | Decisions of Federal Courts in regard bor," generally, § 311. Exception not always necessary to be to strikes, § 316. "Robbers and thieves," §§ 319, 320. "Sweat," § 322. § 311. THE exception "riots, strikes and stoppages of labor" is of such recent addition to the forms of bills of lading in common use that as yet it lacks authoritative construction. It has been added for the evident purpose of avoiding responsibility on the carrier's part for damage or delay to goods in transit during periods of public disturbance and particularly during labor riots, such as have in recent years been of frequent occurrence. That the common law exception, "the king's enemies," did not include the damage done by rioters is clear.1 § 312. It does not necessarily follow from this, however, that a carrier is to be held liable for damages of this sort, unless the exception occurs in his bill of lading. The law appears to be quite otherwise. The first American case of a strike being pleaded in a suit on the carrier's contract is Blackstock v. New York and Erie R. R. Co., decided in 1859. The action was brought for a delay in the carriage of a large quantity of potatoes from Hornellsville to New York and it was shown that of one hundred and sixty-eight engineers in the employ of the railroad company, one hundred and forty had suddenly and together abandoned their engines, for the purpose of compelling 1 Section on "the public enemy." 2 20 N. Y. 48. the company to rescind a regulation which the court considered proper and reasonable. It did not appear that the higher officers of the company were at all in fault. It was nevertheless held that the corporation was liable. Mr. Justice DENIO, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "I cannot see anything in the circumstances of the defendants to take the case out of the rule" (respondeat superior). "Being a corporation, all their business must necessarily be conducted by agents and if they are not liable for their acts and omissions, parties dealing with them have no remedy at all. A railroad company is no doubt peculiarly exposed to loss from the misconduct of its engineers and,in the present case it does not appear that the slightest blame can attach to any of the superior officers of the company. . . . Still, this, we have seen, cannot avail them as a defence." § 313. It follows, therefore, that the carrier is liable for the delay occasioned by a strike of its employés, as well as for their other wrongful acts and negligence. This doctrine is announced in a more recent case in Missouri, where it was held that the mere proof of the existence of a strike does not relieve the carrier from his liability for delay. The language of the court is explicit: "We think the court (below) declared the law correctly in requiring that in order to amount to an excuse for the delay, the obstructions to the running of trains should have been the work of persons other than the employés or servants of the road. A company will be held responsible for damages resulting from a delay to transport freight in the usual time, when it is caused by its servants suddenly and wilfully refusing to work. Because the employés refuse to work or perform their usual employment, it will not release the company or the carrier from the responsibility of his contract. It. may be his misfortune, but third persons are not to suffer |