through its fault. In Dixon v. R. & D. R. R. Co.,' a piano was shipped in good order from Boston to Greensboro, N. C., over several connecting lines. When it was delivered by the last carrier in the line, at Greensboro, it was badly damaged. The court held that the burden of proving that the piano was injured on some other of the connecting lines than their own, was on the defendants and that having failed to do this they were liable for the damage. In Richardson v. "The Charles P. Chouteau," cotton was shipped on through bills of lading by certain steamboats. When it arrived at its final destination it was in a damaged condition. It appeared that the last steamboat received it in about the same condition in which it was delivered. The court held that the libel should be against the last boat,-the owner of the cotton not being required to ascertain to which of the several boats the damage was attributable. The receipt of goods given at the place of shipment by the first carrier is evidence against the last carrier, as to the goods shipped, their condition and the terms of the contract.3 In Georgia it is provided by statute that the last carrier shall be liable to the consignee for any damage occurring during the whole transit, provided that the goods were originally delivered in good condition." $348. Where goods are delivered to a carrier to be transferred over a number of connecting lines, a bill of lading given by the first carrier stipulating for exemption from liability in general terms inures to the benefit of the several carriers over whose lines the goods are carried. It is, however, only where the contract is for through transportation that each connecting carrier will be entitled to the benefits and exemptions of the contract between the shipper and the first carrier. Otherwise an intermediate carrier's liability is that of an insurer unrestricted by any special contract with the shipper and such liability continues until he delivers to the next connecting carrier." 1 74 N. C. 588. 237 Fed. Rep. 532. 3 Southern Exp. Co. v. Hess, 53 Ala. 19. 4 Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Atwater, 18 Lower Canada Jurist, 53. 5 M. D. T. Co. v. Bolles, 80 Ill. 473; Manhattan Oil Co. v. C. & A. R. In Whitworth v. Erie R. R. Co., cotton was shipped at Memphis for Jersey City, under contracts with certain transportation companies, exempting them "and their connections" from liability from loss by fire. The cotton was destroyed while in the custody of a connecting carrier. It was held that being one of the "connections," the said carrier was entitled to the benefit of the contract exemptions and not liable unless the fire resulted from negligence. In Wilson v. Harry, goods were shipped by steamboat with the right of transshipment. There was a provision in the bill of lading that the owner of the second boat should not be liable for injuries done on board the first one. It was held that the owners of the second boat were not liable in an action of tort for injuries received on board the first, by reason of the first having coerced the payment of the entire freight before delivery of the goods. § 349. In the leading English case of Bristol and Exeter Ry. Co. v. Collins, goods were delivered to the Great Western Railway Company, to be sent to Torquay. The bill of lading stated that the Great Western Railway Company "will not be answerable for the loss of, or damage to, any goods arising from fire." At Bristol the goods were delivered to the Bristol and Exeter Railway to be carried to Torquay. They were placed in the night on a siding in an open shed of the defendant, where they were destroyed by fire. The House of Lords decided that the Bristol and Exeter Railway was not liable for the loss. The Lord Chancellor (Lord CHELMSFORD) said: "I think, therefore, that the contract was entire; was for the whole journey from Bath to Torquay, and was made with the Great Western Railway Company alone; that the goods were carried R. Co., 5 Abb. Pr. N. P. (N. Y.) 289; Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 413; Maghee v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 514; Lamb v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 46 ib. 271; Whitworth v. Erie R. R. Co., 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 349; Whitehead v. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co., 9 ib. 168; Taylor v. Little Rock, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Ark. 148; Gordon v. Great Western on the defendants' railway under the contract, and that the defendants are consequently either not liable at all, as no agreement was entered into with.them, or that, if the contract in any way attaches to them, the exception as to loss by fire accompanies it and exonerates them from liability." A connecting carrier who is aiding a first carrier in the performance of his contract, for a compensation to be paid by the latter, to whom the former is but a subordinate, is shielded by a condition against liability for loss by fire in the bill of lading, and this is so although the first carrier did not in regard to fire, as he did in some other respects, make express provisions in the contract for the exemption of connecting lines.' § 350. An intermediate carrier is not, however, entitled to the benefits of the restrictive contract entered into by the first carrier solely on his own behalf. He is bound to deliver to the carrier next on the route and is not relieved of responsibility by storing the goods at his own terminus in a warehouse. A bill of lading may be a contract by the first carrier to transport goods over his own route and deliver them at the end thereof to a second carrier to be forwarded to their destination and the freight fixed by him for the whole discharged. This will not make it a through contract so as to entitle the succeeding carriers to the benefit of exceptions from liability contained in the contract.3 In C. and A. R. R. Co. v. Forsyth, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company gave a receipt for oil to be delivered to "Leech at the company's freight station, Philadelphia." Appended to the receipt was, "Rate to Red Hook, 65 cents. . . . . This oil is carried only on open cars and entirely at the owner's risk from fire and leakage while in possession of the railroad company or carriers while standing or in transit." The freight was 1 Manhattan Oil Co. v. C. & A. R. R. & T. Co., 54 N. Y. 197; S. C. 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 72. 2 Bancroft v. M. D. T. Co., 47 Iowa, 262; Witbeck v. Holland, 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 443; Martin v. Amer. Ex. Co., 19 Wis. 336; Babcock v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 491; Merchants' Despatch Trans. 3 Etna Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 49 N. Y. 616; Gordon v. Great Western Ry. Co., 25 Upper Canada (C. P.), 488. 61 Pa. St. 81. to be paid at Red Hook. At Philadelphia the Camden and Amboy R. R. Co. received the goods and gave a receipt to "Leech, Agent of Pennsylvania Railroad Company," for the oil to be transported to New York. The oil was destroyed by fire between Philadelphia and Red Hook. The court held that the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company was liable for the loss, as there was no contract with the defendants other than the receipt of their shipping agent for the oil, which contained no limitation of the carrier's liability at common law. 265 CHAPTER XXV.` THE CLAUSE "PRIVILEGE OF RESHIPPING." Effect of the clause "privilege of reshipping," § 351. The privilege must be exercised in the customary way, § 353. "Privilege of reshipping in case of Effect of the clause on the second carlow water," § 352. rier's lien for freight charges, § 354. § 351. THE privilege of transshipment reserved to a common carrier in his bill of lading does not discharge him from any liability which is incident to his contract until the goods be delivered at the destined port. Such stipulation is for his benefit. It continues his liability, but throws upon the owner any increase of expense. Where a bill of lading said, "with privilege of reshipping on any good boat," it was held that the master did not lessen his liability by reshipping the goods, but was responsible for their delivery, unless the loss was by the unavoidable accidents of the river. It was necessary for him to prove that the second boat was a good one. If a common carrier attempts to perform his contract in a manner different from his undertaking, he becomes an insurer for the absolute delivery of the goods and cannot avail himself of any exceptions made in his behalf in the contract. In Hirsch v. Leathers, Mr. Justice TALIAFERRO, said: "The privilege of transshipment stipulated by the carriers, by no means exonerates them from the obligation to deliver the goods at the point named in the contract of affreightment. They were bound in reshipping to employ a seaworthy vessel and, as to their liability, the second vessel is considered as much theirs as the first.” § 352. Where the bill of lading for goods carried on a steam 1 Whitesides v. Russell, 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 44; Little v. Semple, 8 Mo. 99; Cox v. Foscue, 37 Ala. 505; Propeller Mohawk, 8 Wallace, 153; Tio v. Vance, 11 La. 199; Cassilay |