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§ 411. Delivery to the consignee and acceptance by him of goods at any other place than the one specified, will discharge a carrier from his contract to deliver at that place,' but where a disaster happens to a cargo in consequence of a peril or accident not within the exceptions of the bill of lading, a mere acceptance of the goods by the owner at an intermediate port or at the place of disaster, will not preclude him from his remedy. It must appear that the acceptance was intended as a discharge of the vessel and her owners from any further responsibility." Where a voyage is stopped by an embargo, an authorized receipt of the cargo at the point of departure by an agent of the owners and the sale of it will, of themselves, defeat an action on the bill of lading against the carrier.3

§ 412. Where a bill of lading is silent as to the time for unloading, a reasonable time is allowed. The consignee is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to examine his goods to see if the obligations of the bill of lading have been fulfilled by the carrier. Until this is given, the carrier is not entitled to demand his freight. For instance, where a consignment consists of cheese, the master should place it in the levee separate from the rest of the cargo, so as to give the consignees an opportunity to inspect it." Where the bill of lading gives three days to unload the cargo and provides for a certain rate of demurrage thereafter, the consignee has a right to detain the vessel a reasonable time after the three days and the right can be terminated only by notice given by the carrier, that if the goods should not be received within the reasonable time therein specified, they would be stored elsewhere. Property is to be considered as "awaiting delivery" as soon as it is in

1 Penna. Co. v. Holderman, 69 Ind. 18; Wright v. Cluxton, 31 U. C. Q. B 246; Arbuckle v. Thempen, 1 Wright (Pa.), 170; Bulkley v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 24 Howard, 386.

2 Home Ins. Co. v. W. T. Co., 51 N. Y. 93.

Brown v. Delano, 12 Mass. 370. Henley v. The Brooklyn Ice Company, 14 Blatchf. 522; Nudd v. Wells,

11 Wisc. 407; Brittan v. Barnaby, 21
Howard, 527; L. L. G. R. R. Co.
v. Maris, 16 Kans. 333; Kemp v.
McDougall, 23 U. C. Q. B. 380;
Howard v. Shepherd, 9 C. B. 296;
Dibble v. Morgan, 1 Woods, 407.
5 Lanata v. Ship Henry Grinnell,
13 La. Ann. Rep. 24.

6 Western Trans. Co. v. Barber, 56
N. Y. 544.

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condition to be delivered to the consignee when demanded and not merely from the time when the right to charge for storage accrues.1

§ 413. A consignee by accepting a cargo with knowledge of the terms on which it was transported, makes himself by adoption a party to the contract between the shipowner and the consignor2 but the consignee and his assigns, not being parties to the contract in the bill of lading, are not bound to accept the cargo at any particular time and incur no responsibility by a refusal or delay in accepting it.3

§ 414. The stipulation as to the "loss" of goods does not apply to their delivery to a wrong person. Where a carrier makes an erroneous entry on a bill of lading whereby the goods are delivered to the wrong person, he is liable for the loss. In Libby v. Ingalls, the carriers, who had been instructed to deliver to the order of the shippers, delivered the goods to the consignees without their producing any bill of lading, receipt or order of the shippers. The court held that until the carriers could deliver to the shippers or some one showing authority from them, it was their duty to retain and take care of the goods and if they delivered to one not entitled to them, they became liable to the owners for their value. In Southern Express Co. v. Dickson, an express company well knowing that

1 M. C. R. R. Co. v. Hale, 6 Mich. 243; Putnam v. Furnam, 71 N. Y. 590.

2 Morse v. Pesant, 2 Keyes (N. Y.), 16; Putnam v. Furnam, 71 N. Y. 590; Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 ib. 519. 9 Gage v. Morse, 94 Mass. 410.

B. & O. R. R. Co. v. McWhinney, 36 Ind. 436; Brunswick v. U. S. Express Co., 46 Iowa, 677; Collins v. Burns, 4 J. & Sp. 518; Bush v. St. L. K. C. & N. Ry. Co., 3 Mo. App. 62; Hieskell v. Farmers & Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 8 Norris, 155; Boatman's Saving Bank v. West & C. R. R. Co., 81 Ga. 221.

Forsythe v. Walker, 9 Barr, 148. 6 124 Mass. 503. See also Bank v.

Bissell, 72 N. Y. 615; Weyand v.
Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 75 Iowa,
573; The Stettin, L. R. 14 P. D. 142;
Neekey v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co.,
35 Mo. App. 79; Nebenzahl v. Fargo,
22 N. Y. St. Repr. 231; Gibbons v.
Farwell, 63 Mich. 344; No. Pa. R.
R. Co. v. Bank, 123 U. S. 727; Wells
v. Oregon, etc., Ry. Co., 32 Fed. Rep.
51; Furman v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.,
106 N. Y. 579; Wernwag v. P. W. &
B. R. R. Co., 117 Pa. St. 46; Chester
Bank v. A. & C. Ry. Co., 25 S. C.
216; Merchant's Desp. v. Merriam,
111 Ind. 5; Wilson v. Adams Exp.
Co., 27 Mo. App. 360.
7 4 Otto, 549.

certain goods received for transportation to a place mentioned in the bill of lading were the property of the shipper, delivered them to a third person on the consignee's order at the place of shipment. The carrier was held liable to the shipper for the value of the goods.

Where goods are sent to two consignees jointly, delivery to either is delivery to both' and if goods are directed to A. care of B., delivery to B. is sufficient."

Where a bill of lading is issued for delivery to the shipper's order, the carrier is bound to deliver to no one who has not the order. If the indorsee is unknown, diligent search must be made for him. A bill of lading is not evidence of delivery to the consignee. That ought to be shown by legal evidence independently of the bill of lading.

415. The consignor's marks on goods are no excuse for an unauthorized entry on the bill of lading made by the carrier, whereby a wrong delivery is made or loss occasioned, and marks on goods copied into the bill of lading cannot be used to contradict the language used in the body of the bill. Thus in Wheeler v. St. L. and Southeastern Ry. Co., the defendant contracted to carry the goods of the plaintiff " to Nashville, Tenn., there to be delivered to J. E. Butler or order, etc." Under the head of marks following the above in one of the bills of lading were the words "J. E. Butler, Atlanta, Ga." In two others the words "Atlanta, Ga." immediately followed the name of consignee where it first occurred. The court held that the defendant was bound to carry only to Nashville. The "marks" on packages might serve for an address, but the copies of them in the bills of lading could serve no purpose but to identify the parcels. They could not contradict the language used in the body of the contract, which was plainly that the goods should be delivered at the company's freight station at Nashville.

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CHAPTER XXX.

A BILL OF LADING IS A MUNIMENT OF TITLE-A SYMBOL OF THE GOODS-A MEANS OF TRANSFERRING TITLE.

Bill of lading is a muniment of title, | Right of a vendee to demand a bill of § 416. lading, § 422. Bill is a symbol or representative of Vendee is not entitled to all existing the goods, § 417.

Bill is evidence of an insurable interest in the cargo in prize courts in England, § 418.

And in American prize courts, § 419. Delivery of the bill is a sufficient delivery of the goods within the statute of frauds, § 420.

Bill of lading is a means of transferring title, § 421.

copies of the bill of lading, § 423. Duration of the bill of lading's availability as a symbol, §§ 424, 425. Duration where there is a continuous carriage on several connecting lines, § 426.

Holder of the bill of lading is not bound to give notice of his title, § 427.

§ 416. IT has been seen that the bill of lading operates as a receipt for the goods therein specified and as a contract for their carriage. There remains for consideration a third office of the instrument, which gives rise to a third set of questions of the highest importance and of no little difficulty. In this division of the work will be examined the bill of lading as evidence of ownership of the goods and as a means of transferring the title to them.

§ 417. Stated in its broadest terms, the principle governing the bill of lading as a muniment of title is, that the bill represents the goods themselves symbolically and the effects of its possession or transfer are to be controlled by considerations peculiar to symbols alone and not, on the one hand, solely by the principles regulating the possession and transfer of actual goods and chattels, nor, on the other hand, solely by those regulating the possession and transfer of instruments representing pure value measured by a monetary standard. The purposes for which a symbol of property may be made in any way available are obviously two. If it possess any validity

in law whatever, it will enable the holder to obtain actual possession or delivery of the goods represented, or equivalent damages, or it will enable him to confer the right to obtain that possession or delivery upon another, by transferring to the latter the symbol which entitles him to it. These offices belong to the bill of lading. While the goods themselves are out of the possession of the owner, in transit, either by land or by water, to their destination, the bill represents them and by its means the owner is enabled to do with them symbolically whatever he might do actually, were they under his immediate control. Representing the goods, the bill is prima facie evidence of the consignee's title. Possession of the bill raises the same presumption for this purpose as possession of the goods themselves.

§ 418. The consignee's production of a bill of lading constitutes ordinarily prima facie evidence of an insurable interest in the goods. In England, however, the contrary rule seems to be established by the case of The John Bellamy," in which the parties were the insurers of a cargo which had been lost in a collision and the owners of the vessel which had been found at fault and condemned in damages, the insurers having paid for a total loss upon the cargo previously to the institution of the suit. The plaintiffs produced the policies of insurance, which had been given up to them, the invoice, a copy of the manifest and the bills of lading. The plaintiffs' right to recover was held not to be sufficiently established by the evidence, since it had not been proved that the shippers were, or represented, the owners of the cargo, who were the real parties to be indemnified by the party condemned,-the latter having a right to be secured against liability to a future demand by the possible possessors of a better title than that furnished by the shippers to the underwriters. "With respect to the fact of insuring," said the Court, "the insured may have insured as agent or have had an insurable interest of his own in the goods distinguishable from property in them. The shipper is the agent of the owner to put the goods on board, but I am not satisfied that the insur

1 Talcott v. Delaware Ins. Co., 2 Wash. C. C. 449; Blagg v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 3 Id. 5.

2 L. R. 3 Adm. 129.

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