Thus, railroad companies are common carriers and are subject to all the liabilities of such carriers. Railways which take a car for transportation over their road and assume the sole possession and care of it, although it remain on their own tracks, are responsible as common carriers. A railroad company agreeing with a party to furnish motive power to draw his cars loaded with his coal over its road, he to furnish brakemen to be under the control of the company's conductor, and also to load and unload the cars assumed as to such cars, the liabilities of a common carrier.3 The charter of the Michigan Central R. R. Co., being in the nature of a contract with the State that the company shall become and remain a common carrier as at common law, its liability as such becomes irrevocably fixed and cannot be modified by any contract. § 8. A private arrangement between a railroad company and an express company for the transportation of light freight will not relieve the former from liability as a common carrier for packages received on the cars from persons having no notice of the arrangement. It is immaterial whether the article was given at the cars to the agent of the express company, or to a baggage master or other agent of the railroad company." Express companies, being engaged in transporting not only small packages and articles of value but also of merchandise and the great staples and products of the country, are common carriers and subject to their liabilities.“ 1 Southwestern Ry. v. Webb, 48 Ala. 585; M. & G. R. R. Co. v. Prewitt, 46 Ala. 63; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88; Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217; Constitution State of Penna., Art. XVII., sect. 1; Selma & Meridian R. R. v. Butts, 43 Ala, 385. 5 Langworthy v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 195. 6 Southern Ex. Co. v. Crook, 44 Ala. 468; Southern Ex. Co. v. Hess, 53 Ala. 19; Southern Ex. Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635; Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166; American Ex. Co. v. Haggard, 37 Ill. 465; Lands 2 New Jersey R. R. Co. v. Penna. berg v. Dinsmore, 4 Daly (N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 3 Dutcher, 100. P.), 490; Gulliver v. Adams Ex. Co., Mallory v. Tioga R. R. Co., 39 38 Ill. 503; Southern Ex. Co. v. Barb. 488. M. C. R. R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Mich. Thornton, 41 Miss. 216. 538. 17 An express company whose business is-and is represented by them to the public to be—to receive, convey and deliver coin, bullion, commercial paper, bank bills and goods for such as choose to employ them for a compensation, are common carriers.1 That they are not the owners of the conveyance they employ in the conduct of their business, does not affect the legal character of the business. An express company making a contract for the transportation of goods from New York to Louisville, though the receipt say "to be forwarded," is a common carrier and not a mere forwarder, though it employs the conveyance of third parties only in the performance of its contract.3 A messenger employed by an express company is not, as between him and the company, a common carrier. The express company is the common carrier. The messenger is only liable to it under his contract with it as agent.* § 9. Transportation companies, receiving goods for transportation, are common carriers and as such are liable as insurers." Draymen, cartmen and porters, who undertake to carry goods for hire as a common employment from one part of a town to another, come within the definition of a common carrier. So does the driver of a slide with an ox-team. The mode of transporting is immaterial. The owner of a wagon train, who sends his train to convey goods for any who may employ him and undertakes to carry the goods of a certain party without any special agreement, assumes the liability of a common carrier. Where a planter, employing his wagons in hauling his cotton crop to market and habitually lading them on their return with goods to be transported for hire, receives such goods and executes his receipt therefor, undertaking to deliver them at the customary rate of 1 Sherman v. Wells, 28 Barbour C. & A. R. & Trans. Co. v. Burke, (N. Y.), 403. 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 611; Spears v. L. Russell v. Livingston, 19 Barbour, S. & M. S. R. R. Co., 67 Barbour (N. Y.), 513; Stephens & C. T. Co. v. Tuckerman, 4 Vroom (N. J.), 543. Robertson v. Kennedy, 2 Dana 346. Read v. Spaulding, 5 Bosw. 395 (Supr. Ct. N. Y.). Southern Ex. Co. v. Frink, 67 (Ky.), 430. Ga. 201. 7 Seligman v. Armijo, 1 New Mex 5 M. D. T. Co. v. Kahn, 76 Ill. 520; ico, 459. charges, he will be responsible as a common carrier. Steamship companies are common carriers, as are also companies using steamboats and railroads to transport passengers and baggage. The owners of steamboats engaged in the carrying trade on navigable rivers, are common carriers bound by the common law rule. Ship owners, in a contract by a bill of lading for the transportation of merchandise, take upon themselves the responsibilities of common carriers. Canal companies are common carriers." § 10. One not in business as a common carrier, but owning a canal boat for his own use, applied to a common carrier, who knew these facts, and was employed by the latter to carry a load of freight. The former was held not to be liable as a common carrier, although his employer had contracted as a common carrier and he knew it. His liability was determined by the business in which he was engaged and the character of his own, not his employer's, employment." Ferrymen are common carriers and liable as such.8 Proprietors of stage wagons, coaches and omnibuses are common carriers. One who, for hire, carries passengers and baggage alone for all who choose to employ him, to and from depots, hotels, etc., is a common carrier of goods and liable for all losses but the inevitable.10 A city express company engaged in carrying parcels between the cities of New York and Brooklyn and to and from various railroad depots, is a common carrier." 1 Harrison (Miss.), 396. v. Roy, 10 George 7 Fish v. Clark, 49 N. Y. 122. 2 Fowler v. L. & G. W. Stm. Co., ders v. Young, 1 Head (Tenn.), 219; Hall. Renfro, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 51; 23 Hun (N. Y.), 196. 3 C. & A. R. & Trans. Co. v. Burke, Powell v. Mills, 8 George (Miss.), 691. 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 611. Gilmore v. Carman, 1 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 279; Gordon v. Buchanan, 5 Yerger (Tenn.), 71; Porterfield v. Humphreys, 8 Humphreys (Tenn.), 497; Allen v. Sewall, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 327; Witbeck v. Schuyler, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 469. 5 The Delaware, 14 Wall. 579; Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 (N. Y.) 594. 6 Constitution of the State of Penna., Art. XVII., sec. 1. Story on Bailments, 496 and cases cited; Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234; Philleo v. Sanford, 17 Texas, 227; but see Powell v. Mills, 1 George (Miss.), 231; Miss. C. R. R. Co. Kennedy, 41 Miss. 671. 10 Parmelee v. Lowitz, 74 Ill. 116. Richards v. Westcott, 2 Bosw. (N. Y. Supr. Ct.) 589. § 11. As they are exercising a public employment, carriers are held to a high degree of care in the conduct of their business. To diminish the heavy responsibility which the law thus imposes upon him, the carrier resorted to the expedient of making a special contract with each shipper for the transportation of his particular goods. By such contract it was agreed that the carrier should not be liable for loss arising from certain specified causes. This contract was the foundation of the bill of lading. It will thus be seen that the bill is not a contract for safe transportation,' for this was the obligation at common law, nor does the bill create the contract between the shipper and the carrier. It was adopted only as a convenient mode of reducing the contract to certainty in regard to the specific terms. The bill will, therefore, be found to contain an enumeration of causes of loss or injury to the goods for which it is specifically agreed by the parties that the carrier shall not be held accountable. The consideration for this release from liability is the reduced price for which the carrier agrees to make the transportation. 12. The premium to which the carrier is entitled for transporting the goods and in consideration of the payment of which he agrees to transport, is known as "freight," a term used as well to designate the goods themselves. Mr. Justice Wayne in the case of Brittan v. Barnaby, says: "The word freight, when not used in a sense to imply the burden or loading of the ship or the cargo which she has on board, is the hire agreed upon between the owner or master for the carriage of goods from ⚫ one part or place to another." Freight may, by the terms of the bill, be made payable by the shipper at the time of shipment, or, by the consignee on the delivery to him upon the completion of the carriage,—the possession of the goods by the carrier and his right to retain them until payment affording him security against loss. § 13. From the definition of a bill of lading, it will be seen that the instrument possesses three distinct characters. First, 1 Drew v. Red Line Trans. Co., Mo. App. Rep. 495. 3 2 Dunn v. Branner, 13 La. Ann. Rep. 453. 21 Howard, 527. "it is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of goods" or, more briefly, a Receipt. Second, it is "an agreement for a consideration to transport and deliver the same." It is, therefore, a Contract. Again, the instrument may be assigned and title to the goods may be thereby transferred. It becomes thus a "Muniment of Title." It has, in some States, been declared a negotiable instrument. The further investigation of the law relating to the paper may, therefore, conveniently be pursued, by viewing the bill, first, as a Receipt, second, as a Contract, and third, as a Muniment of Title. 1 The Delaware, 14 Wallace, 601; Cafiero v. Welsh, 8 Phila. 130. 8 L |