NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCXCI.

FEBRUARY, 1881.

THE NICARAGUA CANAL.

THE Construction of a ship-canal across the isthmus which connects North and South America has attracted the attention of governments, engineers, and capitalists, in this country and in Europe, for considerably more than half a century. The allusions to the possibility and importance of such a work made by travelers and scientists, almost from the time when America was discovered down to the day when practical investigations were commenced by the government of the United States, had left a deep impression on the public mind; and the rapid growth of the American Republic in population and wealth, the increasing commerce between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the long, tedious, and dangerous passage from shore to shore around Cape Horn, all tended to strengthen this impression, and to establish the conviction that the interest of the American people in the commerce of the world required a water communication, from sea to sea, across the Isthmus of Darien. It is now more than fifty years since this project first received serious consideration on this continent. Under the administration of Mr. Adams, in 1825, correspondence and negotiations commenced, which have continued up to the present time. Turning from one government to another for aid in carrying out the scheme, the people of Central America soon arrived at the conclusion that they must look to the United States for the completion of the work, and that to them especially, on account of location and institutions, belonged VOL. CXXXII.-NO. 291.

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the right to unite with that state through whose territory the canal might run, in its construction and control. In 1830, in 1831, in 1835, in 1837, in 1839, in 1844, in 1846, in 1849, in 1858, plans were proposed to the governments of the United States, England, and France for the commencement of the work, until the breaking out of the civil war in this country presented a more important topic for consideration, and overshadowed all questions relating solely to industrial development and international commerce, and ended in results which have given new and vast interest and importance to every enterprise which can add power to the republic and advance the prosperity of its people. Stepping at once into the front rank among the powerful nations of the earth, the United States has entered, as it were spontaneously, upon a career of development almost unparalleled in the history of the world. By the growth of States along the Pacific coast, by the erection of trans-continental lines of railway, by the occupation of new lands, by the opening of new mines, by increasing mechanical and manufacturing enterprises, by the introduction of her products on an amazing scale into the commerce of the world, by her devotion to a system of finance which requires incessant industry among all classes of the people, and the cheapest possible means of intercourse and transportation, the United States has given new and deeper importance to every method by which industry can be advanced and commerce can be promoted. It is during this short period that the value of even the most expensive highways has been proved, that mountain ranges have been penetrated by costly tunnels, and distant seas have been connected by costly canals, and it has been demonstrated that the most extravagant investments in works of this description are remunerative under the vast commercial ebb and flow which characterizes the present age. Of the necessity for, and advantage of, intercommunication of every description, therefore, there seems to be no longer a doubt; and it is with this conviction that the United States government is called on to consider now once more the value and importance of an interoceanic canal on this continent.

Of the advantages of this canal to our industry and commerce it becomes us, therefore, first to speak. In this connection it should not be forgotten that the states of North and South America lying along the Pacific furnish in large abundance those commodities which are constantly supplied with

markets in almost every country of Europe. Of guano and niter the trade is immense. From the ports of Chili nearly 400,000 tons of freight are shipped eastward annually. More than 1,000,000 tons of grain are shipped each year from the Pacific States and Territories. There is no doubt that more than 4,000,000 tons of merchandise find their way from these regions to the East, and require water communication in order that they may be shipped economically and profitably; and this is merchandise to which railway transportation across the continent is wholly inapplicable. The great wheat crops of California and Oregon, for instance, find their way to Liverpool around Cape Horn at the freight-rate of fifty cents per bushel—a rate which would not carry it by rail half-way to Boston or New York or Philadelphia, to be there shipped to its European destination. In addition to the commerce of the North and South American ports referred to, there may be estimated also the advantages which would accrue to the trade of Australia and the remote East Indies bound to Great Britain, and which would undoubtedly add 1,000,000 tons to the freight seeking a passage through the canal. When we consider the time and distance saved by the canal for this vast amount of merchandise by avoiding the passage around Cape Horn, and the importance in these days of rapid transit, and of a ready approach to a destined market, we can readily understand the value of the enterprise to producer and shipper and consumer alike. Leaving out of consideration the dangers and delays of the Cape, we should not forget that by the canal now proposed the distance from New York to Hong Kong is shortened 5,870 miles; from New York to Yokohama, 6,800 miles; from New York to San Francisco, 8,600 miles; from New York to Honolulu, 6,980 miles; from Liverpool to San Francisco, 6,065 miles; and from Liverpool to Callao, 4,374 miles; and we need no longer question the value of an interoceanic canal on the Western continent, as we have long since abandoned all doubt of the value of the Suez Canal to the commerce of the nations of the East. To Europeans the benefits and advantages of the proposed canal are great;-to the Americans they are incalculable. Forming, as a canal properly organized and constructed would, a part of the coast-line of the United States, it would increase our commercial facilities beyond calculation. Interfering in no way with the interests of those lines of railway which connect the Atlantic States with the Pacific, but tending

rather to stimulate and increase the activity out of which their traffic grows, it would cheapen all staple transportation and add vastly to the ease and economy of emigration from the East to the farms and mines of the Pacific slope. That a canal will be of great benefit to the commerce of the United States, also, there can be no doubt. Meeting as we do a formidable competition in the carrying-trade to foreign ports, we find in our coastwise navigation an opportunity for a profitable use of American bottoms, protected by our own commercial laws. A continuous coast-line, including our eastern and western shores, therefore promises an increase of this navigation sufficient of itself to make a canal a matter of the utmost importance to our people.

In view of these advantages, the question naturally arises with regard to the most feasible route for the canal, both as regards economy of construction and convenience in use. On this point it would hardly seem as if there were room for controversy. The difficulties which surround the Panama scheme have been so frequently and so forcibly set forth, that they need not be elaborately repeated here. The floods of this region, caused by sudden and immense rain-fall, have attracted the attention of the most careless traveler, and have perplexed and confounded the scientific engineer in his attempts to provide some method by which to overcome the difficulties which they create. The impassable and unhealthy swamps lying along this route have always been considered unfit for a water-course, and so destructive to human life that labor and death seemed to have joined

nds there. The necessity for long and expensive tunnels or open cuts, and for a safe viaduct, has added vastly to the expense of the route when estimated, and to the obstacles to be overcome by engineering. The most careful surveys have always developed a discouraging want of material for construction. The addition of five hundred miles to the distance between New York and the ports on the west coast of the United States by the Panama route over that of any other feasible route proposed, and the long and tedious calms which prevail in Panama Bay, have never failed to create opposition to this route in the mind of the navigator. The enormous cost of the Panama Canal, moreover, has never been denied. Considering the engineering difficulties attending the diversion of the Chagres River, and the necessary construction of an artificial lake to hold its floods, together with the tunneling, or open cuts, to which allusion has already been

made, the cost of this canal cannot be less than $400,000,000, and would probably be much more—including the payment to the Panama Railroad for its concession. No American capitalist would be likely to look for dividends on an investment like this.

Turning from the Panama route, therefore, as one which, when practically considered, has but little to recommend it, either as a commercial convenience or a financial success, we are brought to the consideration of the Nicaragua route, as that to which the attention of the American public is most strongly drawn at this time. The advantages of this route are: the ease and economy with which the canal can be constructed; the admirable approaches to it from the sea, both east and west; the distance saved between Liverpool and the North American ports over that of the Panama route; and the distance saved, also, between New York and other Atlantic cities and the ports of the United States on the Pacific. The cost of the Nicaragua Canal has never been estimated above $100,000,000; indeed, Civil Engineer Menocal, whose judgment and capacity have never been questioned, gives the following as his estimate of the entire cost of the work, after long and critical examination:

Western Division-from Port Brito to the Lake. Distance, 16.33 miles; estimated cost..

Eastern Division-from Lake to Greytown.

.$21,680,777.00

Middle Division-Lake Nicaragua. Distance, 56.50 miles; estimated cost

715,658.00

Distance,

25,020,914.00

2,822,630.00

2,337,739.00

.$52,577,718.00

A subsequent estimate, based on more recent surveys made by Mr. Menocal, has reduced this amount to $41,193,839-a reduction of $11,383,879; and by abandoning the valley of the San Juan River in favor of a direct route to Greytown,-ascertained to be entirely practicable,-the distance is reduced to 173.57 miles, the total canalization being but 53.17 miles.

It is well known that the Suez Canal, and, in fact, almost all great public works, cost far more than the estimates made by engineers. But applying this rule most liberally cannot bring the outlay on the Nicaragua route above $100,000,000. The surveys of this route, made subsequent to those of the other routes