ser are Catholics, the others Moslems. Lately it was estimated on good authority (no census has been possible) that Albania now has 1,300,000 inhabitants. Of these 1,000,000 are Moslems, 240,000 Orthodox Greeks, mostly in Epirus, and 90,000 Roman Catholics; but regardless of divergencies or agreements, all scorn every edict to compel the use of Turkish and persist in the employment of their own dialects. In view, therefore, of Moslem preponderance in Albania, it was suggested in 1912 to the "Committee of Union and Progress" to commence a series of "necessary" massacres in that district where every one refused to use the "National" tongue. For against Moslems, it was said, such severity would not attract the attention and sympathy of Europeso annoying and even perilous to the Turks in their work of enforcing discipline. Then if the measures succeeded in Albania, they could be later extended to Macedonia, where "union and progress," through extermination of heretics and malcontents, was greatly needed.

The history of the impossible Kingdom of Albania need not be related here. It will, however, be recalled that this political farce lasted only a few months, the King and his court never having dared to emerge beyond the frog-ponds which bounded the tiny "capital," Durazzo.

Matters having been amicably settled at London, the Balkans themselves were next heard from. Serbia at once gave notice to Bulgaria that, being herself debarred from Durazzo, the agreement between them as to Macedonia no longer held, and that she (Serbia) would therefore take as her rightful share of the territory won the northwestern part of that district (Macedonia). Greece in turn demanded Salonica and its hinterland. Bulgarian feeling now ran high, for the people fancied all Macedonia to be racially theirs. As one of their leaders said to me, they "felt like the woman in the Bible story whose child was about to be divided." In brief, they could endure no thought of a division of Macedonia. Under the circumstances, however, Serbia can hardly be blamed for not thinking herself bound

N. J. Cassavety, Greek-American Review, April, 1918.

92

by a treaty already virtually nullified by the Great Powers. Access to the sea, as we have seen, was almost a vital necessity to her national existence. This could be attained in one of three ways only-(1) access to Durazzo through the Novi-Bazar, as agreed on in a treaty, (2) annexation of Herzegovina with the ports of Gravosa, Ragusa and Cattaro in southern Dalmatia, or (3) the annexation of Monastir with the valley of the Vardar River down to the Gulf of Salonica. Failing to secure the first, as previously promised, she insisted on the third."

Meanwhile, peace being apparently established, some of the Bulgarian regiments had begun to disband of their own accord, and to leave for home, thrusting their officers aside. They had had enough of fighting. If, therefore, a stand was to be made by Bulgaria against the pretensions of Serbia and Greece, immediate action seemed to be demanded. The almost inevitable crash came within about two weeks, even while Western Europe was congratulating itself on the happy outcome of affairs. So far as Bulgaria was concerned, she was forced to make a move of some sort at once, or else to relinquish without a struggle all the important gains of the war. Moreover, Bulgarian feeling had been much inflated because of glories in the field and the schemes of her ambi

"A better adjustment than any of the above, because it would serve to bind the nations together, would be to establish a free port on the Gulf of Salonica, with privileges of shipment across the intervening country from

rbia, and from Hungary as well. In time, a canal should be built from Belgrade through Nish and down the Vardar River to the Gulf. The importance of such a waterway, already surveyed the writer understands, has been strongly urged by Serbian economists. In a rational world, it might also be possible to make Gravosa on the Adriatic a free port to be reached from Serbia through Herzegovina. A Balkan customs union would solve these several problems at one stroke. Before the war, the common use of the Danube, under control of the joint Danube Commission, afforded a model of coöperative national action.

The average Bulgarian is a sturdy, independent person, a bit morose and set in his ways, a freeholder at home and a democrat at heart, with a touch of the American spirit which radiates from Robert College throughout the Near East and most distinctly through Bulgaria. It is a common saying that "Robert College is the very heart of Bulgaria." It speaks volumes for the work of the devoted men who have sustained and maintained this great center of education on the Bosphorus.

tious ruler. To be the Prussia of the Balkans was a very flattering prospect, and Tsar Ferdinand, self-willed and audacious, could not let the opportunity slip.

He proceeded then to do the worst thing possible under the circumstances, which was to make war without warning on both Serbia and Greece. The dispute as to who was primarily responsible has brought many facts to light. To me it seems clear that the blame should fall on Ferdinand. His cabinet knew nothing of his intentions; his General, Savoff, executed the orders. The populace, ill-informed and optimistic, applauded this and every other aggressive action. The hostile move was of course a criminal blunder. In this connection, intelligent Bulgarians have admitted to the writer that their county has committed at one time or another all the diplomatic errors she has found possible. This particular one (as well as the recent joining of fortunes with Germany) had tragic results, as will be seen.

To begin with, Ferdinand's plan to make surprise attacks on Serbia and Greece found the Serbian army already warned, and in the encounter with them the Bulgarians were badly worsted. The simultaneous descent on the Greeks in Macedonia, however, was at first successful.

Meanwhile, Rumania, under the claim that she had received no part of the Balkan spoils a share of which was due her for remaining neutral, invaded the Dobruja in northern Bulgaria. At this, the Bulgarian soldiers in Macedonia, knowing their own homes to be imperilled and careless of military discipline, hastily abandoned the field and turned to the defense of their own ravaged lands.

Moving northward up the Struma River, they were pursued by the Greeks as far as the borders of old Bulgaria, though they made two or three vigorous stands near Dzumaia on the way. While these events were taking place, Turkey, repudiating the Enos-Midia line drawn as her northwestern boundary in Europe, also entered the lists and soon recaptured Adrianople and Kirk-Kilissy. Thus attacked on every side, Bulgaria capitulated and the second Balkan war was brought to an end by the Treaty of Bucharest. "We were compelled to accept whatever terms were offered,"

said a Bulgarian official. "If they had asked us to shoot our King, we should have had to do it."

In accord with this treaty, Rumania' received the southern Dobruja, a stretch of rich meadows on the lower Danube, which includes the city of Silistria. Serbia acquired Ochrida and Monastir with most of northwestern Macedonia. Greece took a broad strip with the seaboard from Thessaly eastward to beyond Kavala. By these readjustments Bulgarian acquisitions were reduced to the Rhodope mountain region, north of the River Bistritza, and much of Thrace, including the Thracian Coast with the marshy Porto Lago and its shallow bay and the open roadstead of Dedeagatsch.

Thus was completed the humiliation of Bulgaria. In brief, the allies had determined to crush her once for all. By this means was created on her every side a new AlsaceLorraine, a "wound in flanks" of Balkan unity. But in the events leading up to this consummation, Bulgaria, as we have already seen, had been far from sinless.

III

Macedonia, a historic district of indefinite boundaries varying through the ages, shades off into Thrace on the east and Thessaly and Albania on the west. In the days of Turkish rule, as already noted, the various Balkan races had spread far and wide with no recognized group boundaries. Since classic times, therefore, Macedonia has never had a definite national status, but had supported a medley of many races attracted by its fertile valleys and long seaboard.

7 Rumania's avowed claims to this territory were two-fold. First, she had remained neutral during the war against Turkey, in which all the states concerned had received extension of territory and she was therefore entitled to compensation. On this she had insisted from the first, of which fact Bulgaria had been fully warned. Second, it was a political necessity to humble Bulgaria, eager to make herself "the Prussia of the Balkans." As to these reasons I was told in Bulgaria that "Rumania's act was very wrong, but any other Balkan state would have done the same thing under like conditions."

Kavala, the only valuable seaport Bulgaria could hope to obtain, the Kaiser insisted should be made "a present to his sister, the Queen of Greece." Venizelos, obeying orders, secured it.

By most competent authorities it is agreed that the interior and especially the mountainous parts were, before the evictions to be discussed later on-inhabited mainly by Bulgarians. In the west were thousands of Serbians, with everywhere scattering settlements of Rumanians known as Vlachs. For the rest, the seaboard was preemptied by Greeks. Salonica had also an extensive population of Jews, descendants of refugees from ancient persecutions in Barcelona, and still speaking the Spanish language. Turks meanwhile abounded in the towns and villages everywhere. In these regions, however as again already indicated, "race" is determined mainly by language. For example, the people about Castouria in Thessaly, though largely Bulgarian in stock, speak the Greek language and are therefore rightly counted as Greeks. For the same reason, the Albanians of Epirus are also regarded as Greeks.

Nevertheless, despite all considerations of language and race, the Bulgarians have from the first stubbornly regarded Macedonia as almost wholly Bulgarian, the Greeks, knowing the seaboard, think it mainly Greek, while the claims of Serbia to the western part of the district are scarcely less insistent. With the advent of the wars, all three nations were surprised at the variety among the Macedonian peoples, still more at their resentment at being disturbed.

The Bulgarian people expected a united Europe promptly to reverse the injustices of the Treaty of Bucharest. Especially was it believed that Great Britain, the advocate of fair play, would intercede in their behalf, even to the extent of reclaiming Adrianople. For in the first Balkan war, the populace had come to believe Bulgaria to be a child of fortune, admired of the Great Powers. But no serious protest arose in any quarter, only mild deprecations, and those from Austria and Russia.9

'That Great Britain made no show of opposition at Bucharest is now regarded as a grave diplomatic error. An expression of interest in Bulgaria's fate in 1913, might perhaps have brought her into the Entente, in spite of her German ruler. In the present conflict, the Bulgarian people had avowedly no interest save to recover the Dobruja and to liberate Macedonia.