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of the seduction.' But neither is it necessary to prove that the servant became pregnant.2 Here, of course, the loss of service is clear. Where the direct result of the seduction is a loss of service, the master may recover;" where the seduction affected the girl's mind, and the master was forced to keep a watch on her and give her medical attendance; where it caused bodily injury impairing her health and her capacity to labor; where a venereal disease was communicated to the girl, injuring her health. Evidence that the daughter appeared strong and well before the alleged seduction, and that afterwards she became nervous and excitable, and did not appear to be herself, though no pregnancy or disease ensued, will justify the jury in finding an incapacity to work as the proximate effect of the seduction. But a loss of health caused by mental suffering, not the consequence of the seduction, but produced by subsequent causes, such as her abandonment by the seducer, shame resulting from exposure, or the like, is too remote a consequence of the seduction, and will not sustain an action. So where a man seduced the plaintiff's daughter, but the jury found that he was not the father of the child which she subsequently bore, it was held that there was no cause of action against him. Where pregnancy results, the action may be brought before the birth of the child."

10

'White v. Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405; 88 Am. Dec. 282; Hill v. Wilson, 8 Blackf. 123.

White v. Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405; 88 Am. Dec. 282; Manvell v. Thomson, 2 Car. & P. 303. Contra, Eager v. Grimwood, 1 Ex. 61.

White v. Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405; 88 Am. Dec. 282.

Ingerson v. Miller, 47 Barb. 47. Manvell v. Thomson, 2 Car. & P. 303; Van Horn v. Freeman, 6 N. J. L. 322.

Abrahams v. Kidney, 104 Mass. 222; 6 Am. Rep. 220.

"Nor, in my judgment, does the remedy depend upon the sex of the

servant. The debased woman who lures to her vile embrace an innocent boy, and infects him with loathsome disease, is equally liable to this action if an injury to his master's right to service follow from her crime": White v. Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405; 88 Am. Dec. 282.

Blagge v. Illsey, 127 Mass. 191; 34 Am. Dec. 361.

9 Knight v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 413; Boyle v. Brandon, 13 Mees. & W. 738. 10 Eager v. Grimwood, 1 Ex. 61. "Briggs v. Evans, 5 Ired. 16. "The action was held to lie, though the daughter had not been actually confined before action brought, and

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ILLUSTRATIONS. A minor daughter resided with her father, and was engaged as a school-teacher under an agreement made with him; while thus employed she was seduced, became pregnant, and died suddenly about four months after conception. A post-mortem examination disclosed a dead foetus, and a congested brain, caused, as it was supposed, by nervous excitability or extreme mental agitation. Held, that as a matter of necessity she must have been in no physical condition to render services for several weeks before her death, the action was maintainable by the father: Ingerson v. Miller, 47 Barb. 47.

§ 1112. Right of Action by Woman Seduced. - No action lies at common law by a woman against a man for seducing her, and getting her with child, because she cannot complain of an injury to which she consented; and if there has been a wrong, she is particeps criminis.1 There might be special circumstances of fraud on the defendant's part, which, in connection with the seduction, would support an action for damages by the woman; as, for example, the seduction of an innocent woman through a pretended marriage by a person having a wife. In a Connecticut case, an action was brought by a girl under age, in which the declaration alleged that the defendant fraudulently, and with the intention of getting her within

though the plaintiff had voluntarily turned her out of his house upon discovery of her pregnancy": Per Lord Denman, C. J., in Joseph v. Corvander, Winton Sum. Ass., 1834.

1 Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71; 3 Am. Dec. 95; Hamilton v. Lomax, 26 Barb. 615; Satterthwaite v. Dewhurst, 4 Doug. 315; Roberts v. Connelly, 14 Ala. 235; Woodward v. Anderson, 9 Bush, 624; Dennis v. Clark, 2 Cush. 350; 48 Am. Dec. 671; Burks v. Shain, 2 Bibb, 341; 5 Am. Dec. 616; Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Pa. St. 80; 44 Am. Dec. 159; Conn v. Wilson, 2 Over. 233; 5 Am. Dec. 663; Roper v. Clay, 18 Mo. 383; 59 Am. Dec. 314; Jordan v. Hovey, 72 Mo. 574; 37 Am. Rep. 447; Smith v. Richards, 29 Conn. 232. In Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71, 3 Am. Dec. 95, Parsons, C. J., said: "She is a partaker of the crime, and cannot come into court

to obtain satisfaction for a supposed
injury to which she was consent-
ing. It has been regretted at the
bar that the law has not provided a
remedy for an unfortunate female
against her seducer. Those who are
competent to legislate on this subject
will consider before they provide this
remedy whether seductions will after-
wards be less frequent, or whether
artful women may not pretend to be
seduced, in order to obtain a pecuni-
ary compensation.
As the law now
stands, damages are recoverable for a
breach of promise of marriage; and if
seduction has been practiced under
color of that promise, the jury will
undoubtedly consider it as an aggra-
vation of the damages. So far the
law has provided, and we do not pro-
fess to be wiser than the law.'

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2 Hutchinson v. Horn, 1 Ind. 363; 50 Am. Dec. 470.

his power for purposes of prostitution, she being then but fourteen years of age, destitute, without relatives, and in the care of a charitable society in New York, represented to her, and to the persons who had her in charge, that he wanted her to go to his house in Connecticut, and live in his family as a servant, and that he was a suitable person to take charge of her for that purpose; and that, with the advice of her friends, she came to his house with him for the purpose, and that, while she was living in his house, the defendant, by taking advantage of her ignorance and dependence, and want of friends, and of her fear of him, persuaded her to submit to carnal intercourse with him, and that he thus debauched her, and ruined her character and prospects for life. It was held that the action was maintainable.' But in Missouri an employer persuaded his female servant to consent to sexual intercourse with his minor son, to whom she was affianced. The son subsequently refused to marry her. The court held that the female had no ground of action of damages against the employer and father. By statute in some states the action has been given to the woman seduced. A statute providing that "an action for seduction can be maintained without allegation or proof of loss of service" does not give the right of action to any other persons than those who could maintain it at common law. Where the action is given to an unmarried woman, the fact that she was unmarried at the time of the seduction must be alleged, and also proved. The plaintiff's subsequent marriage does not defeat the action; but husband and wife may sue for her previous

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seduction. A state statute authorizing a woman to prosecute an action for her own seduction gives her no right of action, where the seduction was accomplished in another state, although the illicit intercourse continued in the former.2

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§ 1113. Right of Action by Father. The law gives no right of action to the parent as such. The right arises simply when the child is living with the parent, or he is entitled to her services as a master is entitled to the services of a servant. Hence the action is not maintainable upon the relation of parent and child, but solely upon that of master and servant.3 The relation of master and servant is established if it is shown that the parent, at the time of the seduction, had the right to control the services of the daughter. The daughter need not at the time have been actually a member of the father's household. If she were not in the actual service of another, and the father had a right to recall her to his own service, he may main. tain the action the same as if she actually had been recalled or returned. A constructive service is considered to arise

1 Wicell v. Blackford, 6 Baxt.

141.

& R. 36; 11 Am. Dec. 568; Kennedy v. Shea, 110 Mass. 147; 14 Am. Rep. 2 Buckles v. Ellers, 72 Ind. 220; 37 584; Van Horne v. Freeman, 6 N. J. Am. Rep. 156.

3 White v. Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405; 88 Am. Dec. 282; Bartley v. Richtmyer, 4 N. Y. 38; 54 Am. Dec. 338; Scott v. Cook, 1 Duvall, 314; Logan v. Murray, 6 Serg. & R. 175; 9 Am. Dec. 422; Pruitt v. Cox, 21 Ind. 15; Grinnell v. Wells, 7 Man. & G. 1033; South v. Denniston, 2 Watts, 474; Manley v. Field, 7 Com. B., N. S., 96; Harris v. Butler, 1 Ex. 61; Roberts v. Connelly, 14 Ala. 235.

Roberts v. Connelly, 14 Ala. 235; Briggs v. Evans, 5 Ired. 16; Wallace v. Clark, 2 Over. 93; 5 Am. Dec. 654.

5 Cooley on Torts, 231; Bolton v. Miller, 6 Ind. 265; Bartley v. Richtmyer, 4 N. Y. 38; 53 Am. Dec. 338; Martin v. Payne, 9 Johns. 387; 6 Am. Dec. 287; Mulvehall v. Millward, 11 N. Y. 343; Hornketh v. Barr, 8 Serg.

322; Mercer v. Walmsley, 5 Har. & J.
27; 9 Am. Dec. 486; White v. Murt-
land, 71 Ill. 250; 22 Am. Rep. 100;
Roberts v. Connelly, 14 Ala. 239; Up-
degraf v. Bennett, 8 Iowa, 72; Green-
wood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369; Clark
v. Fitch, 2 Wend. 459; 20 Am. Dec.
639; Stiles v. Telford, 10 Wend. 338;
Blagge v. Illsey, 127 Mass. 191; 34 Am.
Rep. 361; Wallace v. Clark, 2 Over.
93; 5 Am. Dec. 654; Emery v. Gowen,
4 Me. 33; 16 Am. Dec. 233; Clark v.
Fitch, 2 Wend. 459; 20 Am. Dec.
639. The English rule is
strict. It makes the right depend
on the animus revertendi, where the
daughter is living away from home,
though still subject to the parent's au-
thority and control: Dean . Peel, 5
East, 45. In Bartley v. Richtmyer, 4
N. Y. 38, 53 Am. Dec. 338, Bronson,

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in favor of the parent, where she has left his house and is in another's employ, if she is under age, "inasmuch as he has the right to control her conduct, is bound for her support, and may at any time revoke her leave of absence and reclaim her services." So where the infant daughter, when seduced, is only absent from her father upon a visit, the action is maintainable.2

But if the daughter is in the service of another, the master, and not the parent, has the right of action." A father cannot sue for seduction of his minor daughter whom he had left to shift for herself, and who, at the time. of the seduction, was working for another person as a household servant; nor when the daughter is of full age, and not living in the father's family, but in the actual employment of another person, though working under a contract made by her father, who was to receive her wages. And the parent has no action even for her seduction by the master while in the service of the latter." But if the defendant procured the woman to enter his service fraudulently, and for the purpose of withdrawing her from her family and seducing her, this is a wrong which precludes his claiming any rights or protection as master, and the parent may support an action as if the hiring had never taken place. The moment an actual service of the daughter with another is terminated, even

C. J., says: "Our cases stand upon the same foundation, with only this difference, that we go further than the English courts in making out the constructive relation of master and servant, and hold that it may exist for the purposes of this action, although the daughter was in the service of a third person at the time of the seduction, provided the case be such that the father then had a legal right to her services, and might have commanded them at pleasure."

Boyd v. Byrd, 8 Black f. 113; 44 Am. Dec. 740; Bolton v. Miller, 6 Ind. 266; and cases in last note.

Griffiths v. Teetgen, 15 Com. B.

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