§ 1226. Injunction will not lie to restrain publication of libel. § 1237. § 1238. Publication. Who liable — All parties instrumental in publication liable. § 1239. Repetition of libel Who liable. § 1243. Certainty as to charge - Proof. § 1244. Certainty as to person defamed - Who may sue. § 1223. Defamation - When Defamatory Words Actionable. Defamation is a false publication regarding another to the injury of his reputation. Every man has a right to his good name. He has a right to be protected from defamation as much as from assault to his person, or trespass against his property.1 Hence all words, whether oral or written, which injure the reputation of another are actionable." "The injury to the reputation is the gist of the action, and wherever that is clear, there is no need to inquire whether there is any injury to the pocket as well. But where it is by no means clear from the words themselves that they must have injured the plaintiff's reputation, there the court requires proof of some special damage to show that as a matter of fact the words have in this case impaired the plaintiff's good name." Proof of this kind is required more frequently in actions of slander than of libel. Words which are merely uncivil, words of idle abuse, are no ground for an action, unless it can be shown that in fact some appreciable damage to the plaintiff has followed from their use. All defamatory words, therefore, are not actionable. Words which merely might tend to produce injury to the reputation of another are not defamatory, and even though false are not actionable, unless as a matter of fact some appreciable injury has followed from their use. On the other hand, words which on the face of them must be injurious to the reputation of the person to whom they refer are clearly defamatory, and if false, are actionable, without proof that any particular damage has followed from their use.* The fact that the words have injured the plaintiff's reputation will be either presumed, or must be proved. The fact will be presumed in four cases: 1. If the words, being written and published, or printed and published, are in any way disparaging to the plaintiff, or tend to bring him into ridicule and contempt; 2. If the words, being spoken, charge the plaintiff with the commission of some indictable offense; 3. If the words, being spoken, impute to the plaintiff a contagious disorder tending to exclude "His reputation is his property, and if possible, more valuable than other property": Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 492. 2 Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; 72 Am. Dec. 420. 4 3 Odgers on Libel and Slander, 17. Odgers on Libel and Slander, 1. him from society; 4. If the words, being spoken, are spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his calling or occupation, or disparage him in any public office which he may be holding. In these cases the words are said to be, actionable per se, because it is presumed that they must have injured the plaintiff's reputation. But in all other cases of spoken words the fact that the plaintiff's reputation was injured must be proved by showing their injurious consequences or effect. Such evidence is called evidence of special damage. The action of slander is transitory, and may be brought in one state for words spoken in another.' § 1224. Intent Immaterial-Party Presumed to Intend Consequences - Mistake. The intent or motive with which the words were used is as a rule irrelevant. If the defendant has injured the plaintiff's reputation he is liable, though he did not intend that his words should have this effect. He is presumed to have intended the natural consequence of his acts, and it is no defense (though it may go in mitigation of damages) that he had no thought of injuring the plaintiff, or hoped he would not be injured by the publication. Hence, though the complaint generally alleges that the words were spoken. or published falsely and maliciously, malice in fact need never be proved at the trial; the words are actionable, if false and defamatory, although spoken or published accidentally or inadvertently, or with an honest belief in their truth, unless they were privileged. 1 Offutt v. Earlywine, 4 Blackf. 460; $2 Am. Dec. 40. Where the plaintiff brought at one time, and against the same defendants, a separate action in each of the counties of the state for one and the same libel, which was published in the county in which all the parties resided, the defendant's motion to consolidate the actions into 137 The intent is one was granted: Percy v. Seward, 6 "Odgers on Libel and Slander, 5. See |