by consent of the parties. Held, in an action for slander of title, that such allegation was in excess of the occasion, and not merely an assertion of a supposed right, and must be presumed malicious: Andrew v. Deshler, 45 N. J. L. 167. A written contract had been entered into, before the words were spoken, for the sale of the land in question, and the purchaser, having heard thereof, became in consequence dissatisfied with his bargain, and the plaintiff, at his request, canceled it. Held, that the action could not be maintained, the pecuniary damage being the result of his own act: Kendall v. Stone, 5 N. Y. 14. Plaintiff offered his land for sale at auction, defendant was present, and forbade the sale, declaring that plaintiff had only a dower interest in the land, and that the title was in himself; in so declaring, defendant was acting under advice of counsel, but such evidence was procured by false representations made to his counsel by defendant. Held, proper for the court to submit the question of the latter's malice or bona fides to the jury: Gent v. Lynch, 23 Md. 58; 87 Am. Dec. 559. Defendant, a book publisher, issued a circular, charging that plaintiff, by certain publications, infringed defendant's copyright. Plaintiff sued to recover damages sustained by the publication of the circular. Held, that the suit was in the nature of an action for slander of title, and that actual malice must be shown to justify a recovery: John W. Lovell Co. v. Houghton, 54 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 60. A receiver appointed in a partition suit leased the land for a term of years. Afterwards, the court abridged the lease, so as to end it shortly after the time set for partition sale. After the sale, this order was affirmed on appeal. At the sale the lessees, who were then in possession, read a notice claiming the land for the full period of their lease. Held, that such notice, being the lessees' only means of protecting their claims. against an innocent purchaser, was not slander of title: Cornwell v. Parke, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1889.

§ 1278. Slander of Goods. An untrue statement disparaging a man's goods or property, published without a lawful occasion, and causing him special damage, is actionable. But it is not actionable for a man to commend

1 West. etc. Manure Co. v. Lawes Chem. Manure Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 218; Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio, 531; 27 Am. Dec. 271; Wilson v. Dubois, 35 Minn. 471; 59 Am. Rep. 335; Weir v. Allen, 51 N. H. 171. In Addison on Torts, 184, it is said: "Disparaging criticisms by one tradesman upon the goods of a rival tradesman are not action

able, unless it is proved that they have been maliciously and fraudulently made, and were false to the knowledge of the party at the time they were made.' But Mr. Odgers (Libel and Slander, 147), after a review of all the English cases, holds that the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of his statements at the time he made them

his own goods, or to advertise that he can make as good articles as any other person in the trade. No action lies for representing the plaintiff's ferry not to be as good as another rival ferry, and inducing and persuading travelers to cross at the other, and not at the plaintiff's, ferry.2

ILLUSTRATIONS.- A mineral-oil merchant published a chemist's report, which reflected unfavorably upon the oil sold by a rival merchant. Held, that the action would not lie, provided the report was the result of a bona fide analysis of the oils, and contained nothing known to the defendant as false at the time of publication: Young v. Macrae, 3 Best & S. 264. The defendants falsely and without lawful occasion published a detailed analysis of the plaintiffs' artificial manure and of their own, in which the plaintiffs' manure was much disparaged and their own extolled. Special damage resulted. Held, that the action. lay: Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 218. The defendant published an advertisement, denying that the plaintiff held any patent for the manufacture of "self-acting tallow-siphons or lubricators," and cautioning the public against such lubricators as wasting the tallow. No special damage was alleged. Held, that the words were not a libel on the plaintiff, either generally or in the way of his trade, but were only a reflection upon the goods sold by him, which was not actionable without special damage: Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120. H. was prevented from making an advantageous sale of lands belonging to him, and containing an iron-ore mine, by the misrepresentations of P. to the proposed buyer, to the effect that an experienced iron manufacturer was of the opinion that the iron mine was but a "pocket," or nest, that would suddenly run out. Held, that H. could recover damages from P. in a suit in the nature of an is immaterial except on the question of damages; quoting Cockburn, C. J., in Young v. Macrae, 3 Best & S. 267, where he said: "I am far from saying that if a man falsely and maliciously makes a statement disparaging an article which another manufactures or vends, although in so doing he casts no imputation on his personal or professional character, and thereby causes an injury, and special damage is averred, an action might not be maintained. For although none of us are familiar with such actions, still we can see that a most grievous wrong might be done in that way, and it ought not to be without remedy.' "If a man makes a

false statement with respect to the goods of A, in comparing his own goods with those of A, and A suffers special damage, will not an action lie?" Per Cockburn, C. J., in Young v. Macrae, 32 L. J. Q. B. 8. "If a man were to write falsely that what another man sold as Turkish rhubarb was three parts brick-dust, and special damage could be proved, it might be actionable": Id. See Hovey r Leather Tip Pencil Co., 57 N. Y. 119; 15 Am. Rep. 470.

1 Harman v. Delany, 2 Strange, 898; 1 Barn. 289.

2 Johnson v. Hitchcock, 15 Johns. 185.

action of slander for defamation of title: Paull v. Halferty, 63 Pa. St. 46; 3 Am. Rep. 518. A notice in a newspaper advised applicants for board at a specified street and number to "inform themselves, before locating there, as to table, attention, and characteristics of the proprietors." Held, not libelous per se: Wallace v. Bennett, 1 Abb. N. C. 478. Caution. The subscribers, the only shippers of the true and original Franklin coal, notice that other coal dealers in L. than our agent, J. S., advertise Franklin coal. We take this method of cautioning the public against buying of other parties than J. S., if they hope to get the genuine article, as we have neither sold nor shipped any Franklin coal to any party in L. except our agent, J.S." Held, no libel upon a dealer in coal in L. who has advertised genuine Franklin coal for sale: Boynton v. Remington, 3 Allen, 397. The plaintiff alleged that he was and had been engaged in compiling and publishing biennial and county directories at great labor and expense, and had acquired a large advertising patronage therefor and a large list of subscribers; that he had prepared to and would have published the same in 1885, but that by reason of the false and fraudulent statement of the defendant that he had gone out of the business, and disparaging his business, he had been prevented from doing so, and the defendant had published such a directory to his injury; but he did not allege that he had been deprived of the benefit of any contract or property, or that the defendant published the directory as the plaintiff's, nor any infringement of copyright. Held, no cause of action: Dudley v. Briggs, 141 Mass. 582; 55 Am. Rep. 494.

§ 1279. Other Cases. — Other cases in which words spoken caused special damage to another, and an action was held to lay, although the reputation of the plaintiff was not affected at all, are to be found in the reports.1 If a man, it is said in Conesby's Case, should menace my tenants at will, per quod they depart from their tenures, an action upon the case will lie against him, but the menace without their departure is no cause of action. So if a person threatens the plaintiff's workmen, so that they do not dare to go on with their work, whereby the plaintiff loses the selling of his goods, an action lies.

1 See Title Torts-Damnum Absque Injuria.

In an

Rolle Abr. 108; Tarleton v. McGawley, Peake, 270; Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551; Skinner v. 3 Garret v. Taylor, Cro. Jac. 567; 1 Kitch, L. R. 2 Q. B. 393.

2 Year Book, 9 Hen. VII., p. 7.

English case, the defendant wrongfully and maliciously caused certain persons who had agreed to sell goods to the plaintiff to refuse to deliver them, by asserting that he had a lien upon them, and ordering those persons to retain the goods until further orders from him, he well knowing at the time that he had no lien. The court held that the action was maintainable, though the persons who had the goods were under no legal obligation to obey the orders of the defendant, and their refusal was their own spontaneous act.1

1 Green v. Button, 2 Cromp. M. & R. 707.

CHAPTER LXVII.

DEFENSES.

§ 1280. Justification - Truth when a defense.

Privileged communications- Absolute and qualified privilege.
Absolute privilege — Executive of nation and state.

§ 1281.

§ 1282.

§ 1295.

Answers to confidential inquiries.

Information volunteered.

Confidential relations.

Statements to officers of the law and public authorities.

§ 1280. Justification - Truth when a Defense. The falsehood of defamatory words is presumed, and the onus is on the defendant to prove their truth.1 But if he can do so, the truth of the statement is a complete defense to either an oral or a written or printed slander, and this, even though the words were published spitefully and maliciously. Where the charge imputes to the plaintiff the

Hinchman v. Lawson, 5 Leigh, 695; 27 Am. Dec. 623; Offutt v. Earlywine, 4 Blackf. 460; 32 Am. Dec. 40.

Ellis v. Buzzell, 60 Me. 209; 11 Am. Rep. 204; Castle v. Houston, 19 Kan. 417; 27 Am. Rep. 127; Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 710; 5 Am. Rep. 514; McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403; 28 Am. Rep. 465; Gilman v. Lowell, 8 Wend. 573; 24 Am. Dec. 97; Foss v.

Hildreth, 10 Allen, 76; Perry v. Porter, 124 Mass. 338; King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113; 21 Am. Dec. 102. A plea of justification reaffirms the charge or charges justified, and avers the truth of the words spoken. If the words impute a crime punishable by law, and are not in the nature of privileged communications, the filing of a plea may be attended with one of three