munication made is made confidentially, or marking a letter "private and confidential," does not make the communication confidential and privileged, unless it was a communication which the defendant had a right to make under the rules just given.'

ILLUSTRATIONS.-N. selected plaintiff to be his attorney in an action. Defendant, apparently a total stranger, wrote to N. to deprecate his so employing the plaintiff. Held, not a confidential communication: Godson v. Home, 1 Ball & B. 7. H. was about to deal with S., when he met the defendant, who said at once, without his opinion being asked at all, "If you have anything to do with S., you will live to repent it; he is a most unprincipled man." Held, not a confidential communication: Storey v. Challands, 8 Car. & P. 234. The first mate of a ship wrote a letter to the defendant, an old friend, stating that he was placed in an awkward position owing to the drunken habits of the captain, and saying, "How shall I act? It is my duty to write to Mr. Ward [the owner of the ship], but my doing so would ruin" the captain and his wife and family. The defendant, after much deliberation and consultation with other nautical friends, thought it his duty to show the letter to Ward, who thereupon dismissed the captain. The defendant knew nothing of the matter, except from the mate's letter. Held, that the letter was privileged: Coxhead v. Richards, 2 Com. B. 569, but by a divided court. See Amann v. Damm, 8 Com. B., N. S., 597. D. told S. that he intended to employ the plaintiff as surgeon and accoucheur at his wife's approaching confinement. S. thereupon advised him not to do so, on account of the plaintiff's alleged immorality. Held, a privileged communication, though it was volunteered: Dixon v. Smith, 29 L. J. Ex. 125; 5 Hurl. & N. 450. A and B were share

an interest to subserve, or where the party making it is under a legal duty to make it. But when the privilege rests simply upon the moral duty to make the communication, there has been much uncertainty and difficulty in applying the rule. . . Mrs. Collins, then, appears as a mere volunteer, writing the letter to break up relations which she feared might lead to the marriage of the plaintiff to Dora. If she had been the mother of Dora, or other near relative, or if she had been asked by Dora for information as to the plaintiff's character and standing, she could with propriety have given

any information she possessed affecting his character, provided she acted in good faith, and without malice. But a mere volunteer, having no duty to perform, no interest to subserve, interferes with the relations between two such people at her peril. The rules of law should not be so administered as to encourage such intermeddling, which may not only blast reputation, but possibly wreck lives. In such a case, the duty not to defame is more pressing than the duty to communicate mere defamatory rumors not known to be true."

- Picton v. Jackman, 4 Car. & P. 257.

holders in the same railway company. B was also a river commissioner. The plaintiff had been engineer to the railway company, and was seeking to be elected engineer to the river commissioners. Shortly before the election, A voluntarily wrote to B that the plaintiff's mismanagement or ignorance had cost the railway company several thousand pounds. The defendant lost the appointment in consequence. Held, not a privileged communication: Brooks v. Blanshard, 1 Cromp. & M. 779; 3 Tyrw. 844. The defendant was a director of two companies; of one of which the plaintiff was secretary, of the other auditor. The plaintiff was dismissed from his post as secretary of the first company for alleged misconduct. Thereupon the defendant, at the next meeting of the board of the second company, informed his co-directors of this fact, and proposed that he should also be dismissed from his post of auditor of the second company. Held, a privileged communication: Harris v. Thompson, 13 Com. B. 333. D met C in the road and asked him if he had sold his timber yet. C replied that B was going to have it. D asked if he was going to pay ready money for it, and being answered in the negative, said, "Then, you'll lose your timber; for B owes me about twenty-five pounds, and I am going to arrest him next week for my money, and your timber will help to pay my debt." C consequently declined to sell the timber to B. B really did owe D about twenty-three pounds. Held, that the caution was unprivileged, because volunteered: Bennett v. Deacon, 2 Com. B. 628; 15 L. J. Com. P. 289, but by a divided court. In an action by plaintiff, who had been defendant's tenant at will, against the landlord for slander in stating that the tenant had willfully burned the buildings, it appeared that the statement made by defendant was in the course of the consideration by the judiciary committee of the legislature of a proposed bill as to liability of tenants at will, defendant having been instrumental in bringing the matter to the attention of the legislature; but it did not appear that he was sworn as a witness before the committee, nor that they regarded him as such, nor that the statement was in reply to any question put to him by the committee. Held, that the communication was privileged, if defendant acted in good faith and without malice: Wright v. Lathrop, Mass. 1889. The defendant, a parishioner, mentioned to her rector a report, widely current in the parish, that the rector and his solicitor were grossly mismanaging a trust estate, and defrauding the widow and orphans, etc. The solicitor brought an action for the slander. The jury found that she did so in the honest belief that it was a benefit to the rector to inform him of the report, in order that he might clear his character. Held, that the statement was privileged so far as the rector was concerned,

and that, as it was not divisible, it was also privileged as to the plaintiff: Davies v. Snead, L. R. 5 Q. B. 611. A woman whose friend contemplated marriage wrote to her imputations on the character of the man whom she proposed to marry. The motive of the communication was love and friendship. Held, that he could maintain an action for libel: Byam v. Collins, 111 N. Y. 143; 7 Am. St. Rep. 726.

§ 1294. Same-Confidential Relationship.-But where there is a confidential relation existing between the parties, information to the interest of the person to know may properly be volunteered. Thus an agent has a right to give unasked all he knows of a person who is dealing with his principal.' So a father, guardian (or a relation), or an intimate friend, may warn a young man against associating with a particular individual, or may warn a lady not to marry a particular suitor, though in the same circumstances it might be considered officious and meddlesome if a mere stranger gave such a warning. So if the defendant is in the army or in a government office, it would be his duty to inform his official superiors of any serious misconduct on the part of his subordinates; for the defendant is in some degree answerable for the faults of those immediately under his control.2 Confidential communications between a party and his professional adviser, whether legal, medical, or spiritual, fall within the same principle. So words spoken by an employer to his overseer, intended to protect the employer's private interests and property, but not spoken maliciously, are not actionable, although no confidence was expressed at the time of speaking, and although the same words published under other circumstances wouid be slander. A communication made by one to the agent

1 Davis v. Reeves, 5 Ir. C. L. Rep. 79; Wright. Woodgate, 2 Cromp. M. & R. 573; Washburn . Cooke, 3 Denio, 110; Knowles v. Peck, 42 Conn. 386; 19 Am. Rep. 542.

2 Odgers on Libel and Slander, 210;

Todd v. Hawkins, 2 Moody & R. 20; Henwood v. Harrison, L. R. 7 Com. P. 606; Scarll v. Dixon, 4 Fost. & F. 250; Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461. 3 Cooley on Torts, 216.

Easley v. Moss, 9 Ala. 266.

or president of an insurance company, in which plaintiff's property was insured at the time of its destruction by fire, charging plaintiff with arson in setting fire thereto, and with perjury in making proofs of loss, is conditionally privileged. Reports by one employed by a father to ascertain the standing of his daughter's husband, made to the father and mother, are privileged.2

But a communication is not privileged because made by the party in the conviction that he owed a social duty to give currency to libelous rumors, that the victim of them may be avoided.' There is no privilege to a stranger who interferes in negotiations of marriage, though there would be to a near relative. There is no privilege to a priest in making charges against members of his congregation in relation to their business from the pulpit.5

ILLUSTRATIONS. Rumors being in circulation prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff, a minister, he courted inquiry, and appointed A to sift the matter thoroughly. It was agreed that the defendant should represent the malcontent portion of the congregation, and state the case against the plaintiff to A. Held, that a confidential relationship being thus established between the defendant and A, all that took place between them, whether by word of mouth or in writing, so long as the inquiry lasted, and relative thereto, was privileged: Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 Com. B. 293. Defendant dismissed his apprentice without sufficient legal excuse; he wrote a letter to her parents, informing them that the girl would be sent home, and giving his reasons for her dismissal. Held, that this letter was privileged, as there was a confidential relationship between the girl's master and her parents: James v. Jolly, Odgers on Libel and Slander, 212. Defendant and T. were joint owners of the Robinson, and engaged the plaintiff as master; in April, 1843, defendant purchased T.'s share; in August, 1843, defendant wrote a business letter to T., claiming a return of £150, and incidentally libeled the plaintiff. Held, a privileged communication, as the defendant and T. were still in confidential relationship: Wilson v. Robinson, 7 Q. B. 68. A New Orleans firm, in private corre

spondence with a New York house, repeated information received from its own correspondent at Mobile as to a firm at Mobile, as follows: "D. & Co. are people of no standing or credit whatsoever. Neither have they any means. Up to last July they were dealers in chickens, eggs, etc. Since that time they have been buying cotton quite freely, to the general astonishment of the community. . . . . We told them we could never touch their bills again, unless they wrote us a letter stating their means, and which we would forward to your good selves, subject to your approval. They were furious enough, but up to now we never received that promised letter." Held, that the matter was privileged: Dunsee v. Norden, 36 La. Ann. 78. At the suit of the owner of a patent for vulcanized rubber, A, a dentist, was enjoined from using the preparation. Believing that A disregarded the injunction, the owner employed B to ascertain. B procured C to apply to A for a set of teeth upon a plate of vulcanized rubber. A made the teeth upon such plate, delivered them to C, and received pay therefor. B and C reported the facts to the owner, and on their affidavits, proceedings for contempt were commenced against A. Held, that the communications of B and C to the owner of the patent were privileged: Knowles v. Peck, 42 Conn. 386; 19 Am. Rep. 542.

1295. Same-Statements to Officers of the Law and Public Authorities. Statements made to the officers of the law for the purpose of discovering a crime or bringing a guilty person to justice are privileged, provided they are made on reasonable grounds, honestly, and without malice, even though unfounded. It is the duty of all who witness or are cognizant of any misconduct on the part of a magistrate or any public officer to bring such misconduct to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish it; and, therefore, all petitions and memorials complaining of such misconduct, if prepared bona fide and forwarded to the proper authorities, are privileged. So a petition to the appointing power in

1 Amann v. Damm, 8 Com. B., N. S., 597; Bunton v. Worley, 4 Bibb, 98; 7 Am. Dec. 735; Eames v. Whitaker, 123 Mass. 342; Sands v. Robison, 12 Smedes & M. 704; 51 Am. Dec. 133; Shock v. McChesney, 4 Yeates, 507; 2 Am. Dec. 415.

2 Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & B. 344; Reid v. De Lorme, 2 Brev. 76; Vanderzee v. McGregor, 12 Wend. 545; 27 Am. Dec. 156; Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend. 319; 34 Am. Dec. 238; Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163; 22 Am. Dec. 418; Bodwell v. Osgood, 3 Pick.