ILLUSTRATIONS (CONTINUED). - COMMUNICATIONS HELD NOT PRIVILEGED. A share-holder in a company summoned a meeting of share-holders, and also invited reporters for the press to attend. Charges were then by him made against one of the directors for his conduct of the affairs of the company. Held, not privileged, because persons not share-holders were present: Parsons v. Surgey, 4 Fost. & F. 247. Plaintiff and defendant were jointly interested in property in Scotland, to the manager cf which defendant wrote a letter principally about the property and the conduct of the plaintiff with reference thereto, but also containing a charge against the plaintiff with reference to his conduct to his mother and aunt. Held, that though the part of the letter about the defendant's conduct as to the property might be confidential and privileged, such privilege could not extend to the part of the letter about the plaintiff's conduct to his mother and aunt: Warren v. Warren, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 250; 4 Tyrw. 850. The defendant, the tenant of a farm, required some repairs to be done at his house; the landlord's agent sent up two workmen, the plaintiff and T. They made a bad job of it, the plaintiff got drunk while on the premises, and the defendant was convinced from what he heard that the plaintiff had broken open his cellar-door, and drunk his cider. Two days afterwards, the defendant met the plaintiff and T. together and charged the plaintiff with breaking open the cellar-door, getting drunk, and spoiling the job. He repeated this charge later in the same day to T. alone, in the absence of the plaintiff, and also to the landlord's agent. Held, that the communication to the landlord's agent was clearly privileged, as both were interested in the repairs being properly done; that the statement made to the plaintiff in T.'s presence was also privileged, if not malicious; but that the repetition of the statement to T., in the absence of the plaintiff, was unauthorized and officious, and therefore not protected, although made in the belief of its truth: Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 181; 4 Tyrw. 582. Defendant made an affidavit that plaintiff, who had testified on a trial before a Masonic lodge, was not to

is not so difficult to establish as is supposed. If the charge is shown to have been made wantonly, or without proper occasion or just motive or probable cause, any of those being shown would supply the malice that is wanting to make the privileged communication libelous. . . . .We think, then, as this was a communication made by one voter to other voters, each having a voice in the election of the candidate, about a matter of the deepest interest to the public, and

about which they had a right to be informed, and was made in relation to a person seeking a public office, who had thus by offering himself as a candidate challenged scrutiny, the judge who tried the case was right in holding the occasion one entitled to the highest privilege, and that as the plaintiff's own case did not show malice, but most clearly rebutted any such implication, the nonsuit was properly granted."

be believed on oath. This was at the request of the party on trial. Neither party to this action was a Mason. Held, not privileged: Nix v. Caldwell, 81 Ky. 293; 50 Am. Rep. 163. Defendant was a trader, and plaintiff, one of his customers, and as such owed defendant a sum of money, for the payment of which defendant applied to him. Plaintiff, being unwell, directed his wife to write to defendant, sending him at the same time money in part payment of the sum due. Defendant, in reply to this letter, wrote in reference to the balance on a post-card (which was transmitted to the plaintiff through the post-office) the following:

...

"Dr. R.-1877. - To amount for goods as rendered £1 16 2 By post-office order on account.

....

180

82

"Sir, Your plea of illness for not paying this trifle is mere moonshine. We will place the matter in our solicitor's hands if we have not stamps by return, if it cost us ten times the amount. "T. J. & SONS."

Held, that assuming defendant to have an interest in writing the alleged libel, a communication transmitted by means of a post-card is not privileged: Robinson v. Jones, 4 Ir. L. R. 391. H., as assistant inspector of the board of health of New York City, made an official report, published in a public journal, in which he recommended a certain kind of street-pavement, giving statistics. E. caused a communication to be published, to the effect that the statements in the report were dictated by parties interested in the pavement, and that H. received a reward for their publication. In an action by H. against E. for libel, held, that the occasion did not justify an attack on H.'s private character, and in the absence of proof of the truth of the accusation, E. was liable: Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N. Y. 116. A newspaper article stated that a chairman of a county committee of a political party "has descended from the high calling of a clergyman to the recognized champion and professional defender of prostitutes and the lowest grade of criminals who throng the audience-halls of our police-courts. . . . . The money of the ring, of the prostitute, of the libertine and burglar, is all alike to him, if he is duly intent on making money." Held, not privileged: Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. St. 385; 30 Am. Rep.

367.

§ 1297. In Self-defense.

The duty which puts a person under an obligation to speak may be one towards himself as well as towards another. The law permits a man

to speak as well as to act in his own defense, under certain circumstances. It is essential, however, that the occasion justified the words, and that the speaker or writer went no further than was necessary to protect himself.' Thus the occupier of a house may complain to the landlord or his agent of the workmen he has sent to repair the house. A customer may call and complain to a tradesman of the goods he supplies, and the manner in which he conducts his business. The owner of a building which has been set on fire may caution persons in the building against particular persons suspected of being the incendiary, or communicate to his family his suspicions. The directors of a society for promoting female medical education may, in a published report, caution the public against trusting a person who had formerly been employed to obtain and collect subscriptions on

1 Cooke v. Wildes, 5 El. & B. 328; Huntley v. Ward, 1 Fost. & F. 552. In Billings v. Fairbanks, 139 Mass. 66, "the defendant, claiming to have lost money, accused the plaintiff, who was in his employ, with stealing it. Upon this accusation being made, the plaintiff, through his wife, informed one Leonard Foster, with whom he had lived for many years from his boyhood up, of the accusation, and sought his advice. Foster went to the defendant and had an interview with him, in which the defendant informed him of the grounds upon which he made the accusation. Upon this application made to him by the plaintiff, Foster had such an interest in the subject and duty to perform that he was entitled to have the interview with the defendant, and the statements made by the defendant upon the subject to which the interview related were privileged. During this interview the plaintiff came in. The plaintiff asked the defendant to settle with him what he owed him, to which the defendant replied that he hired him for a year. The plaintiff then said: 'You do not want a man who steals your money, and I do not want to work for a man who charges me with it.' To which the defendant replied,

3

'I know you took the money, and there is another person who knows it, also.' It is upon these words so spoken that the plaintiff relies as the substantive slander for which he brings this action. We are of opinion that these words were, under the circumstances, privileged, and the jury should have been so instructed. It is of no importance whether the interview be

tween Foster and the defendant had ended or not. If Foster had not been present, the words were clearly privileged. The plaintiff commenced the conversation, and introduced the subject of the charge of larceny made against him. The words used by the defendant were spoken in this conversation, and the mere fact that the words were spoken in presence of Foster, who, as the friend of the plaintiff, had been investigating the charge and had been fully informed of all the facts and circumstances, did not defeat the privilege."

2 Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 181; 4 Tyrw. 582; Kine v. Sewell, 3 Mees. & W. 297.

3 Oddy v. Lord George Paulet, 4 Fost. & F. 1009; Crisp v. Gill, 29 L. T. 82.

Lawler v. Earle, 5 Allen, 22. 'Campbell v. Bannister, 79 Ky. 205.

their behalf, but has since been dismissed, if the caution is given in good faith, and is required for the protection. of the corporation and the public. An advertisement warning the public against the negotiations of notes, etc., alleged to have been stolen, is privileged. So one who is attacked in print or by word of mouth may retort in like manner. In Koenig v. Ritchie, the plaintiff was a policyholder in an insurance company, and published a pamphlet accusing the directors of that company of fraud. The directors published a pamphlet in reply, declaring the charges contained in the plaintiff's pamphlet to be false and calumnious, and also asserting that in a suit he had instituted he had sworn in support of those charges in opposition to his own handwriting. Cockburn, C. J., held the directors' pamphlet prima facie privileged, saying to the jury: "If you are of opinion that it was published bona fide for the purpose of the defense of the company, and in order to prevent these charges from operating to their prejudice, and with a view to vindicate the character of the directors, and not with a view to injure or lower the character of the plaintiff, if you are of that opinion, and think that the publication did not go beyond the occasion, then you ought to find for the defendants on the general issue."

But the fact that an article alleged to be libelous was published in explanation of and in reply to a false article published by plaintiff concerning defendants cannot be pleaded in justification. So the fact that plaintiff owed money to defendant before her marriage, which she refuses to pay, exhibiting great ingratitude, does not render a defamatory letter concerning her conduct before marriage, written by defendant to her husband, a privileged communication, though the object was to compel the

1 Gassett v. Gilbert, 6 Gray, 94. 1 Com. v. Featherston, 9 Phila. 594. 3 O'Donoghue v. Hussey, I. R. 5 C. L. 124.

43 Fost. & F. 413.

5 Stewart v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 40 Minn. 101.

husband or the wife to pay the debt.' In an advertisement notifying the public not to harbor or trust the advertiser's wife on his account, defamatory words in regard to the wife are not privileged.2

ILLUSTRATIONS.-The defendant, the manager of a hotel, was informed by a guest that the plaintiff, a domestic employed in the hotel, had stolen a diamond pin from his room, whereupon the defendant sent for the plaintiff, and told her what the guest had said, and, in the presence of the chambermaid, charged the plaintiff with the offense. Held, privileged: Keane v. Sprague, 19 Cent. L. J. 315. A baker published in a newspaper that the plaintiff, one of his drivers, had "left my employ, and taken upon himself the privilege of collecting my bills," etc. Held, privileged: Hatch v. Lane, 105 Mass. 394. Several persons who had been defrauded of a large quantity of goods by false representations, having probable cause to believe that the transaction was a criminal offense, and that the plaintiff was a party to it, signed a paper, in which they agreed to bear equally the expenses of prosecuting plaintiff and others criminally, stating that they had been "robbed and swindled" by plaintiff and others. Held, privileged: Klinch v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427; 7 Am. Rep. 360. A publication criticising plaintiff, a teacher, charged her with over-devotion to details and with an impatient and a vacillating disposition. The criticism spoke favorably of her skill. Defendant was superintendent of schools, and had been attacked by plaintiff, who lost her situation through defendant, and he allowed the publication to be made. Held, that an action. for libel could not be maintained: O'Connor v. Sill, 60 Mich. 175. A trader employed an auctioneer to sell off his goods, and otherwise so conducted himself that his creditors concluded that he had committed an act of bankruptcy. One of them, the defendant, sent the auctioneer a notice not to pay over the proceeds of the sale to the trader, "he having committed an act of bankruptcy." Held, privileged, being made in defense of defendant's own interests: Blackham v. Pugh, 2 Com. B. 611; 15 L. J. Com. P. 290. Defendant had dismissed plaintiff from

1 Beals v. Thompson, Mass. 1889. 2 Smith v. Smith, Mich. 1889.

"The communication had its origin in the confidential relation existing between the parties, and emanated from one whom the defendant, under the circumstances, had the right to believe. Privileged communications comprehend all statements made bona fide in the performance of a duty or with a

fair and reasonable purpose of protecting the interest of the person making them. The communication made by the defendant comes within the protection of this rule. What the defendant said was in performance of a duty he owed, not only to the guest, but to the good reputation and management of the hotel under his charge."