pated such a result, he is liable. "To make the words actionable by reason of special damage, the consequence must be such as, taking human nature as it is with its infirmities, and having regard to the relationship of the parties concerned, might fairly and reasonably have been anticipated and feared would follow from the speaking of the words." But it is essential that the party whose act constitutes the special damage should have believed the words to be true.2 1 ILLUSTRATIONS. A vicar in open church falsely declared that the plaintiff, one of his parishioners, was excommunicated, and refused to celebrate divine service till the plaintiff departed out of church, whereby the plaintiff was compelled to quit the church, and was scandalized, and was hindered of hearing divine service for a long time. Held, that an action lay: Barnabas v. Traunter, 1 Vin. Abr. 396. In consequence of defendant's words, a friend who had previously voluntarily promised to give the plaintiff, a married woman, money to enable her to join her husband in Australia, whither he had emigrated three years before, refused to do so. Held, sufficient special damage: Corcoran v. Corcoran, 7 I. R. C. L. 272. Plaintiff lost his place as clerk and weighmaster by reason of defendant's having falsely and maliciously said of plaintiff, "He has caused the downfall and ruin of my clerk," and, in effect, that defendant did not want plaintiff to weigh any goods consigned to defendant. Held, that the words were actionable: Wilson v. Cottman, 65 Md. 190. In consequence of defendant's slandering the plaintiff, a dissenting minister, his congregation diminished. Held, insufficient, as it did not appear that the plaintiff lost any emolument thereby: Hopwood v. Thorn, 19 L. J. Com. P. 94; 8 Com. B. 293. A. told N. that T. had committed adultery with Mrs. F. N. had married Mrs. F.'s sister, and was an intimate friend of T.; N. told T. what people were saying of him, whereupon T. became melancholy, lost his appetite, and was unable to work. Held, that such distress and illness were not sufficient special damage: Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; 72 Am. Dec. 1 1 Lynch v. Knight, 9 Hoffm. L. Cas. 60; Haddan v. Lott, 15 Com. B. 411; Hicks v. Foster, 13 Barb. 665; Georgia v. Kepford, 45 Iowa, 48. 2 Anonymous, 60 N. Y. 262; 19 Am. Rep. 174, the court saying: "I do not think special damage can be predicated upon the act of any one who wholly disbelieves the truth of the story. It is inducing acts injurious to the plaintiff caused by a belief of the truth of the charge made by the defendant that constitutes the damage which the law redresses." But it has been held otherwise in England: Knight v. Gibbs, 1 Ad. & E. 43. 420. The defendant said of a married man that he had had two bastards; "by reason of which words discord arose between him and his wife, and they were likely to have been divorced." Held, no special damage: Barmund's Case, Cro. Jac. 473. The defendant falsely imputed incontinence to a married woman. In consequence of his words she lost the society and friendship of her neighbors, and became seriously ill and unable to attend to her affairs and business, and her husband incurred expense in curing her, and lost the society and assistance of his wife in his domestic affairs. Held, that neither husband nor wife had any cause of action: Allsop v. Allsop, 5 Hurl. & N. 534; 29 L. J. Ex. 315; Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. Div. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281. Defendant charged that plaintiff had been guilty of the murder of one Daniel Dolly; the plaintiff thereupon demanded that an inquest should be taken on Dolly's body, and incurred expense thereby. Held, that such expense was recoverable as special damage, though it was not compulsory on the plaintiff to have an inquest held: Peake v. Oldham, Cowp. 275; 2 W. Black. 960. A slandered the plaintiff to his master, B. Subsequently B, discovering from another source that the plaintiff's former master had discharged him for misconduct, illegally discharged him in the middle of his term. Held, not the proximate result of A's slander: Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1. Plaintiff alleged that certain persons would have recommended him to X, Y, & Z, had not the defendant spoken certain defamatory words of him on the Royal Exchange, and that X, Y, and Z. would, on the recommendation of those persons, have taken the plaintiff into their employment. The plaintiff claimed damages for the loss of the employment. Held, too remote, for it was caused by the non-recommendation, not by the defendant's words: Sterry v. Foreman, 2 Car. & P. 592. In an action of slander of title to a patent, the plaintiff alleged as special damage that in consequence of defendant's opposition, the solicitor-general refused to allow the letters patent to be granted with an amended title, as the plaintiff desired. Held, that this damage was too remote, being the act of the solicitor-general, and not of the plaintiff: Haddon v. Lott, 15 Com. B. 411; 24 L. J. Com. P. 49; Kerr v. Shedden, 4 Car. & P. 528. The plaintiff engaged Mdlle. Mara to sing at his concerts; the defendant libeled Mdlle. Mara, who consequently refused to sing, lest she should be hissed and illtreated; the result was that the concerts were more thinly attended than they otherwise would have been, whereby the plaintiff lost money. Held, that the damage to the plaintiff was too remote: Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48. The defendant asserted that a married woman was guilty of adultery, and she was consequently expelled from the congregation and Bible society of her religious sect, and was thus prevented from obtaining a cer tificate, without which she could not become a member of any similar society. Held, no action lay: Roberts v. Roberts, 5 Best & S. 384. A declaration alleged that the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke of the plaintiff, a working stone-mason, "He was the ringleader of the nine-hours' system," and "He has ruined the town by bringing about the nine-hours' system," and "He has stopped several good jobs being carried out, by being the ringleader of the system at Llanelly," whereby the plaintiff was prevented from obtaining employment in his trade at Llanelly. Held, that the alleged damage was not the natural or reasonable consequence of the speaking of such words: Miller v. David, L. R.9 Com. P. 118; 43 L.J.Com. P. 84. The plaintiff was under twenty-one and lived at home with her father, and the defendant foully slandered her to her father, in consequence of which he refused to give her a silk dress and a course of music lessons on the piano, which he had promised her, although he entirely disbelieved the defendant's story. Held, not to be such special damage as will sustain the action: Anonymous, 60 N. Y. 262; 19 Am. Rep. 174. A tells B that C, a government clerk, had spoken disrespectfully of his chief, D, and this coming to the ears of D, he discharges C from office. Held, that the damages are too remote to enable C to maintain an action of slander against A: Knight v. Blackford, 3 Mackey, 177; 51 Am. Rep. 772. § 1306. Pleading.—In slander the complaint must set out the actionable words spoken, not simply a narrative of what occurred on a certain occasion;2 but it is enough to set out the substance of the words spoken; and in libel the entire article alleged to be libelous need not be set 6 Gray, 495. A complaint setting out the alleged libelous publication, and then averring thus: "Thereby charging, and intending to charge, that plaintiff was guilty of the crime of perjury and of falsehood, and of making the false report in the leaving out of said report of the said item of fifteen thousand dollars, . . . . when in truth and in fact the cost of said bridge was in said report," substantially complies with section 372 of the Revised Statutes of Indiana, declaring that it shall be sufficient to state generally that the defamatory matter was spoken of plaintiff: Prosser v. Callis, Î17 Ind. 105. .... 5 3 out.1 Slanderous words in a foreign tongue must be set out in the original, and with a translation. An averment that the defendant is proprietor of the paper, and that the libelous matter was published in his paper, is a sufficient averment of a publication by him. The degree of certainty with which a libel should be set forth depends on the subject-matter; and where the ridicule consists mainly in postures and movements, the use of general language is unavoidable.1 Different actionable words spoken at different times constitute several and distinct causes of action, and should be embodied in separate counts. If the complaint states that the publication was a libel, it is unnecessary to aver that it is false and malicious, or without probable cause. It is sufficient to allege that the words are false and malicious, without laying a scienter, even when the words were part of a privileged communication. It is not necessary to set forth an imputation of crime with the particularity necessary in an indictment for the offense. In a declaration for slander in charging the plaintiff with perjury in another state, it must be averred that by the laws of such other state perjury is an offense to which is annexed an infamous punishment. But in an action for words imputing an offense criminal by statute only, the statute need not be referred to."1 In an action of slander in which it is alleged that the defendant accused the plaintiff of killing a particular person, it is necessary to allege that such person is dead.12 10 8 The complaint must allege that the slanderous words were spoken, uttered, or published by the defendant,1 and in the presence of third persons.2 But it is not necessary to aver in the declaration the name of the person to whom, or in whose presence, they were spoken. The time of speaking the words is not material. An allegation that the defendant published concerning the plaintiff, in a newspaper, etc., a certain article containing the false and defamatory matter following (setting out the article in full) is sufficient, without alleging that each part of the article was concerning the plaintiff.5 A plaintiff may, in the same count, charge words not actionable per se with words actionable in themselves in aggravation of damages." Evidence of special damage cannot be given in an action of slander, unless it is alleged in the declaration." "It is necessary that the declaration should set forth precisely in what way such special damage resulted from the words relied on. It is not sufficient to allege generally that the plaintiff has suffered special damages or that he has been put to great costs and expenses thereby." And where the plaintiff alleges loss of custom or profits, or the like, as his special damage, it is not sufficient to allege this generally, but the particular instances and the particular persons must be named. Thus it was held insufficient where the plaintiff alleged that by reason of the slander she "lost several suitors." So where plaintiff alleged that the defendant's words had "injured her in 1 Watts v. Morgan, 50 Ind. 318; Roberts v. Lovell, 38 Wis. 211. 2 Frank v. Kaminsky, 109 Ill. 26. But a count charging that the defendant "published a slanderous charge concerning the plaintiff is sufficient, without averring specially the presence of others: Burton v. Burton, 3 G. Greene, 316. Ware v. Cartledge, 24 Ala. 622; 60 Am. Dec. 489. Hosley v. Brooks, 20 Ill. 115; 71 Am. Dec. 252. Carson v. Mills, 69 N. C. 122. 8 Cook v. Cook, 100 Mass. 194. |