§ 1312. § 1313. Wrecks and abandoned vessels. Lost property - Rights and liabilities of finders of chattels. § 1326. § 1327. § 1328. § 1329. § 1330. § 1331. Subject-matter and donee must be definite. Unexecuted gift - Promise to make gift-Revocation. Delivery essential to gift - What is and is not a delivery. Executed gift is irrevocable Extent and effect of. § 1335. § 1336. § 1337. Delivery of property essential - What is and is not a valid delivery. Other requisites, and effect of. § 1338. Other methods of obtaining title to chattels. § 1309. Title by Original Occupancy. Title to chattels by occupancy arises where one takes possession of such articles of personal property as have not been previously appropriated by any one. The common law has not occupied itself much with this kind of title to personalty. The code of Louisiana provides: "There are five ways of acquiring property by occupancy, viz., by hunting, by fowling, by fishing, by finding, by captures from the enemy. Wild beasts, birds, and all the animals which are bred in the sea, the air, or upon the earth, do, as soon as they are taken, become instantly the property of the captor. . . . . And it is not material whether they are taken by a man upon his own ground or upon the ground of another. But the proprietor of a tract of land may forbid any person from entering for the purpose of hunting thereon. ... Those Those who discover or who find precious stones, pearls, and other things of that kind on the sea-shore or other places where it is lawful to search for and take them become masters of them." is likewise the common law of the subject. And this § 1310. Abandoned and Derelict Property. Where an owner of property throws it away with the intention of abandoning it, the person who first takes possession of it obtains a complete title. But abandonment happens as a rule only in those cases where the thing is of little or no value to the owner; as, for example, old clothing, boxes, junk of all kinds, ashes, slops, and refuse which are cast aside by the owner as worthless. In a Connecticut case, the horses of a number of persons on the highway had dropped a quantity of manure which the plaintiff afterwards gathered into heaps to remove to his ' Code Louisiana, secs. 3412 et seq. W Vyman v. Hurlburt, 12 Ohio, 81; 40 Am. Dec. 461; see note to this case, 40 Am. Dec. 464-468; McGoon v. Ankeny, 11 Ill. 558. In Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Pa. St. 393, 55 Am. Dec. 506, Gibson, C. J., says: "In the Doctor and Student it is said that a man who has abandoned his property may at any time resume the ownership of it." land. Before he removed it the defendant took it away. The court held that the manure was originally the property of the owners of the animals which dropped it; that it had been abandoned by them as worthless, and that the plaintiff by first taking possession of it became the owner, and could maintain trover against the defendant.1 Soil removed from the land of one person, and placed on the land of another with his consent, and without an intention on the part of the former to reclaim it, or any agreement authorizing him to remove it, becomes a part of the land of the latter. The owner of land is not the owner of timber floating in a stream running over his land, yet he has an exclusive right to seize such wood. And the transmission of financial news to subscribers by means of telegraphic printing instruments is only a qualified publication of such news, and does not forfeit the owner's right of property therein; and property cannot be held to be derelict in the hands of an officer into whose possession it has come by judicial process.5 1 Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 9 Am. Rep. 350, the court saying: "We do not question the general doctrine that where the right by occupancy exists, it exists no longer than the party retains the actual possession of the property, or till he appropriates it to his own use by removing it to some other place. If he leaves the property at the place where it was discovered, and does nothing whatsoever to enhance its value or change its nature, his right by occupancy is unquestionably gone. But the question is, if a party finds property comparatively worthless, as the plaintiff found the property in question owing to its scattered condition upon the highway, and greatly increases its value by his labor and expense, does he lose his right if he leaves it a reasonable time to procure the means to take it away, when such means are necessary for its removal? Suppose a teamster with a load of grain, while traveling the highway, discovers a rent in one of his bags, and finds that his grain is scattered upon the road for the distance of a mile. He considers the labor of collecting his corn of more value than the property itself, and he therefore abandons it and pursues his way. A afterwards finds the grain in this condition, and gathers it kernel by kernel into heaps by the side of the road, and leaves it a reasonable time to procure the means necessary for its removal. While he is gone for his bag, B discovers the grain thus conveniently collected in heaps, and appropriates it to his own use. Has A any remedy? If he has not, the law in this instance is open to just reproach. We think, under such circumstances, A would have a reasonable time to remove the property, and during such reasonable time his right to it would be protected." 2 Lacustrine Fertilizer Co. v. Lake Guano etc. Co., 82 N. Y. 476. 3 Rogers v. Judd, 5 Vt. 223. Kiernan v. Manhattan Quotation Tel. Co., 50 How. Pr. 194. Norton v. Nye, 56 Me. 211. 3 Further, as to what is to be considered a taking possession by the first comer, to the exclusion of others: The law requires an actual taking of the property with an intention of reducing it into possession. The possession, it has been said, need not be an absolute or perpetual appropriation of the property to the use of the finder, nor need the act of taking possession be manual.' But it has been held that marking trees that extend across a wreck, or affixing temporary buoys to it, are not such acts as the law will protect as appropriating the property; nor marking the position of a wreck and preparing a machine to raise her; nor merely chasing a wild animal;1 nor marking a tree in the woods in which there were bees; nor even getting the permission of the owner of the tree to take them. In order that the title to a personal chattel shall pass by operation of the statute of limitations, there must at least be some use or appropriation of it, or some act of dominion over it inconsistent with an absolute right of property in the owner, and such as would lay the foundation of an action for its recovery. One who cuts and stacks hay on uninclosed prairie owned by others, without authority, acquires no property in such hay, and cannot maintain an action for its destruction. The ownership of split stone lying upon land taken for a highway is not affected by the location; and the officers of the town have no right to use such stone in constructing the highway. Where one man's property is cast on another man's land, as, for example, where fruit is blown or falls from his trees, or logs or other property is carried by a flood, 2 and he is guilty of no negligence, he may abandon the property to the owner of such land, and in such case he is not liable for any damage which the property has caused. But he has also a right to enter and reclaim his property; but if he does, he must make good to the owner of the land any damage which he may have sustained.3 In Pennsylvania it has been laid down that in the case of property carried away by a flood, and stranded on another's land, the land-owner has a right after notice to disencumber his land and cast the property back into the stream. Property on the body of a drowned man washed ashore from a shipwreck is not derelict, but goes to his personal representative.5 Where derelict, or property which has been carried away by flood, etc., is saved, the rescuer has a right to be paid his reasonable costs and expenses incurred thereby." But he has no lien for this. He must deliver up the property on demand, and his only remedy is an action. against the owner. Within the admiralty jurisdiction the preserver of property has a lien on it for his services. 1 Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484; 1 Am. Rep. 569. 2 Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 377; 18 Am. Rep. 500; Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484; 1 Am. Rep. 569; Gould on Waters, 102; Carter v. Thurston, 58 N. H. 104; 42 Am. Rep. 584; Hetfield V. Baum, 13 Ired. 394; 57 Am. Dec. 563; Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9; 50 Am. Dec. 641; Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 563; 66 Am. Dec. 298. 3 Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484; 1 Am. Rep. 569; Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286. But in other cases it has been held that where the owner has not been guilty of negligence, the land-owner has no claim for injury to his property, but that the former may enter and reclaim it without paying compensation: Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Pa. St. 393; 55 Am. Dec. 506; Livezey v. Philadelphia, 64 Pa. St. 106; 3 Am. Rep. 578. Forster 2. Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Pa. St. 393; 55 Am. Dec. 506; Livezey v. Philadelphia, 64 Pa. St. 106; 3 Am. Rep. 578. Doing as little harm to it as possible: Berry v. Carle, 3 Me. 269. 5 Wonson v. Sayward, 13 Pick. 402; 23 Am. Dec. 691. Tome v. Cribs of Lumber, Taney, 553; Tome v. Dubois, 6 Wall. 548; Winslow v. Walker, 1 Hayw. 193; Reeder v. Anderson, 4 Dana, 193. Baker v. Hoag, 7 N. Y. 555; 59 Am. Dec. 431; Tome v. Cribs of Lumber, Taney, 553; Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. Black. 254. 8 Baker v. Hoag, 7 N. Y. 555; 59 Am. Dec. 431. In Story on Bailments, sec. 622, it is said: "Whenever upon the high seas, or on the sea-coast, or elsewhere within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction (which is ordinarily limited to places within the ebb and flow of the tide), any services are rendered by persons not composing the ship's crew to ships in distress, by saving them or their car |