and the sentiments prevailing among the people,-sentiments which this house might be unwilling to sustain.

What did that declaration mean! Was it held out in terrorem?

You hold out the idea, that any interference on the part of the European powers, except Spain, with the South American nations, will be resisted by the United States. Are we prepared to act upon that declaration, if such interference should take place? It would ill become us to say, that we had no serious intention, when we held such language in the face of the world.

The topic has now assumed a graver character.

It is about to become the subject of discussion in the Panama congress, and we are called upon for an explicit declaration of our views. If this had been asked in a special message, we could not refuse it. It is not now asked here, but it is to be asked at Panama; and you are required to send ministers to answer it and it, therefore, becomes us as much to deliberate upon the the subject, as if the question were directly put to themselves. He did not mean to go into a minute investigation. The view he proposed to take, superseded the necessity of that; but he wished

cur in the opinions of the committee of foreign relations. He did not consider this congress as a mere deliberative, diplomatic assembly. He believed its deliberations would be binding on all the governments, that were represented there, without any subsequent action on their part. If not, he could not perceive, what advantage would be derived from this assembly. It is held under the authority of treaties, and is vested with the powers of peace and war, and to give effect to those treaties ; and every power present will be as much bound by its acts, as if under the obligation of specific treaties.

He did not say this in condemnation of the measure. Whatever may be the character of this congress, we may have very important interests connected with it; and it is our duty to be represented there by some accredited agent. He was not tenacious as to the form of this mission. The executive has recommended a particular form, and the senate has confirmed it. He did mean, therefore, to object to the form; but he wished to call the attention of the house, to the subjects to be discussed at the Panama congress. Mr. M'Lane then quoted from the message of the president some passages, stating the objects of the mission, and proceeded.

These objects are all important. They afford a sufficient reason to send some kind of agents. There are other subjects of minor importance; and it is proposed to discuss all these subjects by our ministers; but we are not to be bound by their decisions, until they have been ratified by the senate.

There are, however, subjects connected with this country, which he would not consent should even be discussed or considered; and to prevent that, he had proposed his amendment.

There are questions of international law-the abolition of the slave trade the condition of Hayti, Porto Rico, and Cuba-the resistance of any attempts to form new colonial establishments on this continent and any interference with the domestic relations of the new republics.

Any

He did not object to the discussion of any of these topics, but the last; though he did not believe that any one of these objects would be gained by the mission. We have nothing to give, or to concede; and, therefore, nothing to gain: still they may be discussed. treaty as to foreign nations, is incompatible with our policy, and, therefore, ought not to be discussed. The system of policy adopted by a nation, is not a subject of negotiation. It is the duty of a government to regulate its own con

cerns, and to announce its policy to the world; but not to negotiate, as to what it shall be.

It is for us to say that our policy is pacific and neutral; that we are determined to steer clear, of all difficulties growing out of the situation and circumstances of other nations; and that we will never consent to negotiate, whether we will take part in their concerns or not. If, however, any gentleman would say, that he was willing to stipulate, that we should irrevocably take part in any disputes between foreign nations; he was desirous distinctly to say that he would not consent to any such stipulation. He would not go abroad to make an agreement, which he would not assent to at home. He would not even discuss those points; and therefore he thought it due to ourselves and to these governments, that if we determine to remain free from any such pledge, they should know our determination.

He did not mean to say, that it is the intention of the executive to enter into any alliances, or stipulations on this subject. Still, the subject will be discussed: these powers expect it will; and this expectation, is a reason why our opinions should be declared.

He then quoted from the letters of Messrs. Salazar, Obregon, and Canaz, to Mr. Clay; and his

answer accepting the invitation; and also from the president's message, to show that this was one of the prominent objects of the mission; and then proceeded to say, that it was not by treaty alone, that alliances and obligations were entered into: they might be assumed by proclamation, and by many other modes. He would not enter into this subject. The settled policy of this country is not only neutral; but to avoid all political connections, all entangling alliances, and all associations which are not necessary to effect commercial objects. It is the interest of the country that this policy should prevail; and it is the duty of the government to make it prevail. The government indeed cannot be insensible to the public opinion. It is founded on public opinion; but when a feverish excitement has been created by adventitious causes, it is the duty of the government to repress it. The moment the government loses sight of this principle, we are all afloat. The policy of the act of 1793 was, the moderation of the government, acting on public excitement. The sympathies of the people were strongly and justly excited in favor of the French nation; and this violence of feeling would have hurried us into war, but for the interposition of the power of the government. Again, on a more recent occasion, the efforts of the Greeks

kindled the sympathies of the people -it was an acclamation of the whole country, but the course adopted by the government, checked and qualified it. So also in relation to the South American states, the policy which we have adopted towards them, was the act of the government on the people.

That

The message of the president takes the valedictory address of general Washington, as the foundation of the neutral policy of the country. It is not so. The policy existed before that address; it had its origin in the very infancy of our country, and that valedictory address came to confirm it. address was not so much in favor of the policy itself; as of its continuance. If he had not totally misunderstood the spirit of that address, it related not to our policy as to a particular people or a particular time; but to all people, and to all time: to preserve our neutral attitude, and thus to disconnect ourselves from the broils of other nations, wherever they may be situated. The great spirit of this policy is, to leave the government untrammelled, to act according to our best interests, whenever we may be called on to do so. This might have been the motive to recommend it, in relation to European and other nations. What is there in the character of the South American governments, to induce any change in this

policy towards them. He had no wish, to undervalue that part of the continent. He would not wish it to be supposed, that he had no sympathy for the South American people : he had deeply sympathized in all their struggles and privations in quest of their independence; but in their institutions themselves, there was nothing to excite any particular sympathy. He felt all due respect for their character; he was as great an admirer of the courage and constancy they had exhibited, as any gentleman could be; but he would not suffer that feeling to drag him from his moorings, nor to set the country afloat. If there be any thing in the proximity of those nations to influence, it should rather strengthen our attachment to this policy, and induce us to cling with still greater circumspection to our anchorage. It is here the European nations are detached and distant, and the facilities for the preservation of a neutral character are greater; but because a nation is nearer, and the difficulty of sustaining that character is greater, the more difficult it is to preserve neutrality, the greater necessity is there for circumspection. Would a war on our borders be less injurious to us, than a difficulty with a remote antagonist? These governments are yet in their infancy-they are still in their chrysalis state-they have yet

to pass through various trials, before they can reach their proper elevation among nations. He was desirous that all their best hopes might be realised; but they are yet new, and may be involved by a multiplicity of circumstances.

He would not go farther into an argument, as to general topics. The simple object he had in view, was to offer his amendment. It appeared to him, that we cannot vote the appropriation; unless we come to an expression of the opinion contained in the amendment, without committing ourselves. It is avowed in the message and the documents, that we must have political relations. He would not say, that we would not have these political relations. It is the opinion of the ruling statesmen of our day and of our country, that we are an American family of governments, and have common interests and a common cause. When that opinion is acted on, and we are called to send ministers, he would say, it is a subject not to be discussed. It will not satisfy to bring forward as an argument, that we cannot compromit our neutrality. Our true ground is-we cannot go into the discussion at all. If the executive wish to avoid the expression of an opinion-if the house will sustain him in his amendment, we will tell these governments that we will go so far; but the people and their repre