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Feb. 10,

in question by its terms does not apply as against a claim adverse to or inconsistent | NUECES VALLEY IRR. CO. v. DAVIS et al. with that evidenced under the instrument, (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. which has been asserted during the first 10 years that the instrument has been upon record. The court finds that this instrument 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1008*)-SCOPE OF

has been upon record since 1838, and that no adverse claim has been asserted against that conveyed by it until the execution of the power of attorney to Padgett in 1907. There was no error in admitting the instrument in evidence. The first assignment of error presenting the point is overruled.

The fourth assignment is that the court erred in admitting in evidence the instrument executed by Joseph Sims and in construing the same to be a deed and not a power of attorney.

The only proposition under this assignment, which is not itself presented as a proposition, is that, "so long as the title is imperfect and inchoate, the lands belong to the state of Texas, and the public lands are not a lawful subject-matter of private contract, and any attempt to convey the same by one person to another passes no interest whatever in the land and does not create the relation of vendor and vendees." This proposition has no proper relation to the assignment in question, and the question attempted to be raised by the assignment might properly be dismissed without consideration. If the question of the proper construction of this instrument were properly presented, we would hold that, as concluded by the trial court, the instrument on its face is a deed and not a power of attorney. It is a part of the history of the country of which courts take judicial notice, that in making convey ances of land, especially after location of certificate and before issuance of patent, instruments in the form of powers of attorney were used. Cox v. Bray, 28 Tex. 260. The terms of this instrument are entirely inconsistent with a mere power to sell for the benefit of the maker. They evidence a purpose to confer full sovereignty and beneficial ownership in the land, and, if there were any doubt about this, the findings of fact show conclusively that it has been so treated by Sims during his lifetime and his heirs after him, as well as by Roberts and those claiming under him, from the date of the instrument in 1838 until the date of this belated claim in 1907.

The trial court was correct both in construing this instrument as a deed, and not a mere power of attorney on its face, and also in finding as a fact from the evidence that such was the intention of the parties. Cook v. Lindsay, 57 Tex. 69; Brown v. Simpson's Heirs, 67 Tex. 225, 2 S. W. 644; Davidson v. Senior, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 547, 23 S. W. 24. We find no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

1909. On Rehearing, March 10, 1909.)

REVIEW.

Where no exception was taken to the court's findings of fact, nor to evidence on which they were found, and the court was not requested to make any additional findings, the findings made would be taken as true on appeal, and the only question to be reviewed is whether the findings supported the judgment.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3955; Dec. Dig. § 1008.*] 2. CORPORATIONS (§ 316*) - DIRECTORS - AU

THORITY-ADVERSE INTEREST.

A director of a corporation cannot act as such in a matter in which his interest is adverse to the corporation.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1401; Dec. Dig. § 316.*]

3. CORPORATIONS (§ 316*)-CONTRACTS WITH DIRECTORS-AVOIDANCE.

While a corporation may not at its mere option without inquiring into its fairness avoid a contract made with one of its directors, it by and with directors representing both themmay avoid a trade affecting its interests made selves and the corporation.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1401; Dec. Dig. § 316.*] 4. CORPORATIONS (§ 316*)-DIRECTORS-POWER TO ACT-PERSONAL INTEREST.

comprise all the stockholders, acting in their Directors of a corporation who did not representative capacity for themselves as directors when there was not otherwise a quorum of the board, passed a resolution conferring on the president power to sell the corporation's land to themselves. The president under such resolution sold land of the corporation to two of the directors who passed the resolution, and also to his wife. After the sales had been made, that the conveyances were without authority, they were approved by the same board. Held, and invalid.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1401; Dec. Dig. § 316.*] 5. CORPORATIONS (§ 320*)- CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY-VACATION.

and ratified a conveyance of the corporation's Where directors of a corporation authorized property to themselves and to the wife of the president, any stockholder who was not present at the meeting and who never assented to or ratified such acts was entitled to require the corporation to sue to cancel the conveyances, and, on failure of the corporation to do so, to bring the action himself.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 14292; Dec. Dig. $ 320.*1 6. CORPORATIONS (§ 316*)—SALE TO DIRECTORS

-RATIFICATION.

Where a prior board of directors of a corporation illegally authorized a conveyance of the corporation's property which was carried into effect, a ratification of such transactions by a new board of directors not consisting of all the stockholders of the corporation was ineffective to validate the conveyances.

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Where certain conveyances of a corporation's property were unauthorized, but the purchasers paid the value of the land and there was no positive fraud, the corporation as a condition precedent to the cancellation of the conveyances would be required to refund the purchase price so paid, but without interest; the purchasers having had possession in the

ances by reason of the fact that the stock of | Davis for the sum of $500, alleged to be due the corporation changed hands, and the purchas- the company by reason of his purchasing in ers bought with knowledge of the illegal trans- the name of his wife while president of the actions of the prior board of directors. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, corporation 20 shares of the company's capiCent. Dig. § 1413; Dec. Dig. § 316.*] tal stock at $25 per share, when its par, as 8. CORPORATIONS (§ 316*)-SALE TO DIRECTORS well as market value, was $50 per share. -VACATION-LIEN FOR PRICE. The defendants answered by certain pleas in abatement, by general and special exceptions (none of which was called to the attention of the trial court), by pleas of not guilty and general denial, and specially the matters set out in our conclusions of fact as a ratification of the acts of the company's board of directors and its president, the alleged invalidity of which is the basis of this suit, which acts are also set up as estopping plaintiff from maintaining this action. The case was tried without a jury, and the trial resulted in a judgment against the plaintiff as to the land and cancellation of the deed, and in favor of defendants as to everything else involved. From this judgment the plaintiff alone has appealed.

meantime.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, Dec. Dig. 316.*]

On Rehearing.

9. EQUITY (§ 66*)-PLEADING.

A party suing in equity is not required to plead the equities of his adversary; it being only where such equities are so blended with his own case as to be inseparable from a fair statement thereof that he is required to offer to do his adversary equity before he recovers.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. 88 188-190; Dec. Dig. § 66.*] 10. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1178*) — REVIEW LIMITATION BY SCOPE OF RECORD-REVERSAL-DISPOSITION OF CAUSE.

Where, in a suit to set aside certain illegal conveyances of a corporation's property, the purchasers did not plead the placing of improvements on the property in excess of the purchase price, and ask that the cost be refunded in case the conveyances were set aside and no issue was made thereon at the trial, the Court of Appeals on reversing a judgment for defendants and directing a cancellation of the deeds would not remand the cause for a determination of such question on the affidavit of appellees' counsel that since defendants had bought the premises they had placed improvements thereon aggregating $5,000.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. § 1178.*]

Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; Arthur W. Seeligson, Judge.

The facts found by the trial judge are:

(1) That on March 15, 1904, at a regular meeting of the corporation at which were present Dr. W. H. Davis, F. Vandervoort, J. A. Daugherty, and J. S. Taylor, the company passed the following resolution: "That the president of the Nueces Valley Irrigation Co. is hereby authorized to sell to the members of this company, land or lands now owned by this company, either to pay debts owing to such members, or for cash at such price as may be agreed upon and to sell with the land perpetual water rights for irrigation purposes. The president is further authorized to borrow money on the property of the company to the amount of five thou

sand dollars ($5,000.00) and to give a mortgage on the property of the company." No money was borrowed by the president for the purpose mentioned in the resolution. (2) That on July 4, 1904, the corporation, through its board of directors, Wm. Hope Davis, F. Vandervoort, J. A. Daugherty, and J. S. Taylor, at a regular meeting of the corporation, authorized its president to negotiate a loan for the company for the sum of C. C. Clamp $5,000 for the completion of work under

Action by the Nueces Valley Irrigation Company against William H. Davis and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part. Motion for rehearing

overruled.

A. C. Bullitt, for appellant. and S. S. Searcy, for appellees.

progress, and such new work as clearing land, making laterals, fencing, grubbing, and other work determined on from time to time as the superintendent and engineer might deem necessary; that at the time said directors owned practically all the stock of plaintiff corporation; that the president failed to negotiate a loan for the purpose of paying its indebtedness, and for making the improvements for which the company was indebted.

NEILL, J. Appellant, a private corporation, brought this suit on June 7, 1907, against appellees, William H. Davis, Alletta B. Davis, his wife, and Ida F. Brooks, to cancel a deed made by appellant through its president, William H. Davis, on June 4, 1904, to his wife, Alletta B. Davis, and Ida F. Brooks, conveying them 200 acres of land situated in the county of Dimmitt, and state of Texas, the property of appellant corporation, upon the ground that the conveyance is void because executed by Davis without authority of the irrigation company. In the same action the company sued William H.

(3) That on July 11, 1904, the stockholders of the corporation elected the following directors: Dr. Wm. Hope Davis, Mrs. J. S. Taylor, J. S. Taylor, Mrs. Alletta B. Davis, and Ida F. Brooks, there being 620 shares of

capital stock of the corporation represented, | pany, which contract provided that Bullitt the entire issuance of which did not exceed & Bullitt, attorneys for Dunlap and asso700 shares at $50 per share, aggregating ciates, should investigate the title to the $35,000. land, condition of the company and its stock

(4) That on June 14, 1904, the president, During the investigation Dunlap and his asWm. Hope Davis, acting under the author-sociates had all the records of the corporaity conferred upon him by the board of direc- tion, together with all title papers and stock tors, conveyed 78% acres of the company's book, and were fully advised of the condiland to Adams, Kirkpatrick & Nicholson for tions herein before enumerated; and therethe sum of $- per acre, to Ida F. Brooks after, on September 3, 1904, they purchased 100 acres at $5 per acre, to Alletta B. Davis all the stock owned by Davis and wife and 100 acres at $5 per acre, and to Mrs. J. S. Ida F. Brooks of the company, and from Taylor 152 acres at $5 per acre; that all that date to the present they owned all the the land so conveyed was similar in quality stock of the corporation, save that owned and value except the land conveyed to by the Taylors, who are still members of the Adams, Kirkpatrick & Nicholson, which was corporation owning the shares heretofore better and worth more than the other land; noted. that the consideration received from the sales was paid to the company and expended in paying its debts and improving its property; that the corporation made a deed to Mrs. Davis and Ida F. Brooks for the 200 acres conveyed to them which was filed in the deed records of Nueces county on July 18, 1904, and duly recorded; that Alletta B. Davis was the wife of Wm. Hope Davis when she bought the land; and that the respective purchasers took possession of the respective lands conveyed to them, and have used, occupied, and improved the same ever since.

(5) On July 11, 1904, at a regular meeting of the board of directors, the following resolution was unanimously adopted: "It is hereby ordered that the sale of 78% acres of land sold by Dr. Davis to J. E. Adams, Kirkpatrick, and Nicholson, 100 acres sold to Ida F. Brooks, 100 acres sold to Alletta B. Davis, and 1504 acres sold to Mrs. J. S. Taylor, be and is hereby approved." On that date W. P. Dunlap, W. W. Cunningham, Wm. M. Carroll, and Henry D. Keith were not members of the corporation.

(6) On June 30, 1904, there was issued to Mrs. Alletta B. Davis 50 shares of the capital stock of the corporation at $25 per share, | which sale was made by virtue of a resolution of the board of directors authorizing the president of the company to sell said stock. This resolution was not entered upon the minutes, but the stock book shows the issuance of the stock and the ledger account shows its issuance at the reduced rate of $25 per share, the par value being $50 per share; that the money derived from the sale was used by the company in paying its indebtedness and for improvements; that on said date the company owed approximately $3,000, and there was allowed Wm. Hope Davis $242.26 out of the company's funds by an order of the board of directors for expenses and outlays incurred by him in its business. (7) On July 23, 1904, Wm. Hope Davis. Alletta B. Davis, and Ida F. Brooks entered into a written contract with said Dunlap and his associates for the sale by Davis and his associates to Dunlap and his associates

(8) On July 10, 1905, the new directors of the corporation, who were said Dunlap and his associates, by resolution approved and ratified all the acts of the old board and the company except the sale of the land to Mrs. Davis; the resolution being silent as to the purchase of the land by her.

(9) The land purchased by Mrs. Taylor was shown by the testimony of her husband J. S. Taylor, to be of similar value to that purchased by Miss Brooks; that in the sale of the land the parties acted in good faith and paid the fair market value therefor. No question was raised by the company as against the sale to Adams, Kirkpatrick & Nicholson or to Mrs. Taylor; that the company received the cash consideration for the various tracts of land sold, as well as for the stock, hereinbefore enumerated, and the money was used in payment of debts and for improvements.

(10) Prior to September 3, 1904, the date when Dunlap and associates became the owners of all the capital stock except that owned by the Taylors, the acts and things done and performed by said corporation, was, with the unanimous consent of the directors and stockholders mentioned, and at the time the various acts and things, hereinbefore mentioned, were done, Dunlap and his associates had no interest in the corporation, either as stockholders or as directors.

Upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover upon any issue of the case claimed by it and alleged in its petition against defendants. No exception was taken to these findings of fact, nor to evidence upon which they were found, nor was the trial court requested by either party to make any additional findings. Therefore they will be taken as true, and the naked question of law considered, whether they support the judgment rendered on them. This depends upon whether the resolution of the board of directors under which the sales of the property was made was void, and, if it was, whether the sales were afterwards ratified by the stockholders.

It was held by the Supreme Court in San

fer upon Davis, the president of the concern, the power to sell its land to themselves, who, acting under the guise of the resolution, did sell to two of the directors who passed the resolution and to himself, or, what is the same thing, to his wife. And, when they had bought the property, they, still acting as a board of directors (for themselves), approved the sales. In other words, having bought the property under a void resolution, they approve their own purchase by a resolution which is likewise void. It cannot be successfully contended that this resolution of approval was by the stockholders; for the board of directors was not composed of all the stockholders when either of the resolutions was passed. Therefore any stockholder who was not present, and never assented to or ratified the unauthorized acts of the board of directors and president of the corporation, had the right to require the corporation to institute suit to cancel the unauthorized deed, or, upon the failure of the company to sue, to bring the action himself.

26 S. W. 1040, that a director is without au- | the corporation, when there was not a quothority to act as such in a matter in which rum of the board of its directors. Thus acthis interest is adverse to the corporation, cit-ing, they undertook by the resolution to coning 1 Mora. on Corp. § 517, 518. In that case two of the four directors constituted the quorum when a resolution was passed by which a contract between the corporation and certain parties, of whom two were directors, was made, and, when another resolution was passed affecting the contract, one of the board of directors interested in the contract sat as president at the meeting of the board of directors with only two other members of it present. The court upon the principle stated held the resolutions void. The decision cited rests upon the principle that the directors of a corporation occupy a fiduciary relation towards the corporation, and cannot, either directly or indirectly, in their dealings on behalf of the corporation, acquire any benefit or advantage not also enjoyed by the other stockholders. And for this reason it is generally held that if the directors or other officers of a corporation represent it in making or authorizing a contract or other transaction in which they are personally interested adversely to the corporation, and their consent is necessary to bind the corporation, the transaction is voidable at the option of the corporation and without proof of fraud. 3 Clark & Marsh. Cor. §§ 757, 758, 759. It seems, however, that these principles are not in this state carried to their logical result; for here a corporation cannot, at its mere option, without inquiring into its fairness, avoid a contract made with one of its directors. The

Upon the same principle we do not think that the resolution of July 10, 1905, passed by the new board of directors, approving and ratifying the acts of the old board of directors (called in the trial court's conclusions "the old company"), precluded the corporation from maintaining this suit; it not appearing that the members of the new board were all the stockholders of the company, for it was essential to a ratification of such acts that it should be made by all the stockholders.

Nor, as to the cancellation of the deed, can we perceive from the facts found anything to estop the company from maintaining this action against Miss Brooks, Davis, and wife A corporation is an entity

for that purpose.

right of directors to make fair contracts with the corporation is upheld in the case of Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 294, 67 S. W. 92. But in the same case it is said: "It is doubtless right to allow a beneficiary the option of avoiding a trade affecting his interests which has been effected by a trustee representing separate and distinct from its board of diboth parties to it, for the reason that the trus-rectors, whose personnel may change and tee ought not to be allowed to act for and be different at different times; but this does bind two parties having conflicting interests. not affect the identity or life of the corporaIt may be perfectly just to apply this prin- tion. The spirit of its existence is its charciple to transactions in negotiating which a ter, and there can be no dissolution of a body director or directors of a corporation were corporate until it loses its life, which is its personally interested, and at the same time charter. The Nueces Valley Irrigation Comrepresented the corporation, either alone or pany, after Dunlap and his associates became conjointly with co-directors; and this is prob- the majority stockholders and members of its ably the true spirit of the rule as it has been board of directors, remained the same entity enforced in most of the cases." See, also, that it was before. Whatever unlawful or Parks v. Worthington (Tex.) 109 S. W. 909; unauthorized disposition was made of its Greathouse v. Martin (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S. property through the board of its directors W. 385; Id., 100 Tex. 99, 94 S. W. 322; Na- and officers when Dr. Davis was president bours v. McCord, 100 Tex. 456, 100 S. W. could be righted by suit brought by the corporation under the direction of the board of directors afterwards elected to set aside such wrongful or unauthorized act, and to recover its property from those who claimed it through means thereof, if such acts had not before been ratified by all the company's stockholders. Nor can we perceive any reason why the purchase by Dunlap and his as

1152.

In the case at bar the purchasers of the land did not, as did the director in Tenison v. Patton, divest themselves of their representative character in the transactions under consideration and deal with the corporation through others competent to represent it; but they retained and acted in their representa

knowledge of the unauthorized acts of the board of directors through which they (appellees) obtained the deed to the land in controversy, should be taken as estopping the corporation from maintaining this suit to cancel the unauthorized deed to its land. As their transaction with appellees was in the, individual capacity of the respective parties to the contract, the corporation itself could in no way be affected by it. Essential elements of an estoppel are entirely absent from the transaction. We think, therefore, that under the law applicable to the undisputed facts in this case that trial court should have decreed a cancellation of the deed in question upon plaintiff's refunding the purchase money paid by the defendants for the land conveyed by it; for, as the trial court found that defendants paid the value of the land, and as is evident from its findings there was no positive fraud in the transaction, we think that equity requires the plaintiff to refund defendants the purchase money as a condition precedent to the cancellation of said deed. But, as defendants have had possession and the use of the land from the time the deed was made, we do not think they are entitled to interest on the purchase money.

As no complaint is made as to other parts of the judgment in favor of the appellees, it will be affirmed. But the judgment against plaintiff denying a recovery of the land conveyed to Mrs. Davis and Miss Brooks, and cancellation of the deed made to them by Wm. H. Davis, president of the company, is reversed, and judgment is here directed in favor of plaintiff corporation against the defendants for the recovery of the land and cancellation of the deed upon plaintiff's refunding them the sum of $1,000 ($500 to each vendee named in the deed) within 30 days from the date that the mandate issues herein.

cellation of the deed, under which appellees claim, was asked, no plea or suggestion of improvements in good faith was made, nor the value of such improvements prayed for by defendants. If one who buys land under such circumstances as appellees made the purchase of the tract involved in this case can be regarded as such a purchaser as can make improvements in good faith, he should, when sued for a rescission of the contract of sale, plead his equity in such improvements and their value in order to recover, or make the payment of the value of such improvements by plaintiff a condition precedent to his recovery of the land. One party, though he sues in a court of equity, is neither expected nor required to find out, plead, and establish the equities of his adversary for him as a condition precedent to his recovery. It is only when the equities of the adverse party are so blended and intertwined with his own case as to be inseparable from a fair and correct statement of it that he is required to offer to do his adversary equity before he recovers.

We have failed to find in the conclusions of the trial judge anything that tends to show the value of the improvements made by the appellees on the land, nor do we believe that it was the intention of their counsel to intimate in this motion that there was such a finding as to their value. We take it that they simply assert that defendants have since they bought the premises placed improvements thereon of the aggregate value of at least $5,000. Though we have the highest regard for counsel's integrity and veracity, we are without authority to consider a statement, though true, that is not borne out by the record, but appears to have been made independent of and outside of it. If we are otherwise correct in the conclusions expressed in the original opinion, we cannot be ex

Affirmed in part and reversed and render-pected to reverse the judgment based upon ed in part.

On Rehearing.

In this motion it is stated that the findings of the trial court show that appellees purchased the land sued for in good faith and for a fair price, took possession thereof, and have occupied and improved the same ever since June 14, 1904, the date of their purchase. And that since that time they have steadily improved the land until at this time the value of the improvements they have placed thereon aggregate at least $5,000 in excess of the purchase price. Upon this statement, in view of the maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity, they base the contention that it is incumbent upon appellant to refund them the value of the improvements placed by them in good faith upon the land before it can recover.

them, and remand the cause to be tried upon an issue (improvements in good faith) not raised in the court below by either the pleadings or evidence.

We are unable to bring ourselves to believe that directors of a corporation can legally authorize the sale of its property among themselves, or that the same directors, after they have bought the property under such pretended authority, are capable of ratifying such sale. While all the shareholders may ratify a sale made by the members of the board of directors of the corporation to themselves (for, if it does not prejudice the creditors of the corporation, they can, with the assent and concurrence of all, give the property away), we cannot see how such a transaction can be legalized by its board of directors, unless the members thereof own all the stock of the concern.

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