In Shepherd agt. Dean, 13 How., 174, Special Term, November, 1856, New York Com mon Pleus, DALY, J., it was decided, that in proceedings supplementary to execution, the power to punish a party or witness for disobedience of an order of the judge, is given to the judge, and not to the court. Therefore, an attachment issued in such cases should be made returnable before the judge-not before the court. In Wicker agt. Dresser, 14 How., 465, Special Term, February, 1857, PEABODY, J., it was decided, that for the disobedience of an order of a justice out of court, the punishment should be administered by the justice whose order is disobeyed, and on the papers read on the motion. This was a motion to punish the defendant for contempt in refusing to answer certain questions in supplementary proceedings. Per Contra. In Wicker agt. Dresser, 13 How., 334, Special Term, January, 1857, CLARKE, J., it was decided, that the court has the inherent power, in a general sense, of punishing, as a contempt, disobedience to orders made by judges out of court. It is a power essential to the efficacious existence of a judicial tribunal. This power has not been taken away from the court by any provisions of the Code relating to supplementary proceedings. On the contrary, the Code in the sections in reference to these proceedings, plainly recognizes such power. Because the power, in these proceedings, to punish for contempt is by the Code (302) conferred on the judge before whom the proceedings have been commenced; and in the first judicial district, on any judge before whom such proceedings have been continued, where they have been commenced before another judge, it does not follow that the court is divested by implication, of enforcing the inherent general power, which it has always possessed and exercised, of enforcing the orders of its judges out of court, and of punishing disobedience to them as a contempt, calculated to impair its dignity and efficiency. In Disbrow agt. Folger 5 Abb., 54 Special Term, June, 1857, MITCHELL, J., it was decided, that as an application for an order is a motion, ( 401) an application in the first judicial district for the appointment of a gua dian in partition may be made by a judge at chambers, and it operates as an order of the court. But it seems that the court must appoint such guardians in other districts of the state. In Lowber agt. The Mayor &c. of New York, Special Term, September, 1857, ROOSEVELT, J., it was decided, that a motion to open a judginent and let defendant in to defend, may be made, in the first judicial district to a judge out of court. In Main agt. Pope, 16 How., 272, Special Term, July, 1858, INGRAHAM, J., it was decided, that every application for an order is a motion; and motions in the first district (except for a new trial on the merits may be made to a judge or a justice out of court, (Code 401.) This includes a motion for an allowance of costs. Where an order is entitled as made at chambers by a judge in the first district, which order can only be made by the court, the order can be amended so as to read as the order of the court, and he entitled at special term; because in this district the judge at the same time and place holds chambers and special term. In Latham agt. Westervelt, 16 Barb., 427, General Term, October, 1853, EDWARDS, J., • it was decided, that a warrant issued under the non-imprisonment act, which is made returnable before one of the justices of this court instead of being returnable before the justice who issued it, does not render the warrant void. The command in the warrant to bring the party before the particular justice issuing it, is merely a matter of form, and not of substance; inasmuch as the proceedings may be carried on before any other justice who may be in attendance at chambers. 7. Q. Has one justice power to sit in review of the rulings of another justice in the same court? A. In Morris agt. Brower, 4 Sandf., 702, General Term, February, 1852, SANDFORD, J., it was decided, that when from the nature of the questions of law presented, or the amount in controversy, a decision at special term will not be likely to terminate the cause, the better practice is to order the case or bill of exceptions at once to the general term. The circumstance that there are facts to be examined as well as points of law, should make no difference. Especially ought this practice to be pursued, where the points of law were ruled adversely at the trial. An argument of a bill of exceptions at specia! term in such case, is nothing more than an appeal from one judge to another which should never be permitted, where it can be avoided." 8. Q. Can the action of a justice having general authority, in any case be considered a nullity? If A. In Hill agt. Sellick, 21 Barb., 210, General Term, December, 1855, T. R. STRONG, J., it was decided, that it is a general rule that public officers are not answerable in damages for their proceedings, on account of an error in judgment, when acting judicially, they have general authority in any case, a mere error in law or fact in exercising their authority, will not make their action a nullity. Their acts will be valid until reversed or set aside. What is the result of the decisions under this section? Jurisdiction out of court. 1. A justice of the supreme court, like any other officer when acting out of court is an officer of limited jurisdiction. 2. A justice of the supreme court, any where, may make an order out of court and without notice staying proceedings twenty days, to enable a party to apply for some ulterior relief. 3. The entitling an order as at special term, which may be made by the judge out of court, or the making it when sitting at special term, instead of when sitting at chambers, does not vitiate the order. It must however be appealed from as an order at special term. 4. Where a proceeding upon habeas corpus is had before a judge as an officer, a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings is properly directed to him, and allowed by a justice of the supreme court. 5. Where a party is directed by a judge to be brought up on attachment in supple mentary proceedings for contempt, returnable before the judge at his office, and the judge hears the application when holding special term, it does not render the proceedings and process void. A judge has power to punish for contempt, consequently an attachment may be made returnable before him at his office, 6. Where a court of competent jurisdiction (N. Y. commoa pleas) decides a jurisdictional question (a commitment for contempt of court), a justice of the supreme court at chambers, has no right to review such decision collaterally. 7. No judge at chambers has the power of prescribing a shorter time than eight days for serving a notice of motion to be made in court or before another judge; but when the motion is to be made before himself he may prescribe a shorter time. 8. A judge at chambers has no power to tax or adjust costs. 9. An order granting a new trial which omits the disposition of costs, can be corrected only by a judge at special term. 10. A judge at chambers has no authority to allow a common law certiorari, but only a certiorari or writ of error authorized by statute. 11. A judge at chambers, has no authority to make an extra allowance of costs, it must be made by the court. 12. A judge at chambers has no authority to entertain an application on petition by a debtor, to be discharged from his imprisonment under the Revised Statutes. 13. A judge at chambers has no authority to hear a motion in arrest of judgment. 14. A judge at chambers, had no authority to extend the time to make a case or bill of exceptions, after the expiration of the time for the making the same by the rules of the court, had expired, in an action pending when the Code took effect. 15. A judge at chambers has no power to make an absolute, indefinite and continuing order either to set aside or stay proceedings. And this applies to supplementary proceedings. 16. A judge at chambers, has authority to make an absolute or conditional order for judgment on account of the frivolousness of a pleading under section 247 of the Code. Equity cases. 17. It was provided by the 16th section of the judiciary act of 1847, that orders in equity formerly made by the chancellor out of term, may now be made by any justice of the supreme court, being or residing within 100 miles of the county where the attorney or party making the application resides, at any time or place selected by such justice. 18. The present supreme court is now always open as a court of equity, as much as the former court of chancery; except so far as restricted by its own rules. Therefore a judge at chambers may hear a motion for leave to amend a complaint (former bil in chancery) by adding new parties. 19. A judge at chambers may hear a motion for a reference to ascertain damages on the issuing of an injunction. 20. A judge at chambers has no power to render a judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff has not replied to the answer. There is but one case in which a judge at chambers can grant a judgment, and that is under section 247 of the Code. 21. A judge at chambers, cannot make orders in proceedings for the sale or other disposition of infants' real estate; nor can he at chambers appoint a guardian for an infant in such cases, except in the first judicial district, where motions may be made, to a judge or justice out of court, except for a new trial on the merits. Review of ex parte orders. 22. The legislature never intended to impose upon the judges of the supreme court, the duty, or confer the right to review, at chambers each others' ex parte orders. 23. The judge who may grant an order of arrest, may hear a motion ex parte to vacate or modify it. But such a motion cannot be made before any other judge, except to the court on notice, the same as other motions are made. First judicial district. 24. A proceeding in the first judicial district by any judge competent to institute it therein, may be continued in such district before any other judge competent to have commenced it. And this rule includes proceedings supplementary to execution. 25. The power to punish for contempt in supplementary proceedings is given, by the Code, to the judge before whom the proceedings are pending. And it seems that the court also has an inherent power to punish for contempt in such cases. 26. An application for the appointment of a guardian in partition may be made in the first district, by a judge at chambers, and it operates as an order of the court. But it scems such guardians in other districts of the state must be appointed by the court. 27. A motion, in the first district, to open a judgment and let the defendant in to defend, may be made before a justice at chambers. 28. An application in the first district, for an extra allowance of costs, may be made to a judge at chambers. 29 Where a warrant under the non-imprisonment act is issued by a justice of the first district, commanding that the party be brought before one of the justices of this court, irstead of being returnable before the justice who issued it, it does not render the warrant void, as the proceedings may be carried on before any other justice who may be in attendance at chambers. One Justice Reviewing Another's Decisions. 30. Where, from the nature of the questions of law presented, or the amount in controversy, a decision at special term will not be likely to terminate the cause, the case or bill of exceptions should be ordered at once to the general term. An argument at special term in such case is nothing more than an appeal from one judge to another, which should never be permitted where it can be avoided. Acts a Nullity. 31. If public officers have general authority in any case, a mere error in judgment in law or fact in exercising their authority will not make their action a nullity, nor render them liable in damages. Their action will be valid until reversed or set aside. $28. Rooms, fuel, &c.; how furnished. [Same as § 31 in 1848.] The supervisors of the several counties shall provide the courts appointed to be held therein with rooms, attendants, fuel, lights and stationery, suitable and sufficient for the transaction of their business. If the supervisors neglect, the court may order the sheriff to do so; and the expense incurred by him in carrying the order into effect, when certified by the court, shall be a county charge. Questions. 1. Question. What expenses are properly a county charge under this section? 2. Q. What statute applies this section to the superior court of the city of New York? 3. Q. What statute applies this section to the court of common pleas and marine court of the city of New York! 4. Q. What statute applies this section to the district (justice's) courts of the city of New York? 1. Q. What expenses are properly a county charge under this section! A. In The People ex rel. McSpedon & Baker agt. Stout, 13 How., 314, 23 Barb., 349, Special Term, December, 1856, DAVIES, J., said: "By section 28 of the Code, it is made the duty of the supervisors of the several counties of this state to provide the courts appointed to be held therein with rooms, attendants, fuel, lights and stationery, suitable and sufficient for the transaction of their business. If the supervisors neglect, the court. may order the sheriff to do so, and the expenses incurred by him shall be a county charge. Section 51 of the Code makes this section applicable to the superior court, court of common pleas and marine court of this city (New York). If, therefore, the supervisors incur the expense in compliance with the requirements of the Code, such expenses necessarily become a county charge. If it is incurred by the sheriff, in pursuance of the order of the court, the law declares it shall be a county charge. The providing of rooms suitable and sufficient for the transaction of the business of the court necessarily carries with it the authority to keep the rooms in suitable and convenient order, such as cleaning, painting, or other needful reparations; and if the one is a proper and legal county charge, it follows that the other would be also." 2. Q. What statute applies this section to the superior court of the cily of New York? A. By the 51st section (post), the provisions of this (28th) section are made applicable to the superior court of the city of New York. 3. Q. What statute applies this section to the court of common pleas and marine court of the city of New York? A. The Laws of 1853, p. 992, ch. 525, says that the provisions of this section (28) "shall apply to the court of common pleas for the city and county of New York, and the superior court and marine court of the said city; and the said courts shall appoint the officers necessary to attend said courts, whose salaries shall be fixed by the board of supervisors and paid out of the city treasury." 4. Q. What statute applies this section to the district (justice's) courts of the city of New York? 4. By section 65 of the act entitled "An act to reduce the several acts relating to the district courts in the city of New York into one act," passed April 13, 1857, the above act, passed in 1853, is made applicable to these district courts. What is the result of the decisions under this section? 1. This section of the Code is made applicable, by the several statutes above men tioned, to the superior court, common pleas, marine and district courts of the city and county of New York. 2. This section carries with it authority to keep the rooms in suitable and convenient order, such as cleaniny, painting, and other needful reparations? TITLE IV. Of the County Courts. SECTION 29. Repeal of existing statutes, defining their jurisdiction. 30. Their jurisdiction. 31. General terms, when held. Notice to be published. 32. Jurors, how drawn and summoned. $29. Repeal of existing statutes, defining their jurisdiction. All statutes now in force, conferring or defining the jurisdiction of the county courts, so far as they conflict with his act, are repealed; and those courts shall have no other jurisdiction than that provided in the next section. But the repeal contained in this section shall not affect any proceedings now pending in those courts. 1. Question. Has this section been amended since its passage in 1848? Answer. It has, in 1849, which amendment reads as above. 2. Q. How did this section read in 1848? A. As follows: § 32. [1848,] All statutes now in force, conferring or defining the jurisdiction of the county courts, are repealed, and those courts shall have no other jurisdiction than that provided in the next section. But the repeal contained in this section shall not affect any proceedings now pending in those courts. 3. Q. When does the county judge act as an officer, and not as a court, in making an order? A. In Smith ag,. Hart, 11 How., 204, General Term, July, 1855, BOCKES, J., said: "This is an appeal from an order (made by a county judge in proceedings supplementary to execution, in a cause originating in a justice's court), not from a judginent, within the meaning of section 344. In granting the order appealed from, the county judge acted as an officer, not as a court. His authority to act as an officer, as distinguished from proceedings in court, is clearly recognized by law." (See Judiciary Act 1847, § 29, ch. 280; also ch. 470, § 27, Sess. Laws 1847; Code, §§ 29, 30, 31.) § 30. Their jurisdiction. The county court has jurisdiction in the following special cases, but has no original civil jurisdiction except in such cases: 1. Civil actions in which the relief demanded is the recov ery of a sum of money not exceeding five hundred dollars, or |