I would hope that the other members of the administration would listen a little bit more to you, because I think you are acquainted and oriented in on the problem. But, unfortunately, some of them are not listening.

I read their speeches going around the country and they are just for complete glutting of the American market with everything.

In our area of New England, I represent one of the oldest sections of the country, and I am a little bit apprehensive about what is going to happen once this defense work stops.

My district has lost over 10,000 jobs in the shoe industry in the last 12 years. In the other areas of the State, cities like Lawrence, Lowell, those areas, they have all suffered down through the years. We saw what happened in the textile industry.

During the Depression, the city of Fall River went bankrupt. The State had to put a commission in there. There were empty mills from one end of the city to the other. These were the textile mills that moved out.

Other cities, like Lawrence, Lowell, Nashua, N.H., where the mills went into bankruptcy, the whole community was destroyed.

Even to this day, and that happened over 25 years ago, the marks are still there. Somebody on this group of negotiators has to be a little bit realistic and recognize some of the problems that the communities of this Nation are facing.

I don't believe the textile industry, the shoe industry, the steel industry, or any one of those industries are expendable. I would hope that you could bring that story across to the rest of the members of the present administration.

I want to commend you for the work you have tried to do up until this point.

Secretary STANS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Betts.

Mr. BETTS. Mr. Secretary, I am happy to see you here this morning for a couple of reasons. In the first place, while there might be some disagreement as to some the details of this program, I want to join the other members of the committee who have complimented you on your overall thinking in this very difficult problem.

I think it is refreshing, as has been said before, to have someone come in here who is interested really in the basic problem, which is injury to American industry.

that

In the second place, my own opinion is that trade is basically a commercial actvity. I think the major role, so far as the different departments of Government are concerned, should lie with the Commerce Department. I mention that because I have a suspicion, and it might be only a suspicion, but you can correct me if I am wrong, while an American industry who needs relief has to file applications and go through long periods of delay to have decisions at different levels, while that is going on some of the foreign interests resort to diplomatic channels so that by the time the issue got out of the realm of injury, diplomatic considerations enter into it and have maybe a major part in arriving at a final decision.

Am I right or wrong on that?

Secretary STANS. I think that does occur, and I think I would have to say that many times it properly occurs. While I recognize that the fundamental responsibility for trade development is in the Department of Commerce, I don't believe it would be appropriate for us as a department to have the sole responsibility to deal in international trade matters without recognizing the diplomatic consequences, the political consequences, in our relationships with other countries of actions that we might take in good faith.

I think the Government is so large that the only way we can move in matters of this type is by understanding between the departments as to what is in the overall best interest of the country.

As much as I want to see American industry protected and defended, I must also recognize that the international political and diplomatic relationships have to be taken into account. This is what makes matters so difficult, because there can be very much of a difference of opinion as to the weights to be accorded to the economic versus the diplomatic factors.

We do work these things out fairly well. I think our basic problem is not with respect to our desire to help American industry as with respect to the fact that, as I said earlier, we are in an era in which change occurs so rapidly that our laws and our mechanisms are not adequate to deal with the change in due time.

We need to be able to move faster than we have been in the past when problems develop. This is why we need some of the amendments that are proposed in this legislation.

Mr. BETTS. I appreciate the fact that what you say is true. But at the same time, that means that, as I see it, the test of major cause or primary cause actually isn't the reason for the decision at all in the final analysis, or at least only plays a part of the reason for it. After we compile the statutory test that you propose, then it is subject to a further test of whether or not it fits in with our diplomatic considerations.

Secretary STANS. If it is something that is fixed by statute, then I believe both the State Department and ourselves would work uniformly to adhere to the statute.

It is on matters in which there is no statutory guidance that we have to be careful of balancing the economic and the diplomatic considerations.

Mr. BETTS. I was directing myself to the statutory end of it. I felt in many instances, where relief has been asked for, after you go through all of these statutory tests, then you are subject further to diplomatic considerations. That was my concern.

When you mention the fact that so far as the law is concerned, the State Department and the Commerce Department would try to adhere to that, you also mentioned the need for speedy relief.

I am wondering what would be wrong with leaving the final decision to the Tariff Commission without further appeal. Congress has created a Tariff Commission as experts in the field. They render findings which I assume are the last word as to whether or nor there is injury and what would be necessary to relieve the industry that is suffering that injury.

If the Departments recognize that, why not, just in the interest of speeding up the process and confining our relief solely to the statute, why not leave it with the organization or agency that Congress has set up as the experts?

Secretary STANS. The Tariff Commission now has a considerable responsibility in determining findings with respect to trade matters. Mr. BETTS. That is the point I make.

Secretary STANS. But it reports to the President. The President, as the head of the executive branch, gets advice from the Tariff Commission, from all the other departments of the Government, on trade matters, domestic matters, foreign relations, and so forth, and he, in the final analysis, is the one that has to determine how to balance our international economic interests with our international diplomatic, political interests, and so on.

I think that is probably as it should be. I think we have to leave the responsibility to someone who is in the center of things, as the President is, and with the authority to make the final decision on the weight of the evidence and the weight of the factors.

Mr. BETTS. How many times in the last 10 years has the President acted on recommendations of the Tariff Commission and has he followed them?

Secretary STANS. Whenever the Tariff Commission has found injury, the President has acted in one way or another to provide relief to the industry, sometimes by raising tariffs, sometimes by other measures.

The difficulty has been not that the Tariff Commission hasn't done its job or that the President hasn't made the decisions.

The difficulty has been that the relief provisions in the law as it now stands are written so tightly that no one can get in the door.

Mr. BETTS. I don't quite understand what you mean by that. Secretary STANS. I mean by that that in order for a company to prove that it is being injured as a result of imports, it not only has to prove the degree of the injury that it is sustaining to its markets, but it has to prove that that is the main consequence of tariff concessions that the United States has granted.

We are proposing here that the second part of the requirement be eliminated, that if a company is suffering from imports, it is adequate to presume that that is the result of tariff concessions, or to ignore the matter of tariff concessions and grant relief.

If we do that, it will be possible for many, many more companies and industries to qualify for relief through the Tariff Commission

process.

Mr. BETTS. I only express my concern because, as I said, I have a suspicion that after all the statutory tests have been met-Mr. Byrnes mentioned the political clout-maybe the diplomatic angle overshadows some of the findings as to the bare facts. That is why I was interested in knowing whether you have any figures as to how many times the President has overruled the Tariff Commission, or gone along with it.

I think it would be helpful for the record.

Secretary STANS. I would be happy to put that into the record, the list of all the Tariff Commission actions and presidential actions. (The information requested follows:)

INVESTIGATIONS IN WHICH THE TARIFF COMMISSION DECIDED IN FAVOR OF ESCAPE

ACTION

(Action by the President on Escape Clause Investigations 1)

INVOKED ESCAPE CLAUSE (17) CASES AND

DATE

1. Women's fur felt hats and hat bodies (Oct. 30, 1950).

2. Hatters' fur (1st investigation) (Jan. 5, 1952).

3. Dried figs (Aug. 16, 1952).

4. Alsike clover seed (1st investigation) (June 30, 1954).

DECLINED TO INVOKE ESCAPE CLAUSE (26)
CASE AND DATE

1. Garlic (1st investigation) (July 21, 1952).

2. Watches (1st investigation) (Aug. 14, 1952).

3. Tobacco pipes and bowls (Nov. 10, 1953).

4. Scissors and shears (1st investiga

5. Watch movements (2d investiga- tion) (May 11, 1954). tion) (July 27, 1954).

5. Groundfish fillets (2d investiga

6. Bicycles (2d investigation) (Aug. tion) (July 2, 1954). 18, 1955).

6. Lead and zinc (1st investigation)

7. Toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie (Aug. 20, 1954). (June 25, 1956).

7. Screen-printed silk scarves (Dec.

8. Spring clothespins (4th investiga- 23, 1954). tion) (Nov. 9, 1957).

8. Ferrocerium (lighter flints) (Nov.

9. Safety pins (2d investigation) 13, 1956). (Nov. 29, 1957).

9. Groundfish fillets (3d investiga

10. Clinical thermometers (Apr. 21, tion) (Dec. 10, 1956). 1958).

11. Lead and zinc (2d investigation)

10. Velveteen fabrics (Jan. 22, 1957). 11. Straight pins (2d investigation) (Mar. 29, 1957).

12. Violins and violas (Mar. 30, 1957). 13. Umbrella frames (1st investigacloth tion) (Sept. 30, 1958).

14. Sheet glass (Mar. 19, 1962).
15. Certain carpets and rugs (2d in-

vestigation) (Mar. 19, 1962).

16. Pianos (Feb. 21, 1970).*

14. Tartaric acid (Mar. 14, 1959). 15. Cream of tartar (Mar. 14, 1959). 16. Baseball and softball gloves (Mar. 19, 1962).

17. Ceramic mosaic tile (Mar. 19, 1962).

18. Straight pins (3d investigation) (Apr. 28, 1962).

INVESTIGATIONS IN WHICH THE VOTE OF THE COMMISSION WAS EVENLY DIVIDED

1. Sheet glass (Feb. 27, 1970).*

1. Handmade blown glassware (1st investigation) (Sept. 9, 1954).

2. Spring clothespins (3d investigation) (Nov. 20, 1954).

3. Wood screws (3d investigation) (Dec. 23, 1954).

4. Fluorspar (2d investigation) (Mar. 20, 1956).

5. Para-aminosalicylic acid (Aug. 10, 1956.)

6. Binding twines (Feb. 7, 1961). 7. Hard-fiber cords and twines (Feb. 7, 1961).

8. Alsike clover seed (2d investigation) (Oct. 1, 1961).

*Action taken under Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

1 This list does not include 103 investigations in which no action was required of the President (9 investigations terminated by the Commission at the applicant's request; 9 investigations terminated by the Commission without formal findings; 14 investigations in which the Commission dismissed the applications after preliminary inquiry under procedure provided for in Executive orders (no reports issued); 71 investigations in which the Commission decided against escape action (no reports sent to the President); one investigation still in progress; and one investigation completed by the Commission with evenly-divided vote, awaiting Presidential action).

Mr. BETTS. I think there is a recent decision on flat glass. Wasn't that up at the White House for a long time? I am not criticizing anybody, but in the interest of speeding up the process, as you mentioned, it seems to me that languished in the executive department for quite a long time.

Secretary STANS. There were a number of months between the findings of the Tariff Commission that the injury existed and the action by the President simply because it was necessary to reach agreement in the administration as to the kind of relief that ought to be granted.

But the relief has now been granted by the President, and we are in the process in the Department of Commerce and in the Department of Labor of receiving applications for adjustment assistance. I think we can move quite expeditiously on these.

Mr. BETTS. Assuming, then, that there was considerable delay, and assuming there were valid reasons for it, a smaller industry just couldn't withstand the delay, I don't think, and survive. That is one of the other reasons why I am pressing this question of whether or not the final decision shouldn't be with the Tariff Commission, not only because they are the experts but because it does hasten the day of decision so that a smaller industry maybe would have a better chance of survival.

Secretary STANS. I can only go back to the answer I gave you earlier, which is that if the Tariff Commission makes final decisions, it is in the same character as the Department of Commerce making final decisions without anyone being in a position to take into account the overall international circumstances.

I think you have a valid point, that we ought to do everything we can to see that once the Tariff Commission makes a finding of injury, that the President's conclusion as to what ought to be done comes as quickly as possible.

Mr. BETTS. Personally, I think that the advice he gets or the assistance he gets should come mainly from your Department and none of these other Departments, with the possible exception of the Department of Labor, because I think trade is basically a commercial problem. Well, that is my concern about that area.

In your comments on the escape-clause changes that you would make, you mention the fact that you feel it is liberalizing the present law. I listened to the Ambassador yesterday, and I must confess that I find some difficulty in trying to determine how changing the test from "major cause" to "primary cause" really is of much consequence. It is like some of the legal requirements beyond a reasonable doubt and things like that-that gives a lot of latitude, and when the chips are down the end is the same.

Secretary STANS. I would hope that would not be the case.

Mr. BETTS. I know you would hope so, but I am very concerned about it.

Secretary STANS. And these are legal terms. I think there is quite a difference between the major cause and a substantial cause.

Mr. BETTS. I am interested right now in the difference between major cause and primary cause. That is where you are making the change.