maneuver the United States out of the position which Dewey had grasped, suggested that freedom for the Filipinos would be of short duration. On October 25 McKinley wrote to Day, "There is a very general feeling that the United States, whatever it might prefer as to the Philippines, is in a situation where it cannot let go." On the following day specific instructions were cabled to the peace commissioners, that while the President was sensible of the grave responsibilities involved, the United States must retain the whole of the Philippine archipelago. After brushing aside the Spanish contention as to the Philippine status quo, the commissioners took up the next contentions that Cuba must be transferred to the United States rather than simply abandoned by Spain, and that the Cuban debt must go with the island. Both of these claims were rejected, and by the end of October it seemed doubtful whether the Spanish Commissioners could be brought to agree to a treaty. The demand for the cession of the Philippine Islands, formally presented on November I, increased the danger of deadlock, which was finally avoided by the concession that the transfer of the islands was not based upon conquest, but was in lieu of cash indemnity for war costs, and by the added willingness to reimburse Spain to the extent of twenty million dollars for her cash outlay upon the Philippine Islands. On December 10, 1898, the treaty was signed at Paris, and early in January was transmitted to the Senate, for approval by the constitutional two thirds. Congressional election of 1898 The wave of feeling against the retention of the islands. mounted steadily through the autumn of 1898, and received the support of most of those in both parties who had opposed the war, and of an additional group of Republicans, who feared national decay as a consequence of empire and were speedily known as "anti-imperialists." A large proportion of the Democratic Party opposed the Republican policies which had permitted the war and its consequences. The Congressional election of November, 1898, made it possible to measure these forces of dissatisfaction and estimate the political consequences of the war. As a result of the election the Republican majority in both houses was increased. The forces which had made for free-silver votes two years earlier had materially weakened with the improvement of business conditions. The war had been most popular throughout the Middle West, and brought back to the Republican Party votes that had been lost for several years. Democratic campaigners warned their audiences against the dangers of imperialism, while Republican opponents pointed out that the military victory could be retained and a satisfactory treaty negotiated only by the support of the Administration that had won the war. The campaign brought out the one permanent hero of the Spanish War. Theodore Roosevelt had already aroused the interest of progressive citizens because of his devotion to clean government, and of herc-lovers because of his continuous and breezy appeals. His regiment had brought him a larger fame. His defense of the health and safety of the troops at Santiago had incurred the displeasure of the McKinley Government and War Department, but had widened his personal popularity. He returned to the hospital camp at Montauk Point on Long Island a colonel in khaki and a national figure. There had been no experience in New York politics so refreshing as that of 1898 since Grover Cleveland, the mayor of Buffalo, in 1882 became reform candidate for governor. The community, tired of the tricks of machine politics, whose notoriety had been increased by the recent experiences of New York City, turned with eagerness to the new personality. The managers of the Republican Party found it necessary to lay aside their slate and to appear to welcome Colonel Roosevelt as their candidate for His canvass for that office was his first expegovernor. rience in a general and personal appeal for votes. From the rear platform of his special train he carried the campaign into all corners of the State, and early in 1899 was installed victorious at Albany "standing by the Ten Commandments to the very best of his ability, and humping himself to promote fair play." Before the first of the year there was a real question whether the treaty could be ratified. Demobilization of Ratification of the treaty the army had proceeded rapidly, and there was a suggestion for scandal in nearly every field of war activity. The advocates of Schley and Sampson were mutually conscious of injustice to their favorite. Secretary Alger was denounced as incompetent. The administration of Shafter was under fire. The Quartermaster's department was under charge of criminal inadequacy. A strong minority in the dominant party opposed the terms of peace, while the Democratic opposition responded freely to the arguments of William J. Bryan against imperialism. The treaty was sent to the Senate in January, and was ratified after five weeks' debate, by a bare two thirds. The uncertainty up until the final vote would have resulted in defeat had not Bryan taken the attitude that the treaty must not be repudiated and that any injustices created by it must be corrected subsequently by the United States. He turned his party toward the idea of ultimate independence for the Philippines. Within the Republican Party there was serious dissent with Hoar, of Massachusetts, in the lead, but the junior Senator from that State, Henry Cabot Lodge, spoke for the view that prevailed in final ratification: "We must either ratify the treaty or reject it.... The President cannot be sent back across the Atlantic in the person of his commissioners, hat in hand, to say to Spain with bated breath, ‘I am here in obedience to the mandate of a minority of one third of the Senate to tell you that we have been too victorious, and that you have yielded us too much." BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Most of the documents upon which military judgments on the Santiago campaign are based are to be found in the Proceedings of Court of Inquiry in Case of Winfield S. Schley (1902), 57th Cong., 1st Sess., House Doc. 485; the Report on the Conduct of the War Department in the War (1899), 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Sen, Doc. 221; and the War and Navy Department Reports for 1898. The negotiations at Paris may be followed in the papers that were transmitted to the Senate with the treaty of peace, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., Sen. Doc. 62. Admiral French E. Chadwick, The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War (1911), is the most valuable general account, and may be supplemented by Colonel H. H. Sargent, The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba (1907), which is a critical and technical account. Much of the personal correspondence relating to the treaty negotiations is in Olcott's William McKinley, Thayer's Life and Letters of John Hay, and Royal Cortissoz, The Life of Whitelaw Reid (1921). D. C. Worcester, The Philippine Islands (1899), was hurriedly compiled by a young scientist who chanced to have visited them, and became in its subsequent editions the standard work. Other data are in Joseph Wheeler, The Santiago Campaign (1899), and Nelson A. Miles, Serving the Republic (1911). McKinley CHAPTER XXVII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1900 No American President has dealt with Congress more happily than William McKinley did. His long service in the lower house had familiarized him with the methods of lawmaking and the habits of Congress. His special field of Congressional interest, the protective tariff, is one in which the price of success is a high ability in compromise. The tact, sympathy, and unselfishness that he had developed while reconciling rival and antagonistic claims for protection served him well when he was removed to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, and presided over the nation. The election of 1898 strengthened the tendency already visible when McKinley was elected two years earlier. Hanna in the Senate stood for a new type of commercial statesman. Quay, the master manipulator of Pennsylvania politics, had sat as junior Senator since 1887, a worthy junior to Don Cameron. Upon the retirement of Cameron, Quay became senior Senator, and assisted in the election of his political heir apparent, Boies Penrose. From New York Senator Thomas Collier Platt, "the easy boss," came back in 1897. His earlier career in the Senate had been unexpectedly ended when he resigned with Conkling in a fit of petulance because of Garfield's assertion of the rights of the President. As a business politician no Senator stood higher than Platt. Joseph B. Foraker, of Ohio, a tested "spell-binder," strong in the Civil War tradition, came within the same group. In 1899 Quay's second term expired, and he failed of reelection because he was under trial on charge of gross misapplication of Pennsylvania State funds. His attorneys pleaded the statute of limitations and he was acquitted, yet the legislature declined to reëlect him. Upon the ad |