enormous advantage. He can dismiss one letter as irrelevant, read the portion of another which suits him, and surround the whole with an atmosphere favourable to his client. Of course a vigilant judge, having the letters before him, may see through the wiles of the advocate, and opposing counsel will endeavour to expose the fallacies by judicious interruption. But judges even in the House of Lords are only human. Although the letters are all printed and in front of them, they do not always read everything. Nor do they brook interruption of the counsel who is addressing them. A first impression easily formed may be difficult to dislodge. So in a case of this character he who has the first word has an enormous advantage.

The appellant can open the case in his own way. He is not called upon to read the judgments of the Courts of Appeal until his own good time; and he reads them in the appellant's atmosphere which he has himself created. The writer is to some extent talking of his own experience. He was recently concerned in a case on the above lines. It lasted three weeks in the Court of first instance and was then passed through three Courts of Appeal, the last being the House of Lords. In each case the side which had the first word came off victorious. No doubt justice was done in the long run but the moral is clear. Let not the litigant who is successful in the Court of Appeal begin to rejoice until the time within which an appeal to the Lords may be brought has passed by.

The report of the Inspector of Legal Offices for Ontario for last year has been issued. It contains matters of interest to the profession, who will be glad in this time of dearth of legal business to be reminded that the legal machine is still grinding out law, although so many of the profession have gone overseas. No class in the community has more bravely responded to the call of King and country than has the legal profession and, in proportion to their numbers, more lawyers have gone than any other class; and none have been so hard hit, not only financially but also in the sacrifices, even to the death, which they have made for their country.

REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH CASES.
(Registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.)

ALIEN ENEMY OUTBREAK OF WAR-PARTNERSHIP-DISSOLU

TION.

Stevenson v. Aktiengesselchaft &c. (1917) 1 K.B. 842. This was an appeal from the decision of Atkin, J. (1916) 1 K.B. 763 (noted ante vol. 52, p. 222). The plaintiffs, and defendants, a German firm, were, prior to the outbreak of the war, carrying on business in partnership in England, and the action was brought by the plaintiffs claiming a declaration that, by reason of the war, the partnership was dissolved, and that the defendants were only entitled to such sum as might be found due to them on the date of dissolution, and that defendants were not entitled to any profits made after the declaration of war. Bray, J., held that the partnership was dissolved as of the date of the outbreak of the war, and that the provisions of the Partnership Act of 1890 were not applicable, but that the defendants were entitled to the value of their share in the partnership, including the goodwill, at the date of the dissolution, and to be paid that amount when payment became legally possible, but were not entitled to any share of profits made after the commencement of the war. The Court of Appeal (Eady & Bankes, L. JJ., and Lawrence, J.) agreed with Atkin, J., that the partnership became dissolved by the outbreak of the war, but held that the provisions of the Partnership Act as to the winding-up of a partnership were applicable in such a case and that the English partner was not entitled to purchase the enemy partner's share, or to take it himself upon paying its value, and that the enemy partner was entitled to a share of the profits made out of the partnership assets after the dissolution. Lawrence, J., however dissented on the latter point, and considered that the enemy partner was not entitled to any share of the profits accruing after the partnership had become illegal.

INSURANCE (MARINE)-VESSEL TORPEDOED

SUBSEQUENT LOSS

THROUGH SINKING AT DOCK-PROXIMATE CAUSE OF LOSS.

Leyland Shipping Co. v. Norwich Union F. I. Co. (1917) 1 K.B. 873. In this case the Court of Appeal (Eady, Bankes and Scrutton, L.JJ.), affirming Rowlatt, J., held that where a vessel was torpedoed by a German submarine and damaged, but was towed into a port, and subsequently sank owing to the damage received,

the proximate cause of loss was the torpedoing of the vessel, and that the policy under which the plaintiffs sued having excepted "all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations," the plaintiffs' action failed.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE'S TORT ARISING OUT OF CONTRACTMASTER AND SERVANT-EMPLOYMENT BY WIFE-DANGEROUS PREMISES-LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S TORT.

Cole v. De Trafford (1917) 1 K.B. 911. This was an action against husband and wife to recover damages for the alleged tort of the wife, in the following circumstances: The plaintiff was i chauffeur employed by the wife in and about her garage, and, owing to the defective condition of the garage, he sustained injuries in respect of which the action was brought. The Divisional Court (Bray and Horridge, JJ.), on appeal from a County Court Judge, held that the alleged tort arising out of the contract of the wife with the plaintiff, her husband was not liable therefor, and as against him the action must be dismissed.

MASTER AND SERVANT

DISMISSAL-ARREARS OF SALARY.

was,

that

Healey v. Societé Anonyme Française Rubastic (1917) 1 K.B. 946. In this case the short point decided by Avory, J., where a servant is dismissed by his employer for misconduct, the latter is, nevertheless, entitled to be paid the arrears of salary due to him, but not his pay for the current month in which he was dismissed.

CONTRACT-CONSTRUCTION OF RESERVOIR-TIME FIXED FOR COMPLETION STOPPAGE OF WORKS BY MINISTER OF MUNITIONS— WHETHER CONTRACT TERMINATED OR SUSPENDED DEFENCE OF THE REALM REGULATIONS, reg. 8a (b).

The

Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick (1917) 2 K.B. 1. defendants in July 1914, contracted to construct a reservoir for the plaintiffs to be completed in six years, subject to a pro viso that if, by reason of any impediment, the defendants were delayed in the completion of the work, the plaintiffs might extend the time. By the terms of the contract all plant brought on the premises by the defendants was to become the property of the plaintiffs and was to so continue until the completion of the work. The Minister of Munitions, in pursuance of the powers conferred by Defence of the Realm Regulations, Reg. 8A (b), ordered the defendants to cease work on the reservoir, and directed the plant

to be sold to the owners of munition factories, which was accordingly done. In these circumstances, the defendants claimed that the contract was at an end, and the plaintiffs brought the action for a declaration that it was only suspended. They also claimed that the sale of the plant was without authority, and that they were entitled to the proceeds. Bray, J., who tried the action, held that the contract was not terminated but only suspended, but on this point he was reversed by the Court of Appeal (CozensHardy, M.R., and Scrutton and Warrington, L.JJ.). Bray J., also held that the power of the Minister of Munitions to order the removal of the plant under Reg. 8A (b), with a view to increasing the production of war material in other factories, involved a power to sell it to such other factories, and the plaintiffs were consequently not entitled to the proceeds. This question was not discussed on the appeal, and the decision of the Appellate Court on the other point is without prejudice to the rights of the parties to the proceeds of the sale.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-DISPUTES

AS то

PROPERTY-MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT 1882 (45-46 vICT. c. 75) s. 17(R.S.O. c. 149, s. 70)-REFERENCE TO REFEREE FOR TRIAL. Re Humphrey (1917) 2 K.B. 72. An originating summons was issued under the Married Women's Property Act 1882, s. 17 (R.S.O. c. 149, s. 70), for the purpose of determining certain questions in dispute as to property, arising between husband and wife. Ridley, J., on the return of the summons, referred the whole question for trial before a Referee. The Court of Appeal (Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Scrutton, L.J.) held that in so doing he had exceeded his jurisdiction, as the Act contemplated that the judge himself should decide such questions, and gave him no power to delegate that duty to any other tribunal.

CHARTERPARTY-REQUISITION OF SHIP BY ADMIRALTY-TERMINA

TION OF CONTRACT.

Anglo Northern Trading Co. v. Emlyn Jones (1917) 2 K.B. 78. In this case Bailhache, J., held, on a case stated by an arbitrator, that a time charterparty is put an end to, where the vessel in question is requisitioned by the Admiralty.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT TRAVELLER-RIGHT TO COMMISSION AFTER AGENCY DETERMINED-CONTRACT.

Marshall v. Glanvill (1917) 2 K.B. 87. In this case the defendants engaged the plaintiff as a traveller for the sale of their

goods in a certain district and his remuneration was to be a commission of 72 per cent. on the net amount of trade. The agreement was terminable on six months' notice. On July 12, the defendant joined the Royal Flying Corps. Four days later he would have been compelled to join the forces by virtue of the Military Service Act. The plaintiff contended that his joining the forces did not put an end to his contract, but merely suspended it, and that he was entitled to a commission on accounts actually opened by him, even after he had ceased to work for the defendants, but a Divisional Court (Rowlatt and McCardie, JJ.), overruling a County Court Judge, held that the defendant's enlistment put an end to the contract, and that thereafter he ceased to be entitled to remuneration.

CHOSE IN ACTION-ASSIGNMENT JUDGMENT FOR COSTS-ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT FOR COSTS-COSTS TAXED, BUT NOT ENTERED ON RECORD-CONSIDERATION.

Hambleton v. Brown (1917) 2 K.B. 93. This was an action to recover costs in the following circumstances: One Hope recovered a judgment for possession of land and for costs. After the costs were taxed, but before the amount was entered on the record, Hope by deed, made without consideration, assigned the judgment to the plaintiff, and notice in writing of the assignment was given to the defendant. The defendant contended that until the costs were entered on the record the assignment only amounted to an assignment of a future debt, therefore that the assignment was not a legal assignment, but a mere equitable assignment, and as such void for want of consideration. It was also contended that the amount of the costs was not recoverable because at the time of trial the amount had not been entered on the record. But Atkin, J., overruled all these objections but directed, as a preliminary to the entry of judgment in the plaintiff's favour, that the amount of the costs should be entered on the record, which entry he held to be a mere ministerial act.

SHIP ABANDONMENT OF SHIP AT SEA-SHIP AND CARGO SUBSEQUENTLY SALVED-RIGHT TO FREIGHT.

Newsum v. Bradley (1917) 2 K.B. 112. The facts in this case were that a ship and cargo had been abandoned at sea, but were subsequently salved, and the simple question was, whether, in such circumstances, the shipowner was entitled to freight and Sankey, J., held that he was not.