Court were whether the truth or untruth of the statements in question could be inquired into by the arbitrator, and if so on whom the burden of proof rested. The Divisional Court (Lord Reading, C.J., and Ridley, and Avory, JJ.) held that the truth or untruth of the statements was a matter covered by the arbitration clause, and that the burden of proof was on the insurance company.

BANKER CHEQUE FRAUDULENT RAISING OF AMOUNT OF CHEQUE

-NEGLIGENCE IN LEAVING SPACE IN CHEQUE-BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT, 1882 (45-46 VICT. c. 61) ss. 9 (2), 20— (R.S.C. c. 119, ss. 28 (2), 31).

Macmillan v. London & Joint Stock Bank (1917) 2 K.B. 439. This was an appeal from the decision of Sankey, J. (1917) 1 K.B. 363 (noted ante, p. 178). It may be remembered that the plaintiffs had issued a cheque for £2, but so filled up that it admitted of alteration, and had in fact been fraudulently altered by their clerk by increasing the amount of it to £120. The defendants contended that under ss. 9 (2) and 20 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (R.S.C. c. 119, ss. 28 (2) and 31) as against them the cheque was valid and could not be treated as a forgery: but the Court of Appeal (Eady and Scrutton, L.JJ., and Bray, J.) affirmed the decision of Sankey, J., and in effect overrule Young v. Grote (1827) 4 Bing. 253.

COPYRIGHT TELEGRAPHIC CODE "ORIGINAL LITERARY WORK' -COPYRIGHT ACT, 1911 (1-2 GEO. V. c. 46) ss. 1, 35.

Anderson v. Lieber Code Co. (1917) 2 K.B. 469. This was an action for damages for an infringement of the plaintiff's copyright in a telegraphic code which was compiled of meaningless words of five letters. It was contended by the defendants that such a work was not "an original literary work" within the meaning of the Copyright Act; but Bailhache, J., who tried the action, negatived that contention, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs for the damages assessed by a jury at £1,250.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-NUISANCE-OVERHANGING TREES ON LANDLORD'S PREMISES-LESSOR'S DUTY TO LESSEE.

Cheater v. Cater (1917) 2 K.B. 516. The plaintiff in this case was the lessee of the defendant. On the premises of the defendant, adjoining the land demised to the plaintiff, yew trees were growing which overhung the demised premises. The plaintiff's mare ate of the yew trees, and died in consequence. The

action was brought to recover damages for the loss of the mare. The case was tried by a Judge of a County Court who thought the case governed by the dictum of Mellish, J., in Erskine v. Adam (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. 756, 761, and dismissed the action. The Divisional Court (Lord Coleridge and Rowlatt, JJ.) was divided in opinion. Coleridge, J., agreed with the County Court Judge, but Rowlatt, J., thought the case was within the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), 3 H.L. 330, and that the defendant was liable. In the result the appeal failed.

CONTRACT-MARRIAGE ENGAGEMENT RING BREACH OF ENGAGEMENT TO MARRY-RIGHT TO RETURN OF RING.

Jacobs v. Davis (1917) 2 K.B. 532. This was an action by a disappointed swain to recover from the defendant who had promised to marry him, the engagement ring. The plaintiff swore that the ring had been given to the defendant on the express condition that if the defendant did not marry the plaintiff the ring was to be returned. Sargant, J., who tried the action, seems to have discredited this story; but he held that there is nevertheless an implied condition that a gift of this kind is to be returned if the marriage does not take place, and he gave judgment for the plaintiff.

MARRIAGE LICENCE-FALSE STATEMENTS IN

DECLARATION

NULLITY-DECREE NISI-INTERVENTION OF CHILD. Plummer v. Plummer (1917) P. 163. This was an appeal by an infant from a decree of nullity of marriage of his parents in the following circumstances: The plaintiff and defendant were married by licence before a registrar. In order to keep the marriage secret from her father whose consent was necessary, the defendant being a minor, her true name "Loveday" was not given in the information required to be furnished to the registrar, and she was styled "Findlow." The license was issued and the defendant was married under the name of "Findlow." The husband brought a suit for nullity which was undefended and Deane, J., pronounced a decree nisi. The Court was not informed. that there was issue of the marriage. Subsequently an application was made to the Court on behalf of the appellant for leave to intervene and appeal from the decree, which was granted. The Court of Appeal (Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Bankes, and Warrington, L.JJ.) held that the giving of the false name did not invalidate the marriage in the case of a marriage by licence; though in the case of a marriage by banns, the publication of banns in a false name would invalidate the marriage.

COMPANY-PROSPECTUS-UNTRUE STATEMENTS IN PROSPECTUS— DIRECTOR-ACTIO PERSONALIS

DIRECTOR-DEATH OF

MORITUR CUM PERSONA.

Giepel v. Peach (1917) 2 Ch. 108. This was an action brought against the personal representative of a deceased director of a limited company, to recover damages arising from untrue statements contained in the company's prospectus. Sargant, J., who tried the action, held that in the absence of any evidence shewing that property, or the proceeds or value of property belonging to the plaintiff, had, by reason of the tortious act complained of been added to the deceased director's estate, the maxim actio personalis moritur cum personâ applied, and the action would not lie.

WILL-LEGACY-CONDITION THAT LEGATEE SHALL NOT BE A ROMAN CATHOLIC-INFANT-ELECTION OF RELIGION-WHEN TO BE MADE-GIFT OVER.

In re May, Eggar v. May (1917) 2 Ch. 126. By her will a testatrix bequeathed two legacies of £5,000 each to two nephews on their attaining 24, conditioned on their not being Roman Catholics, or, being Roman Catholics at the time of her decease, should cease to be so before the expiration of twelve months after the testatrix's death. At the time of the death both legatees were infants. Their father was a Roman Catholic, and both infants had been baptized according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church. There was a gift over in the event of the condition not being complied with. More than a year had elapsed since the testatrix's death and the legatees continued to be brought up as Roman Catholics, and the question Neville, J., was called upon to decide, was whether or not the gift over had taken effect. He held that so long as the legatees were under the age of 21 they were not bound to make any election as to their religion, and it would be open to them after they attained 21, and before attaining 24, to elect whether or not they would be, or remain Roman Catholics.

WILL-DIRECTION TO PAY ANNUITY "FREE OF ALL DUTIES"INCOME TAX.

In re Saillard, Pratt v. Gamble (1) (1917) 2 Ch. 140. The question in this case was whether an annuity bequeathed to a solicitor as compensation for his trouble in acting as executor "free of all duties," was to be paid free from income tax. Neville, J., decided in the negative.

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY-VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SALE OF

LAND BY ATTORNEY OF ALIEN ENEMY.

Tingley v. Muller (1917) 2 Ch. 144. This is a case which has been already referred to in this journal. The defendant was a German resident in England. On May 20, 1915, he left England to return to Germany. Prior to his departure he gave an irrevocable power of attorney to his solicitors to sell his house in England; and the attorney, after the donor of the power had become an alien enemy, entered into a contract to sell the house to the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently discovered that at the time of the contract the vendor was an alien enemy, and he therefore brought the present action to have it declared that the contract was void, and for a return of his deposit. Eve, J., who tried the action, dismissed it on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence that the vendor at the time of the sale was in fact an alien enemy; but on this point the Court of Appeal (Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Eady, and Bankes, L.JJ.) found that he had erred; but they affirmed his judgment because at the time the power of attorney was given the donor was not an alien enemy, and that it was irrevocable, and might be carried out without further intercourse wth the donor, and with the assistance of the custodian under sec. 4 of the Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act, 1916, to whom so much of the purchase money as the vendor was beneficially entitled could be paid.

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY-PAYMENT OF DEBTS DUE BY ENEMY -GERMAN ORDINANCE CANCELLING LIABILITY TO PAY INTEREST ON DEBTS DUE BY GERMANS PENDING THE WAR. In re Krupp (1917) 2 Ch. 188. Certain assets of a German firm were being administered in England, out of which certain English creditors claimed to be paid. It was conceded that their debts were governed by German law, and that under the ordinary German law they bore interest from maturity at the rate of 5% per annum. But, after the war, an ordinance had been made in Germany cancelling the liability to pay interest on debts due to German enemies. Younger, J., held that this not being part of the ordinary law of Germany would not be recognized by English Courts, and he held that the debts in question bore interest according to the ordinary German law.

SETTLEMENT REAL ESTATE-NO WORDS OF LIMITATION-EQUIT

ABLE ESTATE.

In re Gillies, Archer v. Penny (1917) 2 Ch. 205. The question in this case was whether an equitable estate in fee could pass to a

cestui que trust without words of limitation. The facts were that by a voluntary settlement made in 1869 the settlor (after reciting that he was seized of, or entitled to, hereditaments in fee, and that, in consideration of natural love and affection for his wife and children, he was desirous of conveying the same upon the trusts and subject to the powers thereinafter declared) granted unto trustees therein named their heirs and assigns the lands in question, upon the trusts thereafter declared, viz.: upon certain trusts in favour of the settlor and his wife, during their joint lives, and the life of the survivor, and, subject thereto, upon trust for such one or more of their children as they should by deed jointly appoint, and in default of such appointment as the survivor of them by deed or will should appoint, and, in default of such appointment in trust for all their children who, being sons, should attain 21 or, being daughters, should attain that age or marry, in equal shares. The settler empowered the trustees to apply "the annual income of the share or fortune" to which any child should for the time being become entitled, for his or her maintenance; and further empowered the trustees to sell the trust estate and invest the proceeds upon the trusts thereinbefore declared. The father and mother being dead, and no appointment having been made, the question was raised whether or not the children took equitable estates in fee simple. Eve, J., who heard the case, held that the recitals in the deed were not a sufficient indication that the children were to take a fee, neither was the maintenance clause; neither was the clause empowering the trustees to sell the trust estate: but he was of the opinion that the powers of appointment showed clearly that the donees were authorized to appoint the fee, and were a sufficient indication of the settlor's intention that the children should take in default of appointment as large an estate as might have been appointed to them under the powers.

PRIZE COURT OUTBREAK OF WAR-DAYS OF GRACE ENEMY YACHT-HAGUE CONVENTION No. 6 ARTS. 1, 2.

The Germania (1917) A.C. 375. In this case the simple point to be determined was whether the Hague Convention, allowing days of grace to enemy's vessels in port at the outbreak of a war, applied to pleasure vessels. The President of the Admiralty Division held that it did not, but that it only applied to merchant vessels (1916) P. 5 (noted ante vol. 52, p. 189), and with that conclusion the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Lords Parker, Sumner, Parmoor, and Wrenbury, and Sir Arthur Channell), agree.