nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power, the United States would take no interest, because she would join no combination of power which is not a combination of us all." A day later an apparently opposite point of view was taken by Premier Clemenceau in the French Chamber of Deputies. "There is an old system," he said, "which appears condemned to-day and to which I do not fear to say that I remain faithful at this moment." That he remained faithful even to the end of the Congress of Versailles is shown by the fact that on the same day that the peace treaty with Germany was signed, two other treaties between France and Great Britain and France and the United States respectively were signed. These treaties are so important in connection with the League itself that one of them is herewith reproduced in full: CONSIDERING that the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic are equally animated by a desire to maintain the peace of the world, so happily restored by the treaty signed at Versailles on June 28, which put an end to the war begun by the aggression of the German Empire and terminated by the defeat of that power, and Considering that the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic are fully convinced that an unprovoked aggression directed by Germany against France would not only violate both the letter and spirit of the Versailles treaty, to which the United States and France are parties, thus exposing France anew to the intolerable burden of unprovoked war, but that such aggression would be regarded by the Treaty of Versailles as being against all the powers signatory to the treaty and calculated to disturb the peace of the world, involving inevitably and directly the states of Europe and indirectly the entire world, as experience has amply and unhappily demonstrated, and Considering that the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic apprehend that the stipulations concerning the left bank of the Rhine cannot assure immediately to France, on the one hand, and to the United States, on the other, as signatory powers to the Treaty of Versailles, appropriate security and protection: Consequently, the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic, having decided to conclude a treaty to realize these necessary ends, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, specially authorized to that end by the President of the United States of America, and Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of War, and Stephen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, specially authorized to that end by Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic, have agreed upon the following: Article 1.-The following stipulations concerning the left bank of the Rhine are contained in the Peace Treaty signed with Germany at Versailles, June 28, 1919, by the United States of America, by the Government of the French Republic, and by the British Empire, among other powers: Article 42.-Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine. Article 43.-In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden. Article 44.-In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43 she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world. In case these stipulations should not assure immediately to France appropriate security and protection, the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her aid in case of any unprovoked act of aggression directed against her by Germany. Article 2.-The present treaty, couched in terms analogous to those of a treaty concluded on the same date and to the same end between Great Britain and the French Republic, a copy of which is hereto annexed, will not enter into force until the moment when the latter is ratified. Article 3.-The present treaty must be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations and must be recognized by the Council, deciding if occasion arise by majority, as an engagement in conformity with the Covenant of the League. It will remain in force. until, upon demand of one of the parties to the treaty, the Council deciding if occasion arise by a majority, finds that the League itself assures sufficient protection. Article 4.-The present treaty shall before ratification be submitted to the Chambers of the French Parliament for approval and it shall be submitted to the Senate of the United States of America at the same time as the treaty of Versailles shall be submitted for assent to ratification. Ratifications shall be exchanged at the time of deposit in Paris of the ratifications of the treaty of Versailles, or as soon afterward as possible.1 The agreement between Great Britain and France corresponds with the above except that there is an additional provision that the treaty imposes no obligation upon any of the dominions of the British Empire unless and until it be approved by the Parliament of each dominion interested. The publication of these treaties, according to the press, immediately produced a reaction in Italy. Resentment was shown in government circles that Italy has been omitted from the alliance, and it was stated that since "it had always been an axiom of European statesmanship that no continental power can exist alone," Italy might for self-protection be forced into an alliance with Germany and Russia. It has been argued that this new triple alliance is inconsistent with the principles of the League of Nations and that it may even destroy it. An opposite argument may with equal cogency be advanced. If we have rightly conceived the nature of the Balance of Power, it was inevitable that there should be opposing groups within the League. Just what these treaties foreshadow was in fact predicted by Professor Oppenheim3 when he said, "It is a fact-I make this statement although I am sure it will be violently contradicted that, just as hitherto, so within a League of Nations some kind of Balance of Power only can guarantee the independence and equality of the smaller states. For the Community of Power, on which the League of Nations must rest, would at once disappear if one or two members of the League became so powerful that they could disregard the combined power of the other members." In his view, the two are not only consistent but correlative. The Balance of Power within the League should operate under restraints 'Current History, 10:273-274, August, 1919; Living Age, 302: 396-398, August 16, 1919. "New York Times, July 8, 1919. The League of Nations and Its Problems, p. 21. which will remove its objectionable features and give play to natural forces as long as they contribute to the good of all. REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER II STOWELL, E. C. Diplomacy of the War of 1914, 1:3-37. WILSON AND TUCKER. International Law, p. 81-87. BERNARD, M. Lectures on Subjects Connected with Diplomacy, p. 61-109. DUGGAN. The League of Nations, p. 273-288 (Chapter by H. F. Munro). OAKES AND MOWAT. Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1918. CHAPTER III HOW THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS WAS BORN It is not necessary to relate the rapid succession of events which followed Austria's declaration of war, among which were the invasion of Belgium, the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, the ranging of Turkey and Bulgaria on the side of the Teutons, and the entrance of Great Britain into the war. Before the final collapse of Germany, twenty-five states were fighting against the Central Powers, four had broken off diplomatic relations with them, and seventeen, though neutral, were almost as profoundly affected as if they had become belligerents. It was the Central European Powers against the world. Moreover, on account of their position, stretching like a barrier across the continent from the North and Baltic seas to the Bosphorus and beyond, and on account of centralized control of their military forces and economic resources, they were winning the war. Opposed to them was a potentially overwhelming force, but for three years a force without central organization or control. Even the various allied states were without complete control over the individual units of which they were composed. The self-governing dominions of Great Britain, which with the mother country represented 434,286,650 people and 13,123,712 square miles of territory, were not united into a war-making machine. They represented within one empire the situation which existed among the independent states aligned with the Allies. The British Government could not with authority call upon them for a specific quota of men or supplies. Conscription could not constitutionally be applied to the whole empire without the consent of the dominions. Organization for war was needed, and this was accomplished, first, by forming a British War Cabinet, whose members were to concern them |