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These objects are all important. They afford a sufficient reason to send some kind of agents. There are other subjects of minor importance; and it is proposed to discuss all these subjects by our ministers; but we are not to be bound by their decisions, until they have been ratified by the senate.

There are, however, subjects connected with this country, which he would not consent should even be discussed or considered; and to prevent that, he had proposed his amendment.

There are questions of international law-the abolition of the slave trade the condition of Hayti, Porto Rico, and Cuba-the resistance of any attempts to form new colonial establishments on this continent and any interference with the domestic relations of the new republics.

He did not object to the discussion of any of these topics, but the last; though he did not believe that

any one of these objects would be gained by the mission. We have nothing to give, or to concede; and, therefore, nothing to gain: still they may be discussed. Any treaty as to foreign nations, is incompatible with our policy, and, therefore, ought not to be discussed. The system of policy adopted by a nation, is not a subject of negotiation. It is the duty of a government to regulate its own con

cerns, and to announce its policy to the world; but not to negotiate, as to what it shall be.

It is for us to say that our policy is pacific and neutral; that we are determined to steer clear, of all difficulties growing out of the situation and circumstances of other nations; and that we will never consent to negotiate, whether we will take part in their concerns or not. If, however, any gentleman would say, that he was willing to stipulate, that we should irrevocably take part in any disputes between foreign nations; he was desirous distinctly to say that he would not consent to any such stipulation. He would not go abroad to make an agreement, which he would not assent to at home. He would not even discuss those points; and therefore he thought it due to ourselves and to these governments, that if we determine to remain free from any such pledge, they should know our determination.

He did not mean to say, that it is the intention of the executive to enter into any alliances, or stipulations on this subject. Still, the subject will be discussed: these powers expect it will; and this expectation, is a reason why our opinions should be declared.

He then quoted from the letters of Messrs. Salazar, Obregon, and Canaz, to Mr. Clay; and his

answer accepting the invitation; and also from the president's message, to show that this was one of the prominent objects of the mission; and then proceeded to say, that it was not by treaty alone, that alliances and obligations were entered into they might be assumed by proclamation, and by many other modes. He would not enter into this subject. The settled policy of this country is not only neutral; but to avoid all political connections, all entangling alliances, and all associations which are not necessary to effect commercial objects. It is the interest of the country that this policy should prevail; and it is the duty of the government to make it prevail. The government indeed cannot be insensible to the public opinion. It is founded on public opinion; but when a feverish excitement has been created by adventitious causes, it is the duty of the government to repress it. The moment the government loses sight of this principle, we are all afloat. The policy of the act of 1793 was, the moderation of the government, acting on public excitement. The sympathies of the people were strongly and justly excited in favor of the French nation; and this violence of feeling would have hurried us into war, but for the interposition of the power of the government. Again, on a more recent occasion, the efforts of the Greeks

kindled the sympathies of the people -it was an acclamation of the whole country, but the course adopted by the government, checked and qualified it. So also in relation to the South American states, the policy which we have adopted towards them, was the act of the government on the people.

The message of the president takes the valedictory address of general Washington, as the foundation of the neutral policy of the country. It is not so. The policy existed before that address; it had its origin in the very infancy of our country, and that valedictory address came to confirm it. That address was not so much in favor of the policy itself; as of its continuance. If he had not totally misunderstood the spirit of that address, it related not to our policy as to a particular people or a particular time; but to all people, and to all time: to preserve our neutral attitude, and thus to disconnect ourselves from the broils of other nations, wherever they may be situated. The great spirit of this policy is, to leave the government untrammelled, to act according to our best interests, whenever we may be called on to do so. This might have been the motive to recommend it, in relation to European and other nations. What is there in the character of the South American governments, to induce any change in this

policy towards them. He had no wish, to undervalue that part of the continent. He would not wish it to be supposed, that he had no sympathy for the South American people he had deeply sympathized in all their struggles and privations in quest of their independence; but in their institutions themselves, there was nothing to excite any particular sympathy. He felt all due respect for their character; he was as great an admirer of the courage and constancy they had exhibited, as any gentleman could be; but he would not suffer that feeling to drag him from his moorings, nor to set the country afloat. If there be any thing in the proximity of those nations to influence, it should rather strengthen our attachment to this policy, and induce us to cling with still greater circumspection to our anchorage. It is here the European nations are detached and distant, and the facilities for the preservation of a neutral character are greater; but because a nation is nearer, and the difficulty of sustaining that character is greater, the more difficult it is to preserve neutrality, the greater necessity is there for circumspection. Would a war on our borders be less injurious to us, than a difficulty with a remote antagonist? These governments are yet in their infancy-they are still in their chrysalis state-they have yet

to pass through various trials, before they can reach their proper elevation among nations. He was desirous that all their best hopes might be realised; but they are yet new, and may be involved by a multiplicity of circumstances.

He would not go farther into an argument, as to general topics. The simple object he had in view, was to offer his amendment. It appeared to him, that we cannot vote the appropriation; unless we come to an expression of the opinion contained in the amendment, without committing ourselves. It is avowed in the message and the documents, that we must have political relations. He would not say, that we would not have these political relations. It is the opinion of the ruling statesmen of our day and of our country, that we are an American family of governments, and have common interests and a common cause. When that opinion is acted on, and we are called to send ministers, he would say, it is a subject not to be discussed. It will not satisfy to bring forward as an argument, that we cannot compromit our neutrality. Our true ground is we cannot go into the discussion at all. If the executive wish to avoid the expression of an opinion-if the house will sustain him in his amendment, we will tell these governments that we will go so far; but the people and their repre

sentatives say we must not go so far, as to commit the interests of the country.

In offering his amendment, he had no disposition to embarrass the measure. He should propose to leave the whole constitutional power to the president; but he could not reconcile it to his sense of duty to give the appropriation without the opinion.

To the amendment of Mr. M'Lane, Mr. Rives of Virginia, proposed to add after the 25th line the following:

"Or any compact or engagement by which the United States shall be pledged to the Spanish American states, to maintain, by force, the principle that no part of the American continent is henceforward subject to colonization by any European power."

Mr. Rives said, that this subject was a prominent object of the deliberations of the Panama congress; and he was unwilling to commit the country to any engagement with the South American states on this point. He thought he could satisfy the committee, that by so doing, we should directly endanger the peace of the country, and be placed in a hostile position, with one of the most powerful nations of the earth. He referred to Great Britain.

The president stated, in general terms, that our territory covered

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the whole continent; so that we must maintain the principle over the whole continent. But, even if restricted, great dangers might ensue. On the Northwest Coast, the claims of the United States and Great Britain are in direct conflict. Between the 42d and the degree of north latitude, (which is the limit of the Russian claim,) there was a dispute as to the boundary of our possessions. Our claims to the disputed territory, are founded on the prior discovery of captain Gray, in 1790. This claim is denied by Great Britain. Our claims to the rest of the coast, rest on the Spanish grants. How is our claim received by Great Britain? Our minister informs us that she is not prepared to relinquish her claim, and would not admit ours. This shows that Great Britain is resolved to dispute our claim; and it becomes us, before. we involve ourselves in a contest, to satisfy ourselves that the principle is just. We had not been able to sustain our demand upon any good ground; and he was unwilling to place ourselves in collision with Great Britain, upon such a shadowy foundation of right.

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He was not satisfied that no European power could introduce a commercial intercourse into this territory; and such an intercourse necessarily accompanied territorial dominion.

Another reason alleged was, that the United States had a sort of political supremacy over the whole continent. This could not be sustained. The principle itself, was still a matter of controversy between Great Britain and this country; and if we pledge ourselves to sustain it, we probably rush into an actual war. This is not a mere question of boundaries. No person will believe, that the president meant that we should pledge ourselves to maintain our territorial boundaries as we claimed them. The fact is, it is a controverted question between ourselves and Great Britain, and it was unwise in us to give such a pledge.

We had no motive for it. We want no aid from these states to vindicate our own boundaries; and if we did, we could not obtain it in the mode proposed.

Mr. Rives also objected to this fraternal system, which, he said, seemed to have been lately adopt ed towards the South American states. All its consequences were to be referred to the secretary of state. The present executive, whatever was his original bias, has become a proselyte. The cabalistic phrases of this system, "sister republics," "new-born nations," &c. recurring in his message, show that the president had adopted it.

to do away, the application of Washington's advice to these times.

He differed with the exécutive on this point. He thought the advice even more applicable now, than when delivered. Then we were in a state of infancy, and it might have been desirable to have had the aid of older powers. Now, we are strong enough to defend ourselves. He considered the government to have pledged itself by this mission on two points, viz. to resist any farther colonization of this continent; and the interference of any European powers in the contest between Spain and her former colonies; and that the house was bound to step in, and release them from the dilemma in which it had involved itself.

In reply, Mr. Webster said, that in his opinion these amendments presented two questions; the first, whether the house of representatives will withhold the ordinary appropriation, for carrying into effect an executive measure, which the executive department has constitutionally instituted? The second, whether, it will take the responsibility of interposing, with its own opinions, directions or instructions, as to the manner in which this particular executive measure shall be conducted?

"He was in the negative, on both these propositions. He was neither

Another evidence is, the attempt willing to refuse the appropriation.

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