nor to limit the discretion of the executive, beforehand, as to the manner in which it shall perform its own appropriate constitutional duties. And, those who hold these opinions have the advantage of being on the common highway of our national politics. We propose nothing new; we suggest no change; we adhere to the uniform practice of the government. It is for those, who are in favor of either, or both, of the propositions, to satisfy the house and the country, that there is something in the present occasion which calls for such an extraordinary and unprecedented interference. "The president and senate have instituted a public mission, for the purpose of treating with foreign states. Such appointment is, a clear and unquestionable exercise of executive power. It is, indeed, less connected with the appropriate duties of this house, than almost any other executive act; because the office of a public minister is not created by any statute or law of our own government. It exists under the law of nations, and is recognized as existing by our constitution. The acts of congress, indeed, limit the salaries of public ministers; but they do no more. Every thing else, in regard to the appointment of public ministers, their number, the time of their appointment, and the negotiations contemplated in such appointments, is matter for executive discretion. Now the 'question is, whether the president and senate,having created this mission, or, in other words, having appointed the ministers, in the exercise of their undoubted constitutional power, this house will take upon itself the responsibility of defeating its objects, and rendering this exercise of executive power void? 66 By voting the salaries, in the ordinary way, we assume, as it seems to me, no responsibility whatever. We merely empower another branch of the government to discharge its own appropriate duties, in that mode which seems to itself most conducive to the public interests. We are, by so voting, no more responsible for the manner in which the negotiation shall be conducted, than we are for the manner in which one of the heads of department may discharge the duties of his office. "On the other hand, if we withhold the ordinary means, we do incur a heavy responsibility. We interfere, to prevent the action of the government, according to constitutional forms and provisions. It ought constantly to be remembered that our whole power, in the case, is merely incidental. The constitution vests the power of appointment in the president and scnate; the law gives to the president even the power of fixing the amount of salary, within certain limits; and the only question, here. is upon the appropriation. There is no doubt that we have the power, to break up the mission, by withholding the salaries; we have power also to break up the court, by withholding the salaries of the judges, or to break up the office of president, by withholding the salary provided for it by law. But, then, can we rightfully exercise this power? These officers do, indeed, already exist. They are public ministers. If they were to negotiate a treaty, and the senate should ratify it, it would become a law of the land, whether we voted their salaries or not. "The gentleman from Delaware says, that the source from which the ineasure springs, should have no influence with us whatever. I do not comprehend this. This measure comes from the executive, and it is an appropriate exercise of executive power. How is it, then, that we are to consider it, as if it were a legislative measure originating with ourselves? In deciding whether we will enable the executive to exercise his own duties, are we to consider whether we should have exercised them in the same way ourselves? And if we differ in opinion with the president and senate, are we on that account to refuse the ordinary means? I think not; unless we mean to say that we will exercise, ourselves, all the powers of the government. "But the gentleman argues, that in the present case, the president has especially referred the matter to our opinion; that he requests our advice. This appears a very mistaken view of the subject; but if our advice and opinion had thus been asked, it would not alter the line of our duty. We cannot take, though it were offered, any share in executive duty. The president cannot properly ask, and we cannot properly give, our advice, as to the manner in which he shall discharge his duties. He cannot shift the responsibility from himself; and we cannot assume it. Such a course, would confound all that is distinct in the constitutional assignment of our respective functions. It would break down all known divisions of power, and put an end to all just responsibility. 66 But, sir, I see no evidence whatever, that the president has asked us to take this measure upon ourselves, or to divide the responsibility of it with him. The senate having concurred in the mission, the president has sent a message, requesting the appropriation, in the usual and common form. Another message is sent, in answer to a call of the house, communicating the correspondence, and setting forth the objects of the mission. It is contended, that by this message he asks our advice, or refers the subject to our opinion. I do not so : understand it. Our concurrence, of the other powers. This is not he says, by making the appropria- a general expression of opinion. tion, is subject to our free deter- It is a particular direction, or a mination. Doubtless it is so. If special instruction. Such a thing, we determine at all, we shall deter- sir, is wholly unprecedented. The mine freely and the message does course of the house, hitherto, has no more than leave to ourselves to not been such. not been such. It has expressed decide how far we feel ourselves its opinions, when it deemed proper bound, either to support or to to express them at all, on great, thwart the executive department, leading questions, by resolution, in the exercise of its duties. There and in a general form. These is no message, no document, no general opinions, being thus made communication to us, which asks known, have doubtless always had, for our concurrence, otherwise than and such expressions of opinion as we shall manifest it by making doubtless always will have, their efthe appropriation. fect. This is the practice of the government. It is a salutary practice; but if we adopt a very differ. ent practice, and undertake to prescribe to our public ministers what they shall discuss, and what they shall not discuss, we take upon ourselves that which, in my judg ment, does not at all belong to us. "Mr. Chairman: I will here take occasion, in order to prevent misapprehension, to observe, that no one is more convinced than I am, that it is the right of this house, and often its duty, to express its general opinion in regard to questions of foreign policy. On those great subjects, for instance, which form the leading topics in this discussion, it is not only the right of the house to express its opinions, but I think it its duty to do so, if it should think the executive to be pursuing a general course of policy which the house itself will not ultimately approve. But that is something entirely different from the present suggestion. Here it is proposed to decide, by our vote, what shall be discussed by particular ministers, already appointed, when they shall meet the ministers "It is obvious to remark, Mr. Chairman, that the senate have not undertaken to give directions or instructions in this case. That body is closely connected with the president in executive measures. Its consent to these very appointments is made absolutely necessary by the constitution; yet it has not seen fit, in this or any other case, to take upon itself the responsibility of directing the mode in which the negotiations should be conducted. "For these reasons, Mr. Chair man, I am for giving no instructions, advice, or directions, in the case. I prefer leaving it where, in my judgment, the constitution has left it-to executive discretion and executive responsibility. "But I think there are other objections to the amendment. There are parts of it which I could not agree to, if it were proper to attach any such condition to our vote. As to all that part of the amendment, indeed, which asserts the neutral policy of the United States, and the inexpediency of forming alliances, no man assents to those sentiments more readily, or more sincerely, than myself. On these points, we are all agreed. Such is our opinion; such, the president assures us, in terms, is his opinion; such we know to be the opinion of the country. If it be thought necessary to affirm opinions which no one either denies or doubts, by a resolution of the house, I shall cheerfully concur in it. But there is one part of the proposed amendment to which I could not agree, in any form. "That part of the amendment to which I now object, is, that which requires, as a condition of the resolution before us, that the ministers shall not be authorized to discuss, consider, or consult upon any measure which shall commit the present or future neutral rights or duties of these United States, either as may regard European nations, or between the several states of Mexico and South America.' "I need hardly repeat, that this amounts to a precise instruction. It prescribes to public ministers the precise manner in which they are to conduct a public negotiation; a duty manifestly and exclusively belonging, in my judgment, to the executive, and not to us. "But if we possessed the power to give instructions, this instruction would not be proper to be given. Let us examine it. The ministers shall not discuss, consider, or consult,' &c. the parties; especially all such treaties as our habitual policy leads us to form. "But, if this objection were removed, still the instruction could not properly be given. What im portant or leading measure is there, connected with our foreign relations, which can be adopted, without the possibility of committing us to the necessity of a hostile attitude? Any assertion of our plainest rights may, by possibility, have that effect. The author of the amendment seems to suppose that our pacific relations can never be changed, but by our own option. He seems not to be aware that other states may compel us, in defence of our own rights, to measures, which, in their ultimate tendency, may commit our neutrality. Let me ask, if the ministers of other powers, at Panama, should signify to our agents, that it was in contemplation immediately to take some measure which these agents know to be hostile to our policy, adverse to our rights, and such as we could not submit to should they be left free to speak the sentiments of their government, to protest against the measure, and to declare that the United States would not see it carried into effect? Or should they, as this amendment proposes, be enjoined silence, let the measure proceed, and afterwards, when, perhaps, we go to war to redress the evil, we may learn, that if our objections had been fairly and frankly stated, the step would not have been taken? Look, sir, to the very case of Cuba the most delicate, and vastly the most important point in all our foreign relations. Do gentlemen think they exhibit skill or statesmanship, in laying such restraints as they propose on our ministers, in regard to this subject, among others? It has been made matter of complaint, that the executive has used, already, a more decisive tone towards Mexico and Colombia, in regard to their designs on this island. Pray, sir, what tone could be taken, under these instructions? Not one word—not one single word could be said on the subject. If asked whether the United States would consent to the occupation of that island by those republics, or to its transfer by Spain to a European power; or whether we should resist such occupation, or such transfer, what could they say? That is a matter we cannot discuss, and cannot considerit would commit our neutral relations-we are not at liberty to express the sentiments of our government on the subject: we have nothing at all to say.' Is this what gentlemen wish, or what they would recommend? "If sir, we give these instructions, and they should be obeyed. |