and inconvenience or evil result, who is answerable? And I suppose it is expected they will be obeyed. Certainly it cannot be intended to give them, and not to take the responsibility of consequences, if they be followed. It cannot be intended to hold the president answerable both ways; first, to obey our instructions, and secondly, for having obeyed them, if evil comes from obeying them.

"Sir, events may change. If we had the power to give instructions, and if these proposed instructions were proper to be given, before we arrive at our own homes, affairs may take a new direction, and the public interest require new and corresponding orders to our agents abroad.

"This is said to be an extraordinary case, and, on that account, to justify our interference. If the fact were true, the consequence would not follow. If it be the exercise of a power assigned by the constitution to the executive, it can make no difference whether the occasion be common or uncommon. But, in truth, there have been much stronger cases for the interference of the house, where, nevertheless, the house has not interfered.

"I am, therefore, against the amendment ; not only as not being a proper manner of exercising any power belonging to this house, but, also, as not containing instructions

fit to be given, if we possessed the power of giving them."

Mr. W. then proceeded :-" Mr. Chairman-It is our fortune to be called upon to act our part, as public men, at a most interesting era in human affairs. Not only new interests and new relations have sprung up among states, but new societies, new nations, and families of nations, have risen to take their places, and perform their parts, in the order, and the intercourse of the world.

We have seen

eight states formed out of colonies on our own continent, assume the rank of nations.

"This is a mighty revolution; and when we consider what an extent of the surface of the globe they cover; through what climates they extend; what population they contain, and what new impulses they must derive from this change of government, we cannot but perceive that great effects are likely to be produced on the intercourse, and the interests of the civilized world.

"In many respects, the European and American nations are alike. They are alike christian states, civilized states, and commercial states. They have access to the same common fountains of intelligence; they all draw from those sources which belong to the civilized world. In knowledge and letters-in the arts of peace and war,

they differ in degrees; but they bear, nevertheless, a general resemblance. On the other hand, in matters of government and social institution, the nations on this continent are founded upon principles which never did prevail, in considerable extent, either at any other time, or in any other place. There has never been presented to the mind of man a more interesting subject of contemplation than the establishment of so many nations in America, partaking in the civilization and in the arts of the old world, but having left behind them those cumbrous institutions, which had their origin in a dark and military age. Whatsoever European experience has developed favorable to the freedom and the happiness of man ; whatsoever European genius has invented for his improvement or gratification; whatsoever of refinement or polish the culture of European society presents for his adoption and enjoyment-all this is offered to man in America, with the additional advantages of the full power of erecting forms of government on free and simple principles, without overturning institutions suited to times long passed, but too strongly supported, either by interests or prejudices, to be shaken without convulsions. This unprecedented state of things presents the happiest of all occasions for an attempt to establish national intercourse upon improved principles;

upon principles tending to peace, and the mutual prosperity of nations. In this respect, America, the whole of America, has a new career before her. If we look back on the history of Europe, we see how great a portion of the last two centuries her states have been at war for interests connected mainly with her feudal monarchies; wars for particular dynasties; wars to support or defeat particular successions; wars to enlarge or curtail the dominions of particular crowns; wars to support or to dissolve family alliances; wars, in fine, to enforce, or to resist religious intolerance. What long and bloody chapters do these not fill, in the history of European politics! Who does not see, and who does not rejoice to see, that America has a glorious chance of escaping, at least, these causes of contention? Who does not see, and who does not rejoice to see, that, on this continent, under other forms of government, we have before us the noble hope of being able, by the mere influence of civil liberty and religious toleration, to dry up these outpouring fountains of blood, and to extinguish these consuming fires of war. The general opinion of the age favors such hopes and such prospects. There is a growing disposition to treat the intercourse of nations more like the useful intercourse of friends; philosophy, just views of national advantage, good

sense, and the dictates of a common religion, and an increasing conviction that war is not the interest of the human race-all concur, to increase the interest created by this new accession to the list of nations. "But, although the independence of these new states seems effectually accomplished, yet a lingering and hopeless war is kept up against them by Spain. This is greatly to be regretted by all nations. To Spain it is, as every reasonable man sees, useless, and without hope. To the new states themselves, it is burdensome and afflictive. To the commerce of neutral nations it is annoying and vexatious. There is some reason, however, to believe that the war approaches to its end that the measures adopted by our own government have had an effect in tending to produce that result.

"Our own course during this contest between Spain and her colonies, is well known. Though entirely and strictly neutral, we were in favor of early recognition. Our opinions were known to the allied sovereigns when in congress at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, at which time the affairs of Spain and her colonies were under consideration; and, probably, the knowledge of those sentiments, together with the policy adopted by England, prevented any interference by other powers at that time. Yet we have

treated Spain with scrupulous delicacy. We acted on the case, as one of civil war. We treated with the new governments, as governments de facto. Not questioning the right of Spain to coerce them back to their old obedience, if she had the power; we yet held it to be our right to deal with them as with existing governments in fact, when the moment arrived at which it became apparent and manifest that the dominion of Spain over these, her ancient colonies, was at an end. Our right, our interest, and our duty, all concurred at that moment to recommend recognitionand we did recognize.

"Now, sir, the history of this proposed congress goes back to an earlier date than that of our recognition. It commenced in 1821; and one of the treaties now before us, proposing such a meeting, (that between Colombia and Chili,) was concluded in July, 1822, a few months only after we had acknowledged the independence of the new states. The idea originated, doubtless, in the wish to strengthen the union among the new governments, and to promote the common cause of all-the effectual resistance to Spanish authority. But this purpose of the congress, or this leading idea, in which it may be supposed to have originated, has led, as it seems to me, to great misappre hensions as to its true character.

and great mistakes in regard to the danger to be apprehended from our sending ministers to the meeting. This meeting, sir, is a congress— not a congress, as the word is known to our constitution and laws; but as it is known to the law of nations. A congress, by the law of nations, is but an appointed meeting, for the settlement of affairs between different nations, in which the representatives or agents of each, treat and negotiate, as they are instructed by their own government. In other words, this congress is a diplomatic meeting. We are asked to join no government-no legislature-no league-acting by votes. No nation is a party to any thing done in such assemblies, to which it does not expressly make itself a party. No one's rights are put at the disposition of any of the rest, or of all the rest. What ministers agree to, being afterwards duly ratified at home, binds their government; and nothing else binds the government. Whatsoever is done, to which they do not assent, neither binds the ministers nor their government, any more than if they had not been pre

sent.

"It has been said that commercial treaties are not negotiated at such meetings. Far otherwise is the fact. Among the earliest of important stipulations made in favor of commerce and navigation, were those at Westphalia. And what

we call the treaty of Utrecht, was a bundle of treaties, negotiated at that congress; some of peace, some of boundary, and others of commerce. Again, it has been said, in order to prove that this meeting is a sort of confederacy; that such assemblies are out of the way of ordinary negotiation, and are always founded on, and provided for, by previous treaties. Pray, sir, what treaty preceded the congress at Utrecht? and the meeting of our plenipotentiaries with those of England at Ghent, what was that but a congress? and what treaty preceded it? It is said, again, that there is no sovereign to whom our ministers can be accredited. me ask whether, in the case last cited, our ministers exhibited their credentials to the mayor of Ghent ? Sir, the practice of nations in these matters, is well known, and is free of difficulty. If the government be not present, agents or plenipotentiaries interchange their credentials.

Let

"It contended that this congress, by virtue of the treaties which the new states have entered into, will possess powers others than those of a diplomatic character, as between those new states themselves. If that were so, it would be unimportant to us. The real question here is, what will be our relation with those states, by sending ministers to this congress? Their arrangements among themselves will

not affect us. Even if it were a government, like our old confederation, yet, if its members had authority to treat with us in behalf of their respective nations, on subjects on which we have a right to treat, the congress might still be a very proper occasion for such negotiations. Do gentlemen forget that the French minister was introduced to our old congress, met it in its sessions, carried on oral discussions with it, and treated with it in behalf of the French king? All that did not make him a member of it; nor connect him at all with the relations, which its members bore to each other. As he treated on the subject of carrying on the war against England, it was, doubtless, hostile towards that power; but this consequence followed from the object and nature of the stipulations, and not from the manner of the intercourse. The representatives of these South American states, it is said, will carry on belligerent councils at this congress. Be it so; we shall not join in such councils. At the moment of invitation, our government informed the ministers of those states, that we could not make ourselves a party to the war between them and Spain; nor to councils for deliberating, on the means of its farther prosecution.

"If, it is asked, we send ministers to a congress composed altogether

of belligerents, is it not a breach of neutrality? Certainly not: no man can say it is. Suppose, sir, that these ministers from the new states, instead of Panama, were to assemble at Bogota, where we already have a minister: their councils, at that place, might be belligerent, while the war should last with Spain. Should we, on that account, recall our minister from Bogota? The whole argument rests on this; that because, at the same time and place, the agents of the South American governments may negotiate about their own relations with each other, in regard to their common war against Spain, therefore we cannot, at the same time and place, negotiate with them, or any of them, upon our own neutral and commercial relations. This proposition, sir, cannot be maintained; and, therefore, all the inferences from it fail.

"It has been affirmed, that this measure, and the sentiments expressed by the executive relative to its objects, are an acknowledged departure from the neutral policy of the United States. Sir, I deny there is an acknowledged departure, or any departure at all, from the neutral policy of the country. What do we mean by our neutral policy? Not, I suppose, a blind and stupid indifference to whatever is passing around us; not a total disregard to approaching events, or