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of the committee to an important point in the discussion, I mean the declaration of the president in 1823. Not only as a member of the house, but as a citizen of the country, I have an anxious desire that this part of our public history should stand in its proper light.

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approaching evils, till they meet us full in the face. Nor do we mean, by our neutral policy, that we intend never to assert our rights by force. No, sir. We mean by our policy of neutrality, that the great objects of national pursuit with us, are connected with peace. We covet no provinces; we desire no conquests; we entertain no ambitious projects of aggrandizement by war. This is our policy. But it does not follow, from this, that we rely less than other nations, on our own power to vindicate our own rights. We know that the last logic of kings is also our last logic; that our own interests must be defended and maintained by our own arm; and that peace or war, may not always be of our own choosing. Our neutral policy, therefore, not only justifies but requires, our anxious attention to the political events, which take place in the world; a skilful perception of their relation to our own concerns; an early anticipation of their consequences; and firm and timely assertion of what we hold to be our own rights, and our own interests. Our neutrality is not a predetermined abstinence, either from remonstrances, or from force. Our neutral policy is a policy that protects neutrality, that defends neutrality, that takes up arms, if need be, for neutrality. "I must now ask the indulgence is, that they had a right to interfere

Sir, let us recur to the impor tant political events which led to that declaration, or accompanied it. In the fall of 1822, the allied sovereigns held their congress at Verona. The great subject of consideration was the condition of Spain, that country then being under the government of the Cortes. The question was, whether Fer dinand should be reinstated in all his authority, by the intervention of foreign force. Russia, Prussia, France, and Austria, were inclined to that measure; England dissented and protested; but the course was agreed on, and France, with the consent of these other continental powers, took the conduct of the operation into her own hands. In the spring of 1823, a French army was sent into Spain. Its success was complete. The popular government was overthrown, and Ferdinand re-established in all his power.

This invasion, sir, was determined on, and undertaken, precisely on the doctrines which the allied monarchs had proclaimed the year before, at Laybach; and that

in the concerns of another state, and reform its government, in order to prevent the effects of its bad example; this bad example, be it remembered, always being the example of free government. Now, sir, acting on this principle of supposed dangerous example, and having put down the example of the Cortes in Spain, it was natural to inquire with what eyes they would look on the colonies of Spain, that were following still worse examples. Would king Ferdinand and his allies be content with what had been done in Spain itself, or would he solicit their aid, and was it likely they would grant it, to subdue his rebellious American provinces.

"It was in this posture of affairs, on an occasion which has already been alluded to, that I ventured to say, early in the session of December, 1823, that these allied monarchs might possibly turn their attention to America. The doctrines of Laybach were not limited to any continent; Spain had colonies in America, and having reformed Spain herself to the true standard, it was not impossible that they might see fit to complete the work by reconciling, in their way, the colonies to the mother country. And, accordingly, as soon as the Spanish king was completely established, he did invite the co-operation of his allies, in regard to South America. In the same month of

December, a formal invitation was addressed by Spain to the courts of St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, proposing to establish a conference at Paris, in order that the plenipotentiaries, there assembled, might aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of her revolted provinces. These affairs were proposed to be adjusted in such manner as should retain the sovereignty of Spain over them; and though the cooperation of the allies, by force of arms, was not directly solicitedsuch was evidently the object aimed at.

"The king of Spain, in making this request to the members of the holy alliance, quoted their own doctrines of Laybach; pointed out the pernicious example of America; and reminded them that their success, in Spain itself, had paved the way for successful operations against the spirit of liberty, on this side of the Atlantic.

"The proposed meeting, however, did not take place. England had already taken a decided course; for, as early as October, Mr. Canning, in a conference with the French minister in London, informed him distinctly and expressly, that England would consider any foreign interference, by force or by menace, in the dispute between Spain and the colonies, as a motive for recognizing the latter, without delay.

It is probable this determination of the English government was known here, at the commencement of the session of congress; and it was under these circumstances, it was in this crisis, that Mr. Monroe's declaration was made. It

was not then ascertained whether a meeting of the allies would, or would not, take place, to concert with Spain the means of re-establishing her power; but it was plain enough they would be pressed by Spain to aid her operations; and it was plain enough also, that they had no particular liking to what was taking place on this side the Atlantic, nor any great disinclination to interfere. This was the posture of affairs; and, sir, I concur entirely in the sentiment expressed in the resolution, of a gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Markley,) that this declaration of Mr. Monroe was wise, seasonable, and patriotic.

"It has been said, in the course of this debate, to have been a loose and vague declaration. It was, I believe, sufficiently studied. I have understood, from good authority, that it was considered, weighed, and distinctly and decidedly approved by every one of the president's advisers, at that time. Our government could not adopt, on that occasion, precisely the course which England had taken. England threat ened the immediate recognition of

the provinces, if the allies should take part with Spain against them. We had already recognized them. It remained, therefore, only for our government to say how we should consider a combination of the allied powers, to effect objects in America, as affecting ourselves; and the message was intended to say, that we should regard such combination as dangerous to us. Sir, I agree that the message did mean something; that it meant much; and I maintain, that the declaration answered the end designed by it, did great honor to the foresight, and the spirit of the government, and that it cannot now be taken back, retracted, or annulled, without disgrace. It met, sir, with the entire concurrence, and the hearty approbation of the country. The tone which it uttered, found a corresponding response in the breasts of the free people of the United States. That people saw, and they rejoiced to see, that, on a fit occasion, our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and that without departing from our duty, we had done something useful, and something effectual, for the cause of civil liberty. One general glow of exultation-one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty-one conscious and proud perception of the consideration which the country possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it—perva

ded all bosoms. Possibly the public enthusiasm went too far; it certainly did go far. But, sir, the sentiment which this declaration inspired, was not confined to ourselves. In that very house of commons, of which the gentleman from South Carolina has spoken with such commendation, how was it there received? Not only, sir, with approbation, but I may say, with no little enthusiasm. While the leading minister expressed his entire concurrence in the sentiments and opinions of the American president, his distinguished competitor in that popular body, less restrained by official decorum, more at liberty to give utterance to the feeling of the occasion, declared that no event had ever created greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, among all the free men in Europe; that he felt pride in being connected by blood and language, with the people of the United States; that the policy disclosed by the message, became a great, a free, and an independent nation; and that he hoped his own - country would be prevented by no mean pride, or paltry jealousy, from following so noble and glorious an example.

"It is doubtless true, as I took occasion to observe the other day, that this declaration must be considered as founded on our rights, and to spring mainly from a regard to their preservation. It did not

commit us at all events to take up arms, on any indication of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe towards South America. If, for example, all the states of Europe had refused to trade with South America, until her states should return to their former allegiance, that would have furnished no cause of interference to us. Or if an armament had been furnished by the allies to act against provinces the most remote from us, as Chili or Buenos Ayres, the distance of the scene of action diminishing our apprehension of danger, and diminishing also our means of effectual interposition, might still have left us to content ourselves with remonstrance. But a very different case would have arisen, if an army, equipped and maintained by these powers, had been landed on the shores of the Gulph of Mexico, and commenced the war in our own immediate neighborhood. Such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves, and, on that ground, to have called for decided and immediate interference by us.

"But how should it happen, sir, that there should now be such a new-born fear, on the subject of this declaration? The crisis is over; the danger is past. At the time it was made, there was real ground for apprehension: now there is none. It was then possible, perhaps not improbable, that the allied

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powers might interfere with AmeriThere is now no ground for any such fear. Most of the gentlemen who have now spoken on the subject, were at that time here. They all heard the declaration. Not one of them complained. And, yet, now, when all danger is over, we are vehemently warned against the sentiments of the declaration.

"To avoid this apparent inconsistency, it is, however, contended, that new force has been recently given to this declaration. But of this, I see no evidence whatever. I see nothing in any instructions or communications from our government, changing the character of that declaration in any degree.

a similar character, rendered it highly desirable to us, that these new states should settle it, as a part of their policy, not to allow colonization within their respective territories. True, indeed, we did not need their aid to assist us in maintaining such a course for ourselves; but we had an interest in their assertion and support of the principle as applicable to their own territories.

"I now proceed, Mr. Chairman, to a few remarks on the subject of Cuba, the most important point of our foreign relations. It has been said, that if Spain chose to transfer this island to any power in Europe, she had a right to do so, and "I have but a word to say on we could not interfere to prevent the subject of the declaration it. Sir, this is a delicate subject. against European colonization in I hardly feel competent to treat it America. The late president seems as it deserves; and I am not quite to have thought the occasion used willing to state here all that I think by him for that purpose, to be a about it. I must, however, disproper one for the open avowal of sent from this opinion. The right a principle which had already been of nations, on subjects of this kind, acted on. Great and practical in- are necessarily very much modified conveniences, it was feared, might by circumstances. Because Engbe apprehended, from the establish- land or France could not rightfully ment of new colonies in America, complain of the transfer of Florida having a European origin, and a to us, it by no means follows, that European connection. We have we could not complain of the cesa general interest, that through all sion of Cuba to one of them. The the vast territories rescued from the plain difference is, that the transdominion of Spain, our commerce fer of Florida to us, was not danmight find its way, protected by trea- gerous to the safety of either of ties with governments existing on those nations, nor fatal to any of the spot. These views, and others of their great and essential interests.

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